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The era of climate change involves the mutation of sys-
tems beyond 20th century anthropomorphic models and 
has stood, until recently, outside representation or address. 
Understood in a broad and critical sense, climate change 
concerns material agencies that impact on biomass and 
energy, erased borders and microbial invention, geological 
and nanographic time, and extinction events. The possibil-
ity of extinction has always been a latent figure in textual 
production and archives; but the current sense of deple-
tion, decay, mutation and exhaustion calls for new modes 
of address, new styles of publishing and authoring, and new 
formats and speeds of distribution. As the pressures and re-
alignments of this re-arrangement occur, so must the critical 
languages and conceptual templates, political premises and 
definitions of ‘life.’ There is a particular need to publish in 
timely fashion experimental monographs that redefine the 
boundaries of disciplinary fields, rhetorical invasions, the in-
terface of conceptual and scientific languages, and geomor-
phic and geopolitical interventions. Critical Climate Change 
is oriented, in this general manner, toward the epistemo-
political mutations that correspond to the temporalities of 
terrestrial mutation.
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Introduction
Murmurations—“Climate Change” 
and the Defacement of Theory
Tom Cohen
The point is, today everyone can see that the system is 
deeply unjust and careening out of control. Unfettered greed 
has trashed the global economy. And we are trashing the 
natural world. We are overfishing our oceans, polluting our 
water with fracking and deepwater drilling , turning to the 
dirtiest forms of energy on the planet, like the Alberta tar 
sands. The atmosphere can’t absorb the amount of carbon 
we are putting into it, creating dangerous warming. The 
new normal is serial disasters: economic and ecological.
– Naomi Klein, “The fight against climate 
change is down to us—the 99%” [2011]
Carbon pollution and over-use of Earth’s natural resources have 
become so critical that, on current trends, we will need a second 
planet to meet our needs by 2030, the WWF said on Wednesday.
– Agence France-Presse, “Time to find a 
second Earth, WWF says” [2010]
1.
Warnings regarding the planet earth’s imminent depletion of reserves or 
“life as we know it” arrive today more as routine tweets than events that 
might give us pause, particularly as the current wars over global “sover-
eign debt” and economic “crises” swamp attention. The intensifying spec-
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ter of megadebt—at a time of “peak everything” (peak water, peak oil, 
peak humans)—dumped into a future despoiled of reserves and earning 
capacity has a specific relation to this white-out—the “economical” and 
“ecological” tandem shifts all attention to the first term (or first “eco”). 
In a post-global present consolidating what is routinely remarked as a 
neo-feudal order, the titanic shift of hyperwealth to the corporatist few 
(the so-called 1%) sets the stage for a shift to control societies anticipat-
ing social disruption and the implications of “Occupy” style eruptions—
concerning which the U.S. congress hastily passed new unconstitutional 
rules to apprehend citizens or take down websites. The Ponzi scheme 
logics of twenty-first century earthscapes portray an array of time-bub-
bles, catastrophic deferrals, telecratic capture, and a voracious present that 
seems to practice a sort of tempophagy on itself corresponding with its 
structural premise of hyper-consumption and perpetual “growth. The 
supposed urgencies of threatened economic and monetary “collapse” oc-
clude and defer any attention to the imperatives of the biosphere, but this 
apparent pause or deferral of attention covers over an irreversible muta-
tion. A new phase of unsustainability appears in which a faux status quo 
ante appears to will to sustain itself as long as possible and at whatever 
cost; the event of the twenty-first century is that there will be no event, that 
no crisis will disturb the expansion of consumption beyond all supposed lim-
its or peaks. In such an environment other materialities emerge, reference 
systems default, and the legacies of anthropo-narcissm go into overdrive 
in mechanical ways. Supposedly advanced or post-theory theory is no ex-
ception—claiming on the one hand ever more verdant comings together 
of redemptive communities, and discretely restoring many phenome-
nological tropes that 20th century thought had displaced. This has been 
characterized as an unfolding eco-eco disaster—a complex at once eco-
nomic and ecological.1 The logics of the double oikos appear, today, caught 
in a self-feeding default.
The present volume, in diverse ways, reclaims a certain violence that 
has seemed occluded or anaesthetized (it is a “present,” after all, palpa-
bly beyond “tipping points” yet shy of their fully arrived implications—
hence the pop proliferation of “zombie” metaphors: zombie banks, zom-
bie politics, zombie “theory”). It departs from a problem inherent in the 
“eco” as a metaphoric complex, that of the home (oikos), and the suicidal 
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fashion in which this supposed proper ground recuperates itself from a 
nonexistent position. The figure of an ecology that is ours and that must 
be saved precludes us from confronting the displacement and disposses-
sion which conditions all production, including the production of home-
lands. Memory regimes have insistently, silently and anonymously pro-
longed and defended the construct of “homeland security” (both in its 
political sense, and in the epistemological sense of being secure in our 
modes of cognition), but these systems of security have in fact acceler-
ated the vortices of ecocatastrophic imaginaries.
If a double logic of eco-eco disaster overlaps with the epoch in deep 
time geologists now refer to as the “anthropocene,” what critical re-ori-
entations, today, contest what has been characterized as a collective blind 
or psychotic foreclosure? Nor can one place the blame at the feet alone of 
an accidental and evil ‘1%’ of corporate culture alone, since an old style 
revolutionary model does not emerge from this exitless network of sys-
tems. More interesting is the way that ‘theory’, with its nostalgic agendas 
for a properly political world of genuine praxis or feeling has been com-
plicit in its fashion. How might one read the implicit, unseen collabora-
tion that critical agendas coming out of twentieth century master-texts 
unwittingly maintained with the accelerated trajectories in question? The 
mesmerizing fixation with cultural histories, the ethics of “others,” the 
enhancement of subjectivities, “human rights” and institutions of power 
not only partook of this occlusion but ‘we theorists’ have deferred ad-
dressing biospheric collapse, mass extinction events, or the implications 
of resource wars and “population” culling. It is our sense of justified pro-
priety—our defense of cultures, affects, bodies and others—that allows 
us to remain secure in our homeland, unaware of all the ruses that main-
tain that spurious home.
The rapacious present places the hidden metaphoric levers of the eco 
or oikos in an unsustainable exponential curve, compounding megadebt 
upon itself, and consuming futures in what has been portrayed as a sort 
of psychotic trance—what Hillis Miller calls, in this volume, a suicidal 
“auto-co-immunity” track.2 Yet the “Sovereign debt crisis” corresponds 
to a credibility crisis as well. The latter applies not only to the political 
classes of the post-democratic klepto-telecracies of the West but seems to 
taint the critical concepts, agendas, and terms received from twentieth-
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century itineraries that accompanied the last decades and that persist as 
currency. Far from opening beyond the propriety of the oikos theories 
of affect, living labor and critical legacies have doubled down on their 
investments, created guilds as reluctant as Wall St. to give up cognitive 
capital. All the while there is attention paid to ‘saving’ the humanities or a 
critical industry that might be extended for a while longer (as if with “sov-
ereignty” itself). Bruno Latour [2010] presumes to call this recent and 
ongoing episode the “Modernist parenthesis” of thought. In his conjec-
ture, the very pre-occupation with human on human histories, cultural-
ism, archivism, and the institutions of power were complicit with a larger 
blind that, in his view, the ecological crisis belatedly discloses.3
At the moment of writing it is common to point to the 2011 “occupy” 
movement, viral and cloud-like, as the Bartlebyesque counter to a total-
ization of the systems of this control. Bartleby has become the figure for a 
rejection of end-fixated production. Were one able to speak of an occupy 
movement applied to critical concepts and twentieth century derived 
idioms one might imagine a call to occupy critical theory and conceptual 
networks—but with what interruption of received programs (“Sovereign 
debt”), what alternative materialities, what purported “ethics” involving 
commodified futures (and the structure of debt), what mnemotechnics, 
and with resistance to what power, if it is the oikos itself, the metaphoric 
chimera and its capture of late anthropocene imaginaries that is at is-
sue? This is one of the implications of what this volume terms telemor-
phosis, the intricacy by which referential regimes, memory, and reading, 
participate in these twenty-first century disclosures. The occupy motif, 
at the moment, sets itself against a totalization or experience of foreclo-
sure—political, mediacratic, financial, cognitive. Various strategies ap-
pearing in this volume involve what could equally be called a disoccupy 
logic or meme.
Such a logic of disoccupation assumes that the domain in question is 
already saturated, occupied in the militarist sense by a program that, un-
wittingly, persists in the acceleration of destruction and takeover. Critical 
thought of recent decades would have walked hand in hand with the cur-
rent foreclosures. The explication of ecocatastrophic logics, accordingly, 
are not found in Foucault nor, surprisingly, Derrida. Timothy Morton’s 
Ecology without Nature is one such effort at disoccupation—seeking to 
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void the two terms of the title, and in the process disrupt the “revised 
organicisms” of contemporary critical schools which, he argues, have 
managed to lapse into sophisticated pre-critical modes not unrelated to 
a more general inertia.
The meme of disoccupation resonates, for instance, with what Rob-
ert Markley in this volume proposes as a practice of “disidentification,” 
and is implied by Timothy Clark’s tracking of a “derangement of scale” 
in the perpetual cognitive disjunctures that come up against the ecoca-
tastrophic present. One would disoccupy the figure of subjectivity, refus-
ing not only the comforting commodifications of “the other” in cultural 
theory, but also the later moral appeals to other redemptive beings, such 
as the animal (as Joanna Zylinska argues with regard to post-humanism 
and its “animal studies”). What might be disoccupied would be the meta-
phorics of the home, even where the latter would sustain itself today in 
cherished terms like trauma, affect, alterity, embodiment, or even culture.
Yet a refusal of supposed redemptive ‘outsides’ to capitalism does not 
lead to a place of critical purity beyond the implied moralism of ‘occupy’ 
but the return of, and orientation to, a violence before which no model of 
sovereignty can be sustained.
To imagine that one might disoccupy by refusing all the supposed re-
demptive ‘outsides’ to capitalism is not to find a place of critical purity 
beyond the moralism of ‘occupy.’ Occupation is never simply takeover 
and appropriation, but always involves destruction of what it claims. The 
viral migration of the “occupy” motif involves a premise of disoccupation 
covertly. In the present volume this takes different forms. If one is now 
beyond tipping points in a zone of irreversibility, what corresponds to 
this as a critical injunction? Catherine Malabou sets aside the entire way 
the figure of trauma and the “always already” have organized time. Claire 
Colebrook affirms, rather than accepting as tragic, extinction as a point of 
departure for thought, which can be used to work against the organicist 
ideologies of the present (such as sexual difference). Martin McQuillan 
shifts the referential spectrum of discourse to “other materialities” in the 
hypothesis of a post-carbon thought, while Robert Markley tracks the in-
flux of geological times that displace human narrative matrices. Bernard 
Stiegler voids the biopolitical model, which he sees as exceeded by “the 
third limit of Capitalism” (when it impinges on the biosphere). From that 
18 Tom Cohen
point of excess he strategizes a counter-stroke to the capture of attention 
by telecratic circuits, initiating a noopolitics. Joana Zylinska disoccupies, 
to continue this motif, the covert model of soft “otherness” by which 
animal studies has invented itself as an anthropo-colonianism. Like post-
humanism generally, Zylinska argues, animal studies sustains its sub-
jectal hegemonies. Hillis Miller locates a source for the ecocatastrophic 
imaginary in the blind insistence of “organicist” models of reading that 
sustain the comforts of the oikos. Against this hermeneutics of security 
Miller posits an “ecotechnics” that is at once machinal and linguistically 
based (where language is not communicative, but literal and inscriptive 
in a manner exemplified by Kafka’s Odradek). Justin Read displaces any 
biopolitical model, again, by relinquishing trauma, the oikos, survival 
and interiorities of any manner, instead describing the circulation of 
data (or the “unicity”) from which the only remaining political gesture 
would be oriented to the ecocatrastrophic. Jason Groves shifts the refer-
ential screen from, again, a human-centered index to the viral textualism 
of (alien) species invasion, the global rewriting of bio-geographies. Mike 
Hill transitions to the alteration of atmospherics under the imaginary of 
climate war technologies in a new horizon of invisible wars (and wars 
on visibility), which today include not only nanotechnologies but also 
the “autogenic” turning of wars without discrete (national) enemies into 
suicidal rages against the “homeland”—a sort of, again, auto-occupation 
that is accelerating.
2.
If it is possible to note that theory’s retrieval of human and animal other-
ness against the horrors of capitalism is akin to political deferrals of the 
future for the sake of saving the present, then we might ask what might 
open the reactive self-bound logics beyond homeland security? What has 
been absent to date is any shared or possible climate change imaginary—or 
a critical matrix. The problem is that the other materialities that constitute 
the forces of climate change would pulverize whatever informs “imaginar-
ies” in general, which have always been tropological systems. When a re-
cent critical query asks, for example, how to define “a political subject of 
climate change” the authors focus on how the “climate crisis shapes par-
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ticular subjectivities,” properly putting any rhetoric of “crisis” itself to the 
side as appropriable. The problem lies in the premise of defining a “politi-
cal subject” or subjectivities to begin with: “Unsurprisingly, much of the 
current discourse on climate change oscillates between these two poles: 
most dramatically, between imminent catastrophe and the prospect of 
renewal; between unimaginable humanitarian disaster and the promise 
of a green-tech revolution. As such the climate crisis regularly calls forth 
regimes of risk” [Dibley and Neilson 2010: 144]. This Janus-faced algo-
rithm, the “political subject of climate change” (147), arrives as a form 
of cognitive disjuncture: “these two images. . . are alternative figures of 
the subjectivity of ecological crisis. They are complimentary. . . . some-
thing like a dialectical image of the subjectivity of climate change” (146). 
On the one hand, this theoretical intervention is typical of the cognitive 
reflex toward pre-emption of the worst in arguments focused on mitiga-
tion, on sustainability, and on various “environmental” agendas—despite 
none of these answering to what science would demand. Sustainability 
has been angled to “sustain” the level of comfort and acquisition that the 
economy of “growth” demands. On the other hand, there is a reflex of 
occlusion. This straining for a “subjectivity” that would account for a po-
litical feature of this new landscape comes up with two mutually cancel-
ing algorithms: a desperate sense of imminent crisis and end, alongside a 
hope of something as lulling as ‘subjectivity’. As a number of essays in the 
volume imply, one might proceed otherwise: depart or begin from a sub-
ject without subjectivity (Catherine Malabou), or an exteriority without 
interior ( Justin Read).
The aporia of an era of climate change are structurally different from 
those that devolved on the torsions of Western mestphysics. They are not 
the aporia explored by Derrida around the figure of hospitality, taken as 
an endless refolding that keeps in place, while exposing, a perpetuated 
and lingering logics that defers the inhospitable. (One mode of decon-
struction as solicitation involves shaking the house or structure within 
which one finds oneself, and this circuit might itself be disturbed by a 
refusal to occupy.) As Masao Myoshi [2001] first suggested, the logics 
of extinction compromise the aims of an emancipatory future along with 
all else. Any project of “formal democracy” runs up not only against the 
twenty-first century post-democratic telecracies that render that episode 
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of 90’s thought transparently inscribed in the neo-liberal fantasy (or pro-
paganda) it would appropriate back for the then bruised “Left.” But it also 
faces the transparency by which market democracy not only appears a 
Potemkin figure itself but, in fact, guarantees planetary ruin by the de-
mographic requirements of cars alone for any emerging middle class of 
India and China (as Arundhati Roy argues).4 Any focus on global popula-
tion control runs up against feminist progressivism [Hedges 2009; Hart-
man 2009]; post-colonial narratives that would restoratively mime the 
promise of 90’s neo-liberalism of a world of market democracy would 
require three planets of resource materiel to allow dispossessed others 
to reach our levels of prosperity. The profound 90’s investment in the 
“otherness of the other,” an other who would be recognized, communed 
with, raised into the polis, and colonized, appears today as a stubborn ar-
chaism and, perhaps, as an epochal error, that maintained the sovereign 
trace of subjective mastery. It would seem that both metaphysics and its 
deconstruction jointly participated in what is now disclosing itself as the 
“anthropocene”—an epoch of self-affirmation into which Enlightenment 
ideologemes have played, as Dipesh Chakrabarty analyzes in the term 
“freedom.”5 The impasse between today’s spellbound and rapacious pres-
ent and supposed future generations, the rupture of any imagined moral 
contract to or recognition of same, has been in circulation for a while.
The present volume of essays focuses on this under-examined question: 
how do mnemotechics, conceptual regimes, and reading—a certain un-
bounded textualization that exceeds any determination of writing—par-
ticipate in or accelerate the mutations that extend, today, from financial 
systems to the biosphere? The volume gives this a name, telemorphosis.
There is a curious parallel between the total occlusion of ecoca-
tastrophic logic during the present economic “crisis” and the ways “post 
theory” criticism recirculates today. Some of this seems transparent. 
What names itself the post-human tends to re-secure a “humanism” that 
was never there to begin with. If the Übermensch once gestured to a rec-
ognition of the human species as profoundly life-denying, its nervous 
programs and tribal identities to be exceeded, the current post-human-
ism affirms the future-closing possibility that ‘we’ might extend our lives 
without limit. It has shifted from an early Nietzschean premise—exceed-
ing anthropo-narcissism—to Kurzweil’s projection to make the organism 
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synbiotic and amortal. The post-human is man who has escaped organic 
limits, thus prolonging a certain present (or individual life) indefinitely: 
a capitalization of duration. In addition to this extension of bodily life, 
‘high’ theory has recreated global man: Hardt and Negri’s premise of a 
“multitude” renovates Catholic male imaginaries; systems theorists os-
cillate within the most organicist of tropes (mother Gaia); “new media” 
theorists return to phenomenological premises from the very logics that 
would suspend such; and figures of embodiments circulate routinely. 
There is a parallel, here, to the efforts to prop up, again and again, the 
“Wall St.” banks by a perpetually deferred megadebt leveraged against 
disappearing resources.
But some examples of this rich prehistory and its default investments 
to a suddenly reset referential horizon:
Judith Butler’s Precarious Life [2005] redressed the defaced “other” of 
the terrorist by appealing to the category of a forbidden grieving. She re-
lies not only on a model of mourning, but also of affirming that which is 
lost and dehumanized in selective grieving. The essay in question is marked 
by its occasion, which is a defense of humanistic studies today as a disci-
pline that shapes a higher enlightenment of alterity—an ethical defense 
in an academic environment in which the utility of such fields is under 
budgetary review. The matter of ethics calls forth Levinas and the topos 
of face. Butler deploys these figures to ask whether “the humanities have 
lost their moral authority” in a post-“9/11” rhetorical horizon. In a man-
ner akin to the rhetorical intent of the Bush “war on terror” (supposedly 
horizonless in time and geography, yet already retired and replaced with 
the economic “crisis”), Butler goes for the bait of interrogating the terror-
ist face or otherness:
The human is not identified with what is represented but 
neither is it identified with the unrepresentable; it is, rather, 
that which limits the success of any representational practice. 
The face is not “effaced” in this failure of representation, but 
is constituted in that very possibility. Something altogether 
different happens, however, when the face operates in the ser-
vice of a personification that claims to “capture” the human 
being in question. [Butler 2005: 144–5]
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The essay is interested in the divide across which the human is con-
structed: “I am referring not only to humans not regarded as humans, 
and thus to a restrictive conception of the human that is based upon their 
exclusion” (128). And here is precisely a negotiated back-loop to a more 
humane order: “If the humanities has a future as cultural criticism, and 
cultural criticism has a task at the present moment, it is no doubt to re-
turn us to the human where we do not expect to find it, in its frailty and 
at the limits of its capacity to make sense” (151). But it may be that the 
humanities does not have a future (in this way). The commodity of “cul-
tural criticism” offers itself incoherently—and does so with the premise 
that its ethical value lies in a reconciliation of peaceable others. Yet, it is 
still and precisely the artificed image of a human “other” with whom “we” 
would empathically commune that involves a foreclosure in the very way 
the “social” or “we” has been fashioned. Is not the premise of mourning 
itself the problem?
If, on the one hand, a residual humanism cannot stop re-inscribing it-
self in a familial oikos or boundedness, it would be neither helpful nor 
accurate to reject all theory with some accusation of humanist recid-
ivism. The point, rather, is that it was never there to begin with in the 
stabilizing memes appealed to. There have always been counter-gestures 
towards inhuman and multi-scalar logics beyond the face, even if these 
attempts to escape anthropocentrism are met by simultaneous resistance. 
An instance would be the coupling of Braudel with Deleuzian dynamism 
and systems theory in Manuel De Landa’s A Thousand Years of Nonlin-
ear History. Despite being published in 1997, this magisterial study has 
no awareness at its closing of the horizons of ecocatastrophe or climate 
change. De Landa refers to organic and non-organic forms of shifting 
“bio-mass” that pass between terrestrial organizations. The writing insis-
tently allows no anthropocentric perspective to emerge in tracking three 
parallel histories of the “Geological,” the “Biological,” and the “Linguis-
tic.” Despite addressing what it calls a comparative socio-linguistics, it 
nevertheless has no conception of mnemonics or rhetorical and percep-
tual regimes participating in or shaping the feedback loops. It leaves out, 
as does Butler’s retention of Levinasian “others” for the amelioration of 
social recognition, what is here termed telemorphosis:
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Over the millennia, it is the flow of bio-mass through food 
webs, as well as the flow of genes through generations, that 
matters, not the bodies and species that emerge from these 
flows. . . . This book has concerned itself with a historical 
survey of these flows of ‘stuff,’ as well as with the hardenings 
themselves, since once they emerge they react back on the 
flows to constrain them in a variety of ways. (259)
At the far end of where “cultural studies” began, De Landa abandons 
the narrative of “capitalism” altogether, which now has no discrete out-
side or discrete other: “What use is there in making this move, if we are 
to crown the whole exercise with a return to the great master concept, 
the great homogenization involved in the notion of a ‘capitalist system’?” 
(267). De Landa identifies with an agency that shapes itself through “cat-
alytic loops” and lateral migrations—miming a limit of systems theory 
and its descriptive capture by organicist metaphors: “much as a given 
material may solidify in alternative ways (as ice or snowflakes, as crystal 
or glass), so humanity liquefied and later solidified in different norms” 
(6).6 De Landa’s history culminates in a post-binarized order in which, 
nevertheless, the problem of reference returns: “We still have to deal with 
the world of referents, with the thousands of routinized organizations 
that have accumulated over the years” (273). De Landa repeats here a 
blindness of theory ‘after theory’: if theory is an enclosure within human 
textualism, then—yes—one needs to exit. But that does not mean that 
departure would allow one to occupy a new space of referents: the refer-
ent—as climate change discloses—is lost, fragmented, dispersed, always 
futural and always exceeding our calculative and referential captures. And 
it mutates. It is common to note an exponential acceleration of temporal 
vectors in which the perceptual and cognitive regimes we have at our dis-
posal are increasingly incapable of experiencing the mutations and chang-
es that mark our climate. That is to say: we have consumed, theorized, 
sanctified, justified and moralized ourself with such speed and frenzy that 
we have sped by and failed to witness the cataclysmic geology that is rup-
turing (or ought to be rupturing) the present.7
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3.
One would need to situate the ephemeral non-phrase “climate change” 
beyond all the variations on empathic alterity. For the ‘other’ like all sup-
posedly redemptive outsides has been long commodified, and can be dis-
turbed only by an asubjectal non-alterity that exceeds modernity and its 
smug formation of a critical ‘we.’ The ethical attention to otherness relies 
on the same metaphorics of the home and hospitality that can only play 
on the borders of the bounded. To track the ways in which our cognitive 
regimes and their critical sophistications have participated in this accel-
eration one might be alert to the ways in which our semantic reaction-
formations, recuperations, redemption narratives, and re-humanizations 
maintain themselves as rhetorical regimes tied to these loops of fore-
closure. Mnemotechnic circuits operate outside of the fables of alpha-
beticism or human archivism (to say nothing of a specifically Western or 
pseudo-monotheist “era of the book”), and actively pervade the produc-
tion of life forms (DNA, RNA, photosynthesis, cell formation, and so 
on). Rather than something like text being sequestered from the orders 
of the political and now a geomorphic real—as, says, systems theory may 
assume—text would more helpfully refer to something like asystematic 
forces: not logics of exchange, production, circulation and order but dis-
articulation and dispersal. If text is rejected as some form of linguistic 
or idealistic capture then this is only if there has not been a full enough 
emphasis on the “non-human” conceit of language (Benjamin). Here, se-
miosis precedes rather than is added on to bios (so-called “biosemiosis”). 
There is no animal who opens the world through speech; in the begin-
ning is the mark or inscription, which we retroactively domesticate as 
that which served to open up our home.
Given more, or different times, one might suggest that a sort of affirma-
tive perspective emerges:
First: the twentieth century preoccupation with human on human 
justice might be interrupted, with incompatible referentials arriving that 
would operate beyond archival memory and social history.
Second, what we call the “political” would migrate from an exclusively 
social category (Aristotle), as it has been defined in relation to the polity, 
to a cognitive or epistemographic zone.
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Third, the era of the Book and its attendant nihilisms (alphabeticist 
monotheism) would appear as a dossier in the trajectory of telemorphic 
practices and memory regimes.
Fourth, rather than segregate textual premises from the “real” world ac-
cording to referential regimes and theotropes, the notion of text would 
intensify the sense of multiscalar and inhuman logics all operating in an 
open field that would be better referred to as an (a)biosemiosis, or nano-
inscriptive process.
Finally, in the “anthropocene era,” writing practices might be appre-
hended in their interweave with carbon and hydro-carbon accelerations, 
from a position beyond mourning and the automatisms of personification, 
or “identification.”
What emerges in the above postulates is that a hermeneutic reflex and 
semantic ritual might be repositioned. We would not only locate reac-
tive processes of meaning in the sphere of textual criticism but discern a 
broader tendency towards the foreclosure of forces of the future. A certain 
reading practice—or returning to the proper (or the other) from which 
one might draw credit—would be akin to cannibalizing a fantasmatic past 
for the sake of an unreal future. The financial system in its current vorti-
ces, in which global currency collapse is constantly threatened, resembles 
the “unsustainability” of resource consumption and global heating. And 
each echoes with the current cognitive trances—“unsustainable,” yet ex-
tending themselves credit (“quantitative easing”). To think that the mod-
ern question of power ought to be one of mourning and sovereignty—or 
of questioning how we lost an originary openness and fell into systemic 
closure, or how we failed to recognize some genuine others—precludes 
facing up to the fact that misrecognition, violent dispersal, decentred and 
inhuman forces have produced the mourned other and the sovereign as a 
lure that closes down confrontation with disappearing “futures.” At issue 
is not just moving “beyond” the fetishization of mourning (get over it!) 
but parrying this steel trap relapse that, as in the model of the organicism 
analyzed by Hillis Miller (“it’s everywhere”), fuels the acceleration. One 
returns to a putative domain of very small things: inscriptions, nano-set-
tings, memory regimes, perceptual settings.
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The contemporary trends of today’s theory “after theory” often circle 
back to pre-critical premises. And they share a curious trait, aside from 
mourning 20th century master texts. Without disjuncture, the “new” 
model of networks and holistic circuitry that binds humanity and effort-
lessly traverses otherness and inter-species communications is the oddest 
replica of the previous organicisms whose suspension was the beginning 
of “theory” as such.8 One is left with the impression that, as Žižek remon-
strates of “the critical Left” during the ‘naughts [Žižek 2009], recent criti-
cal pre-occupations discretely collaborate with the accelerations we are 
witnessing today.
4.
Bruno Latour, as observed above, offered a curious fable in which he iden-
tifies what he calls the “Modernist parenthesis” as the default mode of 
thought that accompanied the disclosure of an ecocatastrophic horizon. 
The twentieth century focus on “critique” that would be transfixed with 
reading and rewriting its own chaotic histories would have walked hand 
in hand with the unfolding impasse to terrestrial life. Latour’s “Modern-
ist parenthesis” includes the very project of critique and a pre-occupation 
with the past at the expense of addressing the past’s now exponentially 
accelerated consequences. Latour—whose speculation departs from 
a painfully Gaiesque reading of the film Avatar—proposes that, as part 
of any reset today, the term materiality ought to be retired as part of a 
faux binary. He also recommends jettisoning the term “future”, which he 
would replace with the ratcheted down and humbled term “prospects.”
The label “Modernist parenthesis” is an intriguing trope. It resonates 
with a term like the “anthropocene” that can only, it implies, be pro-
nounced in a future past tense which the speaker would inhabit. What 
might reading be if we were already looking back at our present, from a 
future that we cannot yet allow? Latour seems unaware to what degree 
he inscribes himself in this specular construction, both by his use of the 
retro-organicism of the Gaia metaphor and his premise, a signature of 
the “modernist” gameboard, of announcing a temporal break and new 
beginning, the revolutionary hypothesis of his imagined “parenthesis.” 
It is thus reluctantly that he finds his way back to a canonical twenti-
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eth century text, the “tired. . . trope” of Benjamin’s Angel of History to 
make his point:
I want to argue that there might have been some misunder-
standing, during the Modernist parenthesis, about the very 
direction of the flow of time. I have this strange fantasy that 
the modernist hero never actually looked toward the future 
but always to the past, the archaic past that he was fleeing in 
terror. [. . .] I don’t wish to embrace Walter Benjamin’s tired 
“Angel of History” trope, but there is something right in the 
position he attributed to the angel: it looks backward and not 
ahead. “Where we see the appearance of a chain of events, he 
sees one single catastrophe, which unceasingly piles rubble 
on top of rubble and hurls it before his feet.” But contrary to 
Benjamin’s interpretation, the Modern who, like the angel, is 
flying backward is actually not seeing the destruction; He is 
generating it in his flight since it occurs behind His back! It 
is only recently, by a sudden conversion, a metanoia of sorts, 
that He has suddenly realized how much catastrophe His de-
velopment has left behind him. The ecological crisis is noth-
ing but the sudden turning around of someone who had ac-
tually never before looked into the future, so busy was He 
extricating Himself from a horrible past. There is something 
Oedipal in this hero fleeing His past so fiercely that He cannot 
realize—except too late—that it is precisely His flight that 
has created the destruction He was trying to avoid in the first 
place. [Latour 2010: 485–6]
This default appeal to Oedipus is perhaps too quick. Latour creatively 
misreads the “tired. . . trope” of an Angel who is, in Benjamin’s text, al-
ready something of a charlatan. The Angel is thoroughly impotent, aware 
of the scam of what the undead masses expect of him (to make them 
whole). “He” can’t give the undead masses and debris of history, turned 
toward him, what they want but lingers, as if wanting to, until he is sim-
ply torn away by what is called a “storm from the future.” This last angel 
is but the ragdoll of a certain angelicism—not just the costumed human 
face (with wings) imposed on the sign as messenger, here of no message, 
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but the entire will to redemption narratives that his very form signifies. 
The text reads differently if one focuses on the word in Benjamin’s text, 
“storm,” which is repeated three times as the subject of three declarative 
sentences. It is a climactic term and subsequently indexed to what Thesis 
XVIII invokes as the aeons of organic life on earth within which human 
time appears as fractional seconds (an “anthropocene” perspective). Ben-
jamin’s so-called Angel of History is in fact a vaudevillian figure and not 
the avatar of the hero, the materialist historiographer. He embodies and 
destroys both the angelicism of an utopist Marxian and the theotropes 
of a Cabbalist—the two specular idioms which the Theses fuses in order 
to cancel one another out. The description of the Angel is so abdicating, 
deceptive, and suicidal (one can imagine him diving for a cigarette as he 
looks at the masses) that it nullifies, in advance, the project of material-
istic historiography. It also cancels any “weak messianism”—or any mes-
sianism whatsoever. The Angel is shown as a con, held to his post by his 
expectant readership who still wants to be made whole. It will never be 
clear whether the Angel only thinks this is what is wanted of him, or if the 
undead masses think he wants them to want this. He is the last trace of 
anthropopism, dolled up as a human figure to mediate chance. When he 
is torn away by the “storm” he removes the anthropo-narcissm of angeli-
cism, the lure of giving matter a human form, face and, in this case, betray-
ing bird wings. He is the last personification of a human face plastered on 
an imaginary other, already a wire-framed incandescent in Klee’s graphic 
deconstruction. He mimes and is dismissed as the sort of “weak messian-
ism” that Benjamin elsewhere pretends to evoke—and which Derrida 
will return to, and try to use to keep a rhetoric of the future open (the 
trope of an impossible “democracy to come”). In this way, the Derrida of 
Specters of Marx regresses from Benjamin’s destructive project by restitut-
ing the phrase “weak messianism.” Derrida’s omission of ecocatastrophic 
logics from his otherwise compendious agenda—for instance, nowhere 
to be found in Specters’ “ten plagues” of the new world order—echoes 
elsewhere in an archival limit he seemed to require for “deconstruction” 
to rhetorically stage itself.
It is not that Benjamin’s Angel trope is about fixation on the past—as 
archive, trace, histories of power, identity formations, narratives of jus-
tice, inscriptions—and hence ritual or time management. It is that “He” 
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thinks that’s what his readers seek in him, and he both gestures toward 
wanting to oblige (with, say, weak messianism?) and effectively gets out 
of dodge. Benjamin’s Angel is given to us as a sort of con: knowing what 
his readership needs and hires him for (since “He” is the messenger of no 
revelation and reports to no god, is nothing but sign itself), He wants to 
help but is violently blown away. This lure of redemptive history is about 
angelicism tout court, its reflex or façade, the compulsion to reconstitute 
and to be reassured (even sanctified). The trompe l’oeil points not only to 
where this faux Angel is in costume as the last anthropomorphic form 
and face. (He looks human, is more or less male traditionally). It also 
points to the disappearance of the pretended mediation of an otherwise 
void sign (angel as messenger, as hermeneut). It gives the lie to a certain 
pretense to ethics, and to cognitive moralisms, and indicates a participa-
tion of angelicism in a more radical evil of which it is, adamantly, struc-
turally, and violently unaware.
The impulse toward angelicism pervades the recycling of twentieth 
century critical idioms in sophisticated variations. And this systemic re-
lapse, like the Nachkonstruction of an oikos whose non-existence would 
accelerate its militarized defense, itself appears to further a suicidal arc. 
This new angelicism, like what Timothy Morton [2007] calls “revised 
organicisms,” merits suspicion. It is opportunistic to note where various 
critical traditions of return and redemption mingle. In a conversation be-
tween Lauren Berlant and Michael Hardt on “love” as a political agency 
at a conference titled “On the Commons; or, Believing-Feeling-Acting 
Together” we can read yet one more variant of an appeal to an angel that 
would make us and our past whole. Let us ignore that the commons in 
question for Hardt and Berlant is not water, oil, or food but the “transfor-
mative” zone of a new social “relationality” of liberal souls. “Love” here 
retains the soft debris and promise of a Christological meme. If for Hardt 
love “makes central the role of affect within the political sphere,” for Ber-
lant a more aggressive claim erupts:
Another way to think about your metaphor, Michael, is that in 
order to make a muscle you have to rip your tendons. I often 
talk about love as one of the few places where people actually 
admit they want to become different. And so it’s like change 
without trauma, but it’s not change without instability. It’s 
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change without guarantees, without knowing what the other 
side of it is, because it’s entering into relationality. The thing I 
like about love as a concept for the possibility of the social, is 
that love always means non-sovereignty. Love is always about 
violating your own attachment to your intentionality, without 
being anti-intentional. [Davis and Sarlin 2011]
Perhaps the metaphorical faux pas about “tendons” being ripped is a 
clue to the skeletal argument (this is not, literally not, the way to build 
muscle). What one witnesses is the effect of doubling down in the idiom 
of commitment (“change without trauma”?), a closing off, as academics 
of a certain age and temperament murmur, narcissistically, about affect. 
One has found a new name for the oscillation that retains a sovereignty 
of intentionality under a shifted algorithm: “Love is always about violat-
ing your own attachment to your intentionality, without being anti-inten-
tional.” Sometimes, as we hear, it’s just not about us, even where self-love 
is called the commons and projects a socio-union, or jouissance, beyond 
the confines of a dubious “collective” individualism. Perhaps this is one 
marker of an end of a cycle, this fusion of critical and culturalist idioms, 
returning to a redeeming origin—this time as “farce.” This sort of eddy 
appears as the comfort spa for what could be called academic theory’s 
“Lehman moment.”
5.
What is interesting in the horizons converging at present is not how a cer-
tain irreversibility impacts or is excluded still by telecracies and cognitive 
regimes. Nor is the main point of interest how sophisticated critical agen-
das have discretely served an agenda of institutional inertia—especially 
in the guise of critique. What is interesting is not the shape this will take, 
the variable catastrophes that are calculable or envisioned. What should 
be interesting is a logic of foreclosure or psychosis that has become, in 
part, normatized, accommodated or confirmed by corporate media.9 This 
psychosis takes the form of excluding, occluding, or denying what is fully 
in the open and palpable, whether in science or before one’s eyes.
Latour assumes that a “Modernist parenthesis” erred by its assiduous 
focus on rereading the past otherwise, but he misses the target of Ben-
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jamin’s cartoon. It is not attention to the past but rather angelicism that 
constitutes a violent hermeneutic relapse. Perhaps an example of Latour’s 
paralyzing ‘parenthesis’ would be Derrida’s injunction against thinking 
the “future” in order to keep open the incalculable and the “to come.” In 
fact, the current plunge in economic and societal “prospects”—lost “sov-
ereignty,” debt enslavement, banker occupation, collapse of reserves, and 
so on—is not premised on an undue focus on the past but is all about 
alternative time-lines. In this respect Latour’s “prospects” run into the 
same capture of futures that occurs in the market, whether manipulated 
from above to defer reckoning (the “too big to fail” logic) or bet against. 
Calculations about future events, the forward narratives that flood media 
and alternative journalism, suggest a time in which the commodification 
of the “past” has flipped forward—marking both past and future as fan-
tasmatic projections. One is not, so to speak, nor have we been, outside 
of “literary” constructions, least of all when we say something like system 
or reserves. What is called the market, now technically rogue in the sense 
that it serves as a façade of manipulations to play for time, is all about bets 
on future circumstance. Expanded to commodified futures and deriva-
tives, and credit default swaps; wired through ingenious and self-implod-
ing “financial instruments”—said market parallels the global despoilment 
of future reserves and times (generations).
It would be indulgent to run through variations of this. Some are famil-
iar: the consolidation of a new form of totalitarianism and internal securi-
ty apparatuses; new climate war technologies (applied internally) testing 
the “full spectrum dominance” protocols that the Pentagon retains as its 
post-imperial template (which Mike Hill explores in this volume). Some 
are becoming visible: untimed prognoses of biospheric collapse (marine 
food chains), extreme weather disasters (mega-drought, flooding, frack-
ing induced quakes). Others hover at the edge of recognizability: mass 
extinction events, the mathematics of global population “culling.” These 
nonetheless, like hydo-carbons and oil itself, literally shape visibility and 
invisibility—no oil, no hyper-industrial techno-culture, no photography 
as we know it, no cinema, no global transport. Is there an imperative, as 
Martin McQuillan suggests, to rethink the histories of writing and cog-
nition in relation to carbon and hydrocarbon culture explicity—and to 
do so not only in relation to human mnemo-technologies? When Claire 
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Colebrook converts extinction from a tragic taboo to an affirmative per-
spective she deflates the semantic boundedness that any angelicism has 
always sought to save. The problem is not that the past draws human nar-
cissism toward it in the latter’s critical revisionism and deconstructions; 
the problem is that the more active “other temporalities” intervene, the 
more the artefacted present appears spellbound.
6.
Certain threads appear across these essays in the aftermath of this residu-
al angelicism, and the retreat of face:10
Time. Robert Markley requires for any thinking of ecocatastrophic 
exigencies a displacement of “human” temporalities with the geological. 
This model to be displaced adheres to all culturalist templates and shows 
itself in the regressive symptom of any argument for “sustainability” at 
present: “Sustainability ultimately refers to an idealized homeostasis be-
tween humankind and environment that never existed except in the sense 
that robust ecological systems could remain unaffected by low-density 
populations of humans chasing a few bison hither and yon.” Instead, “cli-
matological time produces interference patterns that provoke complex 
and self-generating modes of disidentification.” This “disidentification” 
is applied to the problem of other modes of textualization and reading. 
By appearing indexed to temporalities into which human technics and 
life-effects are embedded, “the idea of climatological time paradoxically 
transcends and deconstructs a long philosophical and rhetorical tradition 
that contrasts kronos (chronological time) to kairos (the opportune mo-
ment, the “right” time, or, as in contemporary Greek, the weather).”
Ecotechnics. Hillis Miller exploits this default in the metaphorics of the 
oikos or home to note several things through a reading of Kafka’s curi-
ous verbal pet-thing, Odradek living outside and under the house. In a 
ranging speculation on the state of contemporary imaginaries confront-
ed with the machinal inevitabilities now released by politics and mate-
rial processes (rising oceans, say), Miller traces how ecotechnics both 
constructs itself and—since it does so by a technic that contradicts the 
premise of an interior shelter—generates an “auto-co-immunity” spi-
ral, or suicidal movement. In reflecting how this works he marks where 
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an endlessly recurrent organicization of and in thought, a certain way of 
reading literary effects, has all along furthered the destruction of an earth 
it had romanticized improperly—with notions like nature, body, sustain-
ability, or even the figure of Gaia herself in systems theory. Miller turns 
from Kafka’s positioning of language in its most pre-letteral formations 
as (with Benjamin or de Man) to the non-human. From this, non-human 
reading of Odradek Miller passes to a critique of contemporary Ameri-
ca. Miller’s US is less an evil exception and more the poster-child for a 
zombie acceleration and suicidal “auto-co-immunity” complex. As Miller 
speculates on the rising sea levels from his home on the Maine coast: 
“The earth is not a super-organism. It is not an organism at all. It is best 
understood as an extremely complex machine that is capable of going au-
todestructively berserk, at least from the limited perspective of human 
needs. Global warming will bring about wide-spread species extinction. 
It will flood our low-lying islands, our coastal plains, and whatever towns, 
cities, and houses are on them.” That is, it implies avant la lettre a dispos-
session of metaphor.
Care. Bernard Stiegler draws out the problem of a third limit of Capital-
ism that encroaches on the biosphere. Stiegler makes a pharmocological 
call for the reconfiguration of “care” and the dispersal of the “short-time” 
and telecratic degradations of libidinal economies which anaesthetize 
and infantilize the present: “The third limit of capitalism is not only the 
destruction of the reserves of fossil fuel, but the limit constituted by the 
drive to destruction of all objects in general by consumption, in so far as 
they have become objects of drives, and not objects of desire and atten-
tion—the psychotechnological organisation of consumption provoking 
the destruction of attention in all its forms, on the psychic level as well as 
the collective level.” Stiegler’s strategy shifts from any biopolitical imagi-
nary to a field in which psychopower as the blind capture of attention 
might be countered by “waging war against speculation, but also against 
modes of life founded on the short term, of which the most every-day 
example is the organisation of society by a marketing systematically ex-
ploiting drives by destroying libido as that which evinces the capability 
of sustainable investment.” Stiegler’s shift to a thought of technicity with-
out reserve, echoed in other essays in this volume, shifts the grounds of 
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the political to “a noopolitics susceptible of reversing and overcoming the 
deadly logic of psychopower…where economizing means taking care.”
Unicity. Justin Read tours the logics of a telecratic global polis in which 
binaries have been suspended, biopolitical premises displaced, and a 
mode of pure exteriorization reigns amidst subjects without subjectiv-
ity: “the Unicity is the line at which the world reaches absolute network 
integration, the mutual embedding of seemingly diverse informational 
networks into a complex systematic singularity.” The topography of 
this “unicity” and virtual telepolis displaces what had been called pub-
lic space into a circuitry of data formations and the recyclable memes of 
production or consumption without explicit reference, and before which 
the only politics possible would be elicited by eco-catastrophic and zoo-
political tacts or ruptures: “By including all into a singular oneness, the 
Unicity functions only in terms of absolute exteriority. Everyone and ev-
erything is always already ‘outside.’ …This absolute exteriority alters how 
we must think of power and relations to power. Once everything is on the 
outside, there can be no such thing as transcendence, at least not as some 
metaphysical Being that inheres in physical matter.”
Scale. If not only critical theory but the geopolitical imaginary seems 
to be in cognitive hiatus before the logics of climate change, Timothy 
Clark recalls us to the problem of any metrics, or “scale,” that cognitive 
regimes face. While not unrelated to broader forms of anesthesia or de-
nial, he finds a “derangement of scale” between cognitive affect and the 
material effects evoked, which continually eludes any stable metric. This 
derangement arrives as a network of disjunctures: “Here a barely calcu-
lable nonhuman agency brings about a general but unfocused sense of 
delegitimation and uncertainty, a confusion of previously clear arenas of 
action or concepts of equity; boundaries between the scientific and the 
political become newly uncertain, the distinction between the state and 
civil society less clear, and once normal procedures and modes of under-
standing begin to resemble dubious modes of political, ethical and intel-
lectual containment.”
Sexual (In)difference. If Stiegler infers that the prospect of impacting 
or altering the biosphere arrives as a “lucky” point of reconfiguration for 
thought, Claire Colebrook takes the taboo premise of human disappear-
ance—the limit implication of so-called “anthropogenic” global warm-
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ing—as a point of departure. She finds that the affirmation rather than 
occlusion of extinction opens logics that had been, and are, occluded in 
the regime of organicism. The affirmation of extinction as a logic, rather 
than being somehow pessimistic, opens thinking beyond the mourning 
of sexual difference, which had “always operated as a moralism in theo-
ries of life.” Writing against ecofeminism as itself a discretely regressive 
practice, she finds the dominance and ideology of sexual difference to 
have been an organicist ideology which finds itself suspended before 
the thinking of extinction: “it is precisely because of a certain clinging to 
bounded sexual difference and a fear of individual extinction, that the hu-
man species is now forced to confront a species extinction that will open 
it up to the extinction of the sexual difference of kinds.”
Non-species Invasion. If ecotechnics names a non-existence of the eco 
as “nature,” “home,” or interior, Jason Groves opens a genre variation in 
which the present is read from the perspective of ex-species logics. Un-
derlying the disarticulation of human modernity that climate change 
represents behind the façade of globalization, Groves tracks the terres-
trial transfer and eco-invasions of alien species that operate as real world 
disarticulations of contemporary human life and its geographism. This 
border-destroying transfer operates, in its bio-contaminations, as a form 
of real-work textualism outside the purview of anthropic perception, and 
without face: “The liquidation of the continental scheme, registered by 
the geographers as a ‘crisis in conceptualization,’ is in fact occurring ro-
bustly outside of a conceptual horizon.”
Bio-ethics, otherwise. Joanna Zylinska adds an entire other dimension 
to ex-species thoughts with a discrete demolition of current critical prac-
tices and their soft circulation within retro-humanist motifs rebranded, 
in the texts she examines, as the “post-human.” She turns, specifically, to 
animal studies. At issue implicitly is the trend by which the “post-human” 
as trope has been deflated and domesticated from its once Nietzschean 
premise to speculation of cuddly cyborgs and pets. In this way, the “post-
human” itself has posited (and then inhabited) a human definitional that 
never existed to begin with, and has done so repeatedly. In the tenden-
cy for “animal studies” to choose as its exemplary other (and sometime 
erotic partner) mammalian pets with names, or companion species, one 
encounters the sort of faux other that updates 90s multiculturalism to 
36 Tom Cohen
supposed intra-species communication. This act of “extension” persists 
within the recuperations of human mastery. In reversing this template of 
the inclusion and recognition of others she not only posits a a “bio-eth-
ics, otherwise” which would have to account for microbes, viruses, and 
distinctly uncuddly life-effects, but also a bio-ethics that departs from a 
conception of “life”: “not just a dog, a cat or a horse from the family of 
befriended or domestic animals, but rather a parasite, bacteria or fun-
gus?” If so-called animal studies relapses by “extending” the model of em-
pathetic others from the subaltern, to the animal, “three fundamental blind 
spots [mark] the intermeshed trajectories of thought in animal studies: 
1—The humanist blind spot, 2—The technicist blind spot, where much 
work goes into recognizing the animal’s anima, i.e. its “subjectivity,” with 
the animal becoming an extension of the human. 3—The violentist blind 
spot, where violence is posited as the enemy of ethics.”
Post-Trauma. Catherine Malabou demands an abrupt departure from 
the way anteriority and mnemonics have been organized. She analyses 
the way trauma has been circulated with the temporal injunction of the 
“always already:” it is assumed that we must inhabit a site of guilty loss. 
From this assumption that we are always already at loss, always already 
traumatized, an entire structure of repetition compulsion and mnemon-
ics ensues. Reversing this bad conscience would entail an abrupt depar-
ture not only from the residual strictures of psychoanalysis—here, the 
fetishization of trauma as a fetish of subjectivity maintenance—but those 
of post-structuralist orthodoxy themselves. Refusing the Lacanian (and 
Derridean) demand that the “always already” re-inscribes everything in 
an organization of sheer anteriority, she posits a thought beyond the “al-
ways already” through a normativity of what is called the post-traumat-
ic (a metaphor for which is PTSD). This shift would issue in a subject 
without subjectivity. This creative destruction of the traumatized subject 
opens a different chrono-politics and materiality beyond mourning and 
perpetual re-inscription: “the post-traumatized subject disconnects the 
structure of the always already. The post-traumatized subject is the never 
more of the always already. We propose to entertain a fourth dimension, 
a dimension that might be called the material. . . . If destruction has al-
ways already happened, if there is something as a transcendental destruc-
tion, then destruction is indestructible. What if the always already might 
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explode? What if the always already were self-destructive and able to dis-
appear as the so-called fundamental law of the psyche?”
Ecologies of War. Mike Hill shifts the scene further into technologies 
of the contemporary war machine as it redefines itself as climate change 
war. Hill argues that not only have the terms of atmospherics been tele-
morphically redefined (with new conceptions of the “aerial”), but also 
that the protocols of combat have shifted against the human soldier al-
together. The premises for conflict and resource wars shift from the geo-
graphical wars of enemy states (enemy others as in the past) into a self-
devolving and indefinite system that exceeds any human reference and 
redefines what is in the kill-chain. This autogenic system is turned against 
its innovators, and itself, and becomes the condition for its own advance. 
In this newly self-armed zoosphere: “machine vision re-works our spatial 
bearings and enables the weaponization of temporality itself.”
Post-Carbon Thought. Opening further the relation of writing to the 
hydrocarbon era of energy, Martin McQuillan invokes the specter of a 
“carbon thought” which traverses both rhetorical and material register. 
Carbon is indicative of what he invokes as “other materialities.” Focus-
ing on both the hyperbolic energy consumption that marks the late an-
thropocene and the trajectory of writing as a carbon-indexed technology 
that has redefined the artefaction of “life” itself, McQuillan formulates a 
new energetics in which script and fuel emanate from forces of the past 
that are stored and spent for a non-renewable, and therefore accelerat-
ing, future. The thought of carbon or the possibility of a post-carbon 
thought is probed as an alternate way to think against the present (the 
befuddled, ravenous time of “peak everything”). McQuillan conjures this 
in relation to any possible poetics of oil. For it is oil that has always been 
figured as waste and source, as residual black and viscous storage of dis-
articulated past organic “life,” a sheer anteriority and storage system of 
black sunlight cycled over aeons, sucked, that will be transposed (into en-
ergy, technics, light, fuel). Through this active history in question one en-
counters “the theo-thanto-carbo-economy” that both persists in writing 
forms and must be deconstructed by them in a far more urgent manner 
than has been opened by the legacies of, say, deconstruction in the famil-
ial and auto-immune paralysis one finds it in today: “Writing philosophy 
about carbon, like making film about oil, is one of those tasks that must 
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inevitably inhabit the positions of the theo-thanto-carbo-economy but 
somehow render those positions plastic by reading the deposits emitted 
by the economy in order to rearrange them according to a new logic and 
criteriology.”
Health. Eduardo Cadava and I turn, here, to what might be a mere Sa-
tyr play within this dossier: a critical blog addressing a recent episode in 
post-democratic America’s current hallucinology. Interrupting the cre-
ation and undermining of “Obama-care” at a certain juncture, Cadava 
and I interrogate what the ‘ill’ is that cannot be cured in a system that is 
afflicted with a sort of zombie “democracy” and that is also marked by 
systemic occlusion of climate change from its media and political dis-
course. We in turn explore how small political destructions preclude an 
American political imaginary from finding anything like its own social 
(or historial) prescriptions.
Notes
1. The present volume grew out of a series of symposia focused on critical 
theory in an era of climate change, hosted by the Institute on Critical Climate 
Change, a project devised by myself and Henry Sussman and executed by 
the creative efforts of Mary Valentis, a full partner in the enterprise (http://
www.criticalclimatechange.com/). The companion volume to this effort 
is edited by Henry Sussman and published as Impasses of the Post-Global: 
Theory in an Era of Climate Change II (series on Critical Climate Change, Open 
Humanities Press).
2. Since the economic “crisis” has eclipsed any possible attention to the 
ecological “crisis,” and since the trope of crisis itself operates as a rhetorical 
diversion (like, in Naomi Klein’s reading, “shock”), the occlusion today of the 
latter represents more than a victory for corporate media in America, where 
“climate” cannot be mentioned in a presidential election. This occlusion is 
acknowledged as “global” or systemic, as the global discussions and farcical 
outcomes of Copenhagen, Cancun and Durban make clear repeatedly 
[Wente 2011; Thornton 2011]. Naomi Klein’s recent shift from the analytic 
of “shock” as a planned tool of militarized expropriation to “climate change” 
as the “biggest crisis of all” runs up against the impasse. That is, of imagining 
it as an organizing other for social activism [Klein 2011]. Diverting from 
her influential analysis of the uses of predatory “shock” Klein marks a “new 
normal” in which “serial disasters” appear as unexceptional or naturalized (in 
the epigraph opening this introduction).
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3. It is an interesting marker of the global “credit crisis” when the lords of 
finance meet at Davos to speculate on alternatives to the rogue “capitalism” 
they have been produced by—while consolidating a neo-feudal order of 
debt slave societies. At the heart of climate change denial is a toxic mix of 
short term memory formations (telemarketing, algorhythmic trading), 
corporate propaganda, and an odd rhetorical cocktail of theological defiance 
and defensive humanism in which the trigger is the word “anthropogenic,” 
provoking a speciesist rejection of blame (it wasn’t us, and its premise is a hoax 
to force eco-socialism, and so on).
4. This is the argument of Arundhati Roy in “Is there life after democracy?” 
(2009), calculating the implications of China and India’s middle class all 
acquiring cars alone. The premise of liberationist or post-colonial critique 
mimes, with its restorations of universal subjectivity, the neo-liberal promise 
of a world of American consumers.
5. Referencing a speciesist crisis that “cannot be reduced to a story of capitalism” 
(Chakraharty 2009: 221), Dipesh Chakraharty elaborates a “universal” 
unification of man displacing cultural identifies not out of a positive but a 
“negative universal history”: ”climate change poses for us a question of a 
human collectivity, an us, pointing to a figure of the universal that escapes our 
capacity to experience the world. It is more like a universal that arises from a 
shared sense of a catastrophe. It calls for a global approach to politics without 
the myth of a global identity, for, unlike a Hegelian universal, it cannot 
subsume particularities. We may provisionally call it a ‘negative universal 
history’” (222).
6. De Landa glosses: “It is important, however, not to confuse the need for 
caution in our explorations of the nonlinear possibilities of (economic, 
linguistic, biological) reality, and the concomitant abandonment of utopian 
euphoria, with despair, resentment, or nihilism. . . . And while these views 
do indeed invoke the ‘death of man,’ it is only the death of the ‘man’ of the 
old ‘manifest destinies,’ not the death of humanity and its potential for 
destratification” (273).
7. To index such a perspective is not to accede to a discourse of crisis or 
apocalypse, but the obverse; nor has it anything to do with mourning. The 
anthropocene marks processes that are entirely banal, of the mud (as Timothy 
Morton avers). Rather than having relinquished textualization for the real 
world of social relation and historical narratives, for the “political” and 
institutional power, it seems post-theory made a wrong turn from which it has 
difficulty pulling away. What seems readable today is rather the multi-planed 
orders of a sort of bio-textualization without limit—not one bounded or 
defined by human writing or technologies of human memory alone.
8. In fact, one might read the “late Derrida” upside-down, not as a movement 
beyond his early exanthropic violence but as the retracing of what a 
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pre-Derridean narrative leading to, or paused, before that would have been. 
One could read these pre-occupations and their rhetorical compromises as 
a strategy to embed his project within the canonical academic community 
in a way not easily erased. But the result has been a post-Derridean 
“deconstruction” that pretends it exists as a continuity with or in possession 
of a certain capital to be tended and given orthodoxy, an inability to depart 
from what is not in Derrida’s text (climate change, say) or to recuperate 
its threads gradually (deconstructive “ethics”?)—that is, an auto-immune 
phase. One could say that Derida had always had two columns at work, the 
exanthropic and that entering humanistic discourses and circulating there, 
and that the second has come, rather predictably, to dominate just as the first, 
eclipsed, may be called for. The turning point would seem to be when Derrida, 
no doubt trying to counter the implosion of de Man and the way that was 
aimed against “deconstruction” in America, would risk such hyperbole, to 
rally the troops, as “deconstruction” is justice.
9. The turning away from “climate change” as a public discussion or one pursued 
by states has been confirmed during the global economic crisis—which has 
supplanted the “war on terror” meme in this regard. That has taken the form 
of deferring any address as if until the economic situation permits by providing 
extra public resources [Harvey 2011; Wente 2011], or the foreclosure 
enforced by corporate media and financial capture of “political” discourse 
[Thornton 2011].
10. The present essays are introduced as indexed to a single covering topos (Time, 
Care, War, and so on). The approach is the residue of an earlier proposal by 
Henry Sussman to compose a broader “atlas” to critical climate change, 
which I retain very loosely for the overview it provides. The premise was to 
examine what alterations and ruptures occur within those chosen topoi when 
they are placed in contact with the emerging twenty-first century logics in 
which the calculi of mass extinction events and resource depletion overtakes 
and the socio-historical projects and deconstructive aims of twentieth 
century criticism.
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Chapter 1
Time
Time, History, and Sustainability
Robert Markley
Critical climate change invariably poses questions about time or, more 
precisely, different registers of time: experiential or embodied time, his-
torical time, and climatological time. Each of these registers resists hard 
and fast definition, in part because climatological time—accessible 
through and mediated by a range of complex technologies—complicates 
and disrupts the connections among personal identity, history, and nar-
rative that Paul Ricoeur, for one, identifies as constituting the phenom-
enological and historical perceptions of time. Climatological time has 
emerged from a complex genealogy of symbolic economies that mark 
the limits and continuing crises of representation.1 Consider the implicit 
but entangled registers of time in Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s 1847 
“Evangeline.” At the beginning of the poem, Longfellow asks his readers 
to imagine the landscape of Acadia on the east coast of Canada:
THIS is the forest primeval. The murmuring pines and the hemlocks,
Bearded with moss, and in garments green, indistinct in the twilight,
Stand like Druids of eld, with voices sad and prophetic (5).
Although cast in the imagery of prehistory, this “primeval” forest, is 
inhabited primarily by memories of—or a deep nostalgia for—a van-
ished and yet thoroughly humanized past that has been absorbed into, 
yet remains constitutive of, the landscape. Longfellow’s repetition of his 
opening half-line signals an implied recognition of the dialectic relations 
between human acts and acts of nature that define Nature.2 The “for-
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est primeval” becomes coeval with, and indivisible from, an anthropo-
centric world:
This is the forest primeval; but where are the hearts that beneath it
Leaped like the roe, when he hears in the woodland the voice of 
the huntsman?
Where is the thatch-roofed village, the home of Acadian farmers,—
Men whose lives glided on like rivers that water the woodlands,
Darkened by shadows of earth, but reflecting an image of heaven?
Waste are those pleasant farms, and the farmers forever departed!
Scattered like dust and leaves, when the mighty blasts of October
Seize them, and whirl them aloft, and sprinkle them far o’er 
the ocean. (6) 
The opening of “Evangeline” throws into relief fundamental tensions 
among three notions of time: embodied time (the lives of the villagers), 
historical time (the “pleasant farms” and farmers who have been “Scat-
tered like dust and leaves”), and climatological time—the sense of a natu-
ral world of wind and oceans that marks the limits of narrative and the 
bounds of the anthropocentric “primeval.” The tensions in Longfellow’s 
poem reveal the contested discourses, memories, and conceptual models 
that we term “Nature,” but the forest that Longfellow asks us to imagine 
is “primeval” only from the bounded perspective of experience, memory, 
and recorded history. Ten thousand years ago, during the Younger Dryas, 
Longfellow’s Acadia lay under more than a mile of glacial ice, and the east 
coast of the Canadian Atlantic was uninhabited and, in effect, uninhab-
itable.3 In this respect, the climatological time that haunts Longfellow’s 
poem, yet resists representation, informs the very traditions—literary, 
political, scientific, ecological, moral, and socioeconomic—that allow 
us to make sense of global climate change and the critical apparatus that 
makes possible considerations of our historical moment.
In this essay, I outline a brief history of the registers of time and explore 
some of the ways in which the complex tensions among embodied, his-
torical, and climatological time underlie contemporary understandings 
of and commitments to sustainability. Sustainability, I argue, is a function 
of particular ways of conceiving of time, and therefore the different reg-
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isters of time that I discuss both produce and are reinscribed by invoca-
tions of sustainability as an ethics, a policy goal, and an environmentalist 
rallying cry. Embodied time, historical time, and climatological time are 
mutually constitutive as well as culturally and historically inflected, and 
it would take several full-length studies to examine critically the ways in 
which different cultures have tried to negotiate among them. In focusing 
on aspects of western literary traditions, I trace the ways in which time re-
mains embedded in history, culture, and technology; it is not an abstract 
and objective measurement of duration, but a dynamic set of relations 
mediated by technoscientific understandings of climatic variability and 
climatic change. In this respect, as I argue below, the idea of climatologi-
cal time paradoxically transcends and deconstructs a long philosophi-
cal and rhetorical tradition that contrasts kronos (chronological time) to 
kairos (the opportune moment, the “right” time, or, as in contemporary 
Greek, the weather).4 In complex ways, an understanding of climatologi-
cal time complicates a straightforward political response to the crisis of 
global warming in the twenty-first century.
The familiar catch-phrases that invoke “the world our grandchildren 
will inherit” or urge us to “save the earth for future generations” reveal 
the extent to which sustainability is indebted to conceptions of embodied 
time, that is, to individual experiences of wind, heat, cold, rain, drought, 
and the thousand climatic shocks that flesh is heir to. Reinscribing a 
conception of time that dates back to the Old Testament, sustainability 
evokes a succession of individual lifetimes—an unbroken sequence of 
embodied experiences from the past and into the future that presupposes 
sociocultural evolution taking place against the backdrop of the time-
less present of an abiding Nature. Troubling this quasi-biblical vision of 
succession and a socio-genetic inheritance of moral authority, property 
rights, social responsibility, and racial, ethnic, and religious identities is a 
fundamental question: what exactly is being sustained? Is it the stability 
of the planetary ecosystem (and its numberless subsystems) as a self-per-
petuating, Gaiaesque whole? Or the productivity of the natural world so 
that technologies of resource extraction and practices of intensification 
allow selected populations to maintain, improve, and extend first-world 
standards of living? In an important sense, a sophisticated approach to 
this question invites an exploration of a critical archaeology of time. The 
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work of literature mediates the intimations of sublime change—of clima-
tological time—by restricting time to anthropogenic history. Contempo-
rary rhetorics of sustainability draw on a rich legacy of images of ecologi-
cal stability by re-envisioning the pastoral tradition—the eternal spring 
of the bucolic countryside—and the georgic, the strategies of intensifica-
tion that allow for the endlessly increasing exploitation of resources. The 
roots of these genres in the classical world and their successive re-imag-
inings in Europe and the Americas suggest the extent to which notions 
of sustainability subsume and rework tensions that have characterized 
views of nature for literally thousands of years.
Judeo-Christian and Classical Traditions
The era in which Longfellow wrote—before Darwin but after the revolu-
tions in geology that challenged (or allegorized) the Mosaic history of 
creation—had to contend with competing traditions of history and try 
to negotiate between biblical chronology and a nascent understanding of 
deep time.5 Western conceptions of Nature have been shaped, to a sig-
nificant extent, by the incommensurate traditions of Judeo-Christian and 
pagan views of the natural world, and remain caught between compet-
ing historiographic methods, narrative modes, and conceptual models: 
a Judeo-Christian perception of history as the mysterious unfolding of 
God’s will and a pagan view of historical experience that resists teleologi-
cal explanation.6 In Genesis, humankind is exiled from Paradise because 
Eve and Adam sin. Their expulsion from the Garden into a world of labor 
and scarcity makes the fall of nature an effect of humankind’s willful dis-
obedience. In Book X of Paradise Lost, John Milton figures original sin 
as the fall from an eternal spring into the unstable climate patterns that 
characterized northwestern Europe during the Little Ice Age:
 the Creator calling forth by name
His mightie Angels gave them several charge, 
As sorted best with present things. The Sun
Had first his precept so to move, so shine,
As might affect the Earth with cold and heat
Scarce tolerable, and from the North to call
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Decrepit Winter, from the South to bring
Solstitial summers heat. …
Some say he bid his Angels turne ascanse
The Poles of Earth twice ten degrees and more
From the Suns Axle; they with labour push’d
Oblique the Centric Globe … 
… to bring in change
Of Seasons to each Clime; else had the Spring
Perpetual smil’d on Earth with vernant Flours,
Equal in Days and Nights … (X: 649–56, 668–71, 678–80)
Milton describes an unpredictable and demonized nature as a mark of 
the fall not only into postlapsarian history but also into the extremes of 
the seasons: the Angels literally push the earth into its obliquity, the 24 
degrees of deviation in its angle of rotation, and thus end the “Spring/ 
Perpetual” that Milton erroneously believes would be a consequence of a 
perpendicular rotational axis.7 An idealized May or June day in the Eng-
lish countryside becomes emblematic of an unfallen nature.
As this passage from Paradise Lost implies, the Judeo-Christian un-
derstanding of historical time is implicated in the theology of sin, la-
bor, and longed-for redemption; God’s displeasure and favor thus are 
deeply bound up in a sacrificial economy that seeks to mitigate the ef-
fects of “Decrepit Winter” and “Solstitial summers heat.” The account in 
Genesis of Cain and Abel measures the moral difference between their 
offerings by assuming that agricultural and livestock yields reflect the 
moral status of the giver. In Book XI of Paradise Lost, Milton contrasts 
the sacrifices of the “sweatie Reaper who brought/ First Fruits, the green 
Eare, and the yellow Sheaf,/ Uncull’d, as came to hand” to those of the 
“meek” shepherd, who sacrifices “the Firstlings of his Flock,/ Choicest 
and best” with “all due Rites perform’d.” Although Cain, Milton declares, 
“was not sincere” and “inlie rag’d” that Abel’s sacrifice was received favor-
ably, the moral distinction rests on the fiction that the productivity of a 
fallen world will allow for the sacrifice of the “Choicest and best.” In an 
important sense, such sacrifices are always devoted to a statistical infer-
ence of climatic stability—the predictability and abundance symbolized 
by Abel’s offering. In an agro-pastoral culture, the point of sacrifice is to 
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stabilize or maintain the climatic conditions that promote social cohe-
sion and regularize the consumption of fruits, game and domesticated 
animals, cereals, fish, and so on: send rain, thaw the land for planting, end 
the drought, let the flood waters recede, bring back the elk or fish or bi-
son. A sacrificial economy perceives and treats sin, transgression, and vio-
lation as both the cause and effect of the climatic instability—the earth 
off-kilter—that Milton imagines. Climatic change, therefore, characteris-
tically is figured in terms of catastrophes that mark the limits of historical 
time, the irruption of God’s wrath and vengeance.
Pagan myths, in contrast, emphasize the material prosperity of the 
Golden Age and suggest that virtue is, in effect, a by-product of an ideal-
ized existence of ease and plenty. They offer no clear-cut causal mecha-
nism for the Fall from virtuous abundance to sinful scarcity. The fear of 
the gods and the desire to propitiate them consequently are bound up 
in a classical tradition that explains the fall of nature as contingent rather 
than irrevocable, without invoking an overarching metanarrative to ex-
plain climate change. Rather than yoking climatic change to human sin, 
the natural world and the history of human inhabitation frequently re-
cede into mystery and a-causality.
In Book 15 of the Metamorphoses, Ovid gives to Pythagoras a long 
speech that places climatic change beyond the limits of history, an epi-
phenomenon in a universe of endless transformations:
‘I, for one would believe that nothing continues the same
for long. The Golden Age eventually changed to the Iron;
and places also have often been subject to transformation.
I’ve seen myself what was once the solidest stretch of earth
Replaced by water and land formations supplanting the ocean.
Shells can be seen on the ground some distance away from a shore,
And ancient anchors have been discovered on mountain summits.
Plains have been turned into valleys by rushing torrents in full spate;
Flooding can likewise flatten a mountain to level ground.
Marshes can dry into sand and arid deserts be watered 
to form great pools. New springs can gush at the bidding of Nature, 
while others will trickle to nothing. When earthquakes cause 
an upheaval,
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rivers have gushed from the ground or else dried up and subsided. 
…
‘Antissa, Pharos and Tyre, that famous Phoenician city,
were once surrounded by waves, but none is an island today.
In the time of its early inhabitants Leucas was part of the mainland,
Where now it is ringed by the sea. They also say that Messina
Was joined to Italian soil, till the sea abolished the common
Boundary and formed the strait which divides the isle from 
the mainland. 
The Achaéan cities of Buris and Hélice are to be found, 
If you look for them, under water. The sailors will still point out
The toppled buildings and walls beneath the floods that submerged 
them. (15: 258–72; 287–95)
For Ovid, the catastrophic changes that sever understanding from an 
inaccessible history of drowned cities and vanished passages are em-
bedded within a belief in ceaseless change, including the transmigration 
of souls, rather than in the anthropogenic corruption of a prelapsarian 
Nature. In a broadly Lucretian universe, causation threatens to become, 
in the words of the eighteenth-century Newtonian Colin Maclaurin, “a 
lucky hit in a blind uproar” (4). For Ovid, climatic change resists the 
kind of theocentric explanation that Maclaurin demands and becomes 
instead the stuff of memories (“they say”) or legends (“they also say”). 
Distanced from a sense of embodied time, it is marked only by mute ar-
tifacts, like anchors on mountain summits, that resist causal explanation. 
Ovid offers a non-anthropogenic view of the stochastic processes of the 
natural world that call attention to the limitations of historical represen-
tation as a measure of time. Rather than symbolizing a world rendered 
comprehensible by a sacrificial economy or a phenomenological identi-
fication of mind and world, anchors on mountaintops stand totemically 
for the limitations of premodern climatological knowledge, for the inabil-
ity of humankind to comprehend fully the transformations of the earth.
Ovid’s emphasis on his speaker’s experience (“I’ve seen myself ”) 
points to the ways in which embodied time is written in terms of mem-
ory. In his study of meteorology in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Jan Golinski calls attention to the ways in which the nascent 
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science of meteorology grappled with the poverty of its languages of 
observation and description. The author of the anonymous Worcester-
shire diary called his daily weather register “my Ephemeris or Historicall 
Remarques on vicissitudes of the weather, with a narrative of its course 
& Tracing it in its various winding meanders round ye year” but com-
plained that “our Language is exceeding scanty & barren of words to use 
& express ye various notions I have of Weather &c” (19). This “scanty & 
barren” language restricts the ability to turn the daily experience of the 
weather into a theory of climate. Without a causal, scientific narrative to 
explain changes in the weather, such records drift toward the theocentric 
semiotics of catastrophe and apocalypse: the experience of embodied re-
sponses to the weather tends to be cast in providentialist terms. In his 
account of the devastating wind storm, a once in 500 years extra-tropical 
cyclone, that struck England and Wales in late 1703, Daniel Defoe de-
scribes his fears that as the storm approached, “the Night would be very 
tempestuous,” he recognized, because “the Mercury [in his barometer] 
sunk lower than ever I had observ’d it on any Occasion whatsoever.” But 
the plunging readings seemed so anomalous that they “made [him] sup-
pose that the Tube had been handled and disturb’d by [his] Children” 
(24).8 The full force of the storm dilates the time between midnight and 
dawn, both in distracting Defoe from his observations and in threatening 
to end both experiential and historical time: after midnight, he admits, 
his “Observations [of the barometer] … are not regular enough to supply 
the Reader with a full Information, the Disorders of that Dreadful Night 
having found me other imployment, expecting every Moment when the 
House I was in would bury us all in its own Ruins” (25). This sense of 
impending destruction becomes an emblem of God’s vengeance on Eng-
land for its sins. Defoe sees time in dialectic and emblematic terms; his 
peril and salvation are also England’s. In this sense, the gaps left by im-
perfect languages and unattended barometers mark the ruptures within 
history and experience that structure voluntarist theology: divine power 
always threatens to end kronos, chronological time, and to appropriate 
kairos as divine vengeance.
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Beyond Anthropogenic Time
By the end of the eighteenth century, the “empty” time of mathematical 
simulation and climatological reconstruction paradoxically begins to as-
sert its explanatory power by disembodying climate, that is, by treating 
climatic change not as the catastrophic irruption of divine judgment but 
as a non-anthropogenic time that transcends both individual and histori-
cal experience. At the end of the eighteenth century, climatological time 
emerges as a distinct ontological challenge to theocentric time in three 
interlocking sets of developments. All three sought to redefine the sci-
entific basis for understanding deep time and, in the process, recast tra-
ditional conceptions of Nature. In the 1790s the nebular hypothesis of 
planetary formation advanced by Pierre Simon de Laplace, the argument 
for species extinction by Georges Cuvier, and the “discovery” of geologi-
cal time by James Hutton transformed conceptions of climate by decou-
pling history from human experience and memory.
The nebular hypothesis anthropomorphized the life cycle of planets 
in terms of youth, maturity, old age, and heat-death, offering a model of 
climatic change as the consequence of irreversible, universal processes.9 
Laplace removed Newton’s God from the mathematical equations that 
produced a compelling model of the origins, evolution, and fate of the 
solar system. Hutton’s vision of geological time with “no vestige of a be-
ginning,—no prospect of an end” presented a cyclical history of erosion 
and upheaval that continually reshaped the earth” (1:200). This con-
tinual reshaping both went beyond and challenged the theological cata-
strophism that ascribed evidence such as the drowned cities and toppled 
buildings to the vengeance of an awful God. Eighty years after Defoe had 
echoed a near-universal sentiment among early natural philosophers—
“Nature plainly refers us beyond her Self, to the Mighty Hand of Infinite 
Power, the Author of Nature, and Original of all Causes” (2)—Hutton’s 
geological history challenged perceptions of the reliability of experien-
tial notions of duration, history, nature, and causality.10 The earth itself 
threatened to become a sublime, ahuman environment. Cuvier’s account 
of the extinction of fossilized species raised profound questions about 
the limits of Mosaic history and the ways in which past environments 
differed from present conditions.11 The fascination with the skeletal re-
mains of dinosaurs, giant sloths, and mastodons that gripped London, 
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Paris, Philadelphia, and New York in 1800 suggested that nature bred 
entire species that required primeval ecologies no human ever had seen. 
The emphasis throughout the nineteenth century on the savage violence 
of prehistoric carnivores indicates the extent to which it was difficult to 
imagine the ecological conditions that provided forage for gigantic spe-
cies of plant-eaters.
Even before Darwin published The Origin of Species, then, scientific 
thought had begun to challenge the biblical monopoly on conceptions 
of history and had provoked competing models of climatological time, 
the creation and reshaping of the earth and its natural environment, and 
humankind’s future. The fad in Victorian science fiction for end of the 
universe stories, many riffing on Mary Shelley’s The Last Man, testifies 
to the ways in which the specter of species extinction could be reimag-
ined on a massive, planetary scale. Extinction thus haunts the tendency 
in late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century science to chart, measure, 
and quantify both the natural world and the social regimes of econom-
ics and politics.12 In this sense, the understanding of long-term change, 
of a climatological time that exists outside human experience, gestures 
paradoxically towards embracing and resisting the mathematically regu-
lar, aestheticized universe imagined by Laplace. A time that transcends 
and beggars human experience, however, can be conceived only differ-
entially, paradoxically, in its relation to phenomenological perceptions of 
time and existence. If mathematical reductionism locks man and climate 
into intractable processes that lead to extinction, it also provokes redefi-
nitions of ideas of divinity and therefore to the complex relationships of 
humankind to experience, Nature, and time.
Nineteenth-century transcendentalism suggests that the ruptures be-
tween microcosm and macrocosm, between humankind’s experience of 
time and Nature’s time, are produced by the self-generating alienation of 
custom or ideology, what William Blake called “mind forg’d manacles.”13 
In his essay “Nature,” Ralph Waldo Emerson recasts the threat of extinc-
tion within phenomenological notions of time, nature, and experience:
the knowledge that we traverse the whole scale of being, from 
the centre to the poles of nature, and have some stake in every 
possibility, lends that sublime lustre to death, which philoso-
phy and religion have too outwardly and literally striven to ex-
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press in the popular doctrine of the immortality of the soul. 
The reality is more excellent than the report. Here is no ruin, 
no discontinuity, no spent ball. The divine circulations never 
rest nor linger. Nature is the incarnation of a thought, and 
turns to a thought again, as ice becomes water and gas. The 
world is mind precipitated, and the volatile essence is forever 
escaping again into the state of free thought. . . . That power 
which does not respect quantity, which makes the whole and 
the particle its equal channel, delegates its smile to the morn-
ing, and distils its essence into every drop of rain. Every mo-
ment instructs, and every object: for wisdom is infused into 
every form. (542)
In gesturing toward the reflexivity of microcosm and macrocosm, Em-
erson yokes Hutton’s geological time or Laplace’s universal time to ex-
periential moments and perceptions that defy scientific reductionism. 
Human life, like the planet itself, is “no spent ball,” but a web of complex, 
proliferating, and dynamic energies.14 In contrast to Milton’s view of sea-
sonal change as a mark of the fall, Emerson locates “perfection” and “har-
mony” in individual days. He begins this essay by observing:
There are days which occur in this climate, at almost any 
season of the year, wherein the world reaches its perfection, 
when the air, the heavenly bodies, and the earth, make a har-
mony, as if nature would indulge her offspring; when, in these 
bleak upper sides of the planet, nothing is to desire that we 
have heard of the happiest latitudes, and we bask in the shin-
ing hours of Florida and Cuba; when everything that has life 
gives sign of satisfaction. . . . These halcyons may be looked 
for with a little more assurance in that pure October weather, 
which we distinguish by the name of the Indian Summer. The 
day, immeasurably long, sleeps over the broad hills and warm 
wide fields. To have lived through all its sunny hours, seems 
longevity enough. (540)
In contrast to nineteenth-century scientists struggling to explain the 
prospect of an earth succumbing to the heat-death ostensibly predicted 
by the second law of thermodynamics, Emerson finds time both focused 
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and dilated, intimations of immortality distilled into the “sunny hours” 
of “pure October weather” that bring to the climate of northern New 
England the kind of “satisfaction” ostensibly experienced in the tropical 
sunshine of the Caribbean.15 “Spring/Perptual” becomes a distillation of 
thought and experience, an imaginative transcendence of the often dank 
realities of the “bleak upper latitudes” of the planet. Emerson’s “halcyo-
ns” locate embodied human experience within a matrix of “harmony,” in 
which multiplying complexities produce greater intimations and emotive 
understandings of Nature as “the circumstance which dwarfs every other 
circumstance,” an unalienated universal composed of, and generating, in-
finite experiences of “that power which does not respect quantity, which 
makes the whole and the particle its equal channel.”
Transcendentalism thus can be seen as one response to the fundamen-
tal paradoxes posed by climatological time. Rather than a mathemati-
cized universe that exists beyond the limits of perception and experience, 
and that can be imagined only in terms of the irrelevance or negation of 
embodied experience, the world becomes open to the interweaving of 
mind and matter. In Emerson’s “Nature,” the transcendental imperative 
that “does not respect quantity” encourages humankind to embrace the 
processes of an ongoing reintegration of self and environment natural 
rather than to succumb to the profound ontological as well as epistemo-
logical displacements of what Emerson terms “custom.” To turn away 
from “our life of solemn trifles,” humankind must recognize that Nature 
can be described only as a kind of double negative, a negation of a natural 
world already alienated by “the ambitious chatter of the schools [that] 
would persuade us to despise” material existence in favor of metaphysi-
cal abstractions. Nature’s time therefore exists as the primeval negation 
of humankind’s efforts to measure and institutionalize time: “Here no 
history, or church, or state, is interpolated on the divine sky and the im-
mortal year.” In an important sense, the threat to traditional structures of 
thought and belief posed by Laplace and Cuvier is subsumed by Emer-
son’s encompassing change within an organic regeneration of both mind 
and climate—“We come to our own, and make friends with matter.” 
Dynamic and unpredictable change is transformed into the energies of 
self-renewal.
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Yet the ethics of individualism that Emerson typically is credited with 
(or accused of) promoting constitutes only one half of a dialectic in the 
nineteenth century. In Late Victorian Holocausts, Mike Davis charts the 
devastating human and environmental consequences of European impe-
rialism and the hallucinogenic optimism that colonial proprietors could 
plough under complex ecologies throughout the underdeveloped world 
to grow cash crops (cotton, opium, tea, tobacco, and rice) for export to 
Europe and North America. Unrestrained imperial expansion and rob-
ber-baron capitalism trumpeted the view that the climates of India, Af-
rica, and the Americas could be “improved” by large-scale, moncultural 
cultivation. This view of Nature as an infinite storehouse focuses less on 
what Marx calls exchange value than on the infinite elasticity of use-val-
ue: the belief that John Locke advanced in the Two Treatises of Govern-
ment (1690) that the calculus of infinite productivity forms a consensual 
basis for individual and property rights—and property secures the basis 
of political and social identity.16
Locke invokes explicitly the classical ideal of a “golden age” when hu-
manity, or at least specific populations, reaped the benefits of a benefi-
cent Nature. In such a world of abundant resources and a stable climate, 
as he argues in his second treatise, labor offers the prospect of limitless 
productivity rather than marking, as it does in the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion, humankind’s banishment from Eden. “In the beginning,” Locke de-
clares, “all the World was America” (2, ¶ 49, 301)—that is, all the world 
was open to an unending exploitation guaranteed by the fecundity of the 
nature. In this formulation, labor is divorced from a material world of life-
and-death calculations (when to plant, when to harvest, how much seed 
to conserve for next year’s planting, whether to kill the cow to feed one’s 
family during a harsh winter, and so forth) that defined agricultural ex-
istence during the Little Ice Age in much of early modern Europe.17 By 
the later eighteenth century, neo-Lockean liberalism had turned bodies 
into reliable machines, capable of increasing their useful labor, and the 
land into a repository of potential value that could be mined, refash-
ioned, and exploited without suffering any diminution in either extent or 
productivity.18 By the nineteenth century, as Davis suggests, the Lockean 
argument that the fruits of one’s labor theoretically cannot exceed a nor-
mative notion of physiological sufficiency had been corrupted into the 
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conversion of humans into interchangeable units of labor, and the natu-
ral world becomes an effect of humankind’s use. The time of the world 
thus becomes the time of capitalist calculation. In the long tradition of 
apocalyptic science fiction that emerges in the nineteenth century, it is 
precisely this world of humankind’s dominion that, to quote H.G. Wells 
in The War of the Worlds, begins “losing coherency, losing shape and ef-
ficiency, guttering, softening, running at last in that swift liquefaction of 
the social body” (82). These apocalptic scenarios, the “Grotesque gleam 
of a time no history will ever fully describe!”, invariably have ecological 
overtones because, in their playful cultural necrosis, they offer a way of 
imaginging a time after human history: the end of kronos and the after-
math of kairos (145).
Time and Fiction in the Age of Global Warming
The expanses of pre-human history that extend into the deep backward 
and abysm of time underscore the fact that climatological time, measured 
in millennia, exists beyond daily experiences of the weather, beyond the 
duration of individual lifetimes, beyond the accumulated memories of 
generations, and beyond the technologies of observation, inscription, 
and recording that characterize the rise of modern meteorology in the 
nineteenth century. The tensions between observation and speculation 
in meteorological sciences that Katharine Anderson describes in Victo-
rian England foreshadow the contours of contemporary debates about 
global warming and its consequences. In the twenty-first century, we 
have come to understand climatological time as a dynamic and consensu-
al knowledge about the interpretations of a wide range of proxy data: ice 
cores from Greenland, tree rings, sediment layers in mud and swamps, 
patterns of coral growth, and so on that can be analyzed to reveal signs 
of long-term variability based on specific chemical signatures, pollen 
samples, and gas bubbles trapped in ice.19 In this respect, the cognitive 
understanding of climate has become a process of acclimating one’s em-
bodied experience to increasingly complex technologies and to the re-
sulting displacements, in time and space, of observational and experien-
tial authority. Climatological time is dynamic, shaped and recalibrated, 
as Bruno Latour suggests, by the networks, alliances, and assemblages 
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that collect, transmit, verify, interpret, and disseminate data; that then 
reaffirm or modify assumptions and values about the natural world; and 
that continually negotiate the vexed relationship between seemingly in-
dividual, embodied experience and scientific knowledge.20 A crucial ef-
fect of the technologies of climate science is that our experience has been 
refocused, or really recalibrated, to integrate into our lived experience 
consensual inferences from ratios of isotopes, compression of layers in 
ice cores, models of global circulation of water, atmospheric circulation, 
large-scale deforestation, and satellite images. In this respect, climatologi-
cal time registers the complex theoretical and practical relationships be-
tween qualitative experience and quantitative knowledge, between human 
history and the earth’s history. Recycling becomes, in one sense, a sacrifi-
cial rite to an ideal of sustainability.
The technologically-mediated, proxy observations of longterm cli-
mate change, then, force us to recalibrate to traditional notions of com-
mon sense, to the embodied and expansive times of Emerson’s Nature. 
Even for scientists, policy-makers, environmental activists, and informed 
citizens who believe in anthropogenic global warming and are striving 
to promote whole-scale changes in modes of production and habits of 
consumption, the time-scales of climatic change cannot be experienced 
viscerally but only imagined. Phenomenologically, they are part of what 
Derrida calls, in a different context, the “irreducible virtually of time and 
space” (162). Scientific knowledge requires a willing suspension of ex-
periential belief in the facticity, the experiential groundedness, of a 
world of familiar seasons, a continuous anthropocentric history, and the 
Lockean tendency to treat the natural world as a storehouse of infinite 
productivity.
In this respect, climatological time produces interference patterns that 
provoke complex and self-generating modes of disidentification: proxy 
data is both integrated into patterns of daily experience (recycling plas-
tic bottles, buying energy-efficient cars) and sequestered from traditional 
behaviors (continuing to eat meat, despite the carbon footprint of meat 
production). In Bruno Latour’s sense, we have never been, and cannot 
become modern, because we remain caught (and oscillate) between the 
dialectical impulses toward the purification of identities (the self-aware 
green ethicist) and the proliferation of hybrids (the conflicted, steak-
58 Robert Markley
eating Prius owner).21 This is why, even as the literate public worldwide 
has been deluged with information (and misinformation) about global 
warming and its likely consequences, the effects of this media saturation 
paradoxically have reinforced as well as challenged longstanding views of 
humankind’s relationship to nature. The managerial ethos of late twenti-
eth and twenty-first century corporate culture that tends to treat climate 
change as a marketing opportunity is a descendent of the brutally insen-
sitive optimism of neoclassical economics.
Given its geneaology, the ideal of sustainability that underlies most 
plans of collective action to address global warming risks reinscribing a 
Lockean vision of the inexhaustibility of natural resources into the idea 
of a preternaturally resilient ecology that exists outside of the dynamics 
of climatological time. The measure of several generations—of one or 
two extended human lifetimes—becomes the timescale of sustainabil-
ity. In this regard, sustainability tends to be co-opted into a seemingly 
objective semiotics of mathematics and neoclassical—and neoliberal—
economics, what Philip Mirowski calls “the very ideal of natural law[,] . 
. . the verification of a stable external world independent of our activity 
or inquiry” (75). This projection of stability from mathematics onto “a 
stable external” nature effectively treats complex and dynamic ecologies 
as constants rather than variables; the closer sustainability approaches a 
set of statistical inferences over decades or a century, the more it tends 
to remain complicit in exploitative ideologies of resource extraction and 
the political and administrative hierarchies, centralized bureaucracies, 
technologies of economic calculation and accounting, the policing of 
resources and populations, and distributive political economies that are 
required to manage finite resources.
That said, the paradoxes of disidentification can be captured, if not 
rationally comprehended, only in fictional projections of human experi-
ence. In an important sense, the phenomenological perception of climate 
now includes the simulations—the science fictions—of human experi-
ence as a probability calculus, as projections of the climatological future. 
Published a year before Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, Kim 
Stanley Robinson’s novel Forty Signs of Rain uncannily anticipates the se-
quence of natural disasters and political failures that devastated the city: 
Washington D. C. is hit by a perfect storm—a tropical storm surge com-
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ing up the Potomac, ten inches of rain in the Chesapeake watershed rush-
ing down river, and a record high tide: the city floods. “[I]mages from 
the [flooded] Mall dominated the media,” and viewers around the nation 
see “TV helicopters often interrupt[ing] their overviews to pluck people 
from rooftops. Rescues by boat were occurring all though the Southwest 
district and up the Anacostia Basin. Reagan Airport remained drowned, 
and there was no passable bridge over the Potomac” (352). Although 
the novel and its sequels, Fifty Degrees Below (2005) and Sixty Days and 
Counting (2007) focus on the ecological, scientific, political, and per-
sonal crises of the trilogy’s main characters—from Beltway insiders, to 
bioclimatologists working at the National Science Foundation, to dis-
placed Buddhist monks—Robinson’s treatment of individuals and the 
world at large confronting the consequences of global warming is neither 
a “realistic” novel about climate change nor a near-future, “hard” science 
fiction novel, but a genre-bending exploration of the ethics and politics 
of existence at a time when neither eco-truisms, nor managerial strategiz-
ing, nor self-propelling fantasies of technological amelioration seem ad-
equate. Robinson’s trilogy offers an opportune way to think through the 
lived experience of character and climate in the early twenty-first century. 
His Science in the Capitol trilogy marks the intersection of the different 
registers of embodied, historical, and climatological time: the experience 
of surviving temperatures fifty degrees below zero after the Gulf Stream 
stalls; the fictional history of national politics and the politics of science 
over the course of two years as a new, progressive administration takes 
office; and the onrush of catastrophic changes—melting polar caps and 
drowning islands—that recur literally millions of years after the last pe-
riod of comparable warmth. In this regard, Robinson invites his readers 
to experience imaginatively the processes that Ovid casts in the poetics 
of endless change: the drowned “Achaéan cities of Buris and Hélice” ee-
rily foreshadow a fictional Washington and an all too real New Orleans.
Coda
Human beings seldom witness abrupt climate change in the course of a 
lifetime. Those who do historically face long odds on adapting to a natu-
ral world radically transformed. The prospect of rapid warming and the 
60 Robert Markley
disastrous scenarios that Robinson envisions lead to profoundly different 
ways of conceiving the timescales of what we understand as the object of 
sustainability. Sustainability ultimately refers to an idealized homeostasis 
between humankind and environment that never existed except in the 
sense that robust ecological systems could remain unaffected by low-den-
sity populations of humans for climatologically brief periods of time, on 
the scale of centuries rather than millennia. Robust, in this respect, does 
not imply a moral, ethical, or sociocultural value judgment. Between 
11,000 and 12,000 years ago, during the Younger Dryas, Western Europe 
was frozen tundra without much in the way of recognizable vegetation, 
colder and more forbidding than much of Siberia is today. Longfellow’s 
forest primeval was millennia away from taking root, the coastline of 
Canada lying dozens if not hundreds of miles to the east because larg-
er ice caps lowered sea levels by dozens of meters. Human populations 
huddled in scattered caves or clung to the Mediterranean littoral. Physi-
ologically indistinguishable from any of us, Ice Age peoples produced 
intricate art and effective weapons. They did not flourish. There is over-
whelming evidence that the most common biological response to severe 
climate change (of more than three degrees centigrade) is not to adapt 
but to die: populations crash, and, within the short, short reign of homo 
sapiens, bands of hunters and gatherers vanish, subsistence farmers fall 
prey to malnutrition, starvation, and disease, and empires fall.22 When 
climate changes, people kill each other with greater frequency, popula-
tion centers are abandoned, and centers of calculation do not hold. Sys-
temic climatic change is no more or less characteristic of Gaia than the 
long summer of climatic calm that has existed for the last ten thousand 
years, unpredictable oscillations no less “natural” than ideals of sustain-
ability. Longfellow ultimately gives way to Lucretius.
Notes
1. See Goux.
2. On the dialectical nature of landscape, see Crumley’s “Historical Ecology: A 
Multidimensional Ecological Orientation” and “The Ecology of Conquest: 
Contrasting Agropastoral and Agricultural Societies’ Adaptation to Climactic 
Change” and Ingerson.
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3. See Burroughs.
4. See White.
5. See Rudwick’s Bursting the Limits of Time: The Reconstruction of Geohistory in 
the Age of Revolution and Worlds before Adam: The Reconstruction of Geohistory in 
the Age of Reform.
6. See my “Summer’s Lease: Shakespeare in the Little Ice Age.”
7. Percy Bysshe Shelley makes a similar assumption in his poem Queen 
Mab; see Gidal.
8. I discuss this text at greater length in “‘Casualties and Disasters’: Defoe and 
the Interpretation of Climactic Instability.”
9. See Numbers.
10. See my Fallen Languages: Crises of Representation in Newtonian England, 
1660–1740, Bono, and Hellegers.
11. See Rudwick’s Bursting the Limits of Time and Worlds before Adam. Also, 
see O’Connor.
12. See Porter and Mirowski.
13. William Blake, “London,” 1794.
14. The literature on Emerson, Thoreau, and environmentalism is vast. See 
particularly Buell’s The Environmental Imagination 219–251 and Emerson.
15. On thermodynamics, see Clarke.
16. See my “‘Land enough in the World’: Locke’s Golden Age and the Infinite 
Extensions of ‘Use’.”
17. See Fagan.
18. See Tully, Pocock 22–30, Wood, Rapaczynski, Arneil 132–67, Carey, 
and Michael.
19. There are a number of good introductions to the history of climate change. 
See Lamb, Burroughs, Calvin, and Linden.
20. See Latour’s Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists through Society.
21. See Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern.
22. See Burroughs.
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Chapter 2
Ecotechnics
Ecotechnological Odradek
J. Hillis Miller
Humanity [must] . . . furnish the effort necessary in 
order to get accomplished . . . the essential function of 
the universe, which is a machine for making gods.
– Henri Bergson
Our world is the world of the “technical,” a world whose cosmos, 
nature, gods, entire system, is, in its inner joints, exposed as 
“technical”: the world of an ecotechnical. The ecotechnical 
functions with technical apparatuses, to which our every part 
is connected. But what it makes are our bodies, which it brings 
into the world and links to the system, thereby creating our 
bodies as more visible, more proliferating , more polymorphic, 
more compressed, more “amassed” and “zoned” than ever before. 
Through the creation of bodies the ecotechnical has the sense 
that we vainly seek in the remains of the sky or the spirit.
– Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus
[The universe] knits us in and it knits us out. It has 
knitted time space, pain, death, corruption, despair, 
and all the illusions—and nothing matters.
– Joseph Conrad, Letters to Cunninghame Graham
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Technology as Model
“Eco” comes from the Greek word oikos, the house or home. The prefix 
“eco-“ is used more broadly now to refer to the total environment within 
which one or another “living” creature “dwells.” Each creature dwells in 
its “ecosystem.” Included in that system are other circumambient crea-
tures—viruses, bacteria, plants, and animals—but also the climate in the 
broad sense of the environment. The ecosystem also includes “technical 
apparatuses.” I mean all those manmade teletechnological devices like 
television sets, iPhones, and computers connected to the Internet, into 
which our bodies are plugged.
I would add this to Nancy’s formulation: The total environment more 
and more reveals itself to be “technological,” that is, in one way or an-
other machinelike. The “body” is, according to Nancy “linked” to its 
technological ecosystem in manifold ways, as a prosthesis of a prosthe-
sis. That body, however, is more and more being shown also to function 
like a machine. It is a technical product of the ecotechnical. “The body” 
is a complex set of interlocking mechanisms that are self-generating, self-
regulating, and self-reading sign systems. “There is no ‘the’ body,” (“il n’y 
a pas ‘le’ corps”), in the sense of a unitary organism, says Jean-Luc Nancy 
(Corpus 104). These corporeal sign systems are the products of chance 
permutations extending over millions of years, such as those that have 
produced the human genome. These sign systems do not depend on hu-
man consciousnesses or on actions based on the choice of a voluntary 
code-reader in order to function. They just go on working and unworking.
This essay focuses on Kafka’s uncanny little story, if it can be called a 
story, “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” (“The Worry of the Father of the Fam-
ily”) (1919). I use Kafka’s 474 word text as a way of thinking what re-
sults from a shift from an organic unity model to a technological model 
as a paradigm for thinking in various domains. My essay might be called a 
thought experiment. “What would happen if . . . we used a technological 
model rather than an organic model to understand X?” Whether Kafka’s 
text can be “used” as a way of thinking about this or about anything else, 
or whether anything at all can be done with “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” 
remains to be seen. It does not go without saying.
Among the domains to be subjected to my thought experiment are lan-
guages, human and inhuman; sign systems generally; literature and liter-
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ary criticism, along with literary theory; “life,” “the body,” the immune 
system, the endocrine system, the brain, consciousness, the unconscious, 
the self or “ego”; the atom-molecule-thing-virus-bacterium-vegetable-
animal-human being sequence; societies, both human and inhuman, 
communities, nations, and cultures; history; the Internet and other such 
teletechnological assemblages (radio, telephone, television, cell-phones, 
iPhones, etc.); the global financial system; the environment, the weather, 
climate change; astrophysics from the Big Bang to whatever endless end 
the cosmos may reach. According to many scientists, the universe’s ex-
pansion is apparently accelerating. Galaxies are gradually getting so far 
apart that ultimately no light or other signals will be able to get from one 
to any other. Talk about the Pascalian “silence of infinite spaces”! The 
iPhone will be of no use then.
The organic unity model has had a tenacious hold on thinking in the 
West from the Greeks and the Bible down to Heidegger and present-
day eco-poets and extollers of “the body.” We tend, moreover, to think 
of organisms as “animated” in one way or another. An organism is in-
habited and held together by a soul (anima) or by some principle of life. 
Consciousness, mind, the ego, the soul animate human bodies, just as 
animals, trees, flowers, and the earth as a whole are alive, animated by 
an integrated principle of life, and just as dead letters, the materiality of 
language, the marks on the page, are animated by a meaning inherent in 
a collection of letters and spaces. As Martin Heidegger, notoriously, ex-
presses this, “Die Sprache spricht.” Language speaks (210), as though it 
were animated by an anima. Another way to put this is to say that anthro-
pomorphisms and prosopopoeias have been ubiquitous in our tradition 
as grounds for formulations in many domains. John Ruskin called these 
personifications “pathetic fallacies.” The Book of Numbers in the Old 
Testament, for example, asserts that “If the Lord make a new thing, and 
the earth open her mouth, and swallow them up, with all that appertain 
unto them, and they go down quick into the pit; then ye shall understand 
that these men have provoked the Lord” (Num. 16:30). Isaiah, in a pas-
sage cited by Ruskin, asserts that “the mountains and the hills shall break 
forth before you into singing, and all the trees of the field shall clap their 
hands” (Isa. 55:12). Ruskin calls this a justifiable pathetic fallacy because 
it deals with God’s power, that is, with something that is infinitely be-
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yond human understanding and language. St. Paul speaks of the way “the 
whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain” (Rom. 8:22), as though 
the creation were an animate creature. A living thing, whether vegetable, 
animal, or human, is to be distinguished from dead matter by its organic 
unity. Every part works with the others to make that living thing more 
than a mechanical assemblage of parts. The human ego or self we think of 
as organically unified. We tend to think of a “natural language” as an or-
ganic unity of words organized by an innate, universal, grammar and syn-
tax, such as that imagined by Noam Chomsky. A good community is an 
organically unified set of assumptions and behaviors. History is made of 
transitions from one set of such assumptions and behaviors to the next, 
in a series of Foucauldian “epistemes,” with inexplicable leaps between. 
Some of today’s eco-poets, like many native peoples, imagine the earth 
as a quasi-personified “Pan-Gaia,” Mother Earth. This lovely lady has hu-
man beings under her benevolent care, so we need not fear that climate 
change will harm us. Mama Earth would not let that happen. The “organ-
ic unity” model of a good poem or other literary work has had great force 
from the Romantics to the New Critics. If it is a good poem, it must be 
organically unified, with all its parts working harmoniously together to 
make a beautiful object like a flower or like the body of a graceful woman.
Martin Heidegger, in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
Solitude, Finitude, asserts that the stone is world-less, weltlos, the animal is 
poor in world, weltarm, whereas human beings are world-building, welt-
bilden (389–416; original 268–87). A “world” is implicitly a whole, once 
more an organic unity. We tend to assume that in one way or another 
technology names a human process of making out of parts assembled to-
gether something that is in some way useful, a prosthetic tool extending 
man’s power and a product of his ingenuity, inventiveness, and manufac-
turing power. A technological artifact is not animated, though we tend to 
personify our machines, to refer to our automobiles, for example, as “she.” 
Techné is opposed to Physis, just as subject is opposed to object. Techné is 
a skill manipulated by subjectivities and their bodies. Technology adds 
something to a nature thought of as already externally out there and as 
organic. Heidegger hated modern technological gadgets. He refused to 
use a typewriter. Only a man holding a pen can think, he thought, that 
is, do “what is called thinking.” Human beings think with their pens. Hei-
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degger saw the wholesale technologizing of Russia and the United States, 
and, through them, the technologizing of the whole world, as rapidly 
bringing true organic civilization, that is Greek and German culture, to 
an end.1 “Only a God will save us,” he said on the famous occasion of an 
interview with Der Spiegel. He would no doubt have found the present 
global triumph of teletechnology abominable. We tend, however, even to 
personify our computers and the Internet. We feel that there is a God in 
the machine. Our prosthetic gadgets think and work for themselves, not 
always along the lines we want them to work and think.
Such examples of the organic unity model could be multiplied indefi-
nitely. They are everywhere. Who would dare to say of them what Ruskin 
says of one of his examples of the pathetic fallacy (“The spendthrift cro-
cus, bursting through the mould/Naked and shivering, with his cup of 
gold”): “This is very beautiful, and yet very untrue” (par. 4).
The alternative techno-machinal model has also a long history going 
back at least to Leibniz, to the idea of a watchmaker God, to such eigh-
teenth-century books as de la Mettrie’s L’homme machine, and down to 
recent work that thinks of the human immune system as more machine-
like than organic, or to the rejection of anthropomorphisms in thinking 
of the cosmos or of climate change. Our presupposed paradigm of the 
machine, however, has mutated over the last century from examples like 
the steam engine and the internal combustion engine to forms of tech-
nology that are embodied sign-systems or communications machines, 
like television, iPhones, and a computer connected to the Internet. Even 
automobiles these days are computerized. They are as much complex sign 
systems as they are gas-powered engines to turn the car’s wheels. Before 
looking a little more closely at the strange features of the ecotechnologi-
cal model, however, I turn to Kafka as an exemplary thinker/non-thinker 
of the inhumanly machinal.
Machinal Auto-Co-Immunity as Context: 
Our Present State of Emergency
I do so, however, in a context. I am thinking not of the context of the im-
portant discussions between Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, or 
between Benjamin and Berthold Brecht, on the question of whether Kaf-
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ka is to be thought of as a mystic in the tradition of the Kabbalah or, on 
the contrary, as a faithful recorder of social conditions in pre-Holocaust 
Prague.2 My context, rather, is our situation here in the United States and 
in the world today. Why and how should I read Kafka’s “Die Sorge des 
Hausvaters” today, this moment, on November 4, 2011? It does not go 
without saying that reading this little text is at all useful and justifiable in 
our present state of emergency.
What is that emergency? The United States is engaged full-tilt in four 
radical forms of apparently unwitting “auto-co-immune” self-destruction, 
to borrow Jacques Derrida’s neologism. The systems that should save and 
protect us are turning against ourselves.
One form of our suicidal folly is the refusal to move immediately to 
universal single-payer health care as the only way to keep health care 
costs from escalating further and further as a percentage of our GDP. 
That cost is already 16% of GDP, or even, according to some estimates, 
20%, at least twice that of most European countries. This absurdity is 
bankrupting thousands when they get sick, killing tens of thousands of 
people every year who cannot afford health care, but also bankrupting 
the country, at the expense of making pharmaceutical companies and 
health insurance companies fathomlessly rich.
Another folly is the refusal to do anything serious to regulate the sui-
cidal greed and risk-taking of banks and other financial institutions. Sub-
prime mortgage-based credit default swaps and complex “derivatives” are 
the conspicuous example of this folly and greed. A minor consequence 
of the present “financial meltdown” is the dismantling of our educational 
system, especially public universities and especially the humanities. Our 
universities are in lock-step with finance capitalism. Harvard University 
lost about forty per cent of its endowment in the meltdown. Nothing has 
been done, for example raising taxes on the rich and large corporations, 
to ameliorate the outrageous discrepancy between the wealth of the top 
1% and the remaining 99%. That 1% has survived the meltdown with in-
creased income, wealth, and political power enabled through their ma-
nipulation of the media and “buying” of Congress.
A third form of auto-immune self-destruction is the refusal to with-
draw from a disastrous war in Afghanistan, that “graveyard of empires.” 
Complete troop withdrawal is now scheduled for 2014. I hope I can be 
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pardoned for being skeptical about whether that promise will be kept. It 
depends on who is in charge at that point. If Alexander the Great, the 
British, and the Soviet Union could not conquer and pacify that country, 
we are unlikely to be able to do it, even with a draft, millions of troops, 
and the further destruction of our economy, though of course the indus-
trial buildup for WWII actually pulled our economy out of a decade of 
depression. It put everyone to work making guns, ammunition, tanks, 
and planes that would be then destroyed on the battlefield, in a triumph 
of the military-industrial complex.
The fourth looming catastrophe is the worst. It makes the others look 
trivial. We are doing practically nothing to keep this catastrophe from 
happening. Humanly caused global climate change, all but a tiny major-
ity of scientists tell us, is most likely already irreversible. It is even now 
leading to more violent hurricanes, typhoons, and wild fires, the trans-
formation of the United States Southwest into an arid desert, polar ice 
melt, tundra defrosting, glacial melting in Greenland, and so on. The ice 
and permafrost melting is generating feedback mechanisms that are rais-
ing global temperatures to lethal levels. The disastrous consequences of 
all these suicidal actions were more or less unintentional, though after a 
certain point we should have been able to see what was happening. The 
mystery is why we did nothing until it was too late. The internal combus-
tion engine, chemical agriculture, and coal-fired electricity plants seemed 
like really neat ideas. They seemed to be technological inventions whose 
implementation would lead to improved quality of life all around. In a 
similar way, it seems a neat idea to be able to talk to or “text” to anyone 
anywhere in the world on a cell phone, though the concomitant changes 
in community and society were not at first evident. I mean the way these 
telecommunication gadgets are producing a mutation in the human spe-
cies. The medium is the maker, and one thing it makes is the nature and 
collective culture of the human beings who use a given medium.3 Global 
climate change on the scale it is happening will lead to widespread spe-
cies extinction, water wars, the inundation of coastal plains worldwide 
(Florida, India, Vietnam, Australia, the Northeastern United States, 
where I live, small Pacific island nations, etc.), and perhaps ultimately to 
the extinction of homo sapiens, those wise creatures.
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It is a feature of all four of these interlocked systems that changes in 
them are the product of chance, of random acts that statistically add up to 
a pattern. These systems are explicable by chaos and catastrophe theory. 
This means that they are all subject to sudden catastrophic change when 
they reach a certain unpredictable tipping point, as in the sudden unfore-
seen, but foreseeable, collapse of the investment companies Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers, and the insurance giant AIG. Those collapses trig-
gered the recent worldwide “financial meltdown.” Another famous exam-
ple is the way the flap of a butterfly’s wing in Guatemala can, we are told, 
trigger a destructive hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico.
I can understand the head in the sand resistance to thinking about 
these linked domains and then trying to do something about them. Hu-
man beings have a limitless capacity for denial, for kidding themselves. 
Homo sapiens’ possession of sapience, however, suggests that we should 
at least have a look around as the water rises above our chins. How can we 
explain, if not stop, our penchant for self-destruction? Part of the prob-
lem of course is that we are not objective witnesses. We are ourselves part 
of these self-destructive processes, one element in interlocking stochastic 
system we only think we can control. I claim Kafka’s text might help us 
confront what is happening. That is a big and problematic claim.
Odradek the Illegible
What makes the reader queasy about “Die Sorge des Hausvaters”? This 
slight seasickness is brought about by the way this text resists being read 
according to any of the comforting organic unity models. These models 
are so ingrained as to be taken for granted. That is the case in general with 
ideological prejudices.
The English reader’s problems begin with the title and with the ques-
tion of its translation, not to speak of the translation of the text itself. 
Stanley Corngold’s admirable new translation of Kafka’s stories translates 
“Die Sorge des Hausvaters” as “The Worry of the Father of the Family.” 
Peter Fenves, the translator of Werner Hamacher’s essay, gives “Cares” 
for “Sorge”: “Cares of a Family Man” (118). It is not entirely easy for an 
English speaker to get the hang of the nuances of the word “Sorge,” as it 
is used in German. My German/English dictionary gives a whole set of 
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not entirely compatible meanings for “Sorge”: “grief, sorrow; worry, ap-
prehension, anxiety, care, trouble, uneasiness, concern.” This list is fol-
lowed by a diverse set of idiomatic phrases employing “Sorge,” e.g. “die 
Sorge ertränken” or “ersäufen,” to drown one’s sorrows in drink, and “keine 
Sorge,” “Don’t worry,” ”Never fear.” That is somewhat like what we say to-
day: “No problem.”
Readers of Heidegger will remember the quite specific use he makes 
in Sein und Zeit of “Sorge,” as distinguished from “besorgen,” “Besorg-
nis,” “Fürsorge,” and “versorgen,” not to speak of “Angst.” Macquarrie and 
Robinson translate “Sorge” as “care.” Chapter Six of Section One of Sein 
und Zeit is called “Die Sorge als Sein des Daseins” (“Care as the Being of 
Dasein”), and “Sorge” is firmly distinguished from “Angst,” anxiety. Ear-
lier Heidegger distinguished, in the permutations of words in “Sorge,” 
between “Besorgnis,” the “concern” we have for things ready to hand, 
from “Fürsorge,” the “solicitude” we have for other Daseins, in our primor-
dial condition of “being with” other Daseins. Each is a different form of 
“Sorge,” care. (Being and Time 227, 157–9; original 182, 121–2). Is what 
the “Hausvater” suffers “care,” or “concern,” or “anxiety,” or just “worry”? 
Just what is he worried about? What are his cares? The text is not entirely 
clear about that, but we shall see what we shall see.
“Hausvater” brings its own problems. No straightforward English 
equivalent exists, since “the father of the family” does not carry the impli-
cation of patriarchal domination and responsibility within the house. The 
Greek word “oikonomos” meant manager of a household, from “oikos,” 
house, and “nomos,” managing, or lawgiving. “Hausvater” is a precise 
enough translation of “oikonomos.” “Eco” as in “economy,” or “ecology,” 
or “ecotechnology” refers to the house in the extended sense of “environ-
ment.” An “ecosystem,” says the American Heritage Dictionary, is “an eco-
logical community together with its physical environment, considered as 
a unit.” The whole earth can be thought of as one large ecosystem that 
is now undergoing rapid climate change, or change in the house within 
which all earthlings dwell together in a global village. Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
term “ecotechnological” suggests that the whole environment is to be 
thought of under the aegis of the technological. This is a pantechnologi-
zation into which we and our bodies are plugged as a flash memory stick 
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is plugged into a computer’s USB connection, ready to receive whatever 
information is downloaded into it.
I have not even yet quite finished with the title. Who assigned the ti-
tle? Who is to be imagined as speaking it? Presumably Franz Kafka, the 
author, who gave a name to what he had written. He had a right to do 
that, as a Textvater. Who then speaks the text? Presumably the Hausvater, 
who says of Odradek authoritatively informed things like, “Sometimes 
he disappears for months at a time; he has probably moved into other 
houses; but then he inevitably returns to our house (doch kehrt er dann 
unweigerlich wieder in unser Haus zurück)“ (73). Since both title and text 
seem to be spoken or written in versions of Kafka’s characteristically neu-
tral, deadpan voice, it is hard to know how much irony the title directs at 
the concern, care, sorrow, or worry of the house-father. Is Odradek really 
anything the Hausvater ought to worry about? The house-father perhaps 
has more serious things at hand that ought to generate concern. “Sorge,” 
however the reader takes it, seems, at least at first, an excessive term for 
what Odradek might justifiably cause.
If my reader thinks I am paying too much attention to nitpicking 
questions of translation and semantics, the first paragraph of “Die Sorge 
des Hausvaters” is my model and justification. It does not yet describe 
Odradek. Rather it speculates, fruitlessly, about the word’s etymology 
and meaning. I agree it is a strange word, but are not all proper names 
strange, singular, unique? Nevertheless, they all tend to have semantic 
meaning, as does my family name, “Miller,” or my wife’s given name, 
“Dorothy”: “gift of God.”
Before looking at what the text says about the word “Odradek,” let me, 
in the interest of getting on with what might become an interminable 
reading, suggest a working hypothesis. I claim that the name “Odradek,” 
the “thing” called Odradek, the text about Odradek, and the implied 
speaker(s) of the title and text have a common destructuring technologi-
cal structure. “Structure” is not an entirely good word for what I am try-
ing to describe, since it suggests a static assemblage. The oxymoron “de-
structuring structure” suggests not only that the assemblage in question 
is in a process of constant dynamic movement, but also that this move-
ment is in one way or another a dismantling, I would even dare to say a 
deconstructuring.
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The relation among the four odd deconstructuring structures I have 
identified is difficult to name. The relation is not metaphorical, nor al-
legorical, nor even exactly analogical. Perhaps one might say these struc-
tures are in resonance, or consonance, or Stimmung. The resonance, how-
ever, is not exactly a harmonious chiming. It is more a “Klang.” All are 
dissonant versions of one another.
The best model I know to describe these strange structures is to say 
that they are all are extremely peculiar little machines, each one sui gener-
is, unlike all the others except in being strangely and contradictorily ma-
chinelike. What is machine-like about these structures, and what is pe-
culiar about them if we think of them as machines? Each is made of parts 
that are assembled or articulated to make something that works. It does 
something, like any good machine. Each is both machine-like and also 
a self-functioning sign-system. Each seems in some way the product of 
techné, of an art of know-how. Each, however, is in one way or another in-
complete or fissured, fractured by a crack, or cracks. Moreover, each for-
bids rational description or explanation. Each seems to be lacking mean-
ing and identifiable purpose. The maker, finally, of these little unworked 
or inoperative (désoeuvrées4 ) machines cannot be easily identified, nor 
can one imagine what weird intention motivated his (her? its?) exercise 
of a manufacturing technique. Each of these non-machinal machines has 
what Walter Benjamin, speaking of Kafka’s parables and stories, called a 
“cloudy place,” a place where reasonable understanding and interpreta-
tion fails.5 Let me look at each of these unworked machines in turn, in 
their echoing disconsonance.
The first paragraph of “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” strangely, discusses 
what contradictory things experts have had to say about the word or 
the name “Odradek.” I say this is strange not only because a discussion 
of etymology is an odd way to begin a story or a confession, if it is ei-
ther of these, but also because it is not at all evident how linguists have 
got hold of a word which appears to be a secret kept between Odradek 
and the Hausvater. Only now, it appears, is the father of the family reveal-
ing a secret that has been up to now apparently kept inside the house, 
so to speak. He conspicuously does not begin by saying, “I have submit-
ted this name to linguists expert in etymologies, and here is what they 
say.” Nevertheless, the word has apparently already been the subject of 
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a lot of (fruitless) speculation. The Hausvater’s “cares” may have to do 
with his unsuccessful attempts to figure out, with the help of experts, 
what the word means. “No one,” however, he says, “would occupy himself 
with such studies if there were not really a creature called Odradek.” The 
Hausvater has Odradek in his care, at least during those times the strange 
animal-machine is roaming around the halls and stairways of his house or 
lurking in the attic. Therefore it is the house-father’s care or Sorge to fig-
ure out what the creature’s name means. Since Odradek, so far as I know, 
exists only in Kafka’s text, I and other readers who have taken the word 
into their care are doing just what the Hausvater says no one in his or her 
right mind would do.
Nevertheless, linguists have got hold of the word somehow, says the 
Hausvater. Structural linguists and etymologists, we know, do not really 
care all that much about the existence or non-existence a word’s refer-
ent. It is a word’s putative meaning as an item in a network of differential 
relations to other words that interests them. Moreover, the linguists in 
this case disagree sharply. The speaker concludes, irrationally, from their 
inability to agree, that etymology is of no use in assigning meaning to 
the portentous sounding conglomeration of three syllables, “Odradek.” 
“Some say,” the little text begins, “that the word Odradek has roots in 
(stamme aus) the Slavic languages, and they attempt to demonstrate 
the formation (Bildung) of the word on that basis (Grund). Still others 
maintain that its roots are German, and that it is merely influenced by the 
Slavic” (72).
Somewhat unreasonably, the Hausvater concludes that this disagree-
ment or uncertainty means that such researches are useless in finding a 
meaning for the word. Just because experts disagree, it seems to me, is 
no valid reason for giving up the search. “The uncertainty of both inter-
pretations (Deutungen), however,” says the text, “makes it reasonable to 
conclude that neither pertains, especially since neither of them enables 
you to find a meaning (Sinn) for the word” (72). I do not see how that 
uncertainty makes it reasonable to conclude any such thing. The Haus-
vater’s reasoning is as irrational as the word “Odradek.” One or the other 
of the schools of linguists may be right. Nor does it rationally follow that 
trying out one or the other, or both, of the hypothesized roots might not 
reveal a plausible meaning for the word. What would forbid the word 
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“Odradek” from being a hybrid, like Kafka’s disturbing kitten-lamb in 
“A Crossbreed,” or like Kafka himself as a speaker of both German and 
Czech? “Odradek” may be a combination of Slavic and Germanic roots 
somewhat uneasily joined, with a fissure or fissures, perhaps a bottom-
less cloudy chasm,6 opening up within the word, between its syllables or 
within them. Many such hybrid words do exist, for example in a polyglot 
or mongrel language like English.
What is at stake in this question of identifying meaning from etymons, 
however, as the reader will have noticed, is nothing less than the organic 
model as it dominates the traditional terminology of etymology, as in the 
term “word stem.” The word “Odradek,” experts claims, “has roots in” 
(stamm aus) either Slavic or German. One or the other of those languag-
es is its “basis” (Grund). The word “Odradek” is rooted in the ground of 
either Slavic or German languages. The word has grown from them as a 
flower grows from its roots and stem.
The German word Grund, moreover, does not just mean “ground” in 
the “literal” sense of earth, garden soil. It is the German equivalent of 
the Greek logos or the Latin ratio. Latin ratio is afflilated with radius and 
radix, root, as in our English word “radish,” an edible root. Heidegger’s 
book about the principle of reason is called Der Satz vom Grund. He fol-
lows Schopenhauer in making this translation of the Latin phrase princi-
pium rationis. As a translation of the Latin formula, the Leibnizian idea 
that everything has its reason, that reason can be rendered to everything, 
der Satz vom Grund sounds extremely odd to an English-speaker’s ear. 
“Grund” for “reason”? That is not reasonable. It does not make sense.
“Etymon” comes from Greek etumos, true, real. The branch of lin-
guistics called “etymology” is the search for the true original word from 
which later words are derived, as flower from root. The organic model, in 
this case, carries with it the whole system of Western metaphysics as em-
bodied in that complex word, logos, meaning word, mind, ratio, rhythm, 
substance, ground, reason, and so on. In casually repudiating a procedure 
of reasoning out the meaning of the word “Odradek” by way of tracing its 
stem back to its roots in a grounded etymon, Kafka’s speaker is rejecting 
the claim of that whole branch of linguistics to be able to identify true 
meaning: “neither of them [the two hypothesized language roots: Slavic, 
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German] enables you to find a meaning for the word” (“man auch mit 
keiner von ihnen einen Sinn des Wortes finden kann”) (72).
In spite of the speaker’s firm prohibition, Kafka scholars from Max 
Brod to Werner Hamacher have not failed to take the bait. They have 
risen to the occasion. They have proposed all sorts of meanings for the 
separate syllables of the word “Odradek.” These various meanings are to 
a considerable degree incompatible. Brod’s essay containing his solution 
to the riddle of the word “Odradek” was already published in Kafka’s life-
time. It presupposes Brod’s characteristically religious reading of Kafka. 
Brod claims that the word “Odradek” contains “an entire scale of Slavic 
words meaning ‘deserter’ or ‘apostate’ . . . : deserter from the kind, rod; 
deserter from Rat (counsel), the divine decision about creation, rada.” 
(qtd. in Hamacher 319). Brod puts this succinctly in another essay: 
“(Slavic etymology: having defected from counsel [Rat]—rada = Rat)” 
(Hamacher 319). Hamacher ironically wonders whether this reading of 
Odradek as meaning an apostate from the kind or rod says something 
about a man whose name was Brod. Wilhelm Emrich, in a book on Kafka 
of 1958, also cited by Hamacher, embroiders a bit on Brod’s definition 
and secularizes it:
In Czech [writes Emrich] . . . there is the verb odraditi, mean-
ing to dissuade or deter someone from something. This word 
etymologically stems from the German (rad = Rat: advice, 
counsel, teaching). The subsequent Slavic “influence” is em-
bodied in the prefix od, meaning ab, “off, away from,” and in 
the suffix ek, indicating a diminutive. . . . Odradek . . . would 
therefore mean a small creature that dissuades someone from 
something, or rather, a creature that always dissuades in gen-
eral. (qtd. in Hamacher 319–20)
That is all quite rational and clear. What Emrich says, however, does 
not jibe with what Brod says. For Brod, Odradek is in the condition of 
being an apostate. For Emrich, Odradek is someone who dissuades 
someone else from something. They cannot both be right. Moreover, 
neither Brod’s meaning nor Emrich’s is exemplified in the text itself. The 
Hausvater’s Odradek neither is shown to be an apostate from any faith, 
nor does he attempt to dissuade anyone, the Hausvater for example, from 
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anything. Odradek just nimbly races up and down stairways, corridors, 
and halls, or lurks in the attic. These places are those inside/outside re-
gions of a house or home that appear so often in Kafka’s writings, for ex-
ample as the locations of Joseph K.’s (almost) endlessly postponed trial 
in The Trial.
Werner Hamacher’s own reading/non-reading of the word “Odradek” 
is by far the subtlest and most extensive I know. It goes on for pages. I 
cannot do justice to it here, but a sketch of what he says may be given. 
You must read Hamacher’s essay for yourself. I identify three central 
features of what Hamacher says about “Odradek.” 1) Hamacher is a dis-
tinguished master of what might be called paronomastics, the study of 
puns and wordplay, not the same as the science of word interpretation. 
Even the most apparently far-fetched associations are grist for Hamach-
er’s mill, hay for his making. Hamacher makes a lot of hay. 2) The result 
is an amazing series of more or less contradictory words that Hamach-
er finds buried in “Odradek.” If William Carlos Williams says a poem 
is “a small (or large) machine made of words” (256), Hamacher sees in 
“Odradek” one of those little unworked machines I am claiming is a new 
paradigm for thinking in many realms. The series Hamacher generates 
is like a forever incomplete set of variations on a few given sounds, like 
music by John Cage, John Adams, or Philip Glass, like a certain form of 
postmodern generative poetry, that by Georges Perec, John Cage, the 
Oulipo group,7 or like some apparently mad sequence of superimposed 
words and phrases in Finnegans Wake,8 or like the ones and zeroes in a 
computer file stored in the hard disk’s random access memory, or like the 
just over three billions of DNA Base pairs in the human genome. The hu-
man genome is a huge set of permutations accumulated over millions of 
years, many of them meaningless or without apparent function. They are 
variations on a handful of basic letters naming chemical agglomerations. 
3) Hamacher repeatedly insists that the upshot of this paronomastic in-
vestigation is not to identify the meaning, however complex, of the word 
“Odradek,” but to confirm its lack of meaning or its paradoxical meaning 
as asserting that it is outside any meaning, that it means meaninglessness. 
Most etymologists agree that the first syllable, “od,” is a privative, and that 
the last syllable, “ek,” is a diminutive. The problem is the seemingly limit-
less plurivocity of the syllable “rad”:
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Any interpretation of “Odradek” that lays claim to certainty, 
conclusiveness, and meaning—and these are the hermeneu-
tic principles of both “the family man” and the etymologists 
he criticizes—must miss “Odradek” because “Odradek” 
means dissidence, dissense, and a defection from the order of 
meaning. “Odradek” thus “means” that it does not mean. His 
discourse says that he denies this discourse, that he runs off 
course, that he de-courses; his name says that he has no name. 
(Hamacher 320–1)
Here is the strange Oulipian poem that emerges if I just run Ham-
acher’s paronomastic word lists along in a row, with some of Hamach-
er’s commentary interpolated. The reader will note that Hamacher takes 
away with one hand what he gives with the other. He wants to have these 
associations and at the same time to repudiate them as all false leads. 
The effect of the echoing potentially interminable series of words and 
word fragments is that they all gradually lose meaning and become mere 
sound, “rad, rad, rad, rad,” in a crescendo of nonsense, as does the whole 
word “Odradek” if you repeat it often enough, as I am doing here, with 
Hamacher’s help:
And among the uncertain meanings of “Odradek” which “the 
family man”—this economist of meaning who is always con-
cerned with certainty in matters of interpretation—would 
have to refuse, there are also those that recall other connec-
tions in Czech: rada means not only Rat (counsel) but also 
series, row, direction, rank, and line; rád means series, order, 
class, rule as well as advisable, prudent; rádek means small 
series, row, and line. Odradek would thus be the thing that 
carried on its mischief outside of the linguistic and literary 
order, outside of speech, not only severed from the order of 
discourse (Rede) but also outside of every genealogical and 
logical series: a Verräter, a “betrayer” of every party and ev-
ery conceivable whole. . . . Even the remark that “Odradek” 
can also be read as “Od-rade-K” and “Od-Rabe-K”—or “Od-
raven-K”—and thus contains a double reference to the name 
“Kafka” [a favored move by Hamacher; he tends to see all 
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Kafka’s work as a hidden anagram of “Kafka” or “Franz Kaf-
ka,” though he here rejects that move as illicitly explanatory] 
misses this “word,” a word moving outside of the order of 
the word, outside of natural, national, and rational languages. 
Not even the name “Kafka,” its contraction into the letter K, 
and its transformations into “jackdaw” and “raven” could be 
a source of meaning, an origin of discourse, or a root of refer-
ence, for “Kafka” separates itself in “Odradek” precisely from 
its roots, its radix. Odradek is the “od-radix”: the one “with-
out roots”; in Czech, odrodek, the one without its own kind, 
the one who “steps out of the lineage” (odroditi—to degener-
ate, to be uprooted). “Odradek” is, in short, the one who be-
longs to no kind and is without counsel, the one with neither 
a discourse nor a name of his own. . . . According to Kott’s dic-
tionary, odraditi means “to alienate,” “to entice away”; odranec 
means “rags”; odranka means “a piece of paper,” “patchwork 
of a text”; odrati means “tear off ”; odrbati means “scrape off,” 
“rub away”; odrek means “the renunciation”; odrh means “re-
proach,” “reproof ”; odrod and odrodek mean the one without 
a kind.” Kafka may have connected pieces from all these with 
Odradek. They support the remark of Malcolm Paisley that 
Kafka would always speak of his writings as “patchwork,” frag-
ments soldered together, little bits of a story running around 
without a home. (Hamacher 320–1)
If I abstract just the German, Czech, and Latin words from Hamach-
er’s series I get the following Oulipian or Cagean more or less meaning-
less and unreadable poem. The individual items have meaning, but put 
together in this way, without grammar or syntax, they lose meaning and 
become variations on a mere sound or on possible ways of arranging a 
small selection of letters of the alphabet: rada, Rat, rád, rádek, Rede, Ver-
räter; ratio, Od-rade-K, Od-Rabe-K, Od-raven-K, Kafka, radix, “od-
radix”;odrodek, odroditi, odraditi, odranec, odranka, odrati, odrbati, odrek, 
odrh, odrod, odrodek, Odradek.
This string would be akin to the many unverifiable meanings that 
Jacques Derrida gives to the enigmatic phrase that starts his essay on 
“How to Avoid Speaking: Denials”: “Pardon de ne pas vouloir dire” (which 
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means, among other possibilities, “I beg your pardon for not wanting to 
speak,” or “I beg your pardon for not meaning anything” (119–121; 161, 
163**)), or to the variations in meaning that Thomas Pynchon, in one 
segment of Gravity’s Rainbow, gives by changes in punctuation, emphasis, 
and context to a single word string “You never did the Kenosha Kid”:
Dear Mr. Slothrop:
You never did.
The Kenosha Kid. (62)
Old veteran hoofer: Bet you never did the “Kenosha,” kid! (62)
You? Never! Did the Kenosha Kid think for one instant 
that you…? (62)
“You never did ‘the,’ Kenosha Kid!” (62)
But you never did the Kenosha kid. (63)
You never did the Kenosha kid. Snap to, Slothrop. (63)
Voice: The Kid got busted. And you know me, Slothrop. 
Remember? I’m Never.
Slothrop (peering): You, Never? (A pause.) Did the 
Kenosha Kid? (72)
Another example would be the string of words, phonemes, and puta-
tive Indo-European roots in “g” that I spin out, with help from Derrida’s 
Glas, in “Line,” the first chapter of Ariadne’s Thread: graph, paragraph, 
paraph, epigraph, graffito, graft, graphium, graphion, graphein, gluphein, 
gleubh-, gher-, gerebh-, gno-, guh, gn, gl, gh, gr. (9–10). Derrida’s “Telepa-
thy” appropriates another such multilingual string from Freud’s strange 
essays on telepathy: “Forsyth . . . Forsyte, foresight, Vorsicht, Vorasussicht, 
precaution, or prediction [prevision].” Elsewhere in “Telepathy” Derrida 
appropriates a dazzling sequence, generated from the name “Claude” 
(ambiguously both male and female) from his own Glas: “glas . . . (cla, cl, 
clos, lacs, le lacs, le piége, le lacet, le lais, là, da, fort, hum . . . claudication [cla, 
cl, closed, lakes, snare, trap, lace, the silt, there, here, yes, away, hmmm 
. . . limp])” (260–1, 234 (translation modified), 235; 269, 245, 246).9 
Other examples of such Oulipian poems can be found in the discussions 
of Cage, Perec, and Joyce in Louis Armand’s “Constellations,” referred to 
in footnote 8.
Ecotechnics 83
Given language systems or multiple interwoven language systems are 
non-rational assemblages in which the meaning of a given phoneme or 
string of phonemes may be apparently limited by context, by intona-
tion, and by its difference from other phonemes or strings of phonemes. 
Nevertheless, a given string always exceeds its context and its differen-
tial limitations toward a limitless horizon of more and more remote but 
never entirely excludable puns, homonyms, and chance associations. 
The words or phrases in these lists are not ordered either by priority or 
temporally or as a narrative sequence. They could be given in any order. 
Implicitly they are simultaneous, like all the data in the Internet or like 
the items in a hypertext. The first item is not a beginning, nor is the last 
word an end. That makes Louis Armand’s Mallarméan figure of the con-
stellation appropriate, even though “constellation” implies a fixed pattern 
rather than the dynamically and unpredictably changing assemblage I 
am exemplifying here. The items in these sequences are like those bits of 
different colored thread knotted and twisted together that are wound on 
Odradek as if he were no more than a spool for saving used thread. Each 
list I have cited could be extended indefinitely in either direction. Ulti-
mately, by a more and more outrageous process of substitution and per-
mutation, such as Hamacher brilliantly deploys, as if he were a machine 
for making puns, any item, such as the “rad” in “Odradek,” could lead to 
all the words in the Czeck and German languages, and to all the words in 
other languages too. It is no wonder sane people dislike puns and say of 
them what Samuel Johnson said: “He that would make a pun would pick 
a purse.” Punning robs language of its rationality, as do the alliterations 
in Johnson’s witty formulation. Paronomasia, like accidental alliterations, 
reveals that language is already an irrational machine. The will to mean-
ing, the “vouloir vouloir dire,” can never capture or control this machine, 
anymore than the Hausvater can capture or control Odradek.
I have hypothesized that the thing that calls itself Odradek has an un-
structuring structure that is analogous to the unworking (désoeuvrant) 
word-machine “Odradek.” Let me be more specific about this. For one 
thing Odradek the thing is, like the word “Odradek,” homeless. When 
the Hausvater asks Odradek where he lives, he says “No permanent resi-
dence (Unbestimmter Wohnsitz)” (73),10 and then laughs. “But it is a kind 
of laughter that can only be produced without lungs. It sounds more or 
84 J. Hillis Miller
less like the rustling of fallen leaves (wie das Rascheln in gefallenen Blät-
tern)” (73).
For me this is the most uncanny moment of “Die Sorge des Hausvaters.” 
It is akin to the skin-crawling and hair-raising moment when the Hunter 
Gracchus, who is caught permanently on his death-barge drifting be-
tween this world and the next, says: “My barge has no tiller, it is driven by 
the wind that blows in the nethermost regions of death” (Kafka’s Selected 
Stories 112). Laughter is, experts claim, a form of distinctively human 
gesture-speech. We assume that animals cannot laugh. What, however, 
is laughter that is produced without lungs? It is laughter without laugh-
ter, an ironic undercutting of real laughter. Odradek’s laughter is directed, 
oddly, toward the assertion that he has no permanent residence. It is an 
inhuman sound, like that produced by the rustling of fallen leaves. As 
Hamacher has recognized, however, “Blättern” is also the German word 
for the leaves of a printed book. Odradek’s laughter, one might say, is a 
purely literary laughter. It is a sound generated by the words on the page 
and by their comparison with the sound of fallen leaves. But the leaves 
of this text are fallen, dead, dried out. They can only rustle. They are not 
legible and they cannot be read, like Odradek’s laughter. Why does he 
laugh? No reason is given for why he finds having no permanent address 
risible. It hardly seems a laughing matter, or even an object fit for ironic 
non-laughing laughter.
The Hausvater’s description of Odradek the thing is as anomalous as 
the word that names him or it. Odradek is neither a human being, nor an 
animal, nor a thing, but rather a strange sort of talking and nimbly mov-
ing machine. Odradek is a (not very successful) robot, a technological 
construct that seems to have been made by someone not very good at de-
signing robots. Or rather it is difficult to imagine that it had any designer 
at all. It seems to be the product of techné without a technician, as, it may, 
are the universe as a whole and human bodies within that universe, with 
their defective genomes, potentially self-destructive immune systems, 
and faulty endocrine systems. All three are prone to lethal non-working. 
We and our ecosystem may be the result of chance alterations over bil-
lions of years that have never yet quite got it right from the perspective of 
what we human beings think would be good for us.
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Attractive as the argument from intelligent design is, since it gives a 
meaning to the creation and to all the creatures in it, the evidence strong-
ly suggests that Darwin and recent physicists and geneticists are right: the 
universe and everything within it has evolved through billions of years of 
random variation, with the more or less random survival of the fittest de-
termining which variations last longest. No rational designer could have 
put together the human genome, the endocrine system, and the immune 
system. Almost anyone could have done better than this bricolage of spare 
parts, with a lot of left-over parts (the nonsense sequences in the human 
genome) that do not seem to have any purpose or function at all. They 
may, however, have some hidden function that we have not yet identified, 
or may never be able to identify.
The same thing can be said of Odradek. The Hausvater says nothing at 
all about Odradek’s genesis and genealogy. He seems to have no origin 
and no kin, to be sui generis, a one off, just as he seems to have no end in 
the sense of purpose or goal: “At first it looks like a flat, star-shaped spool 
for thread, and in fact, it does seem to be wound with thread; although 
these appear to be only old, torn-off pieces of thread of the most varied 
kinds and colors knotted together but tangled up in one another. But it 
is not just a spool, for a little crossbar sticks out from the middle of the 
star, and another little strut is joined to it at a right angle. With the help 
of this second little strut on the one side and one of the points of the star 
on the other, the whole thing can stand upright, as if on two legs” (72). If 
you try to imagine what this strange machine would look like, you have 
difficulty making sense of it. I never yet saw a spool for thread that was 
star-shaped, though commentators have seen a reference to the Star of 
David, first employed in Prague as a way of marking Jews. Nevertheless, 
how would you wind thread around the points of the star? In and out? 
They would slip off the star’s points. The bits of thread are all tangled and 
knotted in any case, like those word and phoneme strings I discussed ear-
lier. They have no apparent purpose beyond showing that Odradek or 
someone who uses him (it) is a thread-saver, though for no apparent rea-
son. Perhaps some obscure reference may be encoded to Kafka’s works as 
what he called a “patchwork” of narrative elements knotted together in a 
random sequence.
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I can see how such an apparatus might stand upright, but I do not see 
how it can move so nimbly up and down the stairs, down the corridors, 
in the hallway, in the attic, as the Hausvater says it does. It is so extraordi-
narily mobile that it can never be caught: “Odradek außerordentlich beweg-
lich und nicht zu fangen ist.” Though Odradek appears to be made of wood, 
it is self-propelled and it can speak and laugh, though it is without lungs. 
Like the kitten-lamb in “The Crossbreed,” or the talking ape in “Report to 
an Academy,” or like all those other talking and thinking animals in Kaf-
ka’s work, Odradek belongs to no identifiable species. It is neither thing, 
nor plant, nor animal, nor human being, but a disturbing mixture of all 
these that defies reasonable classification.
The reader might be tempted to think that Odradek is incomplete, un-
finished, or broken in some way, but the Hausvater says no proof of that 
exists, though he has sought evidence of it. If Odradek is incomplete and 
the missing parts could be found, then it might make better sense as a 
technological machine with some identifiable purpose: “It is tempting to 
think that this figure (Gebilde) once had some sort of functional shape 
{zweckmäßige Form] and is now merely broken. But this does not seem 
to be the case; at least there is no evidence for such a speculation; no-
where can you see any other beginnings or fractures that would point to 
anything of the kind; true, the whole thing seems meaningless yet in its 
own way complete (das Ganze erscheint zwar sinnlos, aber in seiner Art ab-
geschlossen)” (72). That would be a good description of Kafka’s works, 
as well as of the paradigmatic Kafkesque word “Odradek.” All these are 
complete, even the works he did not finish, but meaningless.
No wonder the Hausvater is worried. Kafka, I imagine, must have taken 
great delight in imagining a thing that would defy reasonable explana-
tion, be meaningless, and yet “in its own way” complete, abgeschlossen, 
closed in on itself. He also must have enjoyed inventing a responsible and 
reasonable patriarch as “narrator” whose attempts to make sense of the 
creature that has invaded his household lead over and over to the verdict: 
“meaningless (sinnlos),” just as the name Odradek defies all attempts to 
give it a verifiable meaning. Both the name and the thing are cunning 
technological constructions whose “purpose” seems to be to defy reason-
able explanation by human beings.
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The final characteristic of Odradek is the one that causes the father of 
the family the most worry or Sorge. This is his fear that Odradek may be 
unable to die, again like the Hunter Gracchus. Anything mortal, the Haus-
vater says, has at least an identifiable goal, that is, to die. For Heidegger, an 
essential feature of Daseins is that they can foresee their death, as, accord-
ing to him, animals cannot. Sein zum Tode, being toward death, is there-
fore what Daseins are. “Can he die?” asks the Hausvater about Odradek. 
“Everything that dies has previously had some sort of goal (Ziel), some 
kind of activity (Tätigkeit), and that activity is what has worn it down 
(zerrieben); this does not apply to Odradek” (73).
The principle of reason or Satz vom Grund that this strange little text 
radically puts in question presumes that anything with a rational mean-
ing has that meaning because its activity is goal-oriented. Its meaning can 
be defined in terms of its goal or purpose, its Zweck or Ziel. Odradek has 
no goal and therefore his (its) activity does not wear him out until he 
(it) dies, as even a machine, however cleverly made, ultimately wears out. 
Only a technological construction without goal, purpose, or meaning can 
be immortal, perhaps like the universe itself in its endless movement of 
expansion and then contraction back to a new Big Bang. The Hausvater’s 
most haunting worry is that Odradek will outlive him and “that one day, 
with his bits of thread trailing behind him, he will come clattering down 
the stairs, at the feet of my children and my grandchildren[.] True, he 
clearly harms no one (Er schadet ja offenbar niemandem), but the idea 
that, on top of everything else, he might outlive me, that idea I find al-
most painful (fast schmerzliche)” (73).
After all this I have said about the word “Odradek” and the thing 
“Odradek” as a way of exemplifying the model of self-destructuring inor-
ganic technological structures I have in mind as a replacement for think-
ing on the model of the organic, I can give short shrift,11 or, to make a 
pun of my own, short Schrift, in the sense of just a few written words, to 
the two other forms of the inorganic machinal or technological this text 
exemplifies.
If “Odradek” is a word that is not a word and if Odradek it(him)self is 
a machine that is not a machine, Die Sorge des Hausvaters is an anoma-
lous text that belongs to no recognizable genre. It is neither a story, nor 
a parable, nor an allegory, nor a confession, nor an autobiography, nor a 
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scientific report, nor does it conform to the laws of any other recognized 
genre. It is an anomaly, an inorganic hybrid assemblage of words mixing 
aspects of many genres but conforming lawfully to none. It is not even 
much like other texts by Kafka. It is sui generis, a species with one exem-
plar, no parents and no offspring.
In a similar way, Die Sorge des Hausvaters does not create in the read-
er’s mind the illusion of some recognizable character or personage. We 
learn little about the father of the family except that he is worried about 
Odradek. Kafka excels in creating a cool, slightly ironic, narrative voice 
that can hardly be called a “point of view,” or a perspective, or either a 
reliable or an unreliable narrator, or the recognizable speech of a person. 
“Die Sorge des Hausvaters” is just a strange assemblage of words that seems 
to have fallen out of the sky, like a meteor, or like an inscribed astrolith, or 
like a scratched stone we might find on the beach. It just lies there like an 
indecipherable message in code. Though we know Kafka wrote it, noth-
ing we can learn about Kafka the person explains or accounts for this fan-
tastically inventive little text written in pellucid German. Its meaning is 
its successful resistance to interpretation, its failure to mean. It is sinnlos.
Whatever Works
Before turning to some present-day examples of destructuring structures, 
let me summarize the features of such a model as I have identified it in 
“Die Sorge des Hausvaters.” Such a technological artifact seems to have no 
creator. It seems to be self-generated and self-generating. It is certainly 
not the result of human will and technological knowhow. It is best de-
scribed as a machine, but as machine that is unworked, inoperative, or 
disarticulated, though it goes on and on doing its thing, working away, 
like the Energizer bunny. It is techné without a technologist or technician, 
but a mad techné that produces machines that do not make sense from 
the perspective of human needs and wants, or from any other imaginable 
perspective.
I want in conclusion to set in parallel five systems that I claim are un-
derstandable, if they can be understood, according to the linguistico-
machinal model I have sketched out, with Kafka’s help: the environment, 
the global financial system, the nation-community, the body, and lan-
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guage. These mechanical sign-systems work. They make something hap-
pen, often in the end disaster from the human perspective. Each system 
can be seen as a figure for the others, but no one is the literal of which 
the others are displacements, figures, supplements, substitutions, or sym-
bols. All are interconnected. Together they make an all-inclusive ecotech-
nological non-integrated whole into which each one of “us” is plugged.
One such system is terra, the earth. The earth, scientists are more and 
more discovering, is a complicated machine made of almost innumerable 
atoms and molecules that signal to one another. This machine is out of 
our control. It just goes on doing what it does do, that is, create the ever-
changing climate within which we live, as in our environment, our house 
or oikos. The clever scientists, technicians, and engineers who invented 
and perfected the internal combustion engine that uses gasoline as a fuel, 
and then linked it to a vehicle with wheels, like the scientists who devel-
oped chemical fertilizers and pesticides, or coal-fired electrical plants, 
did not intend to cause catastrophic climate change. Nor did they at first 
know that, once started, climate change accelerates rapidly through feed-
back mechanisms. Scientists these days keep saying in amazement, “This 
is happening much faster than we thought it would!” The rapid increase 
of carbon dioxide and other green house gases in the atmosphere as a re-
sult of the later stages of industrialization has intervened in the ecosys-
tem to trigger its self-modifying gears and levers. We intended no such 
thing, but that did not keep it from happening, mechanically.
The earth is not a super-organism. It is not an organism at all. It is best 
understood as an extremely complex machine that is capable of going au-
todestructively berserk, at least from the limited perspective of human 
needs. Global warming will bring about widespread species extinction. It 
will flood our low-lying islands, our coastal plains, and whatever towns, 
cities, and houses are on them. An example is our house on the shore of 
Deer Isle, Maine, where I am writing this, in sight of the ocean, only fifty 
feet away, its surface only a few feet down, at high tide, from the ground 
level of our house.
Moreover, as we continue to build up carbon in the atmosphere to 
higher and higher levels, we never know when the next emitted carbon-
dioxide molecule will tip over some ecosystem and trigger a nonlinear cli-
mate event—like melting the Siberian tundra and releasing all its meth-
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ane, or drying up the Amazon, or melting all the sea ice at the North Pole. 
The systems I am describing are best understood by way of chaos theory 
and catastrophe theory, that is, in terms of instantaneous breaks. More-
over, when one ecosystem collapses, it can trigger sudden unpredictable 
changes in others that could abruptly alter the whole earth (Friedman).
Another such machine is the global financial system. That machine is 
linked now to the Internet and to a host of computer-based data-storage 
and data-manipulation devices. Global capitalism in 2007 imploded, 
causing a worldwide recession and much human suffering. The unem-
ployment level in the United States is at almost ten per cent, not counting 
the millions who have stopped looking for a job. The financiers, bankers, 
and CEOs whose decisions brought about this catastrophe did not intend 
to bring the financial system to the edge of total breakdown. Each acted 
rationally, so they thought, to maximize profits and garner their own high 
salaries, bonuses, and stock options. The financial meltdown happened, 
apparently, because too many people believed in the magic of a simple 
computer program formula that was supposed (falsely) to measure risk 
comparatively, i.e, the joint default probability of mortgages. David X. Li, 
then in Canada and the United States, but now back in Beijing, wrote the 
formula, a Gaussian copula formula of elegant simplicity (Salmon). The 
formula was fatally flawed by the assumption that house values would 
not, could not, go down. All the bankers and investment managers be-
lieved in that assumption, however, including the ratings agencies, paid 
by the financial “industry,” that were giving AAA ratings to bundles of 
eventually almost totally worthless securities.
The computer programs “quants” devised allowed linked computers 
and databases to do things no human brain can understand. All the bank-
ers and heads of financial institutions like Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, 
AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, and so on, said, as their institutions 
were going belly up, that they did not understand what a credit default 
swap is, or what a CDO (collateralized debt obligation) is, or just what 
are the workings of programs that make tranches and tranches of tranch-
es to distribute subprime mortgages into more and more remote slices. 
This procedure was supposed to spread the risk so widely that no one 
would suffer appreciable loss if someone defaulted on one of the mort-
gages. Those in charge of banks and financial companies were not lying 
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when they said they did not know how far in debt they were. It appears 
that many were totally insolvent. One hundred and four smaller banks 
failed in the United States by October 24, 2009, and bank failures have 
continued worldwide since then. CDO’s added up to $4.7 trillion in 
2006. By 2007 the amount of credit default swaps (CDSs) outstanding 
was the astounding sum of $62 trillion. The banks and financial compa-
nies were destroyed, or would have been destroyed if they had not been 
saved by a massive infusion of billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money, 
by something built into the system that was not an object of cognition, 
though some whistle-blowers put up warning signs. This is a little like the 
way I do not understand just what is going on somewhere deep inside 
my computer when I press certain little keys on my keyboard and get this 
present sentence on my screen in twelve point Palatino, double-spaced, 
with certain pre-set margins and other automatic formatting. Our cats are 
adept at accidentally pressing fortuitous combinations of keys that cause 
my laptop to “crash,” just as the stock market crashed. Like the CEOs al-
ready mentioned, in relation to their highly paid computer quants, I have 
no idea just what my cats have done, nor how to undo it.
It is an essential feature of the modern financial system that it depends 
on computer programs and elaborately interconnected computers for its 
workings. These workings exceed human comprehension. That does not, 
however, keep them from going on doing their thing, in what might be 
called by anthropomorphism a revenge of the robots. The unexpectedly 
accelerated pace of global warming and species extinction is parallel to 
this unknowabilty of the workings of the financial system. Experts have 
to keep revising the time frame for the inundation of our Deer Isle house. 
It keeps getting more and more imminent. “Get ready! The end of the 
world is at hand!” “Get ready! The financial system is in meltdown!” It 
will not have escaped my reader’s notice that “meltdown” and “toxic,” 
as in “toxic assets,” are terms borrowed from the vocabulary of climate 
change. Thomas Friedman, in the New York Times Op Ed column cited 
above, expresses our inadvertently-caused plight as follows:
To recover from the Great Recession, we’ve had to go even deeper into 
debt. One need only look at today’s record-setting price of gold, in a pe-
riod of deflation, to know that a lot of people are worried that our next 
dollar of debt—unbalanced by spending cuts or new tax revenues—will 
92 J. Hillis Miller
trigger a nonlinear move out of the dollar and torpedo the U.S. currency.If 
people lose confidence in the dollar, we could enter a feedback loop, as 
with the climate, whereby the sinking dollar forces up interest rates, which 
raises the long-term cost of servicing our already massive debt, which 
adds to the deficit projections, which further undermines the dollar. If 
the world is unwilling to finance our deficits, except at much higher rates 
of interest, it would surely diminish our government’s ability to make 
public investments and just as surely diminish our children’s standard of 
living.As the environmentalist Rob Watson likes to say, “Mother Nature 
is just chemistry, biology and physics. That’s all she is. You can’t spin her; 
you can’t sweet-talk her. You can’t say, ‘Hey, Mother Nature, we’re having 
a bad recession, could you take a year off?’” No, she’s going to do whatev-
er chemistry, biology and physics dictate, based on the amount of carbon 
we put in the atmosphere, and as Watson likes to add: “Mother Nature 
always bats last, and she always bats a thousand.”[Addendum 11/29/11: 
Friedman’s scenario of self-destructive high interest rates has not taken 
place yet in the United States, but just this event has recently occurred 
in the “Club-Med” nations of the Euro-zone that are on the verge of 
bankruptcy: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal. Both the Euro-zone 
nations and the United States, however, are making the same disastrous 
ideological (that is, robot-like) mistake of thinking they can return to 
economic well-being by slashing government spending and lowering 
taxes on the rich and on big corporations. This is exactly the wrong thing 
to do, as Ireland’s present plight demonstrates. Following this strategy 
would be a catastrophe eventually even for the rich and for corporations 
because it would greatly reduce the income consumers must have to buy 
the goods corporations make. Meanwhile, unemployment in the United 
States remains at over nine percent (much higher if you count those who 
are underemployed or who have stopped looking for a job); hundreds of 
thousands of people are losing their houses through mortgage foreclo-
sures, some illegal; the top 1% of Americans make 20% of the national 
income and control 40% of the nation’s wealth; national health care costs 
are rising to 20% of GDP and will go on rising; soaring tuition costs are 
putting higher education out of the reach of more and more Americans, 
in a litany of interlocked auto-co-immune disasters.]
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The third such system is a community or a nation. Such a construct 
is an interrelated conglomeration of human beings controlled by laws, 
institutions, constitutions, legislatures, and all the machinery of govern-
ment, what Foucault calls “governmentality.” The financial system is an 
important part of a given national fabric, especially in a militarist-capi-
talist-teletechnoscientific plutocracy like the United States. What is most 
conspicuous about the United States today, if we think of it not as an or-
ganism but as a technological artifact, a product of techné, is its penchant 
for mindless or at least irrational self-destruction.
Why is it that a large group of apparently well-meaning and apparently 
sane human beings are hell-bent on auto-destruction? The best descrip-
tion of this I know is Jacques Derrida’s hypothesis of what he calls “auto-
co-immunity,” that is, a penchant within any community that turns its 
forces against itself. Such a community destroys itself by way of what is 
intended to make it safe, whole, indemnified from harm, just as autoim-
munity in the human body’s immune system turns the body against itself. 
I have discussed Derrida’s “auto-co-immunity” at some length in For Der-
rida (123–9), but here are the essential passages, from Derrida’s “Faith 
and Knowledge” and “Rogues.” They speak for themselves:
But the auto-immunitary haunts the community and its system of im-
munitary survival like the hyperbole of its own possibility. Nothing in 
common, nothing immune, safe and sound, heilig and holy, nothing un-
scathed in the most autonomous living present without a risk of auto-
immunity. . . . This excess above and beyond the living, whose life only 
has absolute value by being worth more than life, more than itself—this, 
in short, is what opens the space of death that is linked to the automaton 
(exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, the machine, the prosthesis, virtu-
ality: in a word, to the dimensions of the auto-immune and self-sacrifi-
cial supplementarity, to this death drive that is silently at work in every 
community, every auto-co-immunity, constituting it in truth as such in 
its iterability, its heritage, its spectral tradition. Community as com-mon 
auto-immunity: no community <is possible> that would not cultivate its 
own auto-immunity, a principle of sacrificial self-destruction ruining the 
principle of self-protection (that of maintaining its self-integrity intact), 
and this in view of some sort of invisible and spectral sur-vival. This self-
contesting attestation keeps the auto-immune community alive, which is 
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to say, open to something other and more than itself: the other, the fu-
ture, death, freedom, the coming or the love of the other, the space and 
time of a spectralizing messianicity beyond all messianism. It is there 
that the possibility of religion persists: the religious bond (scrupulous, 
respectful, modest, reticent, inhibited) between the value of life, its ab-
solute “dignity,” and the theological machine, the “machine for making 
gods. (82, 87 [translation slightly modified]); original 62, 68–9).Yet all 
these efforts to attenuate or neutralize the effect of the traumatism (to 
deny, repress, or forget it, to get over it [pour en faire son deuil], etc.) are, 
they also, but so many desperate attempts. And so many autoimmunitary 
movements. Which produce, invent, and feed the very monstrosity they 
claim to overcome.What will never let itself be forgotten is thus the per-
verse effect of the autoimmunitary itself. For we now know that repres-
sion in both its psychoanalytical sense and its political sense—whether it 
be through the police, the military, or the economy [au sens politico-polic-
ier, politico-militaire, politico-économique]—ends up producing, reproduc-
ing, and regenerating the very thing it seeks to disarm (99 [translation 
slightly modified]; original 152).The Patriot Act and the Department of 
Homeland Security have made United States citizens conspicuously less 
safe by taking away our precious civil liberties, subjecting us to universal 
surveillance and the danger of indefinite imprisonment, perhaps by way 
of “extraordinary rendition,” to be tortured in a secret prison in a foreign 
country. I identify in iteration in variation four further regions where the 
United States is currently engaged in auto-immune self-destruction.
One, perhaps the worst, is the refusal to have done anything serious 
about global climate change until it is already too late. It is already too late, 
I mean, to keep the atmospheric temperature and the ocean levels from 
rising to levels that will make the planet in most places uninhabitable.
Another auto-immune gesture is the refusal to do anything serious to 
regulate the financial system. Bankers and investment officials are already 
returning to their old ways of excessive risk-taking along with setting 
outrageous salaries and bonuses for themselves. Banks and investment 
houses are fighting tooth and nail to keep regulation from happening. 
This is perhaps because they secretly know that climate change will cause 
devastation. They know what they are doing will cause another financial 
meltdown, but are squirreling away huge sums of money so they can pay 
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to be part of the surviving remnant living in gated communities perched 
high above the rising waters. Or so they imagine.
A third example of auto-immune behavior is the refusal even to con-
sider the only rational solution to our catastrophic health-care system, 
namely single payer government-run health care. The Republicans have 
sworn to repeal the modest and not very effective health care bill that was 
passed when Democrats still controlled both houses of Congress. They 
also want to eviscerate Medicare and Medicaid, which would cause tens 
of thousands of our citizens to die from lack of adequate healthcare, in 
a perhaps not entirely undeliberate process of population culling. It is 
difficult to believe that the Republicans, some of them at least, do not 
know what they are doing. Without a robust so-called “public option” the 
“reforms” that passed Congress and was signed by Presideny Obama will 
only make the health care insurance companies and the pharmaceutical 
companies immensely richer, costing far beyond the current sixteen to 
twenty per cent of the Gross Domestic Product that we spend on health 
care in the United States.
A fourth example, also already mentioned, is the delay in withdrawing 
from the war in Afghanistan and bringing our troops home. Trillions of 
taxpayer dollars have already been sunk into the wars of occupation in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, not to speak of the human toll in killed and wound-
ed on all sides.
If you just stand back a little and look at these four problems, it is easy 
to see the rational solutions. Our collective auto-co-immunity, however, 
seems to make it extremely unlikely that any of these solutions will be 
chosen. Apparently we will remain blindly bent on self-destruction.
An additional realm of the technological is the “human being,” thought 
of as soul embodied, material spirit. The body is now more and more 
seen as not organic in the warm fuzzy sense we have tended to mean that, 
but as a complex product of techné, with the universe as ecotechnician. 
The human immune system is exemplary of the body’s machine-like self-
functioning, as is the endocrine system. You cannot direct your antibod-
ies to do this or that by thinking about them. They act on their own. It is 
L’homme machine, as de la Mettrie said, or La femme machine,  but with 
a tendency to self-destruction built in. Hypothyroidism is, for example, 
apparently an autoimmune disease, as is, perhaps, pancreatic cancer, and 
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as are many other diseases and cancers. Many forms of cancer appear to 
be brought about by random mishaps in the genetic code. We cannot in-
fluence by thinking the way a string of genetic code generates a certain 
protein or enzyme, as it is programmed to do, or the way the immune sys-
tem produces antibodies against what it perceives, not always correctly, 
as invading alien antigens. These mechanical systems do not always work 
all that well. They are cumbersome, redundant, and prone to error. Re-
cent work on the human genome and its functions, on cell biology, on 
the endocrine system, on the immune system with its terrifying power 
of self-destructive autoimmunity, and by neuroscientists on brain chem-
istry and the brain’s “wiring” is showing that a technological paradigm is 
a better way than a traditional organic paradigm to understand the body 
and even its most human-appearing concomitants of consciousness and 
the accompanying senses of self-hood and volition.
An authoritative recent feature essay in Science News, “Enter the Viro-
sphere,” summarizes recent work on viruses in ways that indicate how 
the workings of genes are machine-like, but make big problems for as-
sumptions about what constitutes “life.” Viruses were thought not to be 
alive, but scientists are now increasingly not so sure, hence the pun in the 
title “Virosphere” rather than “Biosphere.” On the one hand, viruses do 
not eat, respire, or reproduce. They have no metabolism, so they must be 
dead. On the other hand, viruses are made of genetic material that acts in 
many ways like that in “living organisms” such as bacteria, algae, rabbits, 
and human beings. A gene is a gene. Whether a given gene is in a virus or 
in the human genome, it is a pattern that constructs things like proteins. 
Viruses are everywhere. “A thimbleful of sea water contains millions of 
virus particles” (Ehrenberg 22). Viruses make up about 90 percent of the 
ocean’s biomass, killing an estimated 20 percent of that biomass every 
day. “Their killing feeds the world” (22), since so many “organisms” feed 
on dead organisms killed by viruses. Just as a living cell’s nucleus uses its 
surrounding cytoplasm “to replicate its own DNA using machinery out-
side of itself ” (qtd. from Jean-Michel Claverie in Ehrenberg 25), a virus 
is made of genetic material that acts like a nucleus in entering a host cell 
and using the machinery of that cell to reproduce itself. Viruses borrow 
genes from other gene systems and either pass them on to “infect” other 
gene systems, or incorporate them in their own genomes.
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It might be best to say that the new evidence does not so much lead 
to the conclusion that viruses are alive as suggest that all so-called liv-
ing things are subject, like viruses, to the machine-like processes of gene 
action. It may even be that the first “living thing” was a protovirus that 
ultimately mutated into biological cells, though that hypothesis is high-
ly controversial. It might aid coming to terms with “Die Sorge des Haus-
vaters ” if we think of Odradek as virus-like, or at any rate of we include 
the virus along with thing, plant, animal, and human beings in Odradek’s 
hybrid mixture of language-like systems. The virus’s relation to language 
is indicated in the terminology used to describe the two different ways 
bacterial and animal viruses enter a host cell, replicate themselves, and 
then leave the cell to continue their work. This is often a work of killing. 
According to how virologists express this process, the viral genome en-
ters a cell, “replicates” itself, then “transcribes” itself,” then “translates” 
itself, finally “assembling” and “packaging” itself before the replicated 
viral genome exits the cell in new multiple copies, like those made by a 
copying machine.
Figures drawn from the workings of language are, you can see, essential 
to expressing the results of genetic research. The three dominant meta-
phors in Ehrenberg’s article are “machinery,” “language,” and “infection.” 
These are used unselfconsciously and unproblematically. They are the 
usual figurative words for the way a virus works. One paragraph, how-
ever, ostentatiously, with evident irony, uses a sustained metaphor com-
paring the way viruses work to the global financial system, with sinister 
implications for the mindless technicity of both. The paragraph also re-
inforces my claim that we tend to think of each of these systems by fig-
urative analogy with the others, in the absence of any grounded literal 
terminology. Any description of these products of techné is catachrestic, 
that is, the borrowing from one realm of a term then used to name some-
thing whose working has no satisfactory literal name: “Viruses also may 
keep genes they’ve procured, and even bundle these assets together, as 
appears to be the case with several photosynthesis genes recently found 
in marine viruses. These findings hint at the vast viral contribution to the 
ocean’s gross national product and viruses’ significance in global energy 
production” (22).
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Fifth: Textual systems, sign systems generally, are also machine-like in 
their action. This can best be seen in the interference of constative and 
performative forms of language. Once these systems come into being 
(who knows how?) they are out of our control. They do things on their 
own which we are powerless to stop. As Paul de Man argued, we cannot 
prevent ourselves from making the same errors of misreading all over 
again even when we have correctly identified them as errors.12 Decisive 
here is de Man’s idea that performative utterances work on their own, not 
as a result of human agency. They work mechanically, through the force 
of language. And they work in weird and unpredictable ways. De Man al-
ways emphasized the mechanical, non-human, and arbitrary workings of 
language, as does, in a somewhat different way, Louis Armand through-
out Literate Technologies.13 The first draft of the present essay was writ-
ten by way of examples that were accessed spontaneously and somewhat 
randomly from the database stored somewhere in my brain’s memory 
center. Sentences just formed themselves magically in my mind, as words 
were fitted into pre-existing grammatical and syntactical paradigms. This 
happened by a process of invention in the double sense of discovery and 
making up. I then typed these sentences into my laptop. I suppose most 
writing by anyone gets done that way. It is uneasy-making, however, to 
realize that writing is so little under the writer’s conscious control and vo-
lition. I never know what I am going to write until I write it. Die Sprache 
spricht: Language speaks. It speaks through me by a species of ventrilo-
quism that uses me (in the sense of my body and my computer literate, 
keyboard-tapping, conscious self and fingers) as medium.
For Paul de Man, a performative utterance makes something happen, 
but not what is intended or predicted. The last sentences of de Man’s 
“Promises (Social Contract)” express this in terms of that paradigmatic 
performative, a promise: “The redoubtable efficacy of the text is due to 
the rhetorical model of which it is a version. This model is a fact of lan-
guage over which Rousseau himself has no control. Just as any other read-
er, he is bound to misread his own text as a promise of political change. 
The error is not within the reader; language itself dissociates the cogni-
tion from the act. Die Sprache verspricht (sich); to the extent that is nec-
essarily misleading, language just as necessarily conveys the promise of 
its own truth” (de Man 277). The German phrase is an ironic allusion to 
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Heidegger’s portentous, Die Sprache spricht, “Language speaks,” cited ear-
lier. “Versprechen” means “to promise,” as a reflexive: “to promise itself,” 
but it also means “to make a slip of the tongue.” This happens because of 
the doubleness of the prefix “ver-,” which can mean both for and against. 
De Man’s little phrase is an example of the nonsensical paronomasias, 
puns, and wordplay, built mechanically into language. Language speaks 
all right, but it says things the speaker does not intend, that are necessar-
ily misleading, for example in the form of a promise that cannot be kept. 
De Man goes on, notoriously, to assert that such rhetorical complexities, 
such linguistic mixups, “generate history.” As de Man expressed this un-
settling feature of performative language in a graduate seminar: “you aim 
at a bear and an innocent bird falls out of the sky.”
Put these five domains together, working like the interconnected ma-
chines that they are, linked as one big and extremely cumbersome and 
désoeuvrée machine, and you get the revolt of the robots big time. Using 
the technological model as a way of outlining what is happening in these 
five realms will not keep what is occurring from occurring. Like Odradek, 
my prime model in this essay of the inorganic ecotechnological, these 
unworked machines just keep on mindlessly doing their thing. This al-
ternative paradigm does, however, provide a better techné or tool than 
the organic model for sketching out what is happening as the water rises 
around us. Unfortunately, however, as my emphasis on what is irrational 
or aporetic about the (non)machines of various sorts I have named, the 
ecotechnological model does not lead to clear cognition or understand-
ing. At most it invites the sorts of performative action, such as passing 
laws about carbon emissions, that seem exceedingly unlikely to take 
place. The implacable law of auto-co-immunity forbids that.
This failure of both cognition and of effective action is taking place 
in fulfillment of a weird translation into Mayan hieroglyphs of Christ’s 
words on the cross. The oral expressions of these hieroglyphs were then 
transliterated into Western letters, according to a perhaps fallacious mys-
tery story I can no longer find among our books: “Sinking, Sinking! Black 
ink over nose.” This essay might be thought of as the inscription in black 
ink, exemplifications of the technicity of the letter, written on the nose of 
someone drowning in black ink.
November 5, 2011, Deer Isle, Maine
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Notes
1. See Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics 45–50 (original 34–8).
2. See Hamacher, especially 296–300.
3. For a fuller discussion, see my The Medium is the Maker: Browning, Freud, 
Derrida and the New Telepathic Ecotechnologies.
4. This the complex word Jean-Luc Nancy uses in the title of his book about 
modern non-community communities: The Inoperative Community (La 
communauté désoeuvrée).
5. The metaphor of a “cloudy spot” in Kafka’s writings, especially the parables, 
occurs three times in Walter Benjamin’s great “Kafka” essay. Of the opening 
anecdote about Potemkin, Benjamin says “The enigma which beclouds this 
story is Kafka’s enigma” (795). The famous parable “Before the Law” has a 
“cloudy spot at its interior” (802), and Kafka’s use of gesture is said to form 
“the cloudy part of the parables” (808). This part is cloudy because it is the 
place where clear-seeing of the doctrine, teaching, or moral that the parable 
ought to express is impossible. The parables of Jesus have a clear meaning. 
The parable of the sower in Matthew is about the Kingdom of Heaven and 
how to get there. Jesus tells the disciples that this is the case. Kafka’s parables 
have no such identifiable meaning. An impenetrable opacity resides where 
the meaning ought to be. Kafka’s parables therefore mean their lack of 
identifiable meaning.
6. My allusion is to what Walter Benjamin says of Kafka’s parables. See 
previous footnote.
7. “Oulipo (French pronunciation: [ulipo], short for French: Ouvroir de littérature 
potentielle; roughly translated: ‘workshop of potential literature’) is a loose 
gathering of (mainly) French-speaking writers and mathematicians which 
seeks to create works using constrained writing techniques. It was founded 
in 1960 by Raymond Queneau and François Le Lionnais. Other notable 
members include novelists Georges Perec and Italo Calvino, poet Oskar 
Pastior and poet/mathematician Jacques Roubaud.The group defines the term 
‘ littérature potentielle’ as (rough translation): ‘the seeking of new structures 
and patterns which may be used by writers in any way they enjoy.’Constraints 
are used as a means of triggering ideas and inspiration, most notably Perec’s 
‘story-making machine’ which he used in the construction of Life: A User’s 
Manual. As well as established techniques, such as lipograms (Perec’s novel 
A Void) and palindromes, the group devises new techniques, often based on 
mathematical problems such as the Knight’s Tour of the chess-board and 
permutations” (“Oulipo”). (Underlined words are links from the Wikipedia 
entry, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oulipo>. [Accessed Nov. 5, 2011.])
8. For Cage, Perec, Oulip, and Joyce as creators of texts in one way or another 
made by a machine-like process of permutation see the brilliantly learned and 
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provocative book by Louis Armand, Literate Technologies: Language, Cognition, 
Technicity, especially the final chapter, “Constellations,” 165–223. Though 
Armand’s primary focus is on the technological aspects of language, thought, 
and consciousness, what he calls “literate technologies,” rather than on 
climate change, on the financial system, or on national communities, or even 
on the effects of new media, his book has nevertheless greatly influenced my 
thinking in this essay.
9. I have discussed these sequences in The Medium is the Maker, 27–9.
10. For whatever it is worth, which is probably not much, Kafka himself had no 
permanent residence. Guides to Prague visitors, as I know from experience, 
point out apartment after apartment where Kafka is said to have lived, mostly 
with his family, if what he did can be called living, which Kafka himself 
doubted. Most of these apartments are around the famous Old Town Square 
or on adjacent side streets, but at least one is in a quite different part of the 
city, across the river and near Prague Castle. Like Joyce in Zurich, Kafka 
moved a lot. He was without permanent residence. Joyce moved from flat to 
flat because he could not pay his rent and was evicted. Kafka moved because 
his father was rising up in the world and wanted to live in always more and 
more pretentious apartments.
11. A “shrift” is a penalty prescribed to a Catholic parishioner by a priest after 
confession. Criminals sentenced to be hanged were given “short shrift” before 
being executed. They were shriven in a hurry. See Shakespeare, Richard 
III. “To give him short shrift” is in German “kurzen Prozeß mit ihm machen.” 
Prozeß is certainly a word with Kafkesque resonances, though Joseph K’s 
Prozeß is anything but short. He is told rather that his best hope is to make his 
trial interminable, which, unhappily, does not happen.
12. See de Man’s “Allegory of Reading (Profession de foi)” in Allegories of Reading: 
“Deconstructive readings can point out the unwarranted identifications 
achieved by substitution, but they are powerless to prevent their recurrence 
even in their own discourse, and to uncross, so to speak, the aberrant 
exchanges that have taken place” (242).
13. See, for example, de Man’s “Excuses (Confessions)” in Allegories of Reading: 
“The deconstruction of the figural dimension is a process that takes place 
independently of any desire; as such it is not unconscious but mechanical, 
systematic in its performance but arbitrary in its principle, like a grammar. 
This threatens the autobiographical subject not as the loss of something that 
once was present and that it once possessed, but as a radical estrangement 
between the meaning and the performance of any text” (298).
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Chapter 3
Care
Within the limits of capitalism, 
economizing means taking care
Bernard Stiegler
Consumers were consuming consumer items
– Raymond Queneau
The future of Europe and the world must be thought in terms of the psy-
cho-power characteristic of control societies, the effects of which have 
become massive and destructive.1 Psycho-power is the systematic orga-
nization of the capture of attention made possible by the psycho-technol-
ogies that have developed with the radio (1920), with television (1950), 
and with digital technologies (1990), spreading all over the planet 
through various forms of networks. It results in a constant industrial ca-
nalization of attention, which has provoked recently a massive phenom-
enon: the destruction of this attention which American nosologists call 
attention deficit disorder. This destruction of attention is a particular case, 
an especially serious one, of the destruction of libidinal energy whereby 
the capitalist libidinal economy self-destructs.
Attention is the reality of individuation in Gilbert Simondon’s sense of 
the term: it is always both psychic and collective. Attention, which is the 
mental faculty of concentrating on an object, that is, of giving oneself an 
object, is also the social faculty of taking care of this object—as of anoth-
er, or as the representative of another, as the object of the other: attention 
is also the name of civility as it is founded on philia, that is, on socialized 
libidinal energy. This is why the destruction of attention is both the de-
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struction of the psychic apparatus and the destruction of the social ap-
paratus (formed by collective individuation). This is so to the extent that 
the latter constitutes a system of care, given that to pay attention is also to 
take care. (It is also to watch out, which is taken up in the emphasis I will 
put on destruction.) Such a system of care is also a libidinal economy, 
wherein a psychic apparatus and a social apparatus hook up, whose de-
struction today is engendered by technological apparatuses. And we will 
see that they are in fact psychotechnological and sociotechnological ap-
paratuses. In other words, we are confronted with a question stemming 
from what I call a general organology.
The major stake of attention deficit disorder and of everything stem-
ming from the destructive effects of the exploitation of attention by psy-
chopower is therefore the fragility inflicted upon the infantile psychic 
apparatus and on sociability founded on philia. Now, this precocious liq-
uidation of libidinal economy is also what destroys the industrial capital-
ism of investment: the organ of psychopower is marketing as the arm of a 
financialized capitalism having become essentially speculative.
～
The gigantic financial crisis sending tremors all over the world is the di-
sastrous result of the hegemony of the short term, of which the destruction 
of attention is at once effect and cause. The loss of attention is a loss of 
capacities of long term projection (that is, of investment in objects of 
desire) which systemically effects the psychic apparatuses of consumers 
manipulated by the psychopower as well as the manipulators themselves: 
the speculator is typically the person who pays no attention to the ob-
jects of his speculation, and who takes no care of them either.
The act of the speculator has effects on the multitude of conscious-
nesses that undergo, directly or indirectly, the effects of his speculation 
through the psychotechnological devices of attention capture. These 
consciousnesses are thus always a little more enclosed in the default of 
attention and care, that is, in the short term, which justifies a posteriori the 
act of the speculator: this act is performative in the sense Jean-François 
Lyotard lends to it in The Postmodern Condition. This is how a system of 
the short term gets established, along with the vicious circle of the de-
struction of attention.
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This is the context in which the colossal environmental crises rage on, 
now in first place in the world’s concerns (Besorgen) and in the atten-
tion (Sorge) of the Nobel Academy. Here is discovered and planetarily 
recognized what I will later analyse as the third limit of capitalism, after 
the tendency of diminishing returns. It also follows the tendency of li-
bidinal energy to self-destruction (resulting directly from the destruction 
of attention).
This is the context of an environmental crisis which suddenly con-
siders self-evident the necessity of planning on a long term basis, that 
is, of re-elaborating a politics of investment—precisely at a time when an 
enormous financial crisis emerges which brings to light the calamity of 
speculative and short term organization induced by attention-destroying 
financialization. Here we can see new operations of spectacular industrial 
concentrations being implemented or prepared, for example the OPA 
by Microsoft on Yahoo, and the decision by Google to invest in a cell 
phone network.
The objective of these operations is to gain control over social net-
works, that is, the digital networks wherein new models for the capture 
and formation of psychic attention as well as collective attention are re-
vealed: it is a new age of reticulation that is being implemented, and it 
constitutes a new stage of what I have described as a process of gramma-
tization. At this stage, it is the mechanisms of transindividuation that are 
grammatized, that is, formalized, reproducible, and thus calculable and 
automatable. Now, transindividuation is the way psychic individuations 
are meta-stabilized as collective individuation: transindividuation is the 
operation of the fully effective socialization of the psychic.
With the social networks, the question of technologies of attention 
becomes manifestly and explicitly the question of technologies of tran-
sindividuation. The latter are henceforth formalized by the technologies 
of psychic individuation originally conceived in view of ending up with 
a collective individuation, with Simondon’s analysis posing that psychic 
individuation is also and in the same stroke collective individuation re-
ceiving spectacular and organalogical confirmation. It is a matter of tech-
nologies of indexation, annotation, tags and modelized traces (M-traces), 
wiki technologies and collaborative technologies in general.
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Here a reading of Foucault is especially necessary and promising: Fou-
cault also showed that the techniques of the self, as techniques of psychic 
organisation, are always already techniques of collective organisation—
which he demonstrates in his analysis of the correspondence of Seneca 
with Lucilius. On the other hand, Foucault did not see coming the ques-
tion of psychopower, whereby marketing, from the emergence of the 
programme industries, transforms the psychotechniques of the self and 
of psychic individuation into industrial psychotechnologies of transindi-
viduation, that is, into psychotechnologies threaded by networks, and as 
the organization of an industrial reticulation of transindividuation that 
short-circuits traditional and institutional social networks.2 After having 
destroyed the traditional social networks, the psychotechnologies be-
come socialtechnologies, and they tend to become a new milieu and a 
new reticular condition of transindividuation grammatizing new forms 
of social relations.
～
In order to analyze these facts, which constitute the specific context on 
the basis of which it is necessary and possible to think a future for Europe 
and the world, we must return to the question of what attention actually 
is. Psychic and collective individuation is essentially what forms atten-
tion insofar as the latter is necessarily both psychic and social, and at-
tention is what results from the relation holding between retentions and 
protentions in the sense Husserl gives to these terms (Husserl naming 
intentional consciousness what I am calling attention). Now, this relation 
of retentions and protentions whose result is attention is always mediated 
by tertiary retentions—of which psychotechnologies and sociotechnolo-
gies are instances.
We must speak of tertiary retentions if we are to complete the analysis 
in which Husserl distinguishes between primary and secondary reten-
tions. Primary retention is, for example, what happens when you listen 
to me speaking and, applying the verb I use to the subject preceding it, 
a subject you no longer perceive, you maintain this subject in the verb, 
which constitutes the maintenance/presence of my discourse which is 
also what maintains your attention: you conjugate the subject to the verb, 
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with a view to projecting this action designated by the verb toward its 
complement, projection which is a protention, that is, an expectation.
What Husserl calls primary retention is this operation consisting of re-
taining a word in another (an operation that Husserl analyzes by studying 
the way in a melody a note maintains in itself the preceding one, and proj-
ects forward the expectation of another note—Leonard Meyer describes 
this as an expectation): it is the operation consisting in retaining a word 
which however is no longer present, the beginning of the sentence having 
been pronounced and in this respect already past, and yet still present in 
the sense that is thus elaborated as discourse.
We must distinguish the operation we are calling primary retention 
from secondary retention. The latter is a memory: something that be-
longs to a past having passed by (it is thus a former primary retention), 
whereas the primary retention still belongs to the present, to a passing 
present: it is the passage itself, per se, and in this respect the direction of 
the present—its sense in the sense of direction as well. Now, the second-
ary memory is also what permits us to select possibilities from the stock 
of primary retentions: primary retention is a primary selection whose cri-
teria are furnished by the secondary retentions.
You are listening to me, but each one of you hears something different 
in what I say, and this is owing to the fact that your secondary retentions 
are singular ones: your pasts are singular ones. In the same stroke, your 
apprehension of what I say is each time singular: the meaning that you 
assign to my discourse, whereby you individualize yourself with my dis-
course, is each time singular—and this is the case because you select each 
time singularly primary retentions in the discourse I am giving for you, 
and through which I am trying to retain and to maintain your attention.
However, if you could, now, repeat the whole discourse that you have 
just heard, for example because you had recorded it on a memory stick in 
MP3 format, you could affect obviously new primary retentions, depend-
ing on previous primary retentions, which become in the meantime sec-
ondary retentions. You would thus call into question the meaning of this 
discourse already constituted by yourself: you would produce a differ-
ence in meaning on the basis of this repetition, through which this mean-
ing would moreover reveal itself as a process much more than a state, and 
more precisely, the process of your own individuation hooking up with 
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the individuation that this discourse exemplifies, which is, in this case, 
my own individuation. You would thus form retentional circuits, which I 
do not have time to explain why they are at the heart of what must be 
conceptualized as circuits of transindividuation.
Be that as it may, that which allows such a discourse to be repeated, for 
example in the form of a recording in MP3 format, is a tertiary retention 
with the same status as the text I am now reading for you, which allows 
me to repeat a discourse that I conceived elsewhere, and at another previ-
ous time: this is what Plato called a hypomnesic pharmakon. Such a phar-
makon allows the production of attentional effects, that is, retentional 
and protentional hook-ups, whose existence entirely justifies the defini-
tion of this pharmakon as a psychotechnical device. Such a device allows, 
to be more precise, the control of retentional and protentional hook-ups 
in view of producing attentional effects.
Such effects are also those that Husserl analyzed as the condition of 
the origin of geometry—where writing is what allows the formation of 
types of rational primary and secondary retentions, through which the 
long circuits of transindividuation are formed, as well as those that Plato 
denounces in Phaedrus or in Gorgias as that which allows the short-cir-
cuiting of the anamnesic work of thought through the intermediary of 
terniary and hypomnesic retentions.
Tertiary retentions are therefore mnemotechnical forms of the exte-
riorization of psychic life constituting organized traces into retentional 
devices (of which the devices described in The Order of Things, The Ar-
chaeology of Knowledge or Discipline and Punish are cases) that character-
ize the systems of care, as therapeutic systems whose retentional devices 
are the pharmacological basis.3
Now, retentional devices constitute themselves in a new distributed or-
ganization that in fact represents a major break with the former organi-
zation of industrial society—and which is the subject of a recent book 
by Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit. I would now 
like to show that this break is a meeting of the ways faced with which a 
new industrial politics must make choices, drawing the consequences of 
these mutations, on the basis of which a new issue out of the hyperin-
dustrial world could present itself. But I must first of all specify why this 
break, which is both an opportunity and a new danger (it is induced by a 
110 Bernard Stiegler
new pharmakon), emerges at a moment when capitalism runs up against 
three limits.
～
It was at the end of the 19th century and at the end of the 20th century that 
capitalism met with its first two limits:
The industrial revolution, as the implementation of the capitalist sys-
tem of production, is the extension of the process of grammatization 
whereby and wherein tertiary retentions (which include psychotech-
niques) are formed by apparatuses of the control of gestures which al-
low, as machine-tools, the liquidation of workers’ know-how, and, on this 
basis, the realization of immense gains in productivity, and the develop-
ment of a new prosperity. However, besides the misery this process en-
genders in the form of the proletariat, it encounters the limit analysed by 
Marx as the tendency of diminishing returns.
To fight against this limit of capitalist development, the American way 
of life invented the figure of the consumer whose libido is systematical-
ly put to work to counter the problems of excess production, which is 
the social concretization of this tendency of the rate of profit to fall. This 
canalization of the libido operated by the capture of attention ends up 
by liquidating the expertise in living [savoir-vivre] of consumers, by the 
massive development of societies of services which let them off the hook 
of their own existences, that is, of their diverse responsibilities as adults 
having reached their legal maturity. This is what ends up provoking the 
liquidation of their own desire, as well as the desire of their own children, 
to the strict extent that the latter can no longer identify with them, both 
because these parents no longer know anything, and are no longer re-
sponsible for anything, having become themselves big fat children, and 
because the process of primary identification is short-circuited by psy-
chopower through the psychotechnologies. This destruction of desire 
(that is to say also the destruction of attention and of care) is a new limit 
encountered by capitalism, this time not only as mode of production, but 
also as mode of consumption, way of life, that is, as biopower having be-
come psychopower.
A third limit henceforth imposes itself on our attention. It consists 
in the fact that the development of the industrial way of life, inherited 
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from the 19th and 20th centuries, has become not only toxic on the level of 
minds and of libido, but also on the geophysical and biological level. This 
third limit will not be able to be raised or effaced before the invention 
of a mode of life constitutive of a new way of taking care and of paying 
attention to/of the world by the invention of therapeutics: techniques, 
technologies and socio-pharmacological apparatuses of the formation of 
attention corresponding to the organological specificities of our time: to 
the specificities of the technologies of transindividuation forming the in-
frastructure of an industrial system itself functioning in an endogenous 
way as a system of care: making care its “chain of value” that is, its econo-
my, and thereby renewing with the original sense of the word economy, 
for to economize is to take care.
Western societies, in the sway of the exportation of technologies is-
suing from their mode of production, have engendered industrial com-
petitors (on whom Paul Valéry was already meditating as to their con-
sequences to come) by a movement of financialization that could do 
nothing but cause a global economic war. In this new form of war, the 
stakes are a defense of society no longer as an enemy, exterior or interior, 
but against a process that ruins time, that is, the horizon of the long term, 
and the possibility of projecting this horizon in giving oneself objects of 
desire. This process spins out of control at this precise moment when the 
effects of the three limits of capitalism combine.
Global competition fired up by financialization has ended up in the de-
struction of the complex equilibrium that allowed that capitalism’s devel-
opment also be the social development of industrial democracies by the 
Keynesian organization of the redistribution of wealth under the author-
ity of a welfare State, and it is in the context of the economic war which 
resulted that marketing has become, as Gilles Deleuze put it, “the instru-
ment of social control” in the societies of control, and that the tendency 
of libidinal energy to self-destruct suddenly worsened.
Thus, on the side of consumption, the capitalist mode of life has be-
come at the end of the 20th century an addictive process less and less ca-
pable of finding sustainable satisfactions—this has induced great discon-
tent in the civilization of consumption, which has replaced culture, that 
is, care, if we accept that culture precedes cults of all types, that is, attach-
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ments to objects whose ensemble constitutes a system of care. It is in this 
context that Jenny Uechi could write in Adbusters that:
According to surveys conducted recently by the sociologist 
Juliet Schor, 81% of Americans estimate that their country is 
too centered on consumption and almost 90% of them con-
sider that it is too materialistic.
～
We all know that in no case will this new global capitalism be able to de-
velop in reproducing the modes of production and consumption that 
have been characteristic of Western, Japanese, and Korean industrial 
democracies. For the exportation of this mode of life is also that of the 
growth in the rate of production of toxins of all sorts toward the greatest 
part of the planetary population, and which can result in nothing else but 
the disappearance of the human race—to say nothing of the phenomena 
of the destruction of psychic apparatuses that also create their effects as 
quickly as “growth” spreads over the world, which is indeed, by this very 
fact, a stunted growth [une mécroissance]. The new global capitalism will 
not be able to renew its energies without inventing a new logic and new 
objects of investment—and here the word investment must be taken lit-
erally and in all its senses: both the sense it has in industrial economy and 
its sense within libidinal economy.
At this stage of my exposé, it is interesting to check for heart murmurs 
in a text by Jeremy Rifkin which is circulating all over France and Europe. 
Rifkin, setting his discourse under the watchword of “the end of the age 
of oil,” asks how we are to assure a “sustainable development” but with-
out ever asking the question of the problem of stunted growth, that is, 
of a “growth” that destroys desire, and that deindividuates producers as 
well as consumers, stunting the dynamism of what Max Weber called the 
spirit of capitalism, a spirit that has to be apprehended as libidinal energy 
and that can be constituted only in processes of sublimation henceforth 
annihilated by marketing techniques.
While never taking up these questions (which were however the hori-
zon of both his European Dream and The Age of Access), Rifkin insists, ap-
ropos the age of oil and more generally of fossil fuels, its growing “exter-
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nal costs” (which in economics is called negative externalities): he thus 
describes the third limit encountered by a capitalism become an actually 
globalised technological system of production and of consumption. In 
this context, he writes, there is a residual stock of fossil energy that we 
will have to learn to exploit to the hilt, that is, the most economically pos-
sible, while at the same time putting into place other processes for the 
production and consumption of energy:
So as to prepare the future, each government will have to ex-
ploit new energy sources and establish new economic models.
I am myself convinced that the stakes are a change in the economic 
model. But I do not believe that the heart of the question is the energy 
of subsistence: the real question is that of an energy of existence that is 
libidinal energy.
Now, by only asking the question of a new production of renewable, 
sustainable energy of subsistence, founded on the intermediary storage 
by the technology of the production of hydrogen, Rifkin would have us 
believe that the energy crisis is a passing one and that it will be able to be 
surmounted, and along with it the third limit of capitalism, without hav-
ing to ask the question of libidinal energy, without taking into account 
this second limit which is the truth of the third one: where the libido has 
been destroyed, and where the drives it contained, as Pandora’s box en-
closing every evil, henceforth are at the helm of beings devoid of atten-
tion, and incapable of taking care of their world.
Libidinal energy is essentially sustainable, except when it decomposes 
into drive-driven energy, which is on the contrary destructive of its ob-
jects. The drive is an energy, but an essentially destructive one, for the 
drive consumes its object, which is to say it consummates it. This con-
sumption and consummation implemented by consumers is a destruc-
tion. Consummare, the etymology of the word to consume, and which ini-
tially meant to accomplish, to reach the goal, becomes with Christianity 
a synonym of to lose, perdere, and to destroy, destruere. Starting in 1580, 
the French word consommer means to do away through use with goods and 
energies.  Starting in 1745 we begin to hear about consumers, and con-
sumption designates then the usage one has of an object for the satisfac-
tion of needs. Consumption becomes an economic term at the beginning 
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of the 20th century. And it was only in 1972 that the word consumerism 
made its appearance in the United States.
～
If consummation is that which destroys its object, libido is to the con-
trary that which, as desire and not as drive, that, as the sublimation in-
trinsic to desire, takes care of its object. This is why the question of the 
third limit of capitalism is not that of the relinquishment of fossil fuels 
but rather the relinquishment of a drive-driven economy and the recon-
stitution of a libidinal economy, that is, a sustainable one, given that this 
energy increases with the frequentation of its objects. The third limit of 
capitalism is not only the destruction of the reserves of fossil fuel, but 
the limit constituted by the drive to destruction of all objects in general 
by consumption, in so far as they have become objects of drives, and not 
objects of desire and attention—the psychotechnological organization of 
consumption provoking the destruction of attention in all its forms, on 
the psychic level as well as the collective level.
Because he seems to ignore everything involved in the second limit of 
capitalism and its meaning once the third limit has been reached, Rifkin’s 
discourse seems to me fraught with dangers: he would have us believe 
that a drive-driven growth could be sustained owing to the technology of 
hydrogen. And yet, this discourse is interesting and of import for at least 
three reasons:
1. it proposes a real alternative to the question of the energy 
of subsistence with this system founded on hydrogen which 
would allow a harmful limit to be pushed back;
2. it poses the questions about energy that are never distinct from 
questions on networks of communication and information, 
that is, hypomnesic systems and retentional devices of tertia-
ry retentions;
3. finally, and above all, it posits that the network founded on hy-
drogen must be based on the model of social networks made 
possible by the World Wide Web and, thus, must get beyond 
the opposition between production and consumption.
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An organization based on consumption, and constituted by its oppo-
sition to production, is dangerous not only because it produces excess 
quantities of carbon dioxide, but because it destroys minds. The oppo-
sition of production and consumption has as its consequence that both 
producers and consumers are proletarianized by the loss of their knowl-
edge: they are reduced to an economy of subsistence, and deprived of an 
economy of their existence—they are deprived of libidinal economy, that 
is, of desire. This is why the fundamental question opened by the combi-
nation of the three limits of capitalism is the overcoming of this opposi-
tion and of the proletarinarization it engenders structurally.
Now what is extremely interesting in Rifkin’s proposition consists in 
positing, based on the position set forth in the first lines of the study, the 
energy systems and information or mnemotechnical systems co-develop, 
that the most recent system of communication, the Internet, breaks pre-
cisely with the opposition of consumption and production and thus con-
stitutes the possibility of implementing a new distributed and decentral-
ized network of sustainable energies where everyone would be producer 
as well as consumer, by combining the technology of stockage by hydro-
gen and that of networking along the lines of the Internet model.
Confronted with this unprecedented challenge to planetary (planetari-
anized) humanity—a challenge of practically sublime dimensions, which 
demands an extraordinary mobilization of the forces of the spirit to meet 
it: a challenge convoking what Kant called the suprasensible, that is, also 
the infinite (infinitely renewable)—the temptation of the industrial and 
capitalist world is to come up with a technological and scientific response 
in denial of the three limits of capitalism. This temptation borne of denial 
cannot apprehend:
1. that these three limits, when they combine, produce a sys-
temic evolution at a superior level, that is, a phenomenon 
of emergence,
2. that we must change industrial models not only to produce a 
new technical and scientific rationality, but to constitute a new 
social rationality, productive of motivation, of reasons for liv-
ing together, that is, of taking care of the world and of those 
living there,
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3. that the fundamental question is here to reorient the financial 
fluxes toward long-term investments by waging war against 
speculation, but also against modes of life founded on the short 
term, of which the most every-day example is the organization 
of society by a marketing systematically exploiting drives by 
destroying libido as that which evinces the capable of sustain-
able investment.
Consumption that becomes drive-based is profoundly dangerous for 
society. If there were no limit to this consumption, and if fossil fuels 
were inexhaustible, the catastrophe would perhaps be even greater than 
the one resulting from the deplenishment of fossil fuels. Perhaps this 
deplenishment is finally a kind of stroke of luck: the opportunity to un-
derstand that the true question of energy is not that one, that the energy 
of subsistence is of interest only insofar as it contributes to an energy of 
existence—and is such in its capacity to project what I call the plane of 
consistencies. Now this is the true stake of what is today called, in an am-
biguous expression, ascendant innovation.
～
Over the past ten years, society as a whole (in industrialized countries 
and in developing countries), because of a spectacular drop in costs in 
the field of the electronic technologies of the fabrication of materials as 
well as transactions and duplications of data, acquires new practical, but 
also analytical and reflexive competencies, through the spread of digital 
apparatuses giving access to functionalities hitherto reserved to profes-
sional actors—these functionalities were hitherto organized by the in-
dustrial division of labor (and by everything coming with it, thus for ex-
ample the law of intellectual property). These functionalities are those of 
the social networks.
This socialization of innovation calls more and more often on social 
forms of apprenticeship that would appear to be self-organizing and to 
elude the usual processes of the socialization of innovation described as 
“descending” (piloted by the research/development/marketing com-
plex): it constitutes what is more and more often called “ascendant” in-
novation. Ascendant innovation is a structural break with the organiza-
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tion of social relations in the industrial world based on the oppositional 
couple production/consumption. It is founded on motivations oriented 
toward consistencies, that is, toward objects of what the Greeks and the 
Romans called skholè and otium, which are very specific objects of atten-
tion: the objects of knowledge (know-how, art of living, the disposition 
to theory, that is, to contemplation).
Digital technologies, where the technologies of information, commu-
nication, and telecommunications converge and tend to amalgamate, and 
on the basis of which a sector of communicating objects called “internet 
objects” is developing, form a new technological milieu, reticulatory and 
relational in nature, belonging to what Simondon called an “associated 
technico-geographical milieu,” reconfiguring what he also called the pro-
cess of psychic and collective individuation, and transforming into tech-
nologies of the spirit what hitherto has functioned essentially as technol-
ogies of control.
In this technological milieu, electronic apparatuses form a systemic en-
semble with the network owing its existence to the IP protocol. Now, the 
resulting dynamic system, in constant evolution, grounded in a relational 
economy of miniaturized and personalized equipment and relational 
services—what is indeed called, and in particular by Jeremy Rifkin, re-
lational technologies (“R technologies”)—install new social dynamics, 
absolutely unheard-of with what hitherto was characteristic of industrial 
society, and which are propelled by a psycho-social state of the popula-
tion no longer content with the classical organizational model, and which 
stores up, therefore, a dynamic potential in the form of expectations, and 
by the combination of the effects of Moore’s “law” and the specificities of 
the IP networks.
The characteristics proper to the new technological milieu being 
formed with the IP protocol, which must be apprehended as a technolog-
ical protocol of reticulation with structural consequences in the field of 
social reticulation, can be put down to its both bidirectional and intrinsi-
cally productive and collective character of a metalanguage of a new type, 
whereby metadata are collected and organized: it is the combination of 
these characteristics that founds the constitution of what are called “so-
cial networks.”
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This metalanguage consititues a new epoch in the process of gramma-
tization that globally transforms the conditions of transindividuation. 
A psychic process is translated at the level of a collective individuation 
where the psychic individuation is marked, inscribed so to speak in the 
real, and is recognized by other psychic individuals: this work of collec-
tive individuation by psychic individuation, and conversely, is the process 
of transindividuation. Now it is precisely this circuit formed by the process 
of individuation that can be observed in the “social networks”—however 
tawdry they may appear at first sight.
This is why the dynamics induced by the technological protocol of 
reticulation IP must be described as the effects of a process of psychic, 
collective and technical individuation the likes of which have never ex-
isted before. As poor and disappointing as the social-digital networks ap-
pear to us, most of the time, they bring together, henceforth, hundreds 
of millions of psychic individuals in a processes of collective individua-
tion that can sometimes be evaluated as rich and inventive—if we recall 
online video games, the network Second Life, Facebook, MSN, Skyblogs, 
etc. But we must also include collaborative platforms like Wikipedia, the 
open source communities in the field of software development with the 
Linux system, and so many other variegated initiatives that have taken off 
in the world—collaborative spaces of teaching, cooperatives of knowl-
edge, and so on.
The Simondonian theory of psychosocial individuation is a theory of 
relations in which this individuation is produced via a process of tran-
sindividuation (which engenders what Simondon calls significations). 
The process of transindivuation consists in the formation of circuits 
“knitted” by these relations, whereby the process of co-individuation can 
be meta-stabilized. However, the conditions of formation of such circuits 
are quite variable. In particular, these circuits can either imply psychic in-
dividuals formed by them, this implication then being the very process 
of their formation, or, on the contrary they can short-circuit them and 
impose formations of signification in which they have not participated—
the psychic individuals having been proletarianized, that is, disindividu-
alized. The significations in which transindividuation consist then tend 
to loose their sense and their direction: this is what occurs in dissoci-
ated milieus.
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Such milieux are created in the production/consumption dichotomy, 
and this causes a generalized loss of individuation, and a protean dis-
content and unease. The IP technology is on the contrary what allows 
the proliferation of new circuits of transindividuation, and that’s why it 
is massively invested in by social practices that were neither anticipat-
ed nor programmed by any industrial or commercial strategy. It is thus 
that this technico-relational milieu tends to reconstitute associated and 
dialogical milieus (that is, where all those who participate in this milieu 
contribute to its individuation) by the unfolding of technologies of tran-
sindividuation.
This is not to say that these technologies cannot serve the cause of the 
short-circuiting of transindividuation. All attentional technologies (and 
these digital technologies of transindividuation belong to the group of at-
tentional technologies) are pharmacological to the strict extent that, as 
technologies of the formation of attention, they can be reversed and up-
turned into technologies of the deformation of this attention, and short-
circuit this attention, that is, exclude it from the process of transindividu-
ation and signification: they can always produce dissociation.
This is the context that ought to spur the European Union to elabo-
rate a new industrial model, based on what I call with my friends in the 
association Ars Industrialis, an industrial politics of the technologies of 
spirit—that is, of sublimation—as the only sustainable libidinal econo-
my. It is only on this condition that Rifkin’s proposition can supply a ba-
sis of subsistence (and a basis for a bio-politics conceived at the level of 
the biosphere) for a new politics of existence: a noopolitics susceptible of 
reversing and overcoming the deadly logic of psychopower. The actual 
question, for Europe as for the rest of the world, is whether it can invent 
with America and the other major industrialized countries a European 
way of life where economizing means taking care.
Notes
1. This essay was translated by Georges Collins.
2. At first sight and after a preliminary analysis, the formalization of 
transindividuation here appears to constitute the ultimate and perfect 
concretization of what I have elsewhere described as the destruction of 
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the associated milieux, which are the symbolic milieux, by the formation 
of dissociated milieux that short-circuit the transitional instances of 
transindividuation, which form circuits of transindividuation which are 
too long for the rhythms of evolution of industrial society. And yet, I 
also believe that the formalization of transindividuation constitutes an 
altogether unheard-of possibility for the reconstitution of the long circuits of 
transindividuation. Here is where the stakes show up in concentrated form as 
a crossroads for a planet having become globally hyperindustrial.
3. Attention, call it A, is a function of tertiary retentions, that is, of 
mnemotechniques and mnemotechnologies, call them R3, to the extent that 
the latter overdetermine the relation between retentions and protentions, R 
and P, and given that the tertiary retentions form systems that must be called 
retentional devices, RD. Here is a formula: A = fR3 = R/P where RE = RD.
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Chapter 4
Unicity
Justin Read
Unicity is a term produced by the 1963 poem “cidade/city/cité” by the 
Brazilian poet Augusto de Campos that I have derived as a concept de-
scribing world order during globalization. The “nature” of this concept is 
such, however, that we cannot think of “Unicity” as conceptual in a nor-
mative way. That is, “Unicity” does operate as an abstract concept describ-
ing the world in which we live, but its abstraction must not be assumed to 
be an idealization. The abstraction of “Unicity” as a concept is, rather, its 
virtualization—a virtual-reality through which the value of ideals, ideal-
izations, essences, spirits, utopias, and so forth, is evacuated completely.1 
Accordingly, the Unicity is not just a concept that describes the world 
of globalization; the Unicity is the world of globalization, the world we 
inhabit. Framed in logico-poetic terms, the Unicity is the line at which 
metaphor, metonymy, analogy, symbol, identity, tautology, and contra-
diction cease to be different in concrete space.
The emergence of the Unicity is indicative of a historical, structural 
shift in world order, typically denoted under the name “globalization.” 
Globalization is the process by which everything in the world approach-
es planetary scale: production, markets, architecture, society, life itself. 
But “planetary scale” by no means equals “massive” or “homogenous.” 
By thinking through the Unicity, we come to understand the propor-
tion of the planet in terms of a unified “sliding scale” that extends from 
sub-atomic particles out to the movement of galaxies; the Unicity is, in 
a word, universal, but only because it operates both microscopically and 
macroscopically, locally and globally. The planetary scale of globalization 
is thus a means by which to measure movement across the world, from 
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any location to any other. There is no difference in the Unicity—how can 
anything be different if all is One? Nonetheless there are movements—
flows within networks, and flows across multiple networks. Thus, there 
must be a way to calculate movements across mutually embedded net-
works. The Unicity provides the scale by which network flows may be 
calculated as differential movement within a singular space.
Stated another way, the Unicity is the line at which the world reaches 
absolute network integration, the mutual embedding of seemingly di-
verse informational networks into a complex systematic singularity. The 
Unicity is the “seam” or “border” between networks by which movement 
through one network with respect to movement across another network 
may be calculated and quantified. With respect to network integration, 
the Unicity may be thought of as the possibility of seamless measurability 
from one network to the next, making possible “leaps” from quanta to 
organic molecules to bodies to ecosystems to digital computer networks 
to cellphones to solar systems to economic/financial flows to warfare to 
linguistic translation to plumbing to garbage collection to academic pub-
lishing to whatever, ad infinitum, along a singular scale of measurement. Be-
cause movement is utterly measurable, the “leap” from one network to 
the next in the Unicity therefore becomes a “leap of confidence” rather 
than a “leap of faith.” Although any particular network may appear dis-
tinct or different from another, the Unicity allows movements within one 
network (i.e., network traffic) and movements within another network 
to be measured in tandem. Thus, although there are no differences per 
se in the Unicity, we must always consider the Unicity to be a differential 
system—a differential space.
As such the Unicity is a form of virtual reality, but only in the follow-
ing way: it is the seam uniting the concrete terrain of the planet and the 
virtual terrain of networked informational flows. The Unicity is therefore 
virtual reality because it is both virtual and reality. Perhaps we think of 
“virtual” in terms of “immaterial,” and perhaps this connotation occurs, 
at least in philosophy and critical theory, because the “virtual” has been 
coded to mean the “possible” (though “not necessarily actualized”). In 
today’s world order, however, we tacitly accept the virtual as both a real 
force and a commonplace aspect of daily life. Everything in the world has 
entered into the flow of informational networks: finance and communi-
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cations, of course; but also transportation (we can go to anywhere from 
anywhere on the planet); energy (generated and utilized anywhere in 
the world); production (things can be manufactured anywhere and con-
sumed anywhere); agriculture (food can be grown anywhere and eaten 
anywhere); and so forth. Ultimately, life itself has been informationalized 
and networked: the meaning of life is no longer a metaphysical question, 
but a physical process of metabolism (transmission of genetic informa-
tion). The space of life (i.e., the planet) has been irrevocably altered by 
human production, to the point that it is no longer “natural,” in the true 
sense of “nature.” There is no nature left, only an ecological system, a singu-
lar network environment. All in all, we can think of the world in two ways: 
on the one hand there is the “rough” terrain of the world’s geography, and 
on the other hand, there is the “smooth” terrain of global informational 
flows. We tend to think that the “smooth terrain” of globalization covers 
the “rough terrain” of the planet, but this is not quite correct. The Unicity 
is the integration of “discrete” networks (such as listed above) into a sin-
gular network, a “network of networks.” But, recognizing the planet and 
life on the planet as networks themselves, the Unicity is also the border-
line between the “rough” terrain and the “smooth” terrain: it is the line at 
which the informational world saturates the real world (rather than “cov-
ering” it). These two “hands”—the rough/real world on the one hand 
and the smooth/virtual world on the other—are in fact the same hand.
There is no reason why this shift to globalization (the emergence of 
Unicity) has occurred; furthermore, there is no direction—finality—to-
wards which globalization is heading. History no longer propels us for-
ward (it does not “overdetermine our movement”) to an end, as if glo-
balization were mandated by human progress. Just because things happen 
over time and space does not mean that things “progress” or “develop” 
or “perfect themselves.” It is clear for a variety of reasons, however, that 
certain changes in world order have occurred over time. The first change 
is from “traditional” societies to “modern” ones. Politically, “traditional” 
sovereignty—primarily European feudalism, but also other social orders 
in the Americas, Asia, Oceania, and Africa—was based on the right to 
kill; the Sovereign (king, lord, cacique) maintained social order by be-
ing able to decide if someone could die, either physically (execution) or 
symbolically (banishment). “Modern” sovereignty, at least as theorized 
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by Foucault and Agamben, shifted into a “biopolitical” order; sover-
eignty is geared to the preservation and maintenance of life (bios) rather 
than the determination of death, in large part because every human is 
born (symbolically) with sovereignty over him/herself, a sovereign sub-
ject. The historical shift to biopolitics has been paralleled (leaping to the 
terms of Henri Lefebvre) by a shift from “absolute space” (one’s place in 
the world is determined by the divine cosmological order of the commu-
nity) to “abstract space” (one’s place in the world is determined by one’s 
abstract relation to capitalist production). The Unicity would be a break 
with both biopolitics and abstract space in certain respects. In the space 
of the Unicity both the natural and the symbolic (spiritual) have been 
liquidated by the sheer physicality of networks; the natural gives way to 
the concrete, the symbolic gives way to the virtual, and all network sys-
tems are “anthropogenic.” In the order of politics, whereas “biopolitics” 
as it has heretofore been understood operates on the level of the pheno-
type, life-information in the Unicity operates on the level of the geno-
type. If politics are possible in the Unicity, they could only take the form 
of an intensified zoëpolitics, and hence a global ecopolitics. The question 
facing any possible political order with respect to Unicity is not whether 
individual organisms continue to live or die; it is the process by which life 
itself may be synthesized within flows of information.
By describing Unicity as a “historical shift” in world order, then, one 
might be led to believe I am saying that a new political order has replaced 
an old one, just as a new spatial order displaced an old one. I am not say-
ing this here. Although I do not discount Lefebvre’s theory of “differen-
tial space” as a new progression from “abstract space,” I cannot say that 
there has been progress from old to new, since what it “old” may very 
well remain contemporary to what is nominally “new” (Lefebvre, Space 
352–400). The Unicity is not the “new world order,” but merely the way 
in which all the various flows across informational networks may be mea-
sured quantitatively. This atlas entry is only an initial attempt to establish 
a cartography of flows through the Unicity qualitatively.
I have been reading one line of poetry for the better part of the last 
decade: “cidade/city/cité” (1963) by the Brazilian concrete poet Au-
gusto de Campos (Fig. 1). This poem is both a map of the Unicity and a 
movement (flow) through the Unicity. At first glance the poem appears 
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un-readable. It is a single line of letters that do not form any known lex-
eme, a composition of letters that convey no meaningful content. Upon 
closer inspection, however, we begin to notice certain amounts of order. 
Though not meaningful (yet), the letters are pronounceable, utterable. 
We begin to read, then, in fits and stops: “atrocaduca” to “ducapaca” to 
“pacausti” and so on. We then realize that the poem in fact consists of 
partial words—atro, cadu, capa, causti… vera, viva, uni, vora—and that 
these partial words have been ordered (for the most part) alphabetically. 
These partial words can therefore be “completed” by combining them 
with the poem’s title, which is attached, integrated into the poem at the 
end of its one line. The title serves as a “key” by which we can begin to 
read “atro-cidade,” “cadu-cidade,” “capacidade,” “causticidade”… “vera-
cidade,” “vivacidade,” “unicidade,” “voracidade.” This string of lexemes 
can be instantly translated into three languages: Portuguese (just cited), 
English (atrocity, caducity, capacity…), and French (…veracité, vivaci-
té, unicité, voracité). All of these terms (nominalized adjectives) may 
be used to describe a city, and in a sense the poem visually reproduces 
urban density in the way its letters mimic buildings pushed together in 
an urban core. But the “city” here is hardly a city at all, but just a suffix, 
an incomplete part of a word (-cidade, -city, -cité). In reality, this “city” 
is composed of language, of typography literally printed in the space of 
a poem. In reality, however, this “city” is also de-composed in language, 
since it generates a virtual list of words that may describe a city (but do 
not specify which city in particular they are describing). The string of lex-
emes generated by the poem, that is, does not exist in concrete space (the 
page) but only in the virtual space of reading.
In the first iteration of my reading of Augusto’s poem (“Obverse Colo-
nization”), I sought to show how the poem maps São Paulo, Brazil. Since 
the time of the Iberian conquests, Latin American cities have always been 
constructed with the idea of establishing order on the “barren” landscape 
of the New World. Initially the Latin American city was designed to be a 
harmonious space so that land could be “civilized” under the command 
of the Monarch and the Church. This civilizing mission was to be accom-
plished by a class of scribes—the “lettered city”2—who would maintain 
social, legal, and/or theological order through writing. Unlike the tradi-
tional Latin American city, however, São Paulo grew after 1870 as a mod-
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ern city linked to international flows of goods (coffee), industrial produc-
tion, and finance. Rather than the ordered, geometric grid of the colonial 
city, São Paulo grew without any cohesive urban planning around the 
disordered lines of factories, railroads, and favelas; the city emerged 
around sites that both generated great wealth and concentrated unspeak-
able poverty and exploitation. Augusto’s modernist poem therefore dis-
rupts the world order initiated by the conquest of the Americas. Veering 
sharply from traditional stanzaic formats, it is at once an illiterate poem 
that cannot be read, and a hyperliterate poem that can be read in three 
languages simultaneously. The one line of the poem marks a borderline 
between illiteracy and hyperliteracy through which a city-space is gener-
ated, much in the way modern São Paulo emerged from the relation be-
tween “hyper-wealth” and “hyper-poverty.” By operating in the primary 
languages of the “developed First World” (English and French), the poem 
would seem to be inserting “underdeveloped Third-World” Brazilian Por-
tuguese into the league of developed nations. The poem would seem to 
insist on bringing Brazil “up” to the First World. In fact, just the opposite 
occurs: because information is instantly translatable between the three 
languages, the poem allows the “transfection” of the hyperliterate/illiter-
ate relation (typical of “underdeveloped” nations) across the globe. The 
poem is in fact about colonization—the “coloniality” of space, language, 
law, and thought3—and yet its mode of colonization operates from the 
“obverse” direction than we might expect historically.
Augusto’s poem therefore marks an “internalized” border in the cen-
ter of São Paulo through which the city has emerged as a global city. The 
poem maps a borderline between hyperliteracy/illiteracy, development/
underdevelopment, wealth/poverty, but this map does not demarcate 
the territory of one as separate from the territory of the other. The poem 
does not demarcate a space-within from a space-without. Rather, the 
poem works as an “internalized” border, drawn within the city of São 
Paulo, to demonstrate how hyperliteracy/illiteracy, development/under-
development, wealth/poverty are all conjoined, co-dependent, united. 
But once the border has been internalized, where do the city limits end? 
Augusto’s poem maps the point at which the city limits reach infinity. In 
other words, São Paulo is “global” insofar as its city limit, being internal, 
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has no external bounds. The “city” mapped by the poem is no city at all, 
but may effectively spread across the entire planet.
The poem suggests that its form of order may be replicated and trans-
lated on a global scale. “Order” in “cidade/city/cité” is established by 
the alphabet of Latinate script. Yet there are instances in the poem when 
alphabetic order is disrupted. Indeed it may be the case that the poem 
is fundamentally disordered alphabetically. The most notable instance of 
disorder is the title itself: “cidade” (or “city” or “cité”) does not follow 
alphabetically from “vora” (the last “stem” in the sequence of the poem). 
Of course, in the poem “-cidade” is utilized as a suffix, rather than as a 
lexeme meaning “city,” in which case we might say that all that matters 
are the ordered prefixes (atro-, cadu-, etc.) comprising the majority of the 
verse. However, although titles usually stand distinct from their poems, 
in this case the title flows directly from the poem—so that “stems” or-
dered by the letter “v” lead directly into terms in the letter “c,” suggesting 
a disruption in the alphabetical order of prefixes. The “cidade” also marks 
a physical disruption in the shape the poem, shifting the line from a hori-
zontal axis to a vertical one.
Another instance of disorder occurs amongst the prefixes themselves: 
“velocity,” “veracity,” “vivacity,” “unicity,” “voracity.” This particular seg-
ment of the lexical string raises questions regarding the truth (veracity) 
within flows at maximum speed (velocity). The truth is linked to two dis-
tinct descriptions of life: the positive energy of living, the life force (vi-
vacity); and destructive needs, consumption of flesh, the violence of life 
(voracity). The truth speeds between these positive and negative nodes 
of life in that the poem files the four terms together under the index of 
the letter “v.” However, this scripted (if not scriptural) index is disrupted 
by “unicity.” The “unicity” jumps out of alphabetic order, even though the 
poem itself is a map of a unified urban space. Or rather, the truth of the 
matter is that the Unicity marks the border between the desire for life 
(vivacity) and the needs of life (voracity), and marks the transition from 
one kind of order to another, from linguistic order (lettered city) to the 
order of translation, information flow, the urban.
The real fact of the matter, however, is that there is very little alphabetic 
order in the poem at all. Recall that the alphabetic string of lexemes can 
only be created virtually. Translation of meaningful content can therefore 
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only occur virtually. But this virtual, meaningful, and non-tactile reality 
can only be generated by dividing the one line of letters that actually ex-
ist on the page (or the screen or wherever) into discrete units: atro, cadu, 
capa, causti, dupli, elasti, and so forth. Yet nothing in the poem actually 
mandates that its single line of letters be divided in this way. We could 
just as easily divide it thus: at, roca, duc, apaca, u, stid, upliela, st, ifeli, etc. 
Seen this way, we must only understand that the majority of the poem 
has no alphabetical order in the slightest, and thus no meaningful con-
tent, and thus no possibility of being translated. The poem, which is both 
hyperliterate and illiterate simultaneously, is also simultaneously translat-
able and untranslatable. The poem establishes a syntactical chain from il-
literacy to underdevelopment to poverty—just as is done by global agen-
cies such as UNESCO, the World Bank, and myriad Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). But it does not create this syntax in terms of an 
exclusion from order and power. Rather, illiteracy and poverty are includ-
ed in the order and language of power—as the untranslatability of order.
The Unicity is exactly what it says it is: a Uni-City or One City that 
covers the globe. We still assign individual names to “different” places, of 
course, but in fact the world is now a singular city, or more precisely a sin-
gular urban network.4 Accordingly, world order is no longer constituted 
by “centers” and “peripheries,” “First World vs. Third World,” relations of 
“inside” vs. “outside,” or similar binary relationalities. Globalization is a 
structural shift in world order, then, in the following way: at some histori-
cal threshold in the recent past, it is as if the relation between “interiori-
ty” and “exteriority” (which constituted the bourgeois-capitalist order of 
nation-states) collapsed or imploded into itself. This implosion produced 
an “internalized” border within the city (any city, all city), no longer de-
marcating a territory-within from a territory-without, but only a singu-
lar vanishing point at which the city limit reached infinity. The Unicity is 
therefore an “internalized border,” but one that works to territorialize the 
entire planet as absolute exteriority. Although many have concluded that 
this exteriority of globalization represents a “smooth” or “homogenous” 
space of global capitalism, this is only partially correct. We live in and 
walk through the material, physical space of the planet, what we can call 
“concrete space.” The “globe” of globalization, however, at first appears 
to us as immaterial, invisible, non-tactile; it is the movement of informa-
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tion across networks by which the world becomes “anthropogenic” or 
engineerable by human society. This “anthropogenic” globe we can call 
“virtual space.” In fact, there is no difference between concrete and virtual 
space; if we can make a distinction between them, it is only to envision 
how virtual space saturates concrete space, and vice versa. The Unicity is 
the border where this saturation occurs, the seam at which concrete and 
virtual realities come into contact and merge.
The Unicity is therefore not a place in the usual way we think of “place-
ment,” but rather a border-zone from which spaces of translatability or 
untranslatability may be generated. But where does the generation of ur-
ban space occur? At first glance “cidade/city/cité” resembles nothing so 
much as a genetic sequence as conventionally symbolized as combina-
tions of “C-T-A-G” (the bases Cytosine, Thymine, Adenine, Guanine):
T G C A G C C T C A A C C T C G T C A G G C T C A A  G 
C A A T C C T C C C A C C  T C A G C C T C C AG A G T A 
G C A G G G A C G A T A G G T G  T G C A C C A C C A T 
G C C C A G C T A A T T T T T G T A T T T T T T T T T C 
T T T T  T T T G A G A T G G  A G T C T T G C  T C T G T T 
G C. (National Center for Biotechnology Information)
This is a fortuitous coincidence, but it is not meaningless. In reading 
Augusto’s poem—the city—we have already entered into the process of 
enzymatic reading.
We can now think of cells and the molecules in them—by which I 
mean to say, any living cells including the ones in your body right now—
as media for the transmission of information. In biochemistry, in fact, this 
is called “information metabolism,” which can be defined as “the storage, 
retrieval, processing, and transmission of biological information” (Mat-
thews, Holde, and Ahern 876). Information metabolism is the use of a 
nucleic acid (either DNA or RNA) as a template for the synthesis of pro-
teins or other nucleic acids (another DNA or RNA molecule). As such, 
information metabolism has three distinct processes: DNA replication, 
DNA transcription, and RNA translation.
When DNA replicates, a set of enzymes (topoisomerases, helicase, 
and primase) “unwinds” and “stretches” the DNA molecule, which is 
normally coiled up in a double-helix. These enzymes effectively open a 
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“fork” between DNA’s two strands. Another set of enzymes (polymer-
ases) then “runs through” and “reads” the genetic information sequenced 
on each strand; as the polymerases run through their reading they cre-
ate a complementary strand for each, thus forming two “daughter” DNA 
molecules. DNA replication is thus the use of DNA as a template for the 
synthesis of duplicate DNA molecules. DNA transcription, by contrast, is 
the use of DNA as a template for the synthesis of RNA. In transcription, 
another kind of polymerase (RNA polymerase) “reads” the sequences of 
base pairs (C-T, A-G) coiled into the DNA molecule and “generates” a 
single-stranded RNA molecule. Initially this RNA has both “meaningful” 
bits of genetic code (called exons) that will ultimately be used to create 
proteins, but it also has “meaningless” bits of genetic code (called in-
trons). These “meaningless” introns are spliced out of the RNA, so that 
transcription results in the production of what is called messenger RNA 
(or mRNA) that is only composed of “meaningful” exons. During RNA 
translation, finally, the mRNA serves as a template for the synthesis of 
proteins—the “stuff ” of which all the cells in your body is composed. In 
RNA translation, mRNA is conjoined to a transfer RNA (or tRNA) by 
means of a rizome. In essence, the rizome uses tRNA as a kind of genetic 
dictionary so that information on mRNA can be transferred into a new 
medium—the amino acids that are chained together to form proteins.
My point in this digression on information metabolism is not to bela-
bor the details of genetics, but only to show that biochemical metabolism 
has now been shown to involve processes through which information is 
replicated and transcribed into a useable form, and then translated into 
content (in the form of proteins, the “stuff ” of which your body is actu-
ally made). Life as we know it has been transposed into information, and 
this information is replicatable, transcribable, and translatable. Through 
understanding and describing “natural” molecular-biological processes, 
molecular biology has effectively worked to “nest” genetic molecules in 
a virtual informational matrix. The map of this virtual matrix, in fact, is 
readily accessible online through the US National Institutes of Health 
now that the Human Genome Project has been completed. This does 
not mean that the life of your cells has been engineered by human hands, 
only that your human hands are formed by an informational process that 
is now potentially engineerable by and for human society. Just because sci-
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ence has infused biological systems with information, and then generates 
more information through experimentation, does not mean that science 
or scientific knowledge is always-already reductive or false. Rather, the 
living organism has come to be understood (and utilized) as part of an 
environmental system in which “natural” life and “human” knowledge 
recombine into one another. There is no distinction between artificial 
and natural here, because all “natural” systems (not just biological ones, 
but also environmental and climatological systems) are potentially “engi-
neerable,” thus rendering them open to social regulation.
In one sense, then, the human body is composed of cells. In another 
sense, each cell is a network of information, and information in one cell 
is networked to all others to form a body. The information in the cell, 
moreover, is in a constant state of decomposition and translation. In fact, 
when decomposition and translation reach a maximum they result in un-
controllable growth—cancer—that quickly becomes a social condition 
to be managed by other networks (health care systems, medical technol-
ogy, pharmaceutical research, government, education, religion, family, 
and so forth).
It is fortuitous, therefore, that the title of “cidade/city/cité” operates as 
if it were an enzyme for the reading, replication, transcription, and trans-
lation of a sequence of letters. Fortuitous, but not mistaken. A reading of 
the poem allows us to “leap” from the urban network of the Latin Ameri-
can city to the urban network of globalization to the metabolic network 
of cells, as if all these networks pertained to a singular network environ-
ment. The “city” (Unicity) is nothing less than the environmental system 
of life generated by the saturation of the environment by information—
information that flows across networks mutually embedded into each 
other. The border of this city is internalized: it is the border that opens 
between one strand of DNA and the other during replication.
The Unicity is a space of both composition and decomposition. Like-
wise, it is a space defined by relative (differential) flows of translatability 
and untranslatability. Across this space there are densities of informa-
tional flow, zones where data-streams are particularly dense. Although 
these densities are the same quantitatively (all are data, information), they 
may differ qualitatively (there are differential flows of data). Some net-
work densities channel information that is highly translatable across the 
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Unicity; other network densities channel information that is highly un-
translatable. Following from the DNA transcription of exons and introns, 
the space of the Unicity is de/composed of zones of dense “meaningful” 
content (translatable content) that I will call exones, and zones of dense 
“meaningless” content (untranslatable content) that I will call intrones. 
Both exones and intrones are necessary for the structural (emergent) sta-
bility of the Unicity, although it is not yet clear why this is the case.
What is clear is that translatability in the exone tends to reach a maxi-
mum when economic interests (i.e., greed) are most intense. This has be-
come painfully clear in the recent financial crisis of 2008–09. From the 
standpoint of global economic order, it has become commonplace to see 
the world in terms of network “flows” (cf. Castells’ “space of flows” to be 
discussed shortly). Capital has become informationalized—it is digital 
“content” that can be moved around the planet at almost the speed of 
light. With increasing force and dexterity since 1990, the informational-
ization of capital has allowed capital to flood into any market that is “hot.” 
Moreover, it has allowed the creation of incredibly complex derivatives 
designed to capitalize instantaneously on the movement of capital into 
“hot” markets, and to leave these markets just as instantaneously once 
they “cool.” As Manuel Castells has written, derivatives “operate to re-
combine value around the world and across time, thus generating market 
capitalization out of market capitalization” (104).
Unfortunately, as it has been made painfully evident recently, deriva-
tives also generate market de-capitalization out of market de-capitaliza-
tion. The prime example of this is the United States housing market since 
2000. Because it could be moved at the push of a button (literally), capi-
tal from across the planet flooded into the US real estate market faster 
than federal regulators of this market could manage—or rather, faster 
than they cared to manage, since the official policy of the US federal gov-
ernment encouraged the flood. Capital, in other words, moved into the 
real estate market virtually. Capital then worked to transform real estate 
into virtual estate: mortgages were bundled into massive bonds (deriva-
tives), so that real property was essentially capitalized into virtual quanti-
ties (mortgages) that could then be used as collateral for further loans 
(bonds); in essence, banks issued loans, and then used these loans to 
borrow other loans, and then used these collateralized loans to take out 
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even more loans. Banks then bought and sold these derived loans (in the 
form of bonds, collateralized debt obligations, etc.) from/to other banks, 
so that for every US$1 of real capital loaned out upwards of US$30 of 
capital was “created” virtually. Of course, when the value of real estate de-
clined sharply and people defaulted on their mortgages en masse, the 30:1 
ratio for profit turned into a 30:1 ratio for debt, and capital evaporated 
from the entire global market instantaneously.
Virtual gains instantly became virtual losses, and this proved to be a 
real problem. Since 1980 all financial activities worldwide have been 
networked. Thanks to the repeal of Depression-era safeguards against 
consolidation, financial institutions merged into one another. Behemoth 
financial institutions, housed in command-and-control centers (e.g. the 
skyscrapers of Lower Manhattan) could operate in consumer and com-
mercial banking, securities markets, insurance, hedge funds, and any oth-
er financial activity of their creation. All of these activities were also digi-
tized over the same time period, so that transactions could be “managed” 
automatically by complex algorithms over digital information networks. 
The informationalization of capital further allowed behemoth financial 
institutions to network themselves globally. In practice, all financial in-
stitutions across the globe loan each other capital to cover their daily op-
erating expenses, facilitated by the grand instrument of digital networks. 
In theory, these loans should be guaranteed by other instruments like 
hedge funds and collateralized debt obligations. In the case of the current 
financial meltdown, however, financial institutions were also profiting 
(virtually) by issuing, buying, and selling these “guarantees.” Thus, the 
more global capitalism “insured” itself virtually, the more capital virtually 
evaporated once the crisis began. And since financial institutions oper-
ated day-by-day by loaning capital to one another, the mass-scale disap-
pearance of capital virtually threatened the viability of the entire market.
Global financial networks were designed in order to mitigate risk. Be-
cause capital has become informationalized, it may be withdrawn from 
one investment instantly and reallocated to another more profitable in-
vestment. Derivatives, moreover, were created as a hedge against risk, so 
that if one aspect of the market dropped profit could still be generated 
“on the back-end” from that drop. The current financial meltdown has 
demonstrated that the informationalization of capital has not yet elimi-
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nated the possibility of miscalculating risk, however. On one hand, pow-
erful capitalists working from the exone may deliberately falsify data and 
then translate that falsified data throughout the system faster than can be 
regulated. On the other hand, and more importantly, the exone of finan-
cial networks is dependent upon intrones, and yet has no means of cal-
culating the flow of information through intrones. In fact, “intronic” flow 
cannot be calculated because it is untranslatable. Thus, mortgages are is-
sued to denizens of the introne, even though terms of the agreement are 
not communicable between exone and introne; financial and corporate 
exones draw upon the labor power of the introne; “natural” resources and 
energy are drawn from the introne. But the risk of dealing with intrones 
in this way cannot be prognosticated.
Financial flows can and must be regulated, however. That is, power in 
the Unicity exceeds the power of governments and international agen-
cies, yet the Unicity still requires governments and international agencies 
for the regulation and maintenance of networks. For finance to flow, after 
all, monetary policies have to be set in place and ordered. Global corpo-
rate structures require some institution to ensure that contracts are en-
forced, that assets are fungible, and so forth. In this sense, the Unicity is a 
historical shift in world order, a step above the order of modernity, indus-
trial modernization, and the modern nation-state. But the Unicity is not 
a progression from the old order, as if the power of the nation-state had 
been totally liquidated. Nothing could be further from the case; in fact, 
the power of the nation-state may be magnified in certain respects. His-
tory needs to be re-written in this way: The bourgeois-capitalist nation-
state evidently succeeded the theological order of the Catholic church; 
but this never meant that the power of theological order waned, as evi-
denced by the incredible power exerted by religion over the world. The 
same will be true with the nation-state. Why? History and juridico-po-
litical paradigms are now just informational networks, to be networked 
into the “network of networks” that is the Unicity. The risks posed by the 
informationalization of history, theology, and capital cannot yet be prop-
erly calculated or prognosticated.
By linking exones and intrones, the Unicity marks the borderline be-
tween the desires of life, perceived as an immaterial life force (vivacity); 
and the bare necessities of life, hunger, the need to eat, the need to de-
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stroy one body so that another may live (voracity). The Unicity links de-
sires and needs so closely that they become indistinguishable. But what 
are the legal and political consequences of this indistinguishability?
In thinking through an answer to this question, the worst mistake that 
could be made is to think of exones in terms of inclusivity, versus intrones 
in terms of exclusivity. There are real modes of disaffection, disempow-
erment, and exploitation in the Unicity, but none of these has anything 
to do with binary relations of inclusion/exclusion. Since exones and in-
trones are bound together as co-dependent relations of production, both 
are “included” in the space and flows of the Unicity.5 By including all into 
a singular oneness, the Unicity functions only in terms of absolute exteri-
ority. Everyone and everything is always already “outside.”
This absolute exteriority alters how we must think of power and rela-
tions to power. Once everything is on the outside, there can be no such 
thing as transcendence, at least not as some metaphysical Being that in-
heres in physical matter. This should be welcome news to most practitio-
ners of deconstruction: there is only physical matter in the Unicity. The 
unwelcome news for practitioners of deconstruction is this: there is only 
physical matter in the Unicity. Just as there is no transcendence in the 
Unicity, neither is there such a thing as immanence. Just data. The problem 
of course is that no institution of political power has ever been formed 
around streams of data. Politics have only been constituted through ei-
ther transcendence (as in, heavenly order handed down through popes 
and kings based on the presupposition that we all have souls), or im-
manence (as in, all subjects are born with inherent powers that they can 
choose to represent rationally in the form of a republic or nation-state). 
Having no sense of transcendence or immanence, it is not clear how law 
can be enforced in the Unicity—or more precisely, by what force-of-law 
(nomos) legal powers could be deemed legitimate.
The Unicity is anti-nomic space in this regard, and this poses all sorts of 
problems for political and legal philosophy. Clearly, in terms of politics, 
law, and governmental organization, the Unicity represents a historical 
and structural shift in world order. Once the validity of both transcen-
dent and immanent modes of subjectivity has been evacuated, it would 
seem that a new mode of subjective power (and/or subjugation) would 
be on the horizon. But this horizon will not arrive. Why? Most philoso-
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phers, theorists, and critics (operating in the exone, after all) assume a 
strict periodization in which the history of world order is the succession 
of juridico-political paradigms. Thus, Europe moves from the Roman 
Empire to the order of the Catholic Church; with the discovery of the 
Americas, the power of the Church wanes and gives way to the modern 
system of nation-states. The days of the nation-state are now thought to 
have come to an end…giving rise to what?
To my mind, Giorgio Agamben has come closest among contempo-
rary political philosophers to providing an answer. Following from Carl 
Schmitt and Michel Foucault, Agamben seeks to theorize the “new” no-
mos of the planet (the force of law over the globe). Agamben knows that 
this nomos is biopolitical, directed to the incorporation of “bare life” (zoë) 
as political life (bios). As biopolitics—the orientation of politics towards 
the preservation and maintenance of life—emerges as a primary aim of 
the nation-state, national order paradoxically enters into crisis. In order 
to preserve the force of law and hence to preserve life in times of crisis, 
the nation-state finds it must suspend its own laws; the force of law (no-
mos) demands the force of law, the state of exception. “It is produced at 
the point at which the political system of the modern nation-state, which 
was founded on the functional nexus between a determinate localization 
(land) and a determinate order (the State) and mediated by automatic 
rules for the inscription of life (birth or the nation), enters into a last-
ing crisis, and the State decides to assume directly the care of the nation’s 
biological life as one of its proper tasks” (Homo Sacer 175).
If I understand Agamben correctly in the totality of his work, the order 
of the nation-state enters into crisis because, although it is founded on 
the symbolic-metaphysical inscription of life into politics, the State can 
never properly translate the bare physicality of life into symbolic-meta-
physical terms of citizenship. The state of exception is the limit between 
this “metaphysicality” and “physicality,” the point at which the two would 
unite; the biopolitical imperative thus mandates entrance into the state 
of exception. Yet the state of exception only marks the transition of the 
biopolitical imperative into a “thanatopolitics,” whereby sovereign power 
may execute bodies at will. In this respect, the Nazi concentration camp 
becomes the primary emblem of the crisis of national nomos and the sup-
posed entrance into the new nomos of the planet:
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The state of exception, which was essentially a temporary sus-
pension of the juridico-political order, now becomes a new 
and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by the bare life that 
more and more can no longer be inscribed in that order. The 
growing dissociation of birth (bare life) and the nation-state 
is the new fact of politics in our day, and what we call camp is 
this disjunction. To an order without localization (the state of 
exception, in which law is suspended) there now corresponds 
a localization without order (the camp as permanent space 
of exception). The political system no longer orders forms of 
life and juridical rules in a determinate space, but instead con-
tains at its very center a dislocating localization that exceeds it 
and into which every form of lie and every rule can be virtu-
ally taken. The camp as dislocating localization is the hidden 
matrix of the politics in which we are still living, and it is this 
structure of the camp that we must learn to recognize in all 
its metamorphoses into the zones d’attentes of our airports and 
certain outskirts of our cities. (Homo Sacer 175)
In order to preserve the life of its “People,” the nation-state establishes 
an external territory it inhabits with bodies stripped of citizenship, a zone 
composed of bodies that may be voided without any possible legal rami-
fication, no protection against homicide or genocide. This new space, in 
which life can no longer be inscribed into juridical order, transforms into 
a space of permanent displacement that “virtually takes” the globe. Agam-
ben concludes, “The camp, which is now securely lodged within the city’s 
interior, is the new biopolitical nomos of the planet” (Homo Sacer 176).
It is precisely on this point that Agamben’s theories falter: in the Unic-
ity, there is no such place as “the city’s interior,” only global exteriority. 
Agamben certainly helps us to see how the historical shift to Unicity oc-
curs. Nevertheless, he tends to equate historically produced spaces incor-
rectly. His temptation is to see in “Third World” zones like the favela or 
the maquiladora slum a direct analogy to the Nazi concentration camp. 
From the standpoint of network integration, the favela and maquiladora 
slums—intrones—are far more nuanced and complex than the concen-
tration camp. This is not a comparison of relative degrees of pain and 
violence, which would be utterly pointless and disgusting. Rather, I am 
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merely stating, first, that intrones are not zones of exclusion, that they are 
thoroughly inscribed into the world order of Unicity as the untranslat-
ability of information. But the Unicity, second, is not a juridical-political 
space in the way Agamben thinks of nomos. Agamben’s main blind spot is 
that in envisioning the absolute decline of one kind of sovereign nomos, 
he assumes it to be replaced by a new nomos. But the Unicity is not that.
The global city has been understood as a “space of flows,” in which 
goods, services, and people are eminently translatable. As Manuel Cas-
tells defines the “space of flows”:
The informational, global economy is organized around com-
mand and control centers able to coordinate, innovate, and 
manage the intertwined activities of the networks of firms. 
Advanced services, including finance, insurance, real estate, 
consulting, legal services, advertising, design, marketing, 
public relations, security, information gathering, and man-
agement of information systems, but also R&D and scientific 
innovation, are at the core of all economic processes, be it in 
manufacturing, agriculture, energy, or services of different 
kinds. They all can be reduced to knowledge generation and 
information flows. Thus, advanced telecommunications sys-
tems could make possible their scattered location around the 
globe. (409–10)
The networks Castells mentions can be located anywhere on the plan-
et, facilitated not only by telecommunications networks, but also trans-
portation (air, ground, sea) networks. Large corporations can therefore 
distribute their various functions to any locale on the globe that offers 
the most advantageous cost-benefit. The most notable effect of the space 
of flows—notable in the sense that it has received the most critical at-
tention—is the emergence of the global city. The global city is not only 
a command-and-control node in the global network, but also a city in 
which urban life (culture) resembles that of any other global city. Thus 
we now have cities in far-flung locales, such as Los Angeles, New York, 
Tokyo, London, São Paulo, Bangkok, which all seem to offer the same 
urban existence—a translatable urban existence. This view of the global 
city, however, is only partially correct, because the “global city” is in fact 
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partial—it is only a part of any of the places just mentioned. The evident 
homogeneity of urban life in global cities is of limited interest, however.
The historical transition from the “space of places” to the “space of 
flows” is far more significant than the emergence of global cities per se. 
That is, we have traditionally thought of city space as a place defined by 
a bounded center (or centers) of densely packed buildings, surrounded 
by houses and smaller buildings, surrounded by countryside. The space 
of places is one held within external city limits. We have traditionally de-
fined “city,” furthermore, according to a spatial model of centers and pe-
ripheries; this model has been extended to the world order of modern 
geopolitics, which was composed of “central” rich industrialized nations 
and “peripheral” poor dependent or agrarian nations. Yet the “center-pe-
riphery” model assumes a static kind of space, one that can be surround-
ed by a borderline because space is thought to be fundamentally motion-
less. In the space of flows all that matters is the movement “through.” 
Data flows in, data is processed, data flows out. Capital flows in, capital 
is processed, capital flows out. Planes fly in, planes are processed, planes 
fly out. I turn on my computer (electricity flows in), I process words and 
send an email, I turn off my computer (electrical flow halts). Thus, it mat-
ters less that a static space can be defined as a “place” or an “area,” and 
more how things and bodies transit through space. From this perspective 
it becomes clear that “city” is network of networks: not only corporate 
services networks, but also water, energy, food, culture, and so on, all of 
which transit through space, hopefully through ordered channels (but 
certainly not always).
The space of flows has been theorized with greatest precision by one 
of Augusto de Campos’ contemporaries in São Paulo, the Jewish/Prus-
sian/German/Czech/Brazilian philosopher Vilém Flusser. In “The City 
as Wave Trough in the Image Flood,” Flusser seeks to re-image space:
We are accustomed, for example, to see the solar system as 
a geographic place in which individual bodies orbit around 
a larger one. We see it as such because it has been shown to 
us in images, not because we have perceived it with our own 
eyes. However, today we also have other images at our dispos-
al. Here is one that shows us the solar system as a network of 
wire netting, as a gravitational field, and in this netting there 
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are sacklike wells in which the wires are more tightly knot-
ted together. In one of these wells we recognize our Earth 
once more because built into this sack there is a smaller body, 
namely, our moon. Both of these images of the solar system 
are models rather than maps. And certainly the second image 
is more useful for a trip to Mars than the first. In the second 
image one sees that one must first crawl up out of our well 
and then be careful not to fall into the sun’s well in order to 
finally fall into the Mars well. The same is true of the image 
of the city. When we are talking about a “new urbanism,” it 
is more useful to construct the image of the city as a field of 
flections. (323)
The first model of the solar system as “geographic place” corresponds 
to a “traditional” center-periphery model of urban space that Flusser 
seeks to surpass: “The typical image we construct of the city looks some-
thing like this: houses as economic private spaces that surround a mar-
ketplace, the political public sphere, and over their on a hill stands a tem-
ple, the theoretical sacred space” (323). In essence Flusser describes the 
idealized image of classical Athens as a public sphere of ideal relations 
between citizens (polis) engaging one another on a public marketplace 
(agora) before returning home to private space (oikos).
This classical urban order no longer exists. In the contemporary “space 
of flows” (Castells’ term) of the Unicity (my term), this image of city 
as composed of discrete, bounded places cannot hold. The city, argues 
Flusser, becomes a “confusion of cables” in which public political and 
economic relations are literally piped into private living spaces and piped 
back out again. Instead of discrete spaces and places, then, there are only 
intersubjective flows of information. I will quote Flusser at length:
We must imagine a net of relations among human beings, 
an “intersubjective field of relations.” The threads of this net 
should be seen as channels through which information like 
representations, feelings, intentions, or knowledge flows. The 
threads knot themselves together provisionally and develop 
into what we call human subjects. The totality of the threads 
constitutes the concrete lifeworld, and the knots therein are 
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abstract extrapolations. One recognizes this when they un-
knot themselves. They are hollow like onions. The Self (I) 
is an abstract, conceptual point around which concrete rela-
tions are wrapped. I am that to which you is said. An image of 
humanity of this type is obvious not only thanks to psycho-
analysis and existential analysis but corresponds also to the 
concepts of other areas, for example, ecology (organisms are 
knottings together of ecosystems); molecular biology (phe-
notypes are knottings together of genetic information); or 
atomic physics (bodies are the knottings together of the four 
field strengths). If one holds fast to the image of an intersub-
jective field of relations—we is concrete, I and you are abstrac-
tions of this—then the new image of the city gains contours. 
It can be imagined roughly in this way: The relations among 
human beings are spun of differing densities on different plac-
es on the net. The denser they are, the more concrete they are. 
These dense places develop into wave-troughs in the field that 
we must imagine as oscillating back and forth. At these dense 
points, the knots move closer to one another; they actualize 
in opposition to one another. In wave-troughs of this type, 
the inherent possibilities of relationships among humans be-
come more present. The wave-troughs exert an attraction on 
the surrounding field (including the gravitational field); ever 
more intersubjective relationships are drawn into them. Every 
wave is a flash point for the actualization of intersubjective 
virtualities. Such wave-troughs are called cities. (325–6)
Writing before the expansion of the Internet, it is remarkable how 
clearly Flusser theorizes social networking—allowing us to see what 
must have been wild abstract images in Flusser’s day as normal parts of 
daily life. Now writing after the expansion of the internet, however, I 
must expand and modify several of his claims here. First, Flusser is cor-
rect to image the city as a density (a wave trough) of intersubjective infor-
mational flows. In such an image each subject (Self) is merely a density 
of information (a “knot”) with respect to another knot (Other); each 
knot exerts a kind of force with respect to all others, such that if enough 
informational knots agglomerate together they form a “deep” density we 
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call a “place.” In this sense there is no such thing as subjective identity, 
at least in the sense of an immanent identity that inheres within an in-
dividual body. Rather, there are only relations between informational 
densities that may be abstracted as individual subjects. In other words, in 
the Unicity subjective identity is always displaced into the network(s) of 
informational flows, so that subjectivity per se is only experienced in the 
differential movement between one “density” and the next. However, the 
networks in the Unicity are not just human or subjective; human bodies 
become informational networks (information metabolism, for instance), 
but so do buildings, air, water, computers, plastic, book. Thus, we must 
view subjectivity in the Unicity in terms of interobjective fields of rela-
tions—how “subjective” information flows across object-networks.
Second, to this end Flusser views his “city” (the Unicity) as a kind of 
marketplace where “masks are lent out” (324). Since the “Self ” is like a 
hollowed-out onion, subjects move through the city by projecting masks 
to one another. What Flusser calls a “mask,” we could rightly now call a 
“username” or “avatar.” In order to transit through networks, we are often 
called upon to prove our identities; we then produce a virtual image of 
our identity and guarantee this image with a unique signature or pass-
word. If the network cannot verify this virtual identity, then we are not 
allowed to pass through. Thus, I can check my email, voicemail, bank ac-
counts, and use a credit card or passport anywhere in the world, so long 
as my avatars are verified.
This flow of masks is precisely what Marc Augé has theorized as the 
“non-place” (non-lieu). It used to be the case that one’s identity was guar-
anteed by a sense of place: perhaps one’s village assigned one’s place in 
the community, in the world of men, and in the world of gods (absolute 
space); or, perhaps one’s inherent sense of self united one to other selves 
(abstract space). In any event, one could always know one’s Self just as 
others could recognize each other. According to Augé, however, we now 
routinely move through spaces (non-places) in which one’s anonymity 
(rather than known identity) is constantly affirmed. Paradoxically, we are 
continually required to demonstrate our identities: we show our pass-
ports, swipe our credit cards, type in our passwords. Only by doing so, 
however, are we allowed to proceed on our way as anonymous subjects 
whose movement through space (a shopping mall, a road, an airport) 
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does not have to be questioned. Augé, just like Flusser, theorizes a world 
in which we carry multiple forms of identity, each of which has been dis-
placed into an objective network of informational flow. How else could 
we possibly explain identity theft? If our identities were locked inside our 
bodies (placed there), how could some other anonymous being steal our 
identities (now displaced to some network non-place) and operate as if 
they wore masks of our faces?
Flusser and Augé are incorrect, however, in that both find all “masks,” 
“identities,” and “non-places” to be of equal measure. All subjects wear 
masks that hide all identities so that all anonymous subjects may tran-
sit through all non-places. If we now turn back to Augusto de Campos’s 
poem, we will recall that the “cidade/city/cité” is simultaneously trans-
latable and untranslatable; the city is a singularity (a single line), but 
it flows through the differential movement of “hypertranslation” and 
“non-translation.” The Unicity, then, is the unbounded informational/
urban terrain of the planet; but far from a “smooth” globe, the Unicity 
is pock-marked by densities, troughs, knots, black holes, across which 
information may flow quickly, slowly, or become suspended like fuzzy 
static charge (noise). Assuming the “leap” between genetics and urban-
ization as argued earlier to be possible, we should recall that in RNA tran-
scription, “meaningless” content (introns) must be spliced out of mRNA 
leaving only “meaningful” content (exons) in order for RNA translation 
to proceed. Similarly, the terrain of the Unicity is marked by differential 
spaces of “content”: exones and intrones. Since the Unicity is both urban 
space and informational network, I would define “exones” more precisely 
as demographic concentrations with network densities of which infor-
mation tends to be immediately translatable throughout the Unicity. By 
contrast, “intrones” may perhaps be more demographically dense than 
exones, but they are less dense informationally, because information in 
the introne is not as readily translatable as meaningful content across the 
Unicity. Exones are informationally “rich” (global wealth); intrones are 
informationally “poor” (global poverty).
One’s ability to flow through an exone is maintained by protocols of 
subjective identification: one must have avatars (e.g., credit cards, pass-
ports, numbers) that can be verified by the network; otherwise one sim-
ply “does not make sense” to the world, and one “habits” an introne. By 
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the same token, the introne may co-opt identities in the exone, whether 
deliberately or not, and thereby circulate with absolute anonymity. In 
any case, the borders between wealth and poverty, exones and intrones, 
may be demarcations between neighborhoods within a single urban 
area; the lines of dependency between these zones are still in effect, of 
course, by which I mean that “global wealth” and “global poverty,” ex-
ones and intrones, are co-dependent relations through which global urban 
space is produced. The Unicity demarcates the entire world as a global 
border zone.
The border of this global border zone, however, does not demarcate 
one geographic (geopolitical) territory from a different territory. The 
border that is the Unicity cannot therefore legitimate that which belongs 
to one territory as opposed to that which belongs to an Other. Here there 
is no question of legitimacy or illegitimacy, because the Unicity is fun-
damentally a-legitimate; no legality or illegality, because the Unicity is 
fundamentally extra-legal; no civilization or barbarity, just users, deni-
zens, avatars, and/or pirates. So what does the border that is the Unicity 
demarcate and territorialize? By stating that the globe is singular urban 
space of network traffic, we are stating that everything has become in-
formationalized. Since “we” are only really information, there is no dif-
ference between a “Self ” and an “Other.” There are only relative densities 
or diffusions of network traffic (you are only a density of network traffic, 
and so am I).
The border therefore constitutes and distributes relative degrees of 
translatability—but how? This is the most difficult question raised by 
this present Atlas entry, one that I hope to have answered if only partially. 
As I see it, translatability must be guaranteed by certain protocols, or sets 
of protocols, so that a user/denizen might be able to enter and exit an 
exone with a particular identity (avatar) intact. These protocols are es-
tablished—for no other reason than the fact that it so happens to be the 
case—by pre-existing social institutions. Thus, there is no force of law—
no nomos—in the Unicity whereby such things as legality, sovereignty, 
citizenship, or subjectivity might be constituted as legitimate. There is no 
such thing as a “global citizen” because citizenship per se is precluded in 
the Unicity. There are no citizens, just denizens and avatars. Citizenship 
is a category determined by immanent subjective power, but identities 
Unicity 145
are not produced immanently in the Unicity. Rather, bodies are merely 
phenotypes of genotypical information. As such, identities are merely 
verified, transcribed, and translated (or unverified, untranscribed, and 
untranslated) across informational networks. There can be no symbolic 
“People” for a State to govern—just data, streaming through bodies. And 
yet social institutions—States—are still required to monitor and main-
tain network traffic and protocols.
On the one hand, then, the Unicity is neither nomos nor anomie, but 
rather anti-nomic space. On the same hand, however, the Unicity is still a 
legal, political, and above all, zoëpolitical space, in that it requires—feeds 
off of—extant sphere(s) of nomos. The Unicity is a singular physis that 
evacuates the metaphysical foundation of nomos, by recombining itself 
into the physical residues of pre-existing nomos. If the physis of the Unic-
ity retains a parasitical (and hence destructive) relationship with extant 
nomos, life in the Unicity nonetheless still depends upon just “so much” of 
laws, protocols, legitimations, contracts, enforcements, and/or subjectiv-
ities guaranteed by nomos. Having no nomos for itself, the Unicity none-
theless operates recursively, retroactively…the retronomos of the globe.
Buffalo, USA / Kolobrzeg, Poland
Notes
1. There is no room for some a priori or ultimate Cause or Reason in the Unicity, 
not even as a negative recess.
2. This is the general argument advanced by the Uruguayan critic Angel Rama, 
in one of the most important works of Latin American cultural theory, La 
ciudad letrada.
3. Cf. Aníbal Quijano. Quijano and his interlocutors see “coloniality” (not just 
colonialism) as the dominant epistemological paradigm of global power 
(capitalism) since the European conquest of the Americas. Any attempt 
to critique epistemology and power without recognizing a connection to 
coloniality is doomed only to reiterate the dominance of coloniality. Thus, 
interlocutors such as Walter Mignolo seek to operate from the “exteriority” 
of coloniality—the borderline, the margin—since speaking from a position 
of “interiority” would only be self-destructive and ineffectual. My theory 
of Unicity concurs with this world-view in certain respects, but diverges 
robustly in others. The reason it is ineffectual to speak from “interiority” is 
that there is no such thing as an interior. The Unicity only exists in absolute 
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exteriority—primarily because the historical roots of the Unicity are to be 
found in the lines of political-economic and techonological dependency 
between global wealth and global poverty. Global wealth and global poverty, 
in other words, are not different but rather produced simultaneously as co-
dependent differential relations. In spatial terms, wealth and poverty occupy, 
respectively, the exones and intrones that compose the Unicity (terms which 
will be defined later in this essay). Thus, Mignolo and Quijano do speak 
from the exteriority of the coloniality of power, but only to the extent that 
the Unicity represents the “obverse” re-colonization of the planet as absolute 
exteriority. They speak from the exteriority because exteriority is all there is. 
Their critical work will only prove moderately successful at best, because both 
operate from an exone, even though they purport to speak for the introne.
4. As a clarification, we may follow Lefebvre and think of the Unicity as “the 
urban” rather as “a city.” Writing in 1970 Lefebvre states: “I’ll begin with 
the following hypothesis: Society has become completely urbanized. This 
hypothesis implies a definition: An urban society is a society that results from 
a process of complete urbanization. This urbanization is virtual today, but 
will becomre real in the future” (Lefebvre, Urban Revolution 1). And later in 
the same work: “From this point on I will no longer refer to the city but to the 
urban” (45).
5. For this reason it is not possible to “include” those who habit the introne by 
giving them computers or credit cards or microcredit, since they were never 
“excluded” in the first place.
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Chapter 5
Scale
Derangements of Scale
Timothy Clark
When we observe the environment, we necessarily 
do so only on a limited range of scales; therefore our 
perception of events provides us with only a low-
dimensional slice through a high-dimensional cake
– Simon A. Levin
Introduction: Scale Effects
You are lost in a small town, late for a vital appointment somewhere in 
its streets. You stop a friendly-looking stranger and ask the way. Gen-
erously, he offers to give you a small map which he happens to have in 
his briefcase. The whole town is there, he says. You thank him and walk 
on, opening the map to pinpoint a route. It turns out to be a map of the 
whole earth.
The wrong scale.
A scale (from the Latin scala for ladder, step or stairs) usually enables a 
calibrated and useful extrapolation between dimensions of space or time. 
Thus a “cartographic scale” describes the ratio of distance on a map to 
real distances on the earth’s surface. To move from a large to small scale 
or vice versa implies a calculable shift of resolution on the same area or 
features, a smooth zooming out or in. With climate change, however, we 
have a map, its scale includes the whole earth but when it comes to re-
lating the threat to daily questions of politics, ethics or specific interpre-
tations of history, culture, literature, etc., the map is often almost mock-
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ingly useless. Policies and concepts relating to climate change invariably 
seem undermined or even derided by considerations of scale: a campaign 
for environmental reform in one country may be already effectively ne-
gated by the lack of such measures on the other side of the world. A long 
fought-for nature reserve, designed to protect a rare ecosystem, becomes, 
zooming out, a different place. Even the climatology works on a less than 
helpful scale: “Paradoxically, it is simpler to predict what will happen to 
the planet, a closed system, than to make forecasts for specific regions” 
(Litfin 137).
Cartographic scale is itself an inadequate concept here. Non-carto-
graphic concepts of scale are not a smooth zooming in and out but in-
volve jumps and discontinuities with sometimes incalculable “scale ef-
fects.” For instance:
In the engineering sciences, scale effects are those that re-
sult from size differences between a model and the real sys-
tem. Even though a miniature model of a building made of 
wood is structurally sound, it is not necessarily appropriate 
to infer that the same process maintaining structural stabil-
ity could hold for a full-size building made of wood. ( Jener-
ette and Wu 104)
To give another instance, a map of the whole earth, at a “small” scale 
in cartographic terms, is at an enormous scale ecologically, one at which 
other non-linear scale effects become decisive and sometimes incalcula-
ble. Garrett Hardin writes:
Many stupid actions taken by society could be avoided if 
more people were acutely aware of scale effects. Whenever 
the scale is shifted upward, one should always be alert for pos-
sible contradictions of the conventional wisdom that served 
so well when the unit was smaller…. Failure of the electorate 
to appreciate scale effects can put the survival of a democratic 
nation in jeopardy. (52)
Some thinkers less controversial than Hardin draw on complexity the-
ory to suggest the necessary emergence of scale effects with merely the 
increasing complexity of globalizing civilization: “once a society devel-
ops beyond a certain level of complexity it becomes increasingly fragile. 
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Eventually it reaches a point at which even a relatively minor disturbance 
can bring everything crashing down” (MacKenzie 33). For others, the 
environmental crisis is in part caused by the effects of conflicting scales in 
the government of human affairs. Jim Dator writes:
Environmental, economic, technological and health factors 
are global, but our governance systems are still based on the 
nation state, while our economic system (‘free market’ capi-
talism) and many national political systems (interest group 
‘democracy’) remain profoundly individualistic in input, al-
beit tragically collective in output (215–6).
Scale effects in relation to climate change are confusing because they 
take the easy, daily equations of moral and political accounting and drop 
into them both a zero and an infinity: the greater the number of people 
engaged in modern forms of consumption then the less the relative in-
fluence or responsibility of each but the worse the cumulative impact of 
their insignificance. As a result of scale effects what is self-evident or ra-
tional at one scale may well be destructive or unjust at another. Hence, 
progressive social and economic policies designed to disseminate West-
ern levels of prosperity may even resemble, on another scale, an insane 
plan to destroy the biosphere. Yet, for any individual household, motor-
ist, etc., a scale effect in their actions is invisible. It is not present in any 
phenomenon in itself (no eidetic reduction will flush it out), but only 
in the contingency of how many other such phenomena there are, have 
been and will be, at even vast distances in space or time. Human agency 
becomes, as it were, displaced from within by its own act, a kind of de-
monic iterability.
The argument of this paper is that dominant modes of literary and 
cultural criticism are blind to scale effects in ways that now need to 
be addressed.
Derangements of Scale
One symptom of a now widespread crisis of scale is a derangement of lin-
guistic and intellectual proportion in the way people often talk about the 
environment, a breakdown of “decorum” in the strict sense. Thus a sen-
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tence about the possible collapse of civilization can end, no less solemn-
ly, with the injunction never to fill the kettle more than necessary when 
making tea. A poster in many workplaces depicts the whole earth as giant 
thermostat dial, with the absurd but intelligible caption “You control cli-
mate change.” A motorist buying a slightly less destructive make of car is 
now “saving the planet.”
These deranged jumps in scale and fantasies of agency may recall rhet-
oric associated with the atomic bomb in the 1950s and after. Maurice 
Blanchot argued then that talk of humanity having power over the whole 
earth, or being able to “destroy itself,” was deeply misleading. “Human-
ity” is not some grand mega-subject or unitary agent in the sense this 
trope implies. In practice such destruction would certainly not be some 
sort of consciously performed act of self-harm, “humanity destroying it-
self.” It would be as arbitrary as was “the turtle that fell from the sky” and 
crushed the head of Aeschylus (Blanchot 106).
The almost nonsensical rhetoric of environmental slogans makes 
Blanchot’s point even more forcefully. Received concepts of agency, ra-
tionality and responsibility are being strained or even begin to fall apart 
in a bewildering generalizing of the political that can make even filling a 
kettle as public an act as voting. The very notion of a “carbon footprint” 
alters the distinctions of public and private built into the foundations of 
the modern liberal state. Normally, demands in a political context to face 
the future take the form of some rousing call to regained authenticity, 
whether personal, cultural or national, and they reinforce given norms of 
morality or responsibility, with an enhanced sense of determination and 
purpose. With climate change this is not the case. Here a barely calcu-
lable nonhuman agency brings about a general but unfocused sense of 
delegitimation and uncertainty, a confusion of previously clear arenas of 
action or concepts of equity; boundaries between the scientific and the 
political become newly uncertain, the distinction between the state and 
civil society less clear, and once normal procedures and modes of under-
standing begin to resemble dubious modes of political, ethical and intel-
lectual containment. Even a great deal of environmental criticism, mod-
eling itself on kinds of progressive oppositional politics and trying (like 
Murray Bookchin’s “social ecology”) to explain environmental degrada-
tion by reference solely to human-to-human hierarchies and oppressions 
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can look like an evasion of the need to accord to the nonhuman a discon-
certing agency of its own.
The environmental crisis also questions given boundaries between in-
tellectual disciplines. The daily news confirms repeatedly the impossibil-
ity of reducing many environmental issues to any one coherent problem, 
dysfunction, or injustice. Overpopulation and atmospheric pollution, 
for instance, form social, moral, political, medical, technical, ethical and 
“animal rights” issues, all at once. If that tired term “the environment” has 
often seemed too vague—for it means, ultimately, “everything”—yet the 
difficulty of conceptualizing a politics of climate change may be precisely 
that of having to think “everything at once”. The overall force is of an im-
plosion of scales, implicating seemingly trivial or small actions with enor-
mous stakes while intellectual boundaries and lines of demarcation fold 
in upon each other. The inundation of received intellectual boundaries 
and the horror of many probable future scenarios has the deranging ef-
fect, for instance, of making deeply unsure which of the following two 
statements is finally the more responsible—(1) “climate change is now 
acknowledged as a legitimate and serious concern and the government 
will continue to support measures to improve the fuel efficiency of mo-
tor vehicles” or (2) “the only defensible relationship to have with a car is 
with a well aimed brick”?1
Contra “Liberal Criticism”
How then can a literary or cultural critic engage with the sudden sense 
that most given thought about literature and culture has been taking 
place on the wrong scale?
The most controversial political effect of climate change may be its 
challenge to basic dominant assumptions about the nature and seeming 
self-evident value of “democracy” as the most enlightened way to con-
duct human affairs. David Shearman and Joseph Wayne Smith write: 
“colossal environmental problems, both existing and impending, have 
been accelerated by the freedoms and corruption of democracy and are 
unlikely to be solved by this system of governance” (15). The decisive 
target here is “liberal democracy” and the now dominant liberal tradition 
in political thought, i.e. the tradition that combines institutions of private 
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property, market-based economics, individualistic-rights-based notions 
of personhood and the conception of the state as “existing to secure the 
freedom of individuals on a formally egalitarian basis” (Brown, Edgework 
39). The liberal political tradition looking back to Thomas Hobbes and 
John Locke sees politics as essentially a matter of compacts between 
individuals for the unmolested use of individual property and exploita-
tion of natural resources. Such concepts of right seem at first merely neu-
tral: the rights that apply to a hundred people, or to a hundred million, 
could surely also apply to billions? Some questions about scale, however, 
emerge when it is remembered that the founding conceptions of the lib-
eral tradition emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries “in 
low-population-density and low-technology societies, with seemingly 
unlimited access to land and other resources,” in a world, that is, that 
has now been consumed ( Jamieson 148). On top of this, “[Locke] takes 
for granted that there will be enough, that the goodness of things pro-
vides enough so that taking by one or a group does not deprive others” 
(Ross 57). Structurally committed to a process of continuous economic 
growth, modern Western society effectively projected as its material con-
dition an ever-expandable frontier of new land or resources. This impos-
sible demand or assumption, long disguised by the free gift of fossil fuels, 
has now become visible and problematic. What Hans Jonas writes of “all 
traditional ethics” applies here: it “reckoned only with noncumulative be-
haviour” (7).
Liberal notions of extending the status of the rights-bearing individual 
to more and more people are caught up in a complex and bewildering 
economy of violence. Climate change disrupts the scale at which one 
must think, skews categories of internal and external and resists inher-
ited closed economies of accounting or explanation in a way even Jacques 
Derrida seems not to have suspected. Referring to Derrida’s well-known 
account in Specters of Marx (1993) of the “10 plagues” (81–3) held to be 
threatening the world, Tom Cohen notes the puzzling absence of any ref-
erence to environmental crisis, arguably the most deadly of all:
[Derrida‘s] manoeuvre looks weak today, all ten being fairly 
standard and all human-to-human political miseries—from 
worklessness to weak international law. Today, as we “know,” 
the entire gameboard has been invisibly haunted by its own 
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drive to auto-erase, or auto-eviscerate its non-anthropic 
premises. (qtd. in Wood 287)
True, Derrida writes of incalculable responsibility and the conceptual 
and physical destabilization of borders, of national frontiers and the “at 
home.” His On Hospitality (2000) argues how the supposedly inviolable 
interiority of the home is already de-constituted, turned inside-out, by 
its multiple embeddings in public space, the state, the telephone line, 
monitored emails, etc., yet there is residual idealism in Derrida’s exclu-
sive attention to systems of law and communication (61). The focus on 
the moment of decision in individual consciousness and its pathos (its 
ordeal of undecidablity, etc.) seems narrow and inadequate in a context 
in which things have now become overwhelmingly more political than 
people. Nothing in his work seems to allow for a situation in which it is 
not irrational to connect a patio heater in London immediately with the 
slow inundation of Tuvalu in the Pacific. Thus On Hospitality mentions 
TV, email and internet but not the central heating system, cooking ap-
pliances, washing machine or car (or, for that matter, the institution of 
private property itself, despite its crucial connection to Derrida’s topic of 
personal sovereignty). In effect, “All reality is politics, but not all politics 
is human” (Harman 89).
Wendy Brown argues that Derrida’s “treatment of freedom reveals the 
hold of liberalism on his formulations of democracy,” (“Sovereign Hesita-
tions” 127) that his arguments still work within an essentially liberal con-
ception of politics as devising systems to enable the space of individuals’ 
seeming freedom to live as they choose, the challenge being to extend 
such politics beyond current borders and even beyond an exclusively hu-
man reference.2 Reconfiguring a notion of the subject as openness to the 
other etc. instead of an autonomous self-presence, and attention to apo-
rias of freedom/equality and conditional and unconditional hospitality, 
do not alter the basic terms of Derrida‘s commitment to a liberal progres-
sivist tradition whose assumptions of scale are here at issue. In support 
of Brown’s point one can argue that a seeming blindness to nonhuman 
agency and to scale effects tends to preserve the political in On Hospital-
ity as a factitiously separate sphere. Yet environmental issues enact a be-
wildering generalization of the political that makes Derrida’s focus on hu-
man norms, institutions, and decisions look like a kind of containment. 
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His conception of the moment of decision as a negotiation with the un-
decidable is simultaneously both trivialized and magnified by scale ef-
fects in relation to such minutiae as turning a light on or deciding to buy 
a freezer. The later Derrida’s frontier questions of conditional or uncondi-
tional hospitality can seem foreclosed in scale, two-dimensional, for they 
ignore that ubiquitous border already contiguous with all other countries 
at the same time, a shared atmosphere. To live the hourly trivia of an af-
fluent lifestyle in France is already to lurk as a destructive interloper in 
the living space of a farmer on the massive floodplains of Bangladesh.
A nonhuman politics also raises questions about the dominant, lib-
eral/progressive cultural politics of much mainstream professional liter-
ary criticism. The frequent method now is to read all issues as forms of 
cultural politics within an understanding of the text analogous to way the 
liberal tradition sees civic society generally, viz. as an arena for the con-
testation of individual or collective interests, rights or identity claims. For 
example, Group A is seen to achieve its self-celebratory image through its 
(implicit) denigration of Group B, while Group C is seen as itself “mar-
ginalized” by the way Group B always seems to identify it with Group 
A, instead of being a distinct set with its own claims…and so on.3 Yet 
each, at the same time, is staking its own rights to air, water, space and 
material resources and to focus solely on the rights of the individual per-
son or group elides the issue of the violence continually and problem-
atically being waged against the earth itself, whose own agency is both 
taken for granted and disregarded. It is as if critics were still writing on 
a flat and passive earth of indefinite extension, not a round, active one 
whose furthest distance comes from behind to tap you uncomfortably on 
the shoulder. Modes of thinking and practice that may once have seemed 
justified, internally coherent, self-evident or progressive now need to be 
reassessed in terms of hidden exclusions, disguised costs, or as offering a 
merely imaginary or temporary closure. How this will work out in prac-
tice, however, is harder to predict—at least beyond the trivially obvious 
(“Well, I always thought Kerouac‘s On the Road was an irresponsible 
book, but now this!”).
Perhaps then the most trenchant environmental and postcolonial criti-
cism in relation to climate change would be one which took up the more 
meta-critical role of examining assumptions of scale in the individualist 
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rhetoric of liberalism that still pervades a large body of given cultural and 
literary criticism. An ethic attending such work would also breach cur-
rent notions of decorum, redrawing the seeming boundaries of privacy 
whereby, say, a critic’s professed views on history, religion, colonialism 
or ethics are all seen to belong in the realm of “public” controversy, semi-
nars, papers and conferences while the resources sequestered to that per-
son’s sole use remain a supposedly “private” matter, with a high salary and 
its attendant life-style still regarded, if at all, as a matter of prestige.
Reading Raymond Carver’s “Elephant” on a scale of six centuries
In what ways are inherited and currently dominant modes of reading in 
literary and cultural criticism blind to questions of scale? The issue can be 
tested through a practical reading experiment. How would it be to read 
and reread the same text through a series of increasingly broad spatial 
and temporal scales, one after the other, paying particular attention to 
the strain this puts on given critical assumptions and currently dominant 
modes of reading?
Let us turn here to a specific literary example, Raymond Carver’s late 
short story, “Elephant” (1988). This text is a comic monologue consist-
ing of the complaints and then gradual acceptance of a male blue-collar 
worker who is continually being pestered for money by hard-pressed 
relatives in other parts of the country. Most of “Elephant” happens be-
tween domestic interiors linked by telephone. The narrator’s recently 
unemployed brother, a thousand miles away in California, requiring im-
mediate help to pay the mortgage on his house, seems later to be able to 
forgo more borrowing because his wife might sell some land in her family 
but finally comes asking for money once more. He has already had to sell 
their second car and pawn the TV. The narrator’s daughter has two chil-
dren and is married to:
A swine who won‘t even look for work, a guy who couldn’t 
hold a job if they handed him one. The time or two he did 
find something, he overslept, or his car broke down on the 
way to work, or he‘d just be let go, no explanation and that 
was that. (77)
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The narrator’s aged mother, “poor and greedy,” (74) relies on the sup-
port of both her sons to maintain her independent lifestyle amid signs 
of failing health. The narrator’s son demands money to enable him to 
emigrate and a divorced wife has to be paid alimony. Struggling with his 
resentment as he writes all the cheques, the narrator reaches a turning 
point with two dreams, one of them being about how his father used to 
carry him on his shoulder when he was a child, and he would feel safe, 
stretch out his arms and fantasize that he was riding an elephant. The next 
morning, giving a kind of private blessing to all his relatives despite their 
demands, he decides to walk rather than drive to work, leaving his house 
unlocked. Walking along the road, he is stretching out his arms as in his 
dream of childhood when a workmate called George stops to pick him 
up. George has a cigar and has just borrowed money to improve his car. 
Together they test it for speed:
“Go,” I said. “What are you waiting for, George.” And that’s 
when we really flew. Wind howled outside the windows. He 
had it floored, and we were going flat out. We streaked down 
that road in his big unpaid-for car. (90)
With the new questions posed by climate change in mind, what kinds 
of readings emerge of such a text?
Firstly, perhaps, that if “Capitalism must be regarded as an economy 
of unpaid costs,” (K. William Kapp, qtd. in Foster 37) then “Elephant” 
could easily read as a kind of environmental allegory, as a narrative of a 
chain of unpaid debt and unearned support extending itself into the fi-
nal image of the large unpaid for car. This relatively obvious first reading, 
however, can be deepened by considerations of scale.
Any broadly mimetic interpretation of a text, mapping it onto different 
if hopefully illuminating terms, always assumes a physical and temporal 
scale of some sort. It is a precondition of any such mapping, though al-
most never explicit in the interpretation. The scale in which one reads a 
text drastically alters the kinds of significance attached to elements of it, 
but, as we will see, it cannot itself give criteria for judgment.
Three scales can be used. Firstly, we could read the text on a (critically 
naïve) personal scale that takes into account only the narrator’s immedi-
ate circle of family and acquaintances over a time scale of several years. 
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At this scale there is a certain humanist coziness about the text, as if the 
Carver story were already a commercial screenplay. Family loyalty wins 
out against misfortune; love and forgiveness prevail in a tale of minor but 
genuine domestic heroism. The reading could refer to Carver’s defense 
of the short story as throwing “some light on what it is that makes and 
keeps us, often against great odds, recognizably human” (Nesset 104). 
In this respect “Elephant” would even come close to being a kind of 
Carver schmaltz.
A second scale is that almost always assumed in literary criticism. Spa-
tially, it is that of a national culture and its inhabitants, with a time frame 
of perhaps a few decades, a “historical period“ of some kind. Almost all 
criticism of Carver is situated at this scale, placing his work in the cultural 
context of the late twentieth century United States (or sometimes, on a 
broader scale, that of the modern short story after Edgar Allan Poe). Kirk 
Nesset, writing in 1995, is representative: “Carver’s figures dramatize and 
indirectly comment upon the problems besetting American culture, par-
ticularly lower middle-class culture, today” (7). Other topics prominent 
in discussions of Carver are broadly located at this scale, such as unem-
ployment and consumer culture as they affect personal relationships, 
the ideals and realities of American domesticity, that society’s material-
ism, and its concepts of gender, especially masculinity. This scale enables 
an interpretation of the final scene of “Elephant” as an affirmative but 
temporary moment of escape from the denigrations and frustrations of 
American consumer capitalism, focused on the private car as an image of 
individual freedom and mobility.
The third, hypothetical scale is, of course, the difficult one. It could be, 
spatially, that of the whole earth and its inhabitants, and placing “Ele-
phant” in the middle of a, let us say, six hundred year time frame i.e. from 
three hundred years before 1988 to 2288, three hundred after, and bear-
ing in mind authoritative plausible scenarios for the habitability of the 
planet at that time.
What does this do? An initial impulse is that trying to read “Elephant” 
at this scale simply does not “make sense.” It seems deliberately to repeat 
the kind of derangement of scale familiar in environmental slogans (“eat 
less meat and save the planet”). At the same time, the feeling of paraly-
sis or arbitrariness in the experiment cannot override the conviction that 
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to read at scales that used, familiarly, to “make sense” may now also be a 
form of intellectual and ethical containment.
What, then, is being held off? Viewed on very long time scales, hu-
man history and culture can take on unfamiliar shapes, as work in envi-
ronmental history repeatedly demonstrates, altering conceptions of what 
makes something “important” and what does not.4 Nonhuman entities 
take on a decisive agency. Thus some would argue that, globally, the two 
major events of the past three centuries have been the industrial exploi-
tation of fossil fuels and a worldwide supplanting of local biota in favor 
of an imported portmanteau of profitable species: cattle, wheat, sheep, 
maize, sugar, coffee, eucalyptus, palm oil, etc. Thus it is that most of the 
world’s wheat, a crop originally from the middle east, now comes from 
other areas—Canada, the United States, Argentina, Australia—just as 
people of originally European descent now dominate a large propor-
tion of the earth’s surface. This huge shift in human populations, includ-
ing slaves as well as domesticated animals and plants, has largely deter-
mined the modern world, with its close connections between destructive 
monocultures in food production, exploitative systems of international 
trade and exchange and the institution of the modern state. At its bleak-
est, an ecological overview of the current state of the planet shows a huge 
bubble of population and consumption in one species intensifying expo-
nentially and expanding at a rate that cannot be supported by the planet’s 
resources for long. It is the transitory world of this bizarre, destructive 
and temporary energy imbalance that Western populations currently in-
habit and take for a stable and familiar reality.
One element of containment in lower scale readings of “Elephant,” 
blind to this bigger reality, is the “methodological nationalism” of read-
ings located at the middle scale. “Methodological nationalism” is a term 
taken from A.D. Smith and used by Ulrich Beck: “While reality is be-
coming [or always was?] thoroughly cosmopolitan, our habits of thought 
and consciousness, like the well-worn paths of academic teaching and 
research, disguise the growing unreality of the world of nation-states” 
(21). That is, we often still think, interpret and judge as if the territori-
al bounds of the nation state acted as a self-evident principle of overall 
coherence and intelligibility within which a history and culture can be 
understood—ignoring anything that does not fit such a narrative. After 
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all, literary criticism itself evolved primarily as an institution of cultural 
self-definition at this scale. Almost all literary criticism of Carver could 
be instanced here. Even so seemingly innocent a phrase as Carver’s “the 
dark side of Reagan‘s America” (qtd. in Nesset 4) may instantiate meth-
odological nationalism in proportion to the degree in which the national 
sphere and its cultural agenda serve exclusively to enframe, contain, and 
shape an analysis or the familiar—but contained—judgments of social 
“inclusion” and “exclusion.”
The expanded scale makes familiar critical assumptions about the ad-
equacy of a national context look parochial, self-interested and damaging. 
What happens if one deploys at the third global scale the methodology of 
mainstream cultural criticism, with its broadly liberal, progressive agenda 
and questions of equity, those topoi of “inclusion” and “exclusion”? The 
rhetoric of marginalization and impoverishment common in readings 
of Carver becomes at the very least complicated by the fact, on a glob-
al scale, that while their distress is undeniable none of the characters in 
“Elephant” is actually poor in a material sense. The narrator has a house 
to himself and also a car. The supposedly impoverished brother had two 
cars and was forced to sell one of them to help keep his house. The sup-
posedly poverty stricken daughter, with her husband and children, lives 
in a trailer but has at least one car. The brother’s wife is a landowner and 
the son requires money to do something most living people will never 
do, travel in an airplane to another country. The mother does not live 
with any of her children but is maintained in a household of her own. 
It is not the number of people but the number of separate households 
demanding support that is the real economic issue in “Elephant,” keep-
ing the property each represents. The culture of independence affirmed 
in the narrator’s indignant work-ethic also effectively serves economic 
and infrastructure systems that set up a continuous dependency on high 
levels of consumption and, as a result, produces a pervasive and intensi-
fying sense of entrapment. “If nothing succeeds like success, nothing also 
entraps like success” ( Jonas 9).
Derrida argued how the supposedly self-contained “inner” realm of the 
at home, the house, the personal household, is constitutively breached by 
its embeddedness in public space, yet his very set up repeated liberal con-
ceptions of politics, even if it complicated them. At the third scale, how-
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ever, everything and everyone is always “outside”: a person registers there 
less in terms of familiar social coordinates (race, class, gender and so on) 
than as a physical entity, representing so much consumption of resources 
and expenditure of waste (not the personality, but the “footprint“). Like 
a great deal of twentieth century literature (including, say, On the Road), 
the effect of embedding “Elephant” within the third scale is to turn the 
text into a peculiar kind of gothic, a doppelganger narrative. Characters as 
“persons” and responsible agents are now doubled by themselves as mere 
physical entities. The larger the scale the more thing-like becomes the sig-
nificance of the person registered on it (even as scale effects have given 
human beings the status of a geological force). Plots, characters, setting 
and trivia that seemed normal and harmless on the personal or national 
scale reappear as destructive doubles of themselves on the third scale, 
part of a disturbing and encroaching parallel universe, whose malign real-
ity it is becoming impossible to deny. It becomes impossible to sustain 
the fiction that significant historical agency is the preserve of human be-
ings alone. The material infrastructure that surrounds and largely dictates 
the lives of the people, the houses, the cars, the roads, may partially dis-
place more familiar issues of identity and cultural representation as a fo-
cus of significance. Technology and infrastructures emerge not only as in-
herently political but as unpredictably doubly politicized in scale effects 
that deride the intentions of their users or builders. “Elephant” could be 
described in terms of what William Ophuls calls “energy slavery,”5 the op-
pressive, all-pervading, and destructive effects of being born into a fos-
sil fuel based infrastructure as aggressive as an occupying army. A futural 
reading of “Elephant” would thus be more object-centered, aware of the 
capricious nature of nonhuman agency and suspicious of the way con-
temporary criticism, even ecocriticism, tends to interiorize all environ-
mental issues as ultimately questions of subjective attitudes or belief, of 
humanity acting reflexively upon itself (even “humanity destroying it-
self ”). For instance, there is nothing really “private” about a car, just as, 
ironically, the average person’s decisions to fill or not fill a kettle will al-
most certainly be of more real consequence, however minuscule, than 
their political opinions ever will.6 Along with the households demanding 
to be sustained, the politics of energy slavery reappear even in such seem-
ing daily trivia as how the daughter’s partner allegedly loses the chance of 
162 Timothy Clark
a job because his car broke down, or the way the narrator’s brother prom-
ises,” I’ve got this job lined up. It’s definite. I’ll have to drive fifty miles 
round trip every day, but that’s no problem—hell, no. I’d drive a hundred 
and fifty if I had too” (83). Cars also proliferate themselves through the 
parasitism of ideologies of individual “freedom”—“Elephant” ends with 
the narrator in the passenger seat, on a high of speed urging on George, 
complete with cigar, to drive as fast as he possibly can.
To highlight nonhuman agency adds a missing dimension to such fa-
miliar critical topoi, in reading Carver, as the erosion of communal val-
ues, or to the social/cultural force of Carver’s so-called minimalism in 
short story technique, its projection of a late-capitalist society of disjunc-
tive surfaces and personal isolation in which the lack of a completely reli-
able sense of relation between cause and effect, intention and result, ef-
fort and reward, is accompanied by a pervading sense of insecurity. The 
futural reading further decenters human agency, underlining the fragility 
and contingency of effective boundaries between public and private, ob-
jects and persons, the “innocent” and “guilty,” human history and natural 
history, the traumatic and the banal, and (with technology) the conve-
nient and the disenfranchising. In sum, at the third scale, a kind of non-
anthropic irony deranges the short story as any easily assimilable object 
of any given kind of moral/political reading.
Simon Levin writes “That there is no single correct scale or level at 
which to describe a system does not mean that all scales serve equally 
well or that there are not scaling laws” (1953). However, there are cru-
cial differences between reading a literary text at multiple scales and the 
function of scales in scientific modeling and explanation. In such model-
ing, suppression of detail is seen as strength of work at large scales, where 
broad patterns can emerge overriding individual variations. A literary 
reading clearly works in no such way. Assumptions of scale are always at 
work in any reading, but these may enable different judgments of value, 
not decide them. The three scales produce readings of “Elephant” that 
conflict with each other, yet can the third scale act as some final frame of 
reference or court of last appeal deciding for us how to read the text? An 
ecological overview is in danger of feeding a reductive but increasingly 
familiar green moralism, keen to turn ecological facts into moral impera-
tives on how to live, blind to the sense of helplessness dominant in “El-
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ephant” at the first scale. While it highlights the hidden costs of lower 
scale thinking, the third scale’s tendency to register a person primarily as 
a physical thing is evidently problematic, almost too brutally removed 
from the daily interpersonal ethics, hopes and struggles that it ironizes. 
For instance, although this essay chose the less controversial example of 
cars, the most environmentally significant aspect of the situation project-
ed by the text would be the reproduction of people themselves. The fact 
that the narrator has fathered two children would be more crucial—in 
the brutal terms of physical emissions—than either his lifestyle or prop-
erty. This highlights an issue, overpopulation, which reduces even Donna 
Haraway to contradiction—or, more strictly, to thinking on conflicting 
scales at the same time—when she says in an interview “as a biologist,” 
“in the face of a planet that’s got well over 6 billion people now”:
the carrying capacity of the planet probably isn’t that. And I 
don’t care how many times you talk about the regressive na-
ture of anti-natalist ideologies and population control ideolo-
gies. All true, but without serious population reduction we 
aren’t going to make it as a species, and neither are thousands 
or millions of other species….So you can hate the Chinese 
for the one-child policy and also think they are right (laughs). 
(qtd. in Schneider 153)
In sum, reading at several scales at once cannot be just the abolition of 
one scale in the greater claim of another but a way of enriching, singular-
izing and yet also creatively deranging the text through embedding it in 
multiple and even contradictory frames at the same time (so that even 
the most enlightened seeming progressive social argument may have 
one in agreement on one scale and reaching for a conceptual brick on 
another). The overall interpretation of “Elephant” offered here can only 
be a multiple, self-conflictual one. The acts of the narrator remain ones of 
great personal generosity even if, at the same time, scale effects ironically 
implicate them in incalculable evil. The text emerges, simultaneously, de-
pending on the scale at issue, as (1) a wry anecdote of personal heroism, 
(2) a protest against social exclusion, and (3) a confrontation with the 
entrapment of human actions and decisions within a disastrous imper-
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sonal dynamic they do not comprehend, as well as the various contain-
ments of inherited modes of thinking.
A further conclusion seems clear. Thinking of climate change in rela-
tion to literary or cultural criticism will not be a matter of inventing some 
new method of reading per se, for its most prominent effect is of a de-
rangement of scales that is also an implosion of intellectual competences. 
It is far easier for critics to stay inside the professionally familiar circle of 
cultural representations, ideas, ideals and prejudices, than to engage with 
long-term relations of physical cause and effect, or the environmental 
costs of an infrastructure, questions that involve nonhuman agency and 
which engage modes of expertise that may lie outside the humanities as 
currently constituted. This would also suggest that the humanities as cur-
rently constituted make up forms of ideological containment that now 
need to change.
Notes
1. This does not exclude that deceptive fix, the electric car. Most of the polluting 
emissions associated with any car come from the process of its manufacture. 
The electricity that powers a supposedly eco-friendly car would need to have 
been generated somewhere.
2. Brown contrasts the alternative notion of democracy as the difficult 
challenge of genuinely sharing power to the liberal conception of delegated 
power as supposedly forming the outward-facing barrier behind which 
individual “freedom” is lived out. Vincent B. Leitch, querying the absence 
of any communitarian element in Derrida’s political thinking, finds “a 
long rightward-leaning libertarian shadow [cast] over Derrida‘s left-wing 
democratic politics” (242).
3. I go into more detail on this in the chapter “Freedoms and the Institutional 
Americanism of Literary Study,” in my The Poetics of Singularity: The Counter-
Culturalist Turn in Heidegger, Derrida, Blanchot and the Later Gadamer 11–31.
4. See, for instance, Ponting, Crosby, Chew, and Diamond.
5. See Ophuls 169–74.
6. Michael Northcott writes: “The ascription ‘private’ is increasingly problematic 
when applied to automobiles. Their use requires the public maintenance of an 
extensive concrete, steel and tarmac infrastructure, representing one half of 
the built space of European and American cities” (215–6).
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Chapter 6
Sexual Indifference
Claire Colebrook
There has been much talk recently regarding the extinction of sexual dif-
ference, both in a highly specific sense and in a broader sense. In humans 
the y chromosome has recently been interrogated with regard to its evo-
lutionary value, with some scientists suggesting its days are numbered. In 
addition to that quite localized prospect of annihilation, it is also possible 
that life, if it survives on this planet, will have to alter so radically that it 
will no longer take the forms of organic sexual reproduction that seem 
to have so dominated the imaginary, especially in these present times 
when thoughts of the inhuman and posthuman often stretch no further 
than imagining animal organic life, itself of the rather comforting sexually 
dual mode.1 Sexual indifference—or the thought of production and ‘life’ 
that does not take the form of the bounded organism reproducing itself 
through relation to its complementing other might not just be a thought 
worth entertaining for the curiosity it presents to the life sciences. Such a 
thought might provoke us to think beyond the lures and laziness that the 
sexual dyad as a figure has offered for thinking. There were, in the early 
days of what has come to be known as ‘theory’ (at least) two diagnoses 
of this image of redemptive unity-in-otherness: Lacan’s insistence that 
ethics might begin if one could imagine the non-existence of woman, 
precluding the dependence of the subject on some fulfillment to come; 
and Paul de Man’s reading of the logic of growth, fruition and genesis as 
relapses into the myopic quiescence of meaning. Today, however, despite 
a few exceptions the dyad of sexual difference as fulfillment has taken on 
a new life in theory and has, I would argue, precluded the thought of the 
logic of extinction that at once resides within sexual reproduction but 
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that also demands a thought of reproduction beyond that of sexuality. 
The two senses of the extinction of sexual difference—both sexuality’s 
necessary relation to extinction and the possibility of sexual difference 
itself becoming extinct—despite coming to the fore in a series of recent 
scientific studies has not only failed to dent theory’s commitment to a 
binary organicism, but has seemed to provoke a return or retreat to the 
figure of the sexual couple.
It is possible that the earth’s previous significant mass extinction event 
was directly related to annihilation via sexual difference: if dinosaur gen-
ders were, like present day turtles and lizards, determined via tempera-
ture, then the severe cold caused by a comet would have precluded the 
birth of females, this in turn leading to a surfeit of males and species ex-
tinction. Recent research has opened the possibility of generating sperm 
from stem cells; further into the future—100 to 200 thousand years 
(which is a mere blink in evolutionary time)—the y chromosome has 
been predicted to face extinction. Many species already reproduce with-
out dual sexual reproduction, or via sexual reproduction that does not 
generate distinct sexes. Non-sexual reproduction has recently been re-
ported beyond the plant kingdom in a species of Amazonian ant that rep-
licates itself from the queen without coming into contact with other gene 
lines. Far, then, from relation to sexual alterity being the sine qua non of 
life, the human sexual dyad is both an event within evolutionary life and 
possibly within human organic life—if the species lives long enough to 
realize its dreams of reproduction via stems cells, sperm generated from 
stem cells, cloning, inorganic artificial replication, and the mastery of a 
virtual reality that negates organic finitude. At a broader level, and in a 
temporal trajectory that conflicts with scenarios of liberation through 
stem cell technologies and anticipated evolutionary timelines of multiple 
millennia, sexual difference is not only a factor in species evolution but 
also faces annihilation via the extinction of organic life. Any number of 
(mutually exclusive but over-determined) threats promise to wipe out 
the existence of organisms: global warming, resource depletion, viral 
pandemic, bio-terrorism, the resurgence of nuclear warfare from ‘rogue’ 
states, economic collapse leading to social chaos, and the lawlessness that 
would preclude the managerial measures required to deal with the other 
threats. Indeed, the number of factors and their unpredictability intensify 
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the possibility of panic and chaos precisely because procedures for adap-
tation and mitigation in one domain preclude the attention and resources 
being devoted to another. One might recall here, just to cite one example, 
the ways in which calls for population control by certain environmental-
ists have been criticized by left-wing feminists for (once again) focusing 
on the control of women and reproduction as the first port of call in a 
crisis regarding the viability of life. If extinction is certain as part of the 
natural logic of evolving life, it is also possible that extinction might—
by virtue of the panic that accompanies the attempts to maintain human 
life at all costs—annihilate organic life as such, sweeping away sexual dif-
ference in any of its currently known or imagined forms. How then, we 
might ask—facing these crises and their ramifications—has theory and 
gender studies addressed the question of climate change in its broadest 
sense? The change of the literal climate cannot be delimited from the ac-
companying change in intellectual, social, political and systemic climates. 
At the very least, this is because a certain sexual feedback, whereby the 
imaginary of human reproduction that has allowed human life to figure 
itself as organically self-sustaining, has come to destroy the very sys-
tem that would allow human life to sustain itself into a future imagin-
able as human.
Work on the relation between climate change and gender has gener-
ally focused on the ways in which disasters caused by global warming 
and resource depletion have tended to affect women more adversely than 
men, and this because women are the first to suffer in a shortage of labor 
opportunities and also because crises in general do not allow the status 
quo of inequality to be addressed. But this use of the concept of gender 
difference to nuance the effects of climate change needs to be extended 
to consider the ways in which all that comes under the rubric of climate 
change—all the ways in which organic human life has rendered itself 
unsustainable precisely by sustaining itself—has a figure of sexual differ-
ence and justice pervading its imagination of itself. Climate change, after 
all, is not change of the climate, as though it were nothing more than the 
human being observing an alteration of its surround; climate change ‘in-
cludes’ a confrontation with what goes beyond any topology of ‘environ’ 
or oikos, no longer being conceivable of the place in which the human re-
sides so much as an infiltration of the human by forces beyond its organic 
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modes of comprehension. What such an over-determined and chaotic 
domain of possibilities alerts us to is that questions of sexual difference 
can no longer be located within life, within questions of living organisms 
and their relations to each other. It is no longer a question of address-
ing the ways in which sexual difference does or does not play itself out in 
the relation among humans. For it is sexual difference, both in its genetic 
reality and in its imaginary figuration, that is one of the crucial factors 
in organic life’s possible survival and possible disappearance; and this is 
because sexual difference is a strange and seemingly perverse logic of life, 
both enhancing organic variability (and survival) and yet also diverting 
perception, attention, and affectivity into the organism’s own bounds. 
What I would like to insist upon here is that the extinction of sexual dif-
ference does not arrive from without as some type of accident that befalls 
an otherwise benevolent living system. On the contrary: the possibility 
of sexual difference is essentially intertwined with the possibility of ex-
tinction. An organism and a species that combines reproduction with 
sexual difference abandons the efficient replication of simple cloning, 
but nevertheless allows for greater gene survival through the multiplica-
tion of variability in recombinant DNA. (Only through the coupling of 
chromosomes can mutations of single gene lines be added to create new 
distinctions in such an effective evolutionary speed.) Sexual difference, 
or the living being’s complex relation to the otherness it requires for ge-
netic continuity alongside the identity that marks it as a living being as 
such, has always been considered (normatively and morally) in terms of 
the gendered couple. It is the failure to confront the potentiality of sexual 
indifference—or difference beyond bounded organisms—that has pre-
cipitated the accelerated trajectory towards the annihilation of sexually 
differentiated and organic life.
So how is sexual difference intrinsically bound up with the potential-
ity of extinction? Sexual difference requires something like the bounded 
forms of distinct kinds, requires genres or relatively stable forms whose 
coupling then allows for greater chances of a gene line’s continuity. One 
of the basic principles of evolutionary theory—rendered annoyingly fa-
miliar through popular evolutionary psychology—is that the gene’s sur-
vival can often occur at the expense of the organism, allowing for seem-
ingly perverse or disinterested behavior to have some rationale at the 
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level of populations or at the level of surviving genetic archaisms. Sexual 
difference allows for a maximal chance of a gene line’s survival but can 
only do so at the expense of the organism’s self-interest. Whereas simple 
cloning or replication would allow the maintenance of the being’s iden-
tity, reproduction through sexual difference enables only a fragment of 
the being’s genetic makeup to survive. Reproduction through sexual cou-
pling admits a large degree of variation, allowing for a greater chance of 
survival, but this survival is never that of an identity, organism or natural 
kind. If a being or organism were to remain simply as it is, without expo-
sure to the risks of sexual reproduction, its gene line would not couple 
with this diversity, maximizing survival. Sexual difference therefore re-
quires something like the boundedness and ongoing stability (achieved 
through difference) of organic life; at the same time, sexual difference 
operates beyond the bounds of organic closure and identity, proceeding 
beyond the organism and the lived.
It is just this time and dynamic relationality of sexual difference—al-
lowing the organism both to be of a certain kind or genre, while also open 
to living on through what is not itself—that has underpinned the highly 
normative images of life that have precluded the thought of the forces 
of life that threaten to annihilate sexual difference in its organic mode. 
An unthinking privileging of this logic of sexual difference has been ex-
trapolated to much of the celebration of life tout court. Ecocriticism and 
many modes of environmentalism begin from the affirmation of human-
ity’s necessary coupling with nature, insisting that we are not detached 
and isolated Cartesian units. But these grounding concepts of climate 
environment and ecology betray the very anthropocentrism they insist 
is not primary: for if we were to consider life not as that of the bounded 
being empathetically attached to its complementing other but as a play 
of annihilating and dominating forces then we would have to jettison the 
figure of the climate, tied as it is (from klima) to the surface of the earth 
(or to region—as in the notion of ‘climes’), to the bounded and delim-
itable. Sexual indifference—or the forces of life, mutation, generation 
and exchange without any sense of ongoing identity or temporal synthe-
sis—have always been warded off as evil and unthinkable, usually associ-
ated with a monstrous inhumanity. The shrill insistence on proper sexual 
difference—that creation must occur with a sense of continuity, inten-
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tionality, identity and dynamic self-becoming—precludes the organism 
from paying heed to those other rhythms that are now (for want of being 
perceived) exacerbating the annihilation of organic life. Had man recog-
nized the inhuman—the monstrous mutations he has always warded off 
as evil, indifferent, and chaotically unbounded—he may have been more 
perturbed by those forces that are not of the life-world or intentional ho-
rizon, might have been able to face the encroaching sexual indifference 
that to date has been deemed to be unthinkable.
We might note, then, that it is just at the point that bounded sexual dif-
ference unravels and opens to a milieu of rampant self-destruction that 
theory and culture has returned to, and reaffirmed, a bounded gendered 
enclosure. And similarly, it is just at the point that capitalism appears to 
be in a state of collapse—precisely because it was too self-enclosed and 
too sheltered from radical exchange and difference—that theory retreats 
to archaisms of community, identity, sociality, the polity, and humanity. 
To make this clearer, we might say that the event that will ultimately pre-
cipitate human extinction is not its radical openness to dissolution but 
its suicidal self-enclosure, its self-bounded integrity that will allow it only 
to imagine its own world from its own imaginative horizon. As has be-
come all too evident recently, what may trigger utter economic collapse 
is not radical capitalism—an absolutely free and open market—but self-
enclosing narcissisms, privileges, feudal lineages, knots of self-interest, 
archaic nepotisms, and good old-fashioned individualist self-interest. 
So, when figures of the nightmares of an indifferent, inhuman, purely 
technical capitalist world of mere exchange and replication are imagined 
through depictions of an equally mechanistic, inhuman, and contingent 
replication, it is always something like the well-bounded whole of inten-
tionality and meaning that is seen as a corrective. And this is so despite 
the fact that the wholeness of bounded, meaningful and intentional life 
constitutes just the self-enclosed blindness that has eliminated any pos-
sibility of witnessing the lines of life beyond our own myopia.
Before considering the ways in which the properly bounded, creative, 
and organic figure of sexual difference has operated as a moralism in 
theories of life, it might be worth pausing to ask how, today, ‘theory’ has 
responded to the milieu of extinction, to the increasing likelihood that 
what is now been imagined as the delimited anthropocene era may come 
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to an end and take with it organic life in general. Far from confronting 
the surfeit of scientific information—or confronting the affective lag 
between influx of information and paralysis of response—theory has 
retreated from a position of theory (or inhuman disengagement) to a 
traditional figure of the sexual binary. In all cases what is rehearsed is a 
theological-anthropomorphic insistence on the fruitful, productive, rela-
tively closed sexually dynamic couple, set over and against a (supposedly 
a-political) circulation of difference, exchange and possibly unproductive 
and senseless proliferation.
Consider some quite specific examples. After an earlier career that in-
sisted that there was no doer behind the deed, and that ‘sex’ was a ret-
roactive effect of a performance without intentional agent, Judith Butler 
has considered structures of recognition and familial alliance as at least 
the starting point of political theorization. Symptomatically, Butler has 
retrieved the face to face encounter that is both formative of human rec-
ognition, and that remains the ultimate horizon of a political theory that 
will be focused on the normativity of humanity (even if who or what 
counts as the norm is the site of a battle). It is the face that marks, for But-
ler, the rupture of representation and the limits of cognition:
For representation to convey the human, then, representation must 
not only fail, but it must show its failure. There is something unrepre-
sentable that we nevertheless seek to represent, and the paradox must 
be maintained in the representation we give.In this sense, the human is 
not identified with the unrepresentable; it is, rather, that which limits the 
success of any available practice. The face is not ‘effaced’ in this failure of 
representation, but is constituted in that very possibility. Something alto-
gether different happens, however, when the face operates in the service 
of personification. (Precarious Life 144)Butler opens with the promising 
and urgent question of the disruption of narcissistic self-enclosure, a dis-
turbance that is not willed, and yet she thinks this intrusion in terms of 
the Other (via a Levinas whose entire project was founded on the prima-
cy of the ethical, reinforcing the homeliness of ethos against the inhuman-
ity of mere force). Butler’s model of the self and life remains primarily 
traumatic; she may see infraction as necessary and constitutive, but it re-
mains the case that the self/other, or border/trauma limit is foundational 
for her theory:
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Perhaps we might have to think, along with Levinas, that 
self-preservation is not the highest goal, and the defense of a 
narcissistic point of view not the most urgent psychic need. 
That we are impinged upon primarily and against our will is 
the sign of a vulnerability and a beholdenness that we cannot 
will away. We can defend against it only by prizing the asocial-
ity of the subject over and against a difficult and intractable, 
even sometimes unbearable relationality. What might it mean 
to make an ethic from the region of the unwilled? It might 
mean that one does not foreclose upon that primary exposure 
to the Other, that one does not try to transform the unwilled 
into the willed, but rather, to take the very unbearability of ex-
posure as the sign, the reminder, of a common vulnerability 
(even as ‘common’ does not mean ‘symmetrical’ for Levinas). 
(Giving an Account of Oneself 100)
This primarily self-other mode of trauma precludes any consideration 
of the thousand tiny micro-events that take place beyond the lived. The 
attention to trauma maintains the self as a bordered whole, even if that 
surface can be punctured; the focus on the other as the agent of this dis-
turbance both allows the self to await intrusion, and localizes that intru-
sion in the human-human relation. Drawing on Laplanche, as well as 
Levinas, Butler leaves behind the diagnosis of this sexual imaginary artic-
ulated by Lacan. The Other does not exist; its fantasmatic presence—the 
lure that if only one could decipher the other’s desire one might attain a 
plentiude beyond the self ’s fragmentation. Lacan’s account of love would 
look forward to a relation of non-dependence, but is this the best we can 
do with his critique? Is a reconfiguring of the human sexual relation as far 
as we can go? Both in Laplanche and Lacan there is another path indi-
cated for thinking beyond the seduction of the human-human lure. And 
yet the interest that has been attained in their work has tended to devolve 
on the question of the sexual relation, the other and love.
Alain Badiou places the encounter of love as one of the four generic 
conditions of events. The properly evental mode of love that may not al-
ways be that of a couple is explicated most fully in Badiou’s work on St 
Paul. The privileging of love operates as a valorization of love as truth, in 
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which human love would strive to achieve through the other, something 
of the universality of Pauline Christian love.
 Thus, the new faith consists in deploying the power of self-love in the 
direction of others, addressing it to everyone, in a way made possible by 
subjectivation (conviction). Love is precisely what faith is capable of.
      I call this universal power of subjectivation an eventual fidelity, and 
it is correct to say that fidelity is the law of a truth. In Paul’s thought, love 
is precisely fidelity to the Christ event, in accordance with a power that 
addresses the love of self universally. Love is what makes of thought a 
power, which is why love alone, and not faith, bears the force of salvation 
(90).Love is set alongside other generic conditions such as mathemat-
ics, politics, and poetry: all of which are other than what Badiou deems 
to be the evil of the present. Evil is the merely senseless ever-sameness 
of communication, the circulation of unthought content, the capitalist 
and bourgeois indifference of a world without proper thinking. Thinking 
is neither the reception of information nor a consideration of how bodily 
life or worldly life might survive. (As an aside one might observe that all 
those indifferent conditions that Badiou associates with the unthinking 
world of bourgeois normality are also figurally tied to a certain notion 
of woman: passive consumption, mere chatter, moral ambivalence, and a 
society of hedonistic spectacle.)
Indifference—the loss of individuation, the subsumption of the think-
ing subject by opinion, and a mode of aesthetics of easy consumption 
and enjoyment rather than the creation of social relations—all these, too, 
are evils for Giorgio Agamben. Despite his theological heritage Agam-
ben does not use the concept of evil to target the modern world’s loss of 
the political, but he does see the terrors of contemporary bio-politics as 
located primarily in the lack of distinction between bios and zoe. If the 
ancient origin of the polis was possible because of a continual working 
of the anthropological machine, whereby man set himself in distinction 
from the mere life that was at once internal and yet externalized, then 
modernity has increasingly lost the polis in its falling back upon a man-
aged biological existence that is no longer formed collectively, practically 
and politically. The human becomes merely managed substance, not that 
which springs forth from itself to open its own world. Agamben, lament-
ing the loss of the political, concludes The Open by finding a way beyond 
176 Claire Colebrook
the opposition between bare (or simply surviving) life and properly hu-
man (or lawfully ordered and recognized) life in the figure of two lov-
ers as presented in a Titian canvas. Here, facing one’s sexual other, one is 
neither a mere body—for one’s natural existence is witnessed by anoth-
er—nor is one fully humanized and politicized, precisely because sexual 
desire is the desire of the other’s bodily being. The lovers figure a thresh-
old—for Agamben the political human threshold—of a fragile coming 
into existence as human from the natural:
In their fulfillment the lovers learn something of each other 
that they should not have known—they have lost their mys-
tery—and yet have not become any less impenetrable. But in 
this mutual disenchantment from their secret…they enter a 
new and more blessed life, one that is neither animal nor hu-
man. It is not nature that is reached in their fulfillment, but 
rather…a higher stage beyond both nature and knowledge, 
beyond concealment and disconcealment. (87)
Even though Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue for a new cre-
ative mode of humanity (or homohomo) beyond the normalized sex of the 
family, it is human embodied love that opens the way to a new politics. 
Rather than move away from the bourgeois couple to impersonal forces 
beyond the human, Hardt and Negri return to a pre-bourgeois theologi-
cal love—the godly love that had served to render heterosexual marriage 
spiritually proper to the life of man: “There is really nothing necessarily 
metaphysical about the Christian and Judaic love of God: both God’s 
love of humanity and humanity’s love of God are expressed and incar-
nated in the common material political project of the multitude” (Multi-
tude 351–52). This love is artifice precisely because it is fully grounded in 
art and knowledge, not the mere life of zoe, and certainly not the simple 
experiences of mixture:
This creative evolution does not merely occupy any existing 
place, but rather invents a new place; it is a desire that cre-
ates a new body. … In addition to being radically unprepared 
for normalization, however, the new body must also be able 
to create a new life. We must go further to define the new 
place of the non-place, well beyond the simple experiences 
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of mixture and hybridization, and the experiments that are 
conducted around them. We have to arrive at constituting a 
coherent political artifice, an artificial becoming in the sense 
that the humanists spoke of a homohomo produced by art and 
knowledge, and that Spinoza spoke of a powerful body pro-
duced by the highest consciousness that is infused with love. 
(Empire 216–217)
What all these appeals to redemptive love share, apart from their rep-
etition of normative figures of life depicted through bounded and gen-
dered distinction, is an alignment with a moralizing anti-capitalism. 
What must be expelled as evil is a proliferation of differences without 
limit, an exchange without sense, a chaotic productivity that is divorced 
from the vital normativity of organic being. Sexual indifference has al-
ways been warded off precisely because it opens the human organism 
to mutation, production, lines of descent and annihilation beyond that 
of its own intentionality. And this is so even if the evolutionary logic of 
sexual difference entails a necessary loss of distinction and opening to 
annihilation. A gene line survives not if it remains sufficient unto itself, 
remaining as it is and fully actualized. Not only is every individual life a 
negotiation between maintaining a border of identity and exposing the 
body to the contingency of an outside, gene line survival occurs through 
an encounter with other gene lines, the creation of maximum mutation 
without any sense of certainty of living on. And yet it is just this logic of 
necessary and positive extinction—this necessary production of differ-
ences that will not survive—that is repressed in the shrill affirmation of 
the vitality of sexual binary difference. Indeed, one might ask whether the 
human species is now facing its end precisely because it has only been 
able to respond to what it recognizes as its own political—that is, human 
to human—milieu?
Apart from the standard anxieties regarding the engineering of life—
which is, after all, an anxiety directed against the loss of chance, mystery 
or exposure to something other than the will making itself from itself, or 
an anxiety about a pure techne that would be a system maintaining itself 
with no sense or end other than its own efficiency—fears of the loss of 
sexual difference occlude a recognition of positive extinction that is the 
aporia of life as such. Sexual difference—if set against replication by split-
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ting or parthenogenesis, or contemporary potentials for cloning—relies 
upon continuing a gene line through coupling with a diversifying other. 
This coupling of difference harbors three general structures of identity 
and difference: first, continuity of a living being occurs through a spe-
cific mode of becoming, whereby a being must neither remain simply 
the same through time (the inertia of a corpse) nor be radically different 
from moment to moment without relation; becoming is the becoming of 
this or that specified being. But what the substratum for becoming is can 
only be known after the event of becoming, and not as its logic. That is, 
it is never certain at what point a differentiation increases the complexity 
of a natural kind, or opens the first branching out of another natural kind. 
It cannot be clear, in other words, whether an event of sexual difference 
is the maximization of a being’s continuity or the opening to its eventual 
annihilation or supplementation. The continuity of life requires some 
degree of ongoing destruction, both of the individual closed forms that 
make up any species, and of species themselves. At what point an event of 
death represents the means by which a species continues itself or passes 
over into extinction for the sake of other forms is undecidable.
Further, sexual difference as the motor for evolution and survival evi-
dences an even more complex passage through a thousand tiny annihila-
tions: if organisms were governed solely by the economic efficiency of 
survival it is hard to imagine how complexity would develop; complex-
ity can—one imagines—only occur with the production of redundancy 
or not immediately useful differences that may or may not have some fit 
with the creation of an ongoing stability. This relation between immedi-
ate efficiency and risky redundancy is highly pertinent for sexual differ-
ence: a simply cloning species can double itself at twice the speed of a 
species that requires coupling, but its capacity to produce complex mu-
tations is diminished. The same applies as sexual difference becomes in-
creasingly complex. The lure of sexual difference, seen in its human mode, 
can appear as a manifest excess above and beyond any calculable benefit 
for continuity. Sexual display may impede a body’s organic function-
ing—including everything from peacock feathers to silicon breasts and 
high heels—rendering the living being’s boundedness less secure, open-
ing its becoming to the eyes, ears, and olfactory sense of other beings. 
The inflections of becoming grounded in the lures of sexual difference at 
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once evidence a logic of life as continuity and a disregard for the indi-
vidual being. If this were not so, if organisms could only act in such a way 
that all actions and reactions were grounded in their own survival, then 
life in general would grind to a halt. Sexual difference appears to be the 
mark that explains the organism’s surpassing of itself for the sake of life, 
its passage beyond its bounded form to the becoming of life in general. At 
the same time, this indicates that the life of sexual difference is more than 
organic and bounded life, even though all the figures, logics and moral-
isms of sexual difference are haunted precisely by a fear of sexual indiffer-
ence that is intertwined with a loss of individuation.
Finally, sexual difference has, at its heart, a positive tendency of annihi-
lation: not only do the lures of sexual difference act less for the organism’s 
own survival and more for the becoming and differentiating life of which 
it is an expression; the coupling with other gene lines enables survival—
not of the same—but of that which lives on only by taking on a line of life 
other than its own. One might note that it is precisely because of a certain 
clinging to bounded sexual difference and a fear of individual extinction, 
that the human species is now forced to confront a species extinction that 
may well lead to the extinction of sexual difference in general, in the anni-
hilation of organic and organized life. What would follow—a difference 
beyond the bounded organism—may be neither difference or indiffer-
ence, having no longer that strange relationship to self-maintenance that 
is figured in all the moralisms of gender difference that have marked nor-
mative figures of life.
As already noted, there has always been an anxiety regarding sexual 
indifference as the mere proliferation of life and production without the 
sense, identity and individuation of bounded forms. If life were simply to 
remain as it is, without alteration, becoming or creation then one would 
be left with nothing other than the inertia of matter, the ever-same of 
the inorganic. But that becoming must be a becoming of bounded and 
marked kinds, remaining both the same and other through the ongoing 
recognizable stability of gene lines issuing in kinds. Even so, alongside the 
anxiety regarding sexual indifference there is also—within the very insis-
tence on creation through relation among individuated kinds—a refusal 
of sexual difference beyond kinds. It is precisely this moralism of sexual 
difference, an organicism that would contain difference in the bounded 
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forms of self-recognising life, that reaches its limit today as the human 
species confronts an intensification both of extinction threats and sexual 
indifference scenarios. To broach a conclusion I would suggest that it is 
sexual difference and its figural imaginary that has underpinned the sui-
cidal logic of human organicism.
According to this persistent figural imaginary life in its proper, bound-
ed, and organic form must at once become and realize itself through a 
creative coupling with an other kind. Not to do so would be a refusal of 
the creativity of which the bounded form is the distinct expression. And 
yet this becoming through what is not oneself must not be so open as 
to risk utter annihilation. Good sexual difference is relation to otherness 
that at once reinforces the bounded stability of the closed form, while 
nevertheless remaining open to a creative potentiality of that form that 
can be achieved by encounter with a complementary other. What cannot 
be admitted is what is figured as sexual indifference—the mere replica-
tion, simulation, or proliferation of chaotic and unbounded life that has 
neither sense of itself nor of its individuating relation to the whole. Good 
sexual coupling is a binary in which each term is more than itself by rec-
ognizing in the other not a merely present body that would be some ob-
ject for consumption, but another open relation, enabling in turn an on-
going life and becoming of the future. Such a good coupling is situated 
between the extremity of an utterly bounded and fixed form—something 
that simply is, as fully actualized and without change or life—and the 
other pole of proliferating difference without identity or limit.
Has not this normative figure of sexual difference, a difference that 
would seemingly ward off the chaos of indifference, randomness, mind-
less proliferation and closed completion, operated as the imaginary that 
has precluded us from thinking the positive indifference and extinction 
that would enable the human species to confront its current milieu? Why, 
we might ask, as extinction and indifference become possible, imagined, 
and even predicted scenarios, has there been a reaction formation assert-
ing the bounds and sense of the organism? Today there is no shortage 
of scenarios for the annihilation of sexual difference, ranging from stem 
cell research that could produce sperm—a possible boon for lesbian cou-
ples—to predictions that evolution will close down the sexually distinct 
male human, and even further to the annihilation of organic life in gen-
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eral which would entail the extinction of the sexually differentiated in all 
its forms, allowing other modes of microbial life (possibly) to start some 
other line of becoming.
One might suggest that this actual threat of annihilation and extinc-
tion followed directly from a logic of organic and sexually differentiated 
survival and self-maintenance. It is because the human organism fears 
sexual indifference, fears the loss of its bounded being and its differenti-
ated world of fixed kinds, that it has been unable to perceive, consider 
or allow differences and rhythms beyond those of its own sensory-motor 
apparatus. That is, the normative dyad of creative human coupling that 
has warded off difference and production beyond its own bounded life, 
has been the figure that has precluded a sense of life beyond oikos, polity, 
organism, sense and man. One might say that it is the insistence on prop-
er sexual difference—a sexual difference that would not extinguish itself 
in chaos and would allow for the ongoing maintenance of distinct lines—
that will ultimately lead to the annihilation or extinction of sexual differ-
ence in general, in the extinction of life as such. Indeed, faced with the 
potentiality of a sexual difference beyond that of the organic couple, both 
popular culture and theory have responded by reaffirming the normative 
image of life that has always enclosed the human within its own suicidal 
logic of survival. The fear of sexual indifference—a circulation, exchange 
and proliferation beyond bounded forms—is precisely that which has 
imprisoned human species within its logic of self-enclosing sameness.
The present continuation of the shrill affirmation of the life and frui-
tion of sexual difference, along with the constant references to love and 
coupling, preclude recognizing all those forces beyond the organism 
whose play has been essential to our milieu.  By only admitting the lived 
differences of bounded kinds we have been unable to consider the differ-
ence of lifelines and force lines beyond our purview.
Notes
1. Why, we might ask, does one of the Ur-text’s for the turn to animality in 
theory—Derrida’s—take the form of the classically existential self-other 
“look”? Why is the relation that might challenge anthropo-morpho-centrism 
one of the eye-to-eye confrontation of duality? In the other two core texts of 
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animal human bordering, Agamben’s The Open and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
plateau on becoming in A Thousand Plateaus, it is the border of the human 
that takes primacy. While all these texts challenge human specificity and 
supremacy they share two features: first, it is the human relation to the animal 
that opens the question of life and becoming; second, the problem of the 
future and the break with human boundedness nevertheless takes place in 
relation to organic and productive life. Deleuze and Guattari insist that the 
human relation to the animal will not be one of imitation, nor of sympathy 
and empathy but will, rather, extract ‘traits’ that will liberate thought from the 
“lived,” the organic and—most importantly—the being of woman. Despite 
that departing gesture, their phrase of “becoming-woman” has either been 
criticized for appropriating the force of “woman” from women themselves or 
has, more recently, seemed to justify maintaining a logic of woman as point of 
redemption. This essay will argue that this gesture of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
to move from becoming-animal and becoming-woman to becoming-
imperceptible—thinking the non-existence of the human organism—has 
been occluded in the recent turn to life and praxis in contemporary theory.
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Chapter 7
Nonspecies Invasion
The Eco-logic of Late Capitalism
Jason Groves
How do you deal with an enemy that has no government, no money trail, and 
no qualms about killing women and children? screamed protectingamerica.
org, a consortium of insurance companies clamoring for public funding, 
in an advertisement published in the New York Times on the one-year an-
niversary of Katrina. Out of this enemy without a face materializes the 
face of the earth in the next sentence. The enemy is Mother Nature. And 
then: On August 29, 2005, in the form of hurricane Katrina, she killed 1,836 
people, devastated a land area larger than Great Britain and caused over 100 
million dollars worth of destruction. Never mind that Katrina remains by 
most accounts an unnatural disaster, an atmospheric disturbance mobi-
lized by a strategic negligence to become what Tom Cohen and Mike Hill 
have called the “preemptive first strike in an undeclared US civil war” 
(12). For the moment this is beside the point. The miscalculation made 
by protectingamerica.org, its disavowal of a political ecology, is that com-
ing disasters will arrive from a subterranean or atmospheric beyond in 
the form of a hurricane, earthquake, storm, or any other discrete meteo-
rological or seismic event.
The Enemy is Mother Nature
Especially in the migrations, explosions, expansions, and contractions of 
species assembled under the term biological invasion, the very prolifera-
tion of the biophysical world is increasingly perceived and conceived in 
ecological and economic arenas as the unmitigated disaster of the 21st 
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century. From microorganisms to megafauna, from killer algae to plagues 
of rats and rubber vines, species are participating in an outbreak of migra-
tion greater than any in the history of the planet. Whether in ballast tanks 
of container ships or on the landing gear of military cargo planes, the bio-
physical world is on the move, and Robert Kaplan’s call in “The Coming 
Anarchy” for a dynamic cartography, one that can serve as an “ever-mu-
tating representation of chaos,” is as both appropriate and as unavailable 
for ecology today as it was for political science in 1994 (75). “Make no 
mistake,” Charles Elton writes in the seminal Ecology of Invasions, “we are 
living in a period of the world’s history when the mingling of thousands of 
kinds of organisms from different parts of the world is setting up terrific 
dislocations in nature” (8). Yet these novel configurations of nonhuman 
life have proliferated so extensively as to have infiltrated the locus itself 
and in the process naturalized dislocation. The explosion of translocated 
life spells the end of endemism, even as the conceptualization of those 
species as invasives (other common designations include non-indigenous, 
exotic, and alien species) promises to preserve the integrity of the border 
and the bounded community, but only in the very susceptibility and re-
ceptivity of those communities to transgression and dissolution. That is 
to say, the acceptation of invasion, the “favorable reception” by practically 
every ecosystem to species previously exotic, undermines the accepta-
tion—the “meaning given to a word”—of “invasion” as deployed by in-
vasion biology. What is called bioinvasion or species invasion could be 
read as an invasion of monstrous nonspecies into the biological, glossed by 
Derrida as “the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming itself and which 
can do so […] only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, 
mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity” (“Structure” 292–3).
Like Kulturkritik, “bioinvasion” has an offensive ring to it, not in the 
least because of the collision between the Greek bios and the Latin vadere. 
Polytopic, then, the word itself is the scene of an invasion, a trespassing of 
territories and temporalities, a disregarding of linguistic proprieties, an-
tiquity gone feral. This unlikely constellation has found a foothold both 
in biological discourse and the popular imagination. What the latter pre-
dominantly responds to is the couched appeal to a smoldering nativism, 
whereas the former insists it is a mere description of life forms wandering 
in space. But if ideology can be defined loosely as a command disguised 
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as description, then bioinvasion, with its close ties to conservation prac-
tices and its soft exhortations to eradicate non-native species, might be 
inseparable from a conservative ideology. Yet persisting terminological 
debates within the blooming field of invasion biology, no matter how “de-
constructed” or otherwise meticulous in tracing (or disavowing) an ideo-
logical subtext, tend to fail to remark on the extent to which mutations in 
the terrestrial itself, rather than the suggestiveness of certain key words 
like “invasion,” frustrate the articulation of key ecological concepts.1 Calls 
to “demilitarize” invasion biology will go only so far, since the movement 
of invasive species oftentimes can be overlain over military expansion, 
the case of the introduction of the Brown tree snake to Guam by U.S. 
military cargo planes being the most prolific.2 With increasing insistence 
the impinging by shifting configurations of nonhuman life upon agricul-
tural and economic systems requires models capable of comprehending 
(containing) these emerging and emergent biogeographies, yet the radi-
cal and relatively recent changes in the spatial distribution of both hu-
man and nonhuman life have delegitimized the retrograde nativisms and 
oversimplified dichotomies (native vs. exotic; invasive vs. non-invasive; 
indigenous vs. non-indigenous) with which biology has accounted for 
these shifts. Instead of polysemy it is the dissemination of polytopic spe-
cies that insists on retiring the image of an inimical mother—nature—
and her unsolicited hospitality. Containment—whether cartographic, 
conceptual, conservationist, or indemnificatory—increasingly is frus-
trated. The possibility that the conceptual framework rigidly imposed on 
the land by these dichotomies is responsible for the perceived material 
effects on the ground (environmental degradation, decreasing biodiver-
sity, dwindling resources) remains more than plausible; the least required 
is some critical recognition of the entanglement between linguistic per-
formance and historical event in the arena of bioinvasion, if not a diagno-
sis of a full blown mal d’archive. While key operators in invasion biology, 
whose ideological valences can be gauged by their association with con-
servationist imperatives, would seem to have warranted a more substan-
tial critical investment, the generous lavishing of theoretical attention on 
domesticated companion species has taken precedent over invasive spe-
cies, which, after all, cannot be handled so easily. But undomesticated, or 
should one say underdomesticated species are our companions too: Rus-
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sian wheat aphids ate an estimated 600 million dollars worth of U.S. ce-
real crops in the years 1987–1989 (followed, remarkably, by a dramatic 
drop in reported damages) (US Congress 58). Invasive species are also 
highly critical of dominant geographic paradigms: not only human geog-
raphers but also those migrating species identified as invasives are busy 
dismantling what Lewis and Wigan call “the myth of continents.” The 
liquidation of the continental scheme, registered by the geographers as a 
crisis in conceptualization, continues to occur robustly without academic 
institutions. What is more, and what remains drastically underconsid-
ered, the turbulent outbreak of undomesticated species from established 
frontiers demonstrates the astonishing capacity of nonhuman life to op-
portunistically appropriate the space-time compression called globaliza-
tion for their own proliferation.
The Reconstitution of Pangaea, or the Generosity of Infrastructure
Of all the sea-changes emerging out of the establishment of a global 
transportation infrastructure the most unsettling might be what Alfred 
Crosby in Ecological Imperialism calls “the reconstitution of Pangaea”: 
the uneasy reunion, ecologically speaking, of the planet’s disparate land-
masses into a single if splintered supercontinent, facilitated by various 
transport systems (12). Although Crosby generally considers the space 
between continents more of a seam than a divide, for most genera the 
blossoming of species diversity depended upon the break-up of the su-
percontinent approximately 180 million years ago. The subsequent de-
velopment of insurmountable geological and climatological obstacles to 
migration led to the abatement of transoceanic flows of biomatter. As the 
interchange of genetic material across these seams was extremely limited, 
evolutionary divergence could take place and biodiversity could flourish. 
This scheme—usually attributed to Alfred Russel Wallace’s division of 
the planet’s surface into six highly distinct biogeographic realms, rough-
ly falling along the “seams of Pangaea,” later identified with the tectonic 
plates—explained the rise of biodiversity over the last 180 million years 
(Crosby 9–13). Yet the very industrial, economic, and military techno-
logical apparatus that prepared the way for Wallace’s extensive field work 
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was at the same time working to render these evolutionary systems and 
geographic schemes biogeographically obsolete.
The outbreaks of bioinvasion mark an ecological watershed and a mas-
sive blind spot in Crosby’s argument: the drifting networks of adventi-
tious disseminules, which first caught a ride on the imperialist envoys 
and which tremendously facilitated the expansion of empire (as coloniza-
tion by other means), mark the limit of any hegemonic biological scheme. 
Today the “neo-Europes” that Crosby describes are more like neo-Pan-
geas; contemporary ecologies are no longer imperial but multinational, 
overwhelmingly cosmopolitan, and in some instances utopically inclu-
sive. Consider the anecdote of a biologist who in 1976 described a hy-
pothetical south Floridian watching “a walking Siamese catfish crawl out 
of a canal choked with the Asian weed hydrilla while Columbian iguanas 
scampered through Australian pines beneath a squadron of Amazonian 
parakeets” (Coates 2). The interspecies soiree undermines its own lan-
guage, though, because the emphasis on nationality flagrantly disregards 
the inappropriateness, outside of taxonomical considerations, of a single 
point or continent of origin. Such scenes also require significant revision 
of the opening lines of Ecological Imperialism: “European immigrants 
are all over the place, which requires explanation” (Crosby 2). If the re-
constitution of Pangaea by trade once led to the biological hegemony of 
Europe, increasing ecological awareness shows quite the opposite move-
ment taking place today.
Whereas biological expansion for Crosby is a one-way street, con-
temporary invasives unravel Crosby’s narrative of biological imperial-
ism. While the pre-18th century proliferation of political and biological 
Neo-Europes is undeniably robust—“While some American plants,” 
Manuel de Landa writes, “including maize and potatoes, tomatoes and 
chili peppers, did ‘invade’ Europe, they did so exclusively in the hands 
of humans and not on their own” (154)—the lines opened up by con-
quest had more than one direction, the dissemination more a product of 
a pedestrian dispersal than a manual distribution.3 In the physiology of 
industrial empire, as Benton MacKaye once pointed out, a source is also 
a mouth. Consequently the related thesis of the biological unassailability 
of Europe requires revision on two points: most instances of translocated 
life today take place outside of humans hands and without so much as a 
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steady grasp, a Begriff, of what is happening, since it is much more a mat-
ter of a footloose invader. Secondly, species native to North America have 
come to invade Europe with the frequency that the European ones invad-
ed North America. As is becoming apparent, for every ship that went to 
a Neo-Europe, bearing not only articles of trade but also the weeds that 
would flourish in this new environment, another ship returned, bearing 
more blind passengers than paying.
A map published in a 2007 Science article vividly if obliviously illus-
trates the emergence of said reconstitution.4 Here the vast oceanic space 
between Asia, North America and Europe has been virtually filled in by 
probes marking transoceanic travel, creating a new supercontinent of the 
Northern hemisphere, a neo-Laurasia. The myth of continents is carto-
graphically, if not yet conceptually, exploded.
Because of the exceedingly large scale, the individual dots bleed into 
one another, forming solid lines that suggest land bridges connecting ev-
ery continent and substantial island. (If air travel were depicted as well 
surely the same would be true of skybridges; the scintillating flight webs 
visualized by Aaron Koblin of UCLA’s celestial mechanics lab, foreshad-
ows the pathway of some as yet unknown zoonotic disease). This infer-
ence belongs only to a necessary distortion, yet this accident of scale 
makes an otherwise counter-intuitive claim visually compelling: the 
continental system is entering a phase of biogeographic obsolescence. 
So what exactly is mapped in this cartography of maritime and terrestrial 
commerce? This question must pass through the still-timely “fundamen-
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tal representational problem” highlighted by Jameson in The Geopoliti-
cal Aesthetic:
Bergson’s warning about the temptations of spatializing 
thought remain current in the age of the intercontinental bal-
listic missile and the new infra-red and laser systems of which 
we are so proud; it is even more timely in an era of urban-dis-
solution and re-ghettoization, in which we might be tempted 
to think that the social can be mapped that way, by following 
across a map insurance red lines and the electrified borders of 
private police and surveillance forces. Both images are, how-
ever, only caricatures of the mode of production itself (most 
often called late capitalism) whose mechanisms and dynamics 
are not visible in that sense, cannot be detected on the surfac-
es scanned by satellites, and therefore stand as a fundamental 
representational problem—indeed a problem of a historically 
new and original type. (2)
A performative reading of the map, however, has the capacity to re-
program reference: what emerges out of the lines is not only a caricature 
of global commerce but also of a different traffic entirely, namely, some 
of the otherwise invisible direct dispersal routes currently facilitating a 
floral and faunal interchange unprecedented in its magnitude and fre-
quency. Major contemporary ecological developments can be read out of 
this map: that the spatial distribution of nonhuman life today is increas-
ingly the result of this reemergence of a global supercontinent stitched 
together by transcontinental and transoceanic transportation systems 
servicing commercial, military, and tourism sectors; that emergent bio-
geographies are decreasingly the result of natural-historical processes of 
species dispersion; in other words, that plate tectonics, sea-floor spread-
ing, glaciation, continental drift and the other primary geomorphological 
factors have had their relevance eclipsed by military expansion, industrial 
development, integration of financial markets, foreign-direct investment, 
trans-national trade agreements, and international tourism—movements 
of capital to which the distribution and frequency of these expendable 
shipping probes attest. The great physical migration barriers, erected by 
the massive geological processes, which once gave rise to species differ-
190 Jason Groves
entiation, are being rendered irrelevant by the global transportation in-
frastructure. The reconstitution of Pangea thus does not signal a return 
to a state of primeval unity, but rather a further iteration of a tectonic ag-
glomeration that occurs without so much as an earthquake.
Elsewhere the urge to map human influence takes a more problematic 
turn for a mapping of the social, as in the case of the phantasmagoric dis-
semination of the footprint in the ecological imagination. Consumption 
footprints, carbon footprints, water footprints: the human footprint to-
day bears the mark of a planetary Oedipus, in that the average ecological 
footprint in the U.S.—which measures how much land and water area 
a human population requires to produce the resource it consumes and 
to absorb its wastes—has swollen to an estimated 9.4 global hectares, or 
roughly a million square feet (WWF). Per pair of feet. At first glance none 
need ask today, in the manner of that infamous Theban biped, Where shall 
now be found the footprint, hard to trace, of ancient guilt? Yet the ecological 
debt of the global North, for all its unmistakability in an industrial and 
agricultural setting, leaves a harder to trace, but no less destructive legacy 
(itself bearing the traces of Derrida’s leg work in legs de Freud) in those 
terrestrial systems otherwise undisturbed by human activity. These hard 
to trace tracks of bioinvasion—the absence of a familiar birdsong, a per-
sistent cough, a mottled leaf, the soft touch of algae on an otherwise san-
dy ocean floor—point to a fundamental shift in the organization of the 
biophysical, one that often goes unregistered topographically, is sound-
less as opposed to merely “silent”, and seemingly unspectacular, but po-
tentially more destructive and deconstructive of the environment than 
any other form of climate change. Paradoxically a bioregional attunement 
to local changes leads to the dissolution of the locus into a polytopic con-
fluence of “socioecological processes occurring at quite different scales” 
that David Harvey and others have analyzed (542). Following Harvey 
and Jameson outside of the polis, or less adventurously to the (hardly) 
vacant lots within the city, I want to argue that the social, its dissolution, 
and its potential recuperation achieve a certain visibility, and sets off an 
archive fever, in the promised disaggregation of vibrant ecosystems into 
“ecoslums” of “weedy species, relics, and ghosts” (Meyer 7).
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Biotic Globalization and the End(s) of Oikopolitics
These largely untheorized and scarcely administrated spaces contain the 
traces to which I propose (re)introducing to critical attention. In ecosys-
tems least subjected to administrative control, technological mediation, 
and economic exploitation we can nonetheless make out the imprint of 
globalization. This claim can be made without falling into the trap, identi-
fied by Bergson and Jameson, that the proliferation of “multinational spe-
cies” throughout ecosystems, for example, would be so many caricatures 
of corporate conglomerates. These nonhuman, post-cosmos cosmopoli-
tans are not caricatures but products, however unmarketable, signify-
ing how late capitalism is ghostwriting and multinational corporations 
underwriting ecosystems across the planet. But there is another side to 
this story. What is startling is not the eclipse of nature—divested of aura 
and defined as “a bundle of ecosystem services” (Kareiva 1869)—by his-
tory but rather the glimmering awareness that globalization is capable of 
jumping species. There remains the promise, not unconsidered by growing 
ranks of biosecurity specialists, that these ghastly and ghostly ecologies 
of invasion will sabotage the mode of production that unintentionally 
produced them. As species continue to opportunistically appropriate the 
global transportation infrastructure for their own dissemination, an unin-
tended modality of globalization appears on the horizon: biotic globaliza-
tion.6 Understanding this shift necessitates something of a critical climate 
change: a turn away from the urban(e) common-places of multinational 
capital—those spaces well articulated by architect Keller Easterling as 
“organization space”—and toward the peripheral underinstrumental-
ized spaces currently in the process of being non-deliberately formatted 
by globalization: the increasingly cosmopolitan and multinational life 
systems inhabiting streams, valleys, lakes, meadows, forests and tropi-
cal islands.7
Such a call for a change of critical venue might appear embarrassingly 
belated following the acknowledged penetration of the market into both 
the most intimate and peripheral spaces and the attendant unavailability 
of a tenable concept of distance in political and critical theory. This re-
dundancy can be exaggerated by recalling the image of the shipping lanes 
and the reading that the infrastructures of a global economy underwrite 
contemporary restructurings of biogeography. But even when the natu-
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ral-historical production of local ecological communities is facilitated (in 
both productive and destructive senses of a Bahnung) by a global eco-
nomic system, and even when the “integrity” and health of the remain-
ing “intact” ecosystems is increasingly dependent on the management of 
conservationists, the translocation of life referred to as biological inva-
sion signals that these mutating ecosystems cannot be simply absorbed 
into the dominant economic system. This is where things get interesting. 
While Timothy Morton offers a compelling account of an “ecology with-
out nature” the unmanageable ecologies of invasion present the apparent 
aporia of an ecology without the oikos—an ecological thought shorn of the 
aesthetic ideology of the household, immune to domestication, and re-
quiring a critical vocabulary of the terrestrial that does not prep, already 
at the level of perception, the landscape for an inevitable anthropogeo-
morphological modification.
In the sheer desperation of the sentence, The enemy is Mother Nature, 
the limit of the economics of nature-as-oikos announces itself. More 
than an accountable mother, making “nature” an enemy, a hostis, must be 
understood as a form of primitive accumulation, an underwriting, a first 
step or first strike toward making nature a host, and thereby subject to the 
law of hospitality (with statistically calculable lapses into inhospitabil-
ity), ultimately subject and subjected to the law of the anthropomorphic 
household, an oikonomia. Derrida’s thinking around the sentence, nous ne 
savons pas ce que c’est, l’hospitalité, could be a pivot point of a critical re-
orientation in an era of invasion meltdowns. Hospitality, or Wirtbarkeit as 
Kant defines and delimits Hospitalität in the third definitive article of per-
petual peace, is glossed by Derrida on the basis of the Wirt that “governs 
the whole lexicon of Wirtschaft, which is to say, economy and, thus, oiko-
nomia, law of the household” (“Hospitality” 6). But what is the subject of 
hospitality when ecosystems, overrun by exotics, increasingly stand before 
the law of the household?8 Species invasion does not pose a novel chal-
lenge to hospitality—the shock comes from the generosity of the ecosys-
tem to the foreigner—but rather illuminates the self-contradiction that 
hospitality, as latent hostipitality, harbors in its own body. The limit of the 
project of conflating the feral ecosystem with the “natural” (as “bundle 
of ecosystem services”) is evident in the fact that most ecosystems not 
currently expropriated for human or corporate welfare are operating at a 
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loss; the managerial and budgetary framework furnished by oikonomia 
registers everywhere only “ecological debt” and a sharp downturn in the 
availability of “ecological services.”
Out of a politically, administratively, and more or less commercially 
disciplined movement of the majority of the biophysical world—witness 
not only these statistics but the budgetary consciousness that registers 
ecosystems in economic terms: a global North that appropriates nearly 
half of the planet’s net primary productivity, consumes over one-third of 
the productivity of the oceanic shelf, uses a majority of freshwater run-
off, and operates over 36,000 dams—out of this “administered world” 
(Adorno) an unregulated, unadministratable and undisciplined circula-
tion of life is emerging under the banner of the invasive, commencing 
to undermine cemented conceptual frameworks and tropologies—in-
cluding that of the topos itself, revealed as the polytopic—and even to 
undermine the economy that bases itself on the anticipated stability of 
the ecosystems (agricultural and otherwise), whose hospitality to ex-
otics and invasives has been severely underestimated.9 As the return of 
the repressed on a planetary scale, species invasion exacerbates, in the 
frustration of the global attempt to fold ecology into the economy, com-
ing agricultural crises. It portends the invasion of multiple species into 
every arena of human life, including the political, and in this sense the 
discourse, or the trope taking the place of a discourse, of “invasion” in 
ecology could be read as the paroxysm of what Angela Mitropoulos, fol-
lowing Hannah Arendt, terms an oikopolitics—articulated doubly in the 
blurring of the public (commons) and the private (enterprise) as well as 
in the attempt of politics to secure “an intimately normative disposition” 
on grounds “both familial and national” (72).
Less abruptly dismissive of an oikopolitics we could instead pose the 
question: if habitat loss and species invasion, as two of the leading forc-
es shaping ecosystems, could stand to alter the make-up of the oikos (as 
paleonymy designating squat or slum rather than affluent single-family 
household), then what might an actual oikopolitics, readjusted for this 
eviction of past associations and occupation by new ones, promise? For 
the scope of this essay such a question is too speculative to answer, but 
in the foreclosure of oikopolitics emerges, no matter how rudimentary, 
a political ecology. In the rise of feral ecologies the eco- will not come 
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out unscathed, but neither will the political where as it is based on, and 
projects, a certain normative disposition of the domestic. The insolvency 
of oikopolitics in an era of ecological invasion might be softened, then, to 
the foreclosure of the purchase of the oikos.
There’s a loss of features that allow you to describe where you 
live. When you characterize where you’re from, you look out 
the window at the plants and animals even if you don’t notice 
them immediately. I think there’s something wrong with the 
loss of a distinct sense of being. It comes down to: where’s my 
home? (Burdick 11)
Hardly just a question of the house. Already some time ago Adorno 
identified the contiguity between the seemingly apolitical “protec-
tive hand” of the gardener—like the biologist quoted above from Out 
of Eden: An Odyssey of Ecological Invasion—and an extreme hostility to 
immigration.
The caring hand that even now tends the little garden as if it 
had not long since become a ‘lot’, but fearfully wards off the 
unknown intruder, is already that which denies the political 
refugee asylum. (34)
And it should be no surprise that same presidency that in 1999 pro-
duced Executive Order 13112, which authorized U.S. federal agencies to 
prevent the introduction and/or control the spread of alien invasive spe-
cies had in 1994 militarized the U.S. / Mexico border with the establish-
ment of Operation Gatekeeper; both are, in the words of Mike Davis, not 
originary events but only so much “gas on the flames of nativism” (11). 
But before the increasing absurdity of nativism, and the increasingly fre-
quent irruption of nonspecies, the magnitude of the dissolution of the 
ecological “home” into the “lot” should have the capacity to inform po-
litical practice (encompassing even immigration policy) and not the oth-
er way around.
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Dissemination
For all that a technologically assisted passage may be an 
aspect of adventure, biological life’s willingness to take 
advantage of new openings suggests a capacity for mobilism, 
dispersal and self-transformation that is not reducible to 
any anthropic principle, let alone any single moment in the 
development of the technological apparatus. (Clark 104)
The task of this critical climate change is no longer to consider the extent 
to which globalization intervenes in, structures, disarms, imprints, or oth-
erwise acts upon life systems; rather the explosion of translocated life in-
vites consideration of how the biophysical world itself capitalizes on the 
generosity of infrastructure and the transportation industry for its own 
dissemination and proliferation. This shift in agency has been posed by 
Michael Pollan in The Botany of Desire: what if it is the plant that exploits 
us for its own proliferation and not the other way around? But what if this 
perspectival shift goes feral, leaving the hortus conclusus in which Pollan, 
the human bumblebee, is content to dwell? Such a perspective might find 
in biotic globalization an extreme and perhaps contentious case of what 
has been called “globalization from below” and in doing so would follow 
Nigel Clark, who argues that “there is no final cut-off point to this ‘below,’ 
no guard rail to keep us to the realm of the already humanized” (105).
By its very deterritorializing capabilities, plurality of affiliations, open-
ness to mutation and hybridization, dissemination operates in a decon-
structive modality far outside those textfields to which it has been dis-
cursively delimited. The exploitation of the accidental filiations between 
seme and semen, seeds and semes, is what dissemination is all about: 
finding new corridors, new communication networks, novel contacts and 
vectors of contagion, and new generative possibilities. Biotic modalities 
of dissemination capitalize on these entirely fortuitous resemblances too: 
the similarity, for a disseminule, between a drifting timber mass and the 
deck of a steamer, between a prolonged gale and the sail of a ship, be-
tween a land bridge and the landing gear of a 747. Floating as well as fly-
ing signifiers: “the force and form of [dissemination’s] disruption explode 
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the semantic horizon” (Derrida, Points 41). The extensification of dis-
semination takes form today in the ecological explosion, not only in the 
upheavals in the distribution of life, but first in the “enormous increase 
in numbers of some kind of living organism” (Elton 1). This novel us-
age of “explosion,” popularized by Elton, itself signals an explosion by the 
word “explosion” out of a fixed semantic horizon. “I use the word ‘explo-
sion’ deliberately,” Elton confirms on the opening page of The Ecology of 
Invasions, “because it means the bursting out from control of forces that 
were previously held in restraint by other forces. Indeed, the word was 
originally used to describe the barracking of actors by an audience whom 
they were no longer able to restrain by the quality of their performance” 
(1). The OED corroborates Elton’s etymology: “to explode: to clap and 
hoot a player off the stage; to drive away with expressions of disapproba-
tion; to cry down; to banish ignominiously.” The metaphoric “ecological 
explosion” is at the same time an explosion of the metaphor: an outbreak 
of the allegorical and a breakdown of the monosemantic within an eco-
logical treatise, and moreover an outbreak that “explodes” out of the se-
mantic horizon of the theater and into the wild: the explosion goes feral. 
And what does species invasion portend if not an explosion of dissemina-
tion in the transgression of one boundary after another? The inverse also 
deserves consideration: that species invasion signals the implosion of the 
oikos, and thus a mutation of the eco- into a horizon not constrained by 
any anthropology.
A Willingness to Take Advantage of New Openings
Yet, to return to an earlier point, Nigel Clark’s compelling suggestion—
that the explosive dissemination of invasive species could be attributed 
to a polymorphous perverse “willingness to take advantage of new open-
ings”—still offends the dominant scientific sensibility. A survey of eco-
logical literature evidences a refusal to consider the Pollanian possibility 
of dissemination outside of an anthropogenesis. “Humans,” one reads, 
“have surpassed natural forces as the principal global disperser of vascu-
lar plants” (Mack and Lonsdale 95). More recently and more encompass-
ing: “Species transfer though human agency is much more frequent, ef-
ficient and effective than through natural mechanisms and has no parallel 
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in evolutionary history” (Kowarik and von der Lippe). While the initial 
articulation as such of “Man as a Dispersal Agent” may stem from a talk 
given in 1958 by botanist F.R. Fosberg, this talk is limited to domesti-
cated species in agricultural space, whose proliferation and maintenance 
is dependent at every stage of life on a horticultural agency. Yet today 
species transfer increasingly deals with “escaped” and non-target nonspe-
cies in peripheral spaces not actively managed. And the extent to which 
“human agency” is an adequate designation for such non-deliberate pro-
liferation, often occurring outside of agricultural space, remains highly 
dubious. While the most noxious weeds in Australia, for example, con-
sist mostly of exotics deliberately imported for ornamental gardens, their 
proliferation outside of horticultural space could not be achieved without 
their willingness to take advantage of new openings. The very problem of 
bioinvasion, if one may put it this way, is based on an extreme ecological 
irresponsibility on the part of human specie(s), coupled with an equally 
radical response-ability by biological life to technological development.
To wind down—both this paper and the anthropological machine—I 
propose turning to a critical passage of American literature, the close of 
Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian. Set in a crucial moment in Ameri-
can history, the years directly following the colonization and genocide of 
the Southwest, the closing scene of the novel takes place in a crude the-
ater, which doubles as a bordello, situated amidst a theater of war popu-
lated only by “enormous ricks” and “colossal dikes” of buffalo skeletons, 
the blood of the massacres having evaporated. Amidst this landscape a 
bear in a crinoline dress, dancing to the sound of a barrel organ, is shot 
during a drunken altercation, and, though bleeding profusely, contin-
ues dancing in the eerie stillness, until it collapses and dies. The Judge, 
the monstrous Judge Holden, nonspecies par excellence, falls to speaking 
to the Kid, the novel’s protagonist, of this stage. “There is room on this 
stage,” says the Judge, “for one beast and one beast alone. All others are 
destined for a night that is eternal and without name. One by one they 
will step down into the darkness beyond the footlamps. Bears that dance, 
bears that don’t” (331). What Judge Holden describes is the subscript 
of a species whose emblem consists in the image of an unruly audience 
that will not cease exploding until it has driven every other actor off the 
stage. As definitive as his totalitarian proclamation sounds in a country 
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currently defined by a military doctrine of full-spectrum domination, the 
mutually assured destruction of the environmental and financial crises, 
both greatly amplified by wars abroad, supplants such outdated asym-
metries. And while conservationists now propose programs of “managed 
relocation” and “assisted deportation” for species unable to track climate 
change fast enough, at the same time new (and far better funded) bureau-
cracies and biosecurity agencies have been established to stop the flow of 
invasives into and throughout the country.10 These seemingly opposing 
movements, however, work in tandem with the wealth of commercial ac-
tivities tied to the destruction of habitat—namely, to ensure the subjec-
tion of the biosphere to political, administrative, and commercial control. 
Of all the hats he wears—scalp-hunter, natural-historian, scientist, and 
politician—Judge Holden’s legendary ledger book, in which he inscribes 
his anthropological discoveries before consigning them to the fire, places 
him foremost in the position of a administrator, a manager of budgets.
Whatever in creation exists without my knowledge exists 
without my consent. He looked out at the dark forest in which 
they were bivouacked. He nodded toward the specimens he’d 
collected. These anonymous creatures, he said, may seem lit-
tle or nothing in the world. Yet the smallest crumb can devour 
us. Any smallest thing beneath yon rock out of men’s know-
ing. Only nature can enslave man and only when the existence 
of each last entity is routed out and made to stand naked be-
fore him will he be properly suzerain of the earth. […] The 
Judge placed his hands on the ground. He looked at his in-
quisitor. This is my claim, he said. And yet everywhere upon 
it are pockets of autonomous life. Autonomous. In order for 
it to be mine nothing must be permitted to occur upon it save 
by my dispensation. (199)
But suzerains as well as stewards of the earth, subjected to dialectical 
Umschlag, both belong to ruined mythologies. In our ecologies of war 
only a limited and highly discrete control is capable of being exercised. 
The novel pathways of biotic migration are too engrained in a modern 
technicity to be eradicated without a total collapse of the global econo-
my, and yet metropolitan space is too sprawling to permit the unassisted 
Nonspecies Invasion 199
passage of most species. Until further notice these government agencies, 
as well as Judge Holden’s apocalyptic pronouncements, will remain, as 
one aptly calls them, a security theater.
Notes
1. See Keulartz and Van der Weele.
2. See Larson.
3. “On the return to England of the Durham University Exploration Society’s 
Eire Expedition in 1954,” writes H.T. Clifford, “the members were asked to 
scrape off the mud from any footwear worn on the expedition, but not since 
their return” (129–30). The results of this ingenious experiment, when the 
mud samples were placed in sterilized pots in an unheated greenhouse, were 
robust: from 22.1 grams of dry mud sixty-five plants were raised. In a later 
experiment involving the writer’s own footwear, a sample from a single boot 
yielded 176 seedlings of Poa annua (annual bluegrass) alone.
4. See Kareiva et al.
5. From Peter Kareiva, Sean Watts, Robert McDonald and Tim Boucher, 
"Domesticated Nature: Shaping Landscapes and Ecosystems for Human 
Welfare", Science (29 June 2007): 1866-1869. Reprinted with permission 
from AAAS. Readers may view, browse, and/or download material for 
temporary copying purposes only, provided these uses are for noncommercial 
personal purposes. Except as provided by law, this material may not be 
further reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, adapted, performed, 
displayed, published, or sold in whole or in part, without prior written 
permission from the publisher.
6. See Mark Davis.
7. See Easterling.
8. As the Wall Street Journal recently reported, the global foreclosure crisis has 
spawned an unlikely ecosystem: the backyard swimming pool. Thousands 
of swimming pools of foreclosed properties are rapidly transforming from 
chemical baths to vernal pools. As pioneered in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, city officials are introducing Gambusia affinis, commonly known as 
the “mosquito fish,” into these pools. Now known as the “foreclosure fish,” 
these organisms point to the capacity of the abandoned house to transform 
into an ecosystem in its own right. “The mosquito fish is well suited for a 
prolonged housing slump. Hardy creatures with big appetites, they can 
survive in oxygen-depleted swimming pools for many months, eating up to 
500 larvae a day and giving birth to 60 fry a month” (Corkey).
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9. See Sanderson et. al.
10. See McLachan, Hellman, and Schwartz’s “A Framework for Debate of 
Assisted Migration in an Era of Climate Change.”
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Chapter 8
Bioethics
Bioethics Otherwise, or, How to Live with 
Machines, Humans, and Other Animals
Joanna Zylinska
For thinking concerning the animal, if there is such a thing, 
derives from poetry. There you have a thesis: it is what 
philosophy has, essentially, had to deprive itself of.
– Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am
It seems that an animal is in the world as water in the water.
– Bojan Šarčević, video project, Galerie BQ, Cologne
I never wanted to be posthuman, or posthumanist, 
any more than I wanted to be postfeminist.
– Donna Haraway, When Species Meet
Broken Wings
How can the human speak in the shadow of the post-humanist critique? 
This essay arises out of a prolonged moment of doubt, a cognitive and 
affective confusion over the ontology and status of what goes under the 
name of “man.” Now, that confusion is of course nothing new. It has been 
inherent to the disciplinary inquiry within the humanities conducted 
under the aegis of philosophical positions broadly associated with post-
structuralism over the last few decades. The early twenty-first century 
attempts on the part of humanities scholars to turn to a more serious 
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engagement with those hard sciences that deal with different human 
parts and particles—anatomy, neurology, genetics—have contributed 
even further to this uncertainty, as has the discovery that the typical sig-
nal points of the human such as language, tool use, culture (or “leaving 
traces”), and emotions are to be found across the species barrier.1 Rather 
than aim at ascertaining the identity of the human/non-human animal, 
in all its biodigital configurations, what I am predominantly concerned 
with in this essay is discussing how this transformed understanding of the 
human can help us not only think better about ourselves and others who 
may or may not be like us, but also live better with others—machines, 
humans, and other animals. The emphasis in this investigation falls on 
the pragmatics of the “how” as much as on the nature of that “we.” My 
focus here is therefore primarily ethical rather than ontological. And yet 
the very inquiry into ways of living a good life must be accompanied by 
the assessment not only of who will do the living but also of who will be 
involved in the process of judging its goodness, and in structuring a theo-
retical discourse around our biological and political forms of existence.
In a certain sense this essay is an attempt to return to the human “after 
the cyborg.”2 This attempt is underpinned by an intellectual and, dare I 
say it, personal imperative to find a way out of what I see as the posthu-
manist impasse of some strands of contemporary cultural theory, where-
by the widespread acceptance of the notions of transhuman relationality, 
interspecies kinship, and machinic becoming by many humanities schol-
ars seems to have diminished the need for a more rigorous interrogation 
of the singularity of trans-species and intra-species difference. It is thus 
armed with doubt and singularity as my analytical tools, coupled with 
the intransigent use of the “I” pronoun, which simultaneously under-
mines and reasserts the humanist pretence of this piece of writing, that 
I set out to explore these issues. Obviously, there is also a possibility that 
this posthuman, all-too-human interrogation is just another exercise in 
narcissism, a desperate attempt to return to the self and hang on to a fan-
tasy of human exceptionalism. In this context, Jacques Derrida’s query “Is 
there animal narcissism?” (51–52) becomes something of an accusation, 
aimed perhaps at those of us who are still obsessed by Descartes’ ques-
tion: “But as for me, who am I?”
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Still, post Freud, this fantasy of human exceptionalism is not an easy 
one to retain, as Donna Haraway explains poignantly in her book, When 
Species Meet. The three great wounds to the primary narcissism of the hu-
man—the Copernican revolution, the Darwinian theory of evolution, 
and the Freudian excavation of the unconscious—have seriously desta-
bilized humanity’s geographical, historical, and psychic self-centered-
ness.3 To these Haraway adds a fourth, “informatic or cyborgian” wound, 
“which infolds organic and technological flesh” (Species 12). As a result, 
the human has to think of her- or himself as always already technological, 
as co-constituted and co-evolving with the world which is made up of an-
imate and inanimate entities. To explain this performative process, Har-
away takes recourse to the metaphor of dance and argues that this process 
of co-constitution is never fully stabilized or accomplished, and that each 
intervention, each movement, generates a new state of becoming. “All the 
dancers are redone through the patterns they enact,” she writes (25).
Applying a critical lens to the theoretical offerings on interspecies re-
lations by Haraway and two other theorists of becoming-with-animals, 
Matthew Calarco and Paul Patton, I want to raise some broader ques-
tions about the emergent (inter)discipline of animal studies which has 
gone some way towards thinking human-nonhuman relations precisely 
as relations. This is why “animal studies” is sometimes referred to as “hu-
man-animal studies” (Calarco 3). “While there is no widely agreed upon 
definition of what precisely constitutes animal studies,” as Calarco ac-
knowledges in the introduction to his Zoographies, “it is clear that most 
authors and activists working in the field share the conviction that ‘the 
question of the animal’ should be seen as one of the central issues in con-
temporary critical discourse” (1). The key debates within animal stud-
ies thus focus, on the one hand, on the being or (for the lack of a better 
word) “nature” of animals, and, on the other, on the possibility of making 
the human-animal distinction (2). Within this, the question of living-with 
but also of living-as animals becomes central to this field of inquiry.
It is the promises and limitations of the very notion of interspecies 
or companion ethics as outlined by animal studies theorists that are of 
particular interest to me in this piece. To let the cat out of the bag, so to 
speak, I am not going to be too optimistic about the viability of any such 
ethical framework or model. This conceptual hesitation will be outlined 
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against the wider canvas of what I called in my earlier work “alternative 
bioethics.” “Departing from the more accepted definition of bioethics as 
the interrogation of ‘ethical issues arising from the biological and medical 
sciences,’ … [b]ioethics for me stands for an ‘ethics of life,’ whereby life 
names both the physical, material existence of singular organisms (what 
the Greeks called zoē) and their political organization into populations 
(bios)” (Zylinska, Bioethics xii–xiii). Traditionally, the bioethical debate 
about issues of health and life management has been primarily proce-
dural, with questions of moral agency, political influence, and economic 
interest already pre-decided in many of the dominant ethical paradigms 
which are applied to resolving the so-called moral dilemmas concern-
ing genomic interventions, cosmetic surgery, and cloning. Rooted in the 
philosophy of alterity, the “alternative” non-systemic bioethics I propose 
instead takes as its focal point relationality and kinship between humans 
and non-humans—such as animals and machines. Yet, for all my consid-
eration of interspecies relationality and the recognition of its significance 
as both a set of material circumstances and an ethical injunction, I stop 
short of embracing companion or interspecies ethics as a viable propo-
sition for what we can tentatively (but not unproblematically) call the 
posthuman age. In the argument that follows I will attempt to provide 
a justification for this ethical stoppage on my part and work through 
the three fundamental blind spots that the intermeshed trajectories of 
thought in animal studies have frequently run into. These are, to shoot 
from the hip:
The humanist blind spot, which is centered around issues of language, 
culture, affect, and the violence of imposition. Arguably, the majority of 
what we can call distributed positions on interspecies ethics return (to) 
the human through the back door, even if the theorist has temporarily de-
scended into the kennel, looked her cat seriously in the eye or his horse 
in the mouth. That return in itself is not so much of a problem, I will ar-
gue, provided it is recognized as such, rather than slid or galloped over.
The technicist blind spot, where much work goes into recognizing the 
animal’s anima, i.e. its “subjecitivity,” with the animal becoming an exten-
sion of the human. Entities designated as “human” and “animal” then get 
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carved out of a complex field of co-constitutive technical forces and situ-
ated on the side of “nature.”
The violentist blind spot, where violence is posited as the enemy 
of ethics, something that should be overcome both in “us” and in “the 
world,” rather than being seen as a structuring and inevitable condition of 
all relationality.4
The reason I have decided to reroute my discussion of (the difficulties 
of) interspecies ethics here via the thought of Haraway, Calarco, and Pat-
ton is not because I am positioning these thinkers as the representatives 
or figureheads of “animal studies”—although of course they cannot by 
themselves fully resist such an interpellation. I am turning to them pri-
marily because in their respective works they have actually taken some 
significant steps towards addressing, more or less explicitly, the three 
blind spots outlined above. To what extent these efforts have been suc-
cessful and whether they can help us envisage some better ways of living 
with non-human others is something I will discuss in the course of what 
follows. The essay will end with a tentative outline of a bioethics for the 
twenty-first century, a kind of “in-the-clouds” proposal that piggybacks 
on the ideas of the animal studies scholars such as Haraway, even if it ul-
timately takes many of their notions in a somewhat different direction.
Haraway’s When Species Meet is an exceptional book precisely because 
of its consistently playful yet rigorous effort to undermine human excep-
tionalism through a series of philosophical exegeses, scientific reports, 
auto-ethnographic accounts, and personal anecdotes. It is also an attempt 
to enact what we may describe as lived philosophy, whereby the theorist 
lays on the table, for all to see, both her well-processed intellectual trajec-
tories and her much more convoluted desires and passions. Such an act 
of dual revelation is not entirely new: feminist and queer scholars have 
been attempting to incorporate, literally and figuratively, their passions, 
desires, and everyday foibles into their theoretical and activist projects 
for a few decades now. Importantly, Haraway is prepared to turn her own 
critical lens not only on her ideas, but also on her own everyday lived 
practices—her agility training with her dog Cayenne, her family histo-
ry—while also exposing, for all to see, the weaknesses and contradictions 
of any such “live/d theory.” It is precisely while stumbling and becoming 
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entangled in the texts and textures of human-nonhuman environments 
made up of academics, dogs, bureaucrats, Californian sunshine, wine, 
training competitions, research papers, French philosophers, and tech-
nologies big and small that Haraway’s argument becomes most powerful.
Puppy Love
Haraway has frequently been accused of either hedging around ethical 
questions in her earlier books, or of resorting all too early to the Ameri-
can legal discourse, with its clearly identified, individualized moral and 
political subjects. However, in her latest offerings—primarily her 2003 
text, The Companion Species Manifesto—she makes a more explicit effort 
to outline an alternative (bio)ethics of living-with, and emerging-with, 
other beings. The origins of her ethics of companion species are experi-
ential and spring from “taking dog-human relationships seriously” (3). 
Significantly, the natural habitats for these cross-species acts of encounter 
and emergence are always already technological. In her attempt at think-
ing how to live well together, Haraway insists that the orientation of this 
ethical project has to transcend the wishes and desires of man as the sole 
arbitrator of “goodness.” This is when she makes one of those well-known 
gestures of hers which tend to leave many of her critics, myself included, 
somewhat baffled: namely, she proposes “love” as the source of an ethical 
bind between companion species. Although she is careful to distinguish 
it from technophiliac or canonophiliac narcissism (i.e. the belief that 
dogs are either “tools” for human activity or sources of unconditional af-
fection and spiritual fulfillment for humans), this notion of love as ethical 
co-emergence and cohabitation entails a number of problems. Not least 
among these is the way in which the values that underpin her ethics of 
companion species—love, respect, happiness, and achievement—have a 
distinctly human “feel” to them precisely because it is the human who 
defines the meaning of these values and their appropriateness for all 
companion species. There is no escape from the philosophical quandary 
that even the most committed of efforts to give dogs what they want, and 
not what humans merely want for them, inevitably depend on the hu-
man ideas of “want,” “satisfaction,” and “gift.” This is not to say that dogs 
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should tell “us” what “they” want; only that a value-driven theory of good 
is not the most appropriate basis for this kind of ethics.5
To a certain extent, When Species Meet is a continuation of Haraway’s 
attempt to think an interspecies ethics, but one of the most significant 
developments in this book concerns the suspension of any programmat-
ic, value-driven intimations of Haraway’s prior ethical outlook. Instead, 
she is much more self-reflexive and hesitant. Picking up a thread from her 
earlier work, Haraway proposes that “to be a situated human being is to 
be shaped by and with animal familiars” (47). While this is an ontologi-
cal given for her, an ethical way of being-with needs to involve curios-
ity about our ontology and our becoming—i.e., about those who are not 
us, but who constantly challenge us through their gaze, their touch or 
through the lick of their tongue.
Sealed with a Kiss
Haraway lays out her ethical injunction for animal curiosity—arguably 
the softest and yet, paradoxically, also the strongest building block of 
any ethics of interspecies cohabitation—through an encounter with that 
oft-cited text within the posthumanist circles, Jacques Derrida’s essay, 
“The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow).” In this text Der-
rida provides an account of finding himself naked, gazed at, and thus put 
to shame, by his own cat—“a real cat, truly, believe me,” he insists (6). 
Now, Haraway is very upfront about her affections: she loves her dog—
“We have had forbidden conversations; we have had oral intercourse,” 
she confesses (16)—and rather likes Derrida. She is just slightly worried 
about the latter’s actual feelings for his cat. More precisely, she is disap-
pointed with Derrida for ultimately using his cat as a stepping stone for a 
nice philosophical parable about human unknowingness, and for not be-
ing intimate enough with his cat or curious enough about her. Begrudg-
ingly, Haraway writes: “he did not seriously consider an alternative form 
of engagement…one that risked knowing something more about cats 
and how to look back, perhaps even scientifically, biologically, and there-
fore also philosophically and intimately” (20). Derrida himself admits as 
much: “my having confessed to feeling disarmed before a small mute liv-
ing being, and my avowed desire to escape the alternative of a projection 
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that appropriates and an interruption that excludes, all that might lead 
one to guess that I am not ready to interpret or experience the gaze that 
a cat fixes, without a word, on my nakedness…” (18). In this very event 
Derrida came “right to the edge of respect” but then got sidetracked by 
himself, by his own nakedness and his pee-pee, and hence his own phil-
osophico-anthropocentric narcissism. He thus “failed a simple obligation 
of companion species; he did not become curious about what the cat 
might actually be doing, feeling, thinking, or perhaps making available to 
him in looking back at him that morning.” In Haraway’s reading, that day 
Derrida “missed a possible invitation, a possible introduction to other-
worlding” (20).
This is a serious admonition; one as a failed animal lover—i.e. some-
one who has never owned a dog, does not coo over kittens, and has no 
desire to go horse riding—I take personally, which is also perhaps the 
sign of the aforementioned narcissism (as well as unreconstructed hu-
manism). Yet what if Derrida did indeed “get curious,” but then refused 
to rechannel this curiosity through his own imagined ideas of desire, love, 
respect, and companionship?
Love is Not Enough
The uneasiness of these admonitions raised by Haraway—not just 
against Derrida, but also against other “metropolitan” theorists of criti-
cal persuasion (like myself) who are somehow prevented by their own 
disciplinary corset and urban upbringing from caring sufficiently and ad-
equately about animals—raises for me the important issue of what it ac-
tually means to become undone by another species, and to redo oneself 
after the encounter. Is this “becoming-undone” the best post-humanism 
can hope for, where the “post-” refers to the transformative interspecies 
encounter rather than any straightforward overcoming of the human 
(Haraway, Species 21)? In which case what happens if this animal is not 
just a dog, a cat, or a horse from the family of befriended or domestic 
animals, but rather a parasite, bacteria, or fungus? (Incidentally, all these 
are also included in Haraway’s notion of companion species, even if they 
are not really properly “encountered” as such in her writings.) In a review 
of When Species Meet, Boria Sax similarly criticizes Haraway for showing 
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“hardly any interest in wild creatures, except when these offer opportu-
nities to display human ingenuity.” Love for Ms Cayenne Pepper, as Ha-
raway’s Australian shepherd is often referred to affectionately, seems to 
win over an obligation to tell a multispecies story, with what Derrida calls 
“unsubstitutable singularity” (9) giving way to mere particularism—or, 
to put it in less generous terms, to being undone by pet love. Rather than 
worry about overcoming the human-animal difference via the shared ex-
perience of “other-worlding,” perhaps we should spend more time tracing 
the already embedded, “worlded” differences between animals, breeds, 
and kinds, and analyze what they mean, not just how they unfold? Hors-
es, for example, are said to induce either reticence or careless familiarity 
in those who do not know them, according to Australian sociologist Ann 
Game. “But to live relationally with horses,” writes Game, “is to know and 
respect their otherness and difference, which, in turn, implies recognition 
of the otherness in us” (10).
What shall we do then with Calarco’s postulate that “the human-animal 
distinction can no longer and ought no longer to be maintained” (3)? If by 
distinction we mean the listing of structural differences that safely place 
different beings in entirely discrete categories—Homo sapiens, Canis 
lupus familiaris, Erinaceus europaeus—then perhaps there are good 
reasons for suspending, at least temporarily, such a typology, especially 
given how it can be used to justify interspecies dependency and exploi-
tation (even if we are to conclude eventually that power relations inevi-
tably define human-animal coexistence). Yet the acknowledgement of a 
gap between human and animal as conceptual categories at our disposal 
is necessary if we are not to fall all too easily into uncritical species con-
tinuism, a theory that claims that “we” are basically “animals” professed 
by neo-Darwinists such as Richard Dawkins. The latter of course exerts 
all his human cognitive privileges in carrying out the theoretical maneu-
ver of subsuming one conceptual category—i.e., “the human,” under an-
other—“the animal.” In the same way, Calarco’s statement about the need 
to obviate “the human-animal distinction” can only ever be made from the 
point of species difference.
When Calarco asserts that “philosophy still has a unique and significant 
role to play” in transforming “our thinking about what we call animals,” 
he seemingly remains unaware of the fact that his proposition reaffirms 
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the very distinction he is trying to overcome (4). In describing Derrida’s 
reluctance to “abandon the human-animal distinction” altogether as “dog-
matic” (145), Calarco reveals and simultaneously conceals his own ges-
ture of attempting to continue philosophizing about the animal, even if 
the latter is seen as part of a broader system of co-emerging materialities. 
Now, I do not want to enter into a discussion as to whether the animal 
can or cannot do philosophy, since I am not sure such a discussion would 
get us very far. I only aim to foreground this differential, cutting gesture 
of philosophizing about the other—which is singularly different from, say, 
eating the other. It is not therefore surprising that Derrida would not aban-
don this evidently troublesome and politically sensitive human-animal 
distinction. After all, any such act of “abandonment” could only ever be 
conducted from within the most anthropocentric position of not just “I 
am,” but also “I decide” and “I profess,” with all the hegemonic authority 
this carries. What Calarco therefore sees as Derrida’s “refusal” is perhaps 
only a hesitation, one that actually adds strength to the latter’s attempt at 
practicing “animal studies.” Incorporating such a moment of hesitation as 
a condition of responsible interspecies ethics, however, is not something 
either Calarco or Haraway particularly want to consider. Significantly, in 
turning to the latter’s “Cyborg Manifesto” on the penultimate page of his 
own book, Calarco takes as a statement of fact what is evidently a norma-
tive proposition—i.e., that “the boundary between human and animal is 
thoroughly breached” (148)—a proposition that, incidentally, remains 
disconnected from any particular material context and that carries all the 
rhetorical force of an “I” that writes, signs, and breaches. Ironically, Calar-
co proposes that a better solution than Derrida’s “refusal” is to be found 
in Haraway’s closing statement that “many people no longer feel the need 
for such a separation” (140) (I hope I do not need to explain the unwit-
ting joke once I’ve italicized it for you, dear reader?).
Don’t Let the Stars Get in Your Eyes
Where do we go from here? How far can this hesitation about the animal 
take us—epistemologically and ethically? Derrida provides us with the 
following, much more jagged but perhaps also much more responsible 
and thought out (in that old-fashioned anthropocentric way) suggestion:
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There is no interest to be found in debating something like a 
discontinuity, rupture, or even abyss between those who call 
themselves men and what so-called men, those who name 
themselves men, call the animal. Everybody agrees on this; 
discussion is closed in advance; one would have to be more 
asinine than any beast…to think otherwise….The discussion 
is worth undertaking once it is a matter of determining the 
number, form, sense, or structure, the foliated consistency, of 
this abyssal limit, these edges, this plural and repeatedly fold-
ed frontier. The discussion becomes interesting once, instead 
of asking whether or not there is a limit that produces a dis-
continuity, one attempts to think what a limit becomes once 
it is abyssal, once the frontier no longer forms a single indivis-
ible line but more than one internally divided line; once, as 
a result, it can no longer be traced, objectified, or counted as 
single and indivisible. What are the edges of a limit that grows 
and multiplies by feeding on an abyss? (30–31)
From there, Derrida develops a threefold thesis, which asserts that: 
(1) this abyssal rupture does not mark a straight and clear-cut distinction 
between two entities: Man and Animal; (2) the border of this abyssal 
rupture has a history which we cannot ignore or dismiss all too quickly; 
(3) beyond the border of the human there exists a heterogeneous multi-
plicity of the living, or “a multiplicity of organizations of relations among 
realms that are more and more difficult to dissociate by means of the fig-
ures of the organic and inorganic, of life and/or death” (31).
There is perhaps a similarity between what Derrida calls “a multiplic-
ity of organizations” between indissociable realms and what Haraway un-
derstands as the co-evolution and co-emergence of the organic and the 
inorganic. This line of argument also points to the technical dimension 
of these multiple ontologies, whereby beings come to life precisely via 
the technical process of bringing-forth or creation, in which no fixed ele-
ments precede their mutual becoming. However, even if we are to take 
co-evolution and co-emergence as a starting point for considering ethical 
relations between species and kinds, I suggest we need to get there via the 
Derridean detour of caring not only about other beings and other spe-
cies but also about the history and meaning of these processes of “sam-
214 Joanna Zylinska
ing” and “othering.” This, in turn, requires us to recognize “our” kinship 
not just with animals but also with machines(s), with technics. Ethical 
responsibility stands for the ability and need to respond—“responders 
are themselves co-constituted in the responding” (Haraway, “Becoming” 
116)—which applies to people as well as lab and domestic animals. It 
also entails acknowledging the inevitability of relations of dependency 
between and among humans, animals, and machines, some of which may 
include causing pain and killing—even though, as Haraway insists, such 
practices “should never leave their practitioners in moral comfort, sure of 
their righteousness” (Species 75).6
What emerges from the above is that violence and dependency are po-
sitioned as inevitable conditions of “worlding.” This conclusion should 
not be seen as a get-out clause from ethical responsibility. The recogni-
tion of the inevitability of violence in any relation with alterity does not 
take away the injunction to both minimize the violence and reflect on it. 
An ethical theory that embeds violence into its framework—rather than 
just pushing it aside in a fantasy gesture of moral purification—promises 
to address the question of dependency in all its complexity. This does 
not imply imposing moral equivalence between all forms of violence and 
all forms of dependency, even if we accept that “[a]ny act of identifica-
tion, naming, or relation is a betrayal of and a violence toward the Other” 
(Calarco 136).7 Yet in spite of recognizing that there is no “pure” ethi-
cal position, “no way of living that is not also a way of someone, not just 
something, else dying differentially” (Haraway, Species 80), Haraway’s 
proposal for “ruthlessly mundane,” non-utilitarian interspecies ethics ul-
timately sounds rather fuzzy when she writes that “The needed moral-
ity, in my view, is culturing a radical ability to remember and feel what is 
going on and performing the epistemological, emotional, and technical 
work to respond practically in the face of the permanent complexity not 
resolved by taxonomic hierarchies and with no humanist philosophical 
or religious guarantees” (75). By saying this she seems to fall prey to what 
Simon Glendinning calls the “cognitivist presumption” of humanism, 
in the sense that the human acts and processes of “remembering,” “feel-
ing what is going on,” and “performing practically” are not adequately 
assessed for their anthropocentrism (184). Again, this is not to say that 
humans need to invite “others”—animals, sentient machines—into their 
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thinking, feeling, and acting circle: such a gesture would only confirm the 
taxonomic hierarchy. It is only to suggest that a certain doubt or hesita-
tion should perhaps be introduced at the very foundation of any such 
ethical endeavor. Yes, there is a danger that this ego dubito will only be an 
extension of the Cartesian thinking and reasoning. Yet for it to be about 
the ethics of the other, rather than primarily about the ontology of the 
self, the outcome of this doubting process needs to be pointed elsewhere. 
Ethical doubt has the potential to turn the focus and attention of the study 
of interspecies relationality precisely to the alterity that is not in me. It 
does not therefore serve the ultimate reaffirmation of the human “I.”
Anything else—no matter if I was to defend the special positioning of 
the human as a being with its own teleology and truth, or the species con-
tinuism of modern naturalism which only affirms differences of degree, 
not of kind—would require the reinstatement of the position of know-
ing the nature of interspecies difference and being able to arbitrate over 
it once and for all. There is ethical value in the injunction for curiosity 
about “animals,” yet this curiosity has to be combined with the recogni-
tion of not knowing all that much about “them.” Otherwise we face the 
danger that this curiosity will lead to the projection of our most unre-
formed beliefs, ideas, and desires onto “the animal other,” with the al-
leged knowledge being a mere extension of what we thought we knew in 
the first place, a filtration of some observed behavior through the cogni-
tive and conceptual apparatus at our disposal which also makes us be-
lieve that we have been co-constituted together—while in fact we have 
only constituted this “animal” in our own image (of “us” or “them”). The 
ethical recognition of this difference between human and animal does not 
therefore amount to knowing its nature once and for all. Indeed, any at-
tempt to cognitively master it will only be a narrative, a story, one that 
inevitably has a mythical character. It will also be another technical pros-
thesis—alongside flint tools, hammers and computers—that shapes our 
systemic co-emergence in and with the world.8
Side Saddle
If stories and myths shape the human as much as technical tools and 
apparatuses do, one particular story that is of interest to me in the con-
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text of this enquiry into interspecies ethics concerns animal training as 
narrated by both Haraway and Paul Patton. Reflecting on training to a 
high standard of performance for competitions with her dog Cayenne, 
Haraway remains aware of the economies of class, leisure, and geography 
that shape this particular sport. She also acknowledges that it is the hu-
man who decides that training will take place, even though “[t]he human 
must [then] respond to the authority of the dog’s actual performance” 
(221), and hence take account of what Game calls animal (or, to be more 
precise, horse) “sociality” (4). But even if we recognize, with Game, that 
in any training situation animals need to “allow people to teach them to 
be led” (4), we also need to acknowledge the problem of multiple tem-
poralities—i.e., a difference between the animal present and the human 
future, which is also a difference between (strategic) necessity and expe-
diency. Haraway admits to having had the same reservations regarding 
the perfecting of the breed to “produce dogs who could herd with match-
less skill, win in conformation, excel in obedience and agility sports, 
and serve as pets with dignity” that many cultural theorists display, but 
she apparently changed her mind after she “fell in love” (129). Now, we 
should take this confession less as an acknowledgement that what she 
calls “the love of the breed” has clouded her critico-ethical judgment and 
more as an admittance to being with, amongst and close to animals; and 
thus also an admonition against critical theorists (such as myself per-
haps) who only ever look at animals from far away, treating them as ob-
jects of interpretation while also reducing them to two-dimensional fig-
ures of speech. Haraway seems to be saying to us: some of you know how 
to think with animals but not really how to live with them—and actually 
what to do with them.
Analogous concerns underpin Paul Patton’s attempt to think animal 
philosophy from the bottom, or rather saddle, up. His essay, “Language, 
Power, and the Training of Horses” in Cary Wolfe’s edited collection, 
Zoontologies, opens with a generic declaration of animal love: “People 
love horses for all kinds of reason” (83). Patton himself fell in love with 
horses through the experience of learning to train them. In a similar 
vein to Haraway, he is attempting to combine his philosophical position 
rooted in continental philosophy with “a good story” about his training 
relationship with his horse Flash. And yet what is missing for me from 
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Patton’s narrative is a deeper reflection on this desire to train, and hence 
master another being—and on the pleasure of that. Even if we recognize 
that precision in training involves making the horse “do the right thing,” 
this does not explain why “we” would want to achieve this in the first 
place. What is the purposefulness of horse/man training? The argument 
about ennoblement borrowed from horse trainer Vicky Hearne that Ha-
raway brings under the rubric of flourishing and that Patton also refers 
to is just too close to colonial narratives of improving the native for my 
own, admittedly paper-thin animal lover’s comfort. Of course, Haraway 
and Patton are no strangers to postcolonial theory. Patton also realizes 
that “The aesthetico-moral defense of the activities for which animals 
are trained is corrupt…to the extent that it misrepresents what, anthro-
pomorphically, we might call the ‘values’ of the animals involved and it 
projects onto them as natural certain aptitudes and airs that are valued by 
their all too human trainers” (93).
How does he then get out of the potential accusation of rationalizing 
certain human preferences and culturally acquired desires for beauty, 
grace, and skill through training practice? Not very well, I fear, as evi-
denced in the following declaration: “Disciplinary relations of command 
and obedience are precisely a means to create and maintain stable and 
civil relations between different kinds of beings, not only among indi-
viduals of the same species, but also between representatives of different 
species” (95). Conceding, after Nietzsche and Foucault, that all social re-
lations are power relations does not resolve the socio-political quandary 
that not all social relations are the same; they do not all mean the same 
thing, and are not necessary in the same way. For example, how has a de-
cision been reached that training horses is a good thing? I am not par-
ticularly convinced by the more spiritualist justification of human-horse 
training provided by Game as a way of living together more “creatively” 
(7–8). While the majority of us humans would probably agree that train-
ing horses is not morally equivalent to beating or eating horses, I also 
wonder what criteria underpin Patton’s notion of “civility” that structures 
his declaration and how he has arrived at it. Patton says that we learn from 
animal training “that hierarchical forms of society between unequals are 
by no means incompatible with ethical relations and obligation toward 
other beings” (95). But this argument has to be developed further via the 
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notion of species singularity, the forgetting of which will only perpetu-
ate the species exceptionalism that both Haraway and Patton are so keen 
to avoid. By asking “What is the point of training?” I am not therefore 
promoting some kind of Edenic fantasy of free roaming wolves or mares. 
I am only suggesting that a clarification is needed with regard to the af-
fective investments of animal lovers and animal studies theorists. The 
reflection on the trainer’s desire to make the universe supple, to have it 
bend under their command, is nevertheless something Haraway and Pat-
ton withhold in their affective analyses of human-animal relationships. 
Even if we acknowledge, as Patton does, that a training relation is one 
possible form of an ethical relation which “enhances the power and the 
feeling of power of both horse and rider” (97), we are back in a logical 
loop, with the theorist’s fantasy and projection covering over the violence 
involved in making the world and in making meanings in the world with 
and via animals.
What’s New Pussycat, or Bioethics Otherwise
Is there a way out? As the discussion above hopefully demonstrates, any 
gesture of attempting to propose an ethical framework is always inevita-
bly suspended between anthropocentrism and violence. Yet this recogni-
tion should not absolve us of an ethical responsibility to work out bet-
ter ways of living-with—with humans, other animals, and machines. As 
biotechnologies and digital media are constantly challenging our estab-
lished ideas of what it means to be human and live a human life, they also 
command a transformation of the recognized moral frameworks through 
which we understand life, as well as a rethinking of who the moral sub-
ject is in the current conjuncture. The so-called post-humanist critique 
discussed throughout this essay has the potential to call into question the 
anthropocentric bias of our established ways of thinking—i.e., the belief 
that the human is situated at the top of the “chain of beings” and that this 
special positioning entitles him or her to a particular set of consumerist 
and exploitative attitudes towards non-humans (mammals, fish, rainfor-
ests, the ecosphere as a whole, etc.). Following Haraway et al., the human 
can be understood instead as being part of a complex natural-technical 
network and as emerging in a dynamic way out of this network. On this 
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emergence, the human is presented with an ethical task of having to make 
decisions, always in an uncertain terrain, about life, in all its different in-
carnations and enactments.
In the biodigital age, this tentatively differentiated human needs to re-
spond to an expanded scope of obligations, beyond those exerted by sin-
gular human others. The field of bioethics thus has to deal not just with 
questions of the transformation of life on a biological level—via genom-
ics, DNA sequencing, cloning, and so forth—but also with life situated 
in a broader political context, through questions of the financing of the 
biotech industry, of the database management of the immigration and 
asylum systems, of the normativity of cosmetic surgery, of national and 
cellular surveillance, of biocitizenship, etc. The decision-making process-
es of those who call themselves human, with all the awareness of the his-
torical and cultural baggage this term carries, and of the temporary and 
fragile nature of any such identification, are important in any situation 
when issues of life and its multiple transformations are at stake. Involve-
ment in these processes does not have to amount to the celebration of 
human superiority though: it should rather be seen as a practical mobili-
zation of the human skills, however compromised and imperfect, of criti-
cal reflexivity and practical intervention. Now, the question of whether 
“animals” or “machines” should also engage in such ethical processes is ir-
relevant, even if we recognize that the features and behaviors that used to 
be seen as uniquely human have recently been identified across the spe-
cies barrier. It is irrelevant because this responsibility only ever refers to 
“me”: a temporarily stabilized singular human who emerges in-relation-
with human and non-human others.
The moral quandary of whether “we” should respect parrots, bacte-
ria, cyberdogs, or even iPods that is sometimes raised in the context of 
interspecies ethics shows a reluctance to submit this “we” category, in 
all its implied unity and speciesism, to a rigorous critique. Also, in the 
framework outlined throughout this essay ethics is not so much about 
respect, because respect assumes that I am already fully constituted as a 
moral agent before I encounter the other, any other, and then I can give 
this other my gift of recognition, care, and kindness. Instead, ethics can 
be thought more productively in terms of phenomenological responsive-
ness and moral responsibility—a position that assumes that whatever at-
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titude I adopt towards the other, I am already responding to the other’s 
presence and demand.9 Indeed, sometimes withholding respect might be 
the most responsible thing to do, depending on the circumstances. Also, 
it is worth emphasizing again that the notion of the human—who, as 
soon as she takes up ethical responsibility, she differentiates herself from 
carrots, machines and the general flow of life—does not disappear alto-
gether in this “alternative” bioethical theory, even if we raise some sub-
stantial questions for the humanist, anthropocentric assumptions around 
many traditional bioethical positions.
Understood in this way, bioethics becomes a supplement to both mo-
rality and politics; a prior demand on those of us who call themselves 
humans to respond to the difference of the world critically and responsi-
bly, without taking recourse all too early to pre-decided half-truths, opin-
ions, beliefs, and political strategies. But it is not something that can be 
“implemented” once and for all or become a practical tool for resolving 
specific moral dilemmas over life and death. The kind of alternative bio-
ethics I am attempting to outline here cannot be instantiated in a single 
“example” because any such example would inevitably take over and even 
colonize the need for open-ended critical work of bioethics by becom-
ing a measuring stick against which other bioethical cases and dilemmas 
could be compared.10 In undertaking this kind of critical-creative work 
of bioethics, I am much more interested in shifting the parameters of the 
ethical debate from an individualistic problem-based moral paradigm in 
which rules can be rationally and strategically worked out on the basis 
of a previously agreed principle, to a broader political context in which 
individual decisions are always involved in complex relations of power, 
economy, and ideology.
By pointing to a place of difference as a productive site of relationality 
and interspecies kinship, bioethics as an ethics of life the way I envisage it 
has the capacity to challenge the hierarchical system of descent through 
which relations between species and life forms have traditionally been 
thought. At the same time, focusing on the multiple instances in which 
this difference manifests itself, always differently, is one way of ensur-
ing that we do not collapse various beings and life forms into a seamless 
flow of life, and then continue philosophizing about it as if nothing had 
happened. This non-normative, technics-aware bioethics thus needs to 
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seriously consider the polyvalent relations of co-evolution and co-emer-
gence. However, it must also carry a visible trace of reflection on the very 
process of its creation: from the human vantage point of language, philos-
ophy, and culture. In other words, this technics-aware bioethics entails an 
injunction to give an account of the violence of thinking ethics, including 
that of interspecies relations.
Importantly, doubt needs to become the condition and structuring de-
vice of such an alternative bioethics. Yet this is not the impartial doubt of 
the Cartesian ego cogito. Rather it involves the suspension of the cogni-
tive essentialism that knows the nature of interspecies difference in ad-
vance, all too early. Even if this sounds like a much more tentative and 
hesitant ethical proposition than some of those discussed throughout 
the course of this essay (not to mention many procedural or value-based 
bioethical theories, where different forms of life are assigned value in ad-
vance and are then weighted against each other), it can perhaps speak 
more convincingly to those of “us” to whom animal love does not come 
“naturally,” as it were. It can also keep a check on those animal studies 
experts who love their companion species, or even themselves as com-
panion species, a little too much. Because the question that is posed to 
us is not only “What does my pet want?” or even the Cartesian “But as 
for me, whom am I?” but also, perhaps first of all, “And what if a bacte-
ria responded?”
Notes
1. For a discussion of how the features and behaviors that used to be seen as 
uniquely human have been identified across the species barrier, see Wolfe 35 
and Calarco 3.
2. The figure of the cyborg, borrowed from the tradition of cyberfeminism, has 
been an important concept in my work. In my On Spiders, Cyborgs and Being 
Scared: The Feminine and the Sublime and The Cyborg Experiments: Extensions 
of the Body in the Media Age, the cyborg served as a hybrid, material figure 
signaling the human’s kinship with other creatures as well as the human’s 
dependency on technology—or what the philosopher Bernard Stiegler has 
called “originary technicity.” Yet the power of this metaphor has perhaps 
become somewhat exhausted, not only because of the transience of academic 
fashions for metaphors and concepts. While cyborgs for me have always 
been technical and processual, I am concerned that my continued use of this 
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concept may give too much ammunition to the proponents of many “fluid” 
theories of human-machine couplings, where the overall metaphor of the flow 
seems to have swept away any discrete beings and entities. But the defense 
or critique of the cyborg as a singular entity is not my primary aim in this 
essay. My efforts rather arise out of my dissatisfaction with some aspects of 
the relational theory of becoming which at times leads to an all-too-quick 
dissolution of differences between beings, species and kinds—hence my 
return to the human “after the cyborg” here.
3. Haraway engages here with Derrida’s essay, “And Say the Animal 
Responded?,” first delivered as a lecture in 1997 and included in The Animal 
That Therefore I Am.
4. The important animal studies texts whose authors have made significant 
efforts in resituating the traditional debates and discourses on the animal 
beyond their anthropocentric assumptions and biases but which have 
nevertheless fallen prey to at least one of the three blind spots listed here 
include, to name but a few, Adams, Baker, Fudge, and Haraway’s The 
Companion Species Manifesto.
5. Some of the ideas included in this paragraph have been borrowed from my 
review of Haraway’s “Dogs R Us?”, 129–131.
6. Dogs and other animals do not come to us from some kind of prelapsarian 
world: they are actors and subjects in the complex technoscientific 
networks of technocapitalist production. Following Edmund Russell, 
Haraway recognizes that dogs are “biotechnologies, workers, and agents of 
technoscientific knowledge production in the regime of lively capital;” they 
are herders “deliberately selected for their working capacities,” sled laborers, 
workers/competitors in sheep trials, and livestock guardian dogs (56). Like 
humans and other animate and inanimate world beings, dogs are mutually 
co-emerging via the interlinked multiple processes of biotechnological 
production. And yet Haraway also acknowledges that it is humans who “make 
the deliberate plans to change things” (56), and who thus define the purpose 
and direction of many of these transformative processes—be it those of guide 
dogs for the blind or training dogs in competitive agility sports—even if, in 
order to achieve these objectives, “dogs and people have to train together in 
subject-changing ways” (57). However, she also argues that people and dogs 
“emerge as mutually adapted partners in the naturecultures of lively capital,” 
which leads her to postulate that we should think harder about what she 
terms “encounter value” (62). The latter will also presumably be very different 
depending on whether we are encountering a dog or a microbe. The existence 
of such different economies of scale and cuteness is one of the key reasons 
why the overarching value- and principle-driven interspecies ethics is rather 
difficult to design.
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7. Commenting on Derrida’s ethical thought, Calarco explains that the 
inevitability of violence in any relation with the Other “should not be 
taken to mean that such violence is immoral or that all forms of violence 
are equivalent. Rather, the aim is to undercut completely the possibility of 
achieving good conscience in regard to questions of nonviolence toward 
the Other. The ideal of ethical purity is ruled out a priori as structurally 
impossible” (136).
8. In Technics and Time, vol. 1 Bernard Stiegler draws on the paleontological 
theories of André Leroi-Gourhan to argue that the human is originally 
prosthetic, i.e. dependent on technical prostheses for his or her emergence 
and existence. For Stiegler, the drive towards exteriorization, towards tools, 
artifice and language, is due to a technical tendency which already exists in 
the older, zoological dynamic. It is due to this tendency that the (not-yet) 
human stands up and reaches for what is not in him or her: and it is through 
visual and conceptual reflexivity (seeing herself in the blade of the flint, 
memorizing the use of the tool) that she emerges as always already related 
to, and connected with, the alterity that is not part of her. For more on the 
consequences of this line of thinking for our idea of ethics, see my Bioethics in 
the Age of New Media, 35–63.
9. Broadly speaking, the philosophical framework for understanding ethics 
in this way is provided by the work of Emmanuel Levinas and by Derrida’s 
rereading of it. Levinas’ ethical theory shifts the focus of attention and 
concern from myself to the Other and can therefore be read as a blow to 
human self-centredness. The place I occupy in the world for Levinas is never 
just mine. Instead, it belongs to the Other, whom I may have oppressed, 
starved or driven away from my home, my country and my life. His thought 
provides a justification for caring about the life, any life, of the Other, 
especially the precarious and destitute lives of all those who lack recognition 
in the dominant political debates and policies, and those whose biological 
and political existence is confined to “zones of exception”: comatose patients, 
asylum seekers, refugees, people with non-normative bodies and looks, 
victims of biotech experimentation. Yet drawing on Levinas in an effort 
to develop a post-humanist bioethics is not unproblematic as his theory 
suffers from an anthropological bias, which is evident, for example, in the 
excessive weighting he gives to human language. His notion of the Other 
therefore needs to be expanded if, in the digital era, we are not sure any longer 
whether the Other who is before me is human or machinic, and whether the 
“fraternity” Levinas talks about extends to all of DNA-kin (chimpanzees, 
dogs, bacteria). I discuss the viability of Levinas’ philosophy for thinking 
a bioethics of human and non-human relations in Bioethics in the Age 
of New Media.
10. Having said that, in my various writings I have addressed multiple bioethical 
scenarios and events which arise in the context of cosmetic surgery, abortion, 
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cloning, genetic testing, or art practice which uses biomaterial, and have also 
suggested ways of thinking ethically about all these different cases.
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Chapter 9
Post-Trauma
Towards a New Definition?
Catherine Malabou
In his article “Descartes and the Post-Traumatic Subject,”   Slavoj Žižek 
develops a very insightful critique of the current neurobiological and 
neuro-psychoanalytic approach of trauma. He challenges the way in 
which these approaches tend to substitute for the Feudian and Lacanian 
definitions of psychic wounds.
Žižek’s critique may be summarized in the following terms: while de-
veloping its own critique of psychoanalysis, namely of Freud and Lacan, 
neurobiologists would not have been aware of the fact that Lacan, pre-
cisely, has already said what they thought he hasn’t said. They would 
thus be ventriloquized by Lacan at the very moment when they thought 
they were talking from another point of view than that of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis.
Why is that? How is it possible to repeat Lacan without knowing it? 
According to Žižek, contemporary approaches to trauma would remain 
unaware—out of disavowal or of desire—of Lacan’s most fundamental 
statement: trauma has always already occured. A specific trauma, such or 
such empirical shock, may happen only because a more profound and 
originary trauma, understood as the Real or as the “transcendental” trau-
ma, has always already occured. Trauma had always already happened. 
Already always already. Lacan had already said always already. The new 
approach of trauma would only be a confirmation, and not a destitution, 
of the always already. It would be a mere repetition of what has already 
occured and been said.
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To state that trauma has already occurred means that it cannot occur 
by chance, that every empirical accident or shock impairs an already or 
a previously wounded subject. There is an obvious rejection of chance in 
Freud and Lacan. Beyond the always already principle. Something that 
Lacan had never said, to the extent that I wanted to give a chance to a 
thought which would definitely escape the always already’s authority, 
which would give a chance to chance.
“Before I focus on the notion of chance, I want to state that the pos-
sibility of such a beyond is opened (this is the central thesis of my book) 
by current neurobiology and its redefinition of both the unconscious 
(named neural unconscious or neural psyche) and the trauma, conse-
quently the post-traumatic subjectivity.” Neurobiology and neuropsy-
choanalysis challenge the Freudian conception of the psychic accident 
understood as a meeting point between two meanings of the event: the 
event conceived of as an internal immanent determination (Erlebnis) and 
an encounter that occurs from outside (Ereignis). In order for an accident 
to become properly a psychic event, it has to trigger the subject’s psychic 
history and determinism. The “Ereignis” has to unite with the “Erlebnis.” 
The most obvious example of such a definition of the psychic event is the 
example, often taken by Freud, of the war wound. When a soldier, on the 
front, gets traumatized by a wound, or fear of the wound, it appears that 
the current real conflict he is involved in is a repetition of an internal con-
flict. Shock is always a reminder of a previous shock. Freud would then 
have then considered PTSD as the expression of the always already char-
acter of the conflict or trauma.
Neurobiologists admit on the contrary that severe trauma 1) is funda-
mentally an “Ereignis,” that is something which happens by mere chance 
from the outside; 2) it thus dismantles the Ereignis/Erlebnis distinction 
to the extent that it severs the subject from her reserves of memory and 
from the presence of the past. After severe brain damage, which always 
produces a series of disconnections and holes within the neural network, 
a new subject emerges with no reference to the past or to her previous 
identity. A neural disconnection does not trigger any previous conflict. 
Instead, the post-traumatized subject disconnects the structure of the al-
ways already. The post-traumatized subject is the never more of the al-
ways already.
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We can then state that a neural disconnection cannot belong to either 
of the three terms that form the Lacanian triad of the Imaginary, the Sym-
bolic, and the Real, to the extent that this triad is rooted in the transcen-
dantal principle of the always already. We propose to entertain a fourth 
dimension, a dimension that might be called the material. From a neu-
robiological point of view, the trauma would be taken to be a material, 
empirical, biological, and meaningless interruption of the trancendental 
itself. This is why post-traumatic subjects are living examples of the death 
drive and of the dimension beyond the plesaure principle that Freud and 
Lacan both fail to locate or to expose. Beyond the always already prin-
ciple is the true beyond the pleasure principle.
Žižek affords a certain credulity to these ideas but rejects them out of 
hand for three main reasons:
1. These statements are seemingly ignorant of the Lacanian dis-
tinction between pleasure (plaisir) and enjoyment (jouissance). 
Enjoyment in itself is precisely beyond pleasure. It is this pain-
ful surplus of pleasure that resists being contained within the 
framework of the pleasure principle. Enjoyment is the always 
already confronting us with death, and without which we 
would be trapped in pleasure only. In other words, neurological 
trauma cannot be but a form of enjoyment. Lacan has always 
already said that disconnection, separation from the past, lost 
of memory, and indifference, are modalities or occurrences of 
enjoyment. The unconscious is always already ready for its own 
destruction: “What is beyond the pleasure principle is enjoy-
ment itself, it is drive as such,” writes Žižek (136).
2. The second objection concerns destruction itself understood 
as the presence of what Lacan calls the Thing (la Chose). The 
Thing is the threat of death. Without this threat, which mainly 
appears to the subject as the threat of castration, any empirical 
objective danger or hazard would remain meaningless to the 
psyche. Here comes the always already again: “Castration is not 
only a threat-horizon, a not yet/always to come, but, simultane-
ously, something that always already happens: the subject is not 
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only under a threat of separation, it is the effect of separation 
(from substance)” (141).
3. This last sentence expresses the main objection: according to 
Žižek, the subject is, since Descartes, a post-traumatic subject, 
a subject structured in such a way that it has to constantly erase 
the traces of its past in order to be a subject. Thus, and once 
again, the experience of being cut off from oneself is a very 
old one. Neuriobiology doesn’t teach us anything new on that 
point, it rather confirms the very essence of the subject: “The 
empty frame of death drive is the formal-transcendental condi-
tions” of subjectivity: “What remains after the violent traumat-
ic intrusion onto a human subject that erases all his substantial 
content is the pure form of subjectivity, the form that already 
must have been there” (144). Further: “If one wants to get an 
idea of cogito at its purest, its ‘degree zero,’ one has to take into a 
look at autistic monsters (the new wounded), a gaze that is very 
painful and disturbing” (146).
From Descartes to Damasio via Lacan, there would, once again, be one 
and only one principle: trauma has always already happened.
To answer these objections one may insist that the motif of chance, 
thought and elaborated in a certain way, deconstructs the always already, 
which appears to be a barrier to what it is supposed to be—that is, a bar-
rier to destruction. If destruction has always already happened, if there is 
something as a transcendental destruction, then destruction is indestruc-
tible. This is what, in Freud and in Lacan, remains extremely problematic: 
destruction remains for them a structure, the repetition of the originary 
trauma. What if the always already might explode? What if the always al-
ready were self-destructive and able to disappear as the so-called funda-
mental law of the psyche?
In order to address these issues more specifically, let’s concentrate on 
the status of chance in a dream that Freud analyzes in chapter 7 of The 
Interpretation of Dreams, and that Lacan comments in his turn in seminar 
11, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, in chapters 5, “Tuché 
and Automaton,” and 6, “The Split between the Eye and the Gaze.”
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Freud writes:
A father had been watching beside his child’s sick bed for days 
and nights on end. After the child had died, he went into the 
next room to lie down, but left the door open so he could see 
from his bedroom into the room in which the child’s body 
was laid out, with tall candles standing round it. An old man 
has been engaged to keep watch over it, and sat beside the 
body murmuring prayers. After a few hours sleep, the father 
had a dream that his child was standing beside his bed, caught 
him by the arm and whispered to him reproachfully: ‘Father, 
don’t you see I’m burning?’ He woke up, noticed a bright glare 
of light from the next room, hurried into it and found that the 
old watchman had dropped out to sleep and that the wrap-
pings and one of the arms of the beloved child’s dead body had 
been burned by a candle that had fallen on them. (5: 547–8)
The issue immediately addressed by Freud is to know whether we can 
consider such a dream as a wish-fulfillment. Isn’t it on the contrary an 
objection, a counter example to the theory of dreams as wish-fulfillment?
Let’s consider Lacan’s answer to this issue. First of all, after having re-
minded us of this dream, Lacan posits that psychoanalysis is “an encoun-
ter, an essential encounter—an appointment to which we are always 
called with a real that eludes us” (53). This essential missed encounter, 
or misencounter, with the real is the encounter with the trauma. Accord-
ing to Lacan, this dream stages such an encounter. The Freudian ques-
tion comes back at that point: if this dream stages the encounter with the 
trauma, how can we consider it as a wish-fullfillment, as a fullfillment 
of a desire?
We need to understand more precisely what the very notion of “en-
counter with the real” means. The analysis of this formula (“encounter 
with the Real”), forms the content of Chapters 5 and 6. This formula is 
contradictory to the extent that “encounter” refers to something contin-
gent, accidental, something that may or may not happen, and “real,” on 
the contrary, designates for Lacan the necessary and determined mecha-
nism of repetition, the always already of the trauma. How then can we 
encounter—contingently—the necessity of trauma? Here, the notion of 
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chance is emerging. How can we encounter—by chance—the necessity 
of the trauma which has been always already here?
It is on this point that Lacan refers to Aristotle, who distinguishes 
in his Physics two regimes of events or of causality. First “tuché”: which 
means fortune, contingency; then “automaton,” the blind necessity of the 
repetition mechanism, the compulsion to repeat as such. We then have 
chance on the one hand, determinism on the other. According to Aris-
totle, everything that comes to pass is due to one of theses two modes 
of temporality. Tuché will decide if you will meet by chance a friend on 
the agora today. Automaton governs the cycle of sunset and sunrise, or 
the seasons cycle, etc. Lacan comments on these two modes: “Tuché, he 
says, is good or bad fortune” (69). “Automaton is the Greek version of the 
compulsion to repeat” (67). Even if this encounter between two regimes 
of events and two modes of causality is said to be a missed encounter, it is 
nonethesless an encounter. Again, how is this possible?
Here begins the analysis of the dream. In this dream, what does belong 
to automaton and what to tuché? As Lacan puts it: “Where is the reality in 
this accident?” (58) and where is the accident in this reality? Obviously, 
what belongs to tuché is the falling of the candle and the burning of the 
child’s arm. This is the reality, Lacan says, but not the real. The Real is the 
unreal “resurrection” of the child and the words “Father, can’t you see I 
am burning?” And here, Lacan starts to analyze tuché as a secondary kind 
of causality or of reality. The child’s burnt arm is not the real accident in 
this dream, it is not the Real. The Real comes with the speech, the son’s 
address to his father. Tuché has no autonomy, it is in fact only a means for 
the Real or the automaton to emerge. There would only be one mode of 
happening, that of automaton, with a disguised version of it, a mask, tuché.
Chance, or fortune, is only an appearance, an “as if.” What happens “as 
if ” by chance is in fact always the automatism of repetition, the primary 
trauma: “What is repeated, in fact, is always something that occurs as if by 
chance” (54).
Lacan asks himself what is genuinely burning in the dream: is it the 
child’s arm, or the sentence uttered by the child: “Father, can’t you see 
that I’m burning?” “Does not this sentence, said in relation to fever,” 
asks Lacan, “suggest to you what, in one of my recent lectures, I called 
the cause of fever?…What encounter can there be with that forever inert 
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being—even now being devoured by the flames—if not the encounter 
that occurs precisely at the moment when, by accident, as if by chance, 
the flames come to meet him? Where is the reality in this accident, if not 
that it repeats something more fatal by means of reality, a reality in which 
the person who was supposed to be watching over the body still remains 
asleep, even when the father reemerges after having woken up?” (58).
It is clear that if contingent reality is always a means for the Real to 
come to light, it is then always secondary. When Lacan asks what is the 
reality in this accident, he means that there is something other, in the ac-
cident, than the accident: “Is there no more reality in this message than in 
the noise by which the father also identifies the strange reality of what is 
happening in the room next door?” (58).
The contingent external encounter of reality (the candle collapses and 
inflames the cloth covering the dead child, the smell of the smoke dis-
turbs the father) triggers the true Real, the unbearable fantasy-apparition 
of the child reproaching his father. Again, what burns are the words, 
not the arm. “Father, can’t you see I’m burning? This sentence is itself a 
fire-brand—or itself it brings fire where it falls” (69) Further: the veiled 
meaning is the true reality, that of the “primal scene.”
In other words, there is a split between reality and the Real.
Now is the moment for approaching the problem of wish-fulfillment.
Lacan writes: “It is not that, in the dream, the father persuades himself 
that the son is still alive. But the terrible version of the dead son taking 
the father by the arm designates a beyond that makes itself heard in the 
dream. Desire manifests itself in the dream by the loss expressed in an im-
age at the cruel point of the object. It is only in the dream that this truly 
unique encounter can occur. Only a rite, an endlessly repeated act, can 
commemorate this…encounter” (59).
This dream would then be a kind of fullfillment to the extent that it 
would render the encounter with “jouissance,” enjoyment, possible. The 
fullfilment is not always linked with pleasure, says Lacan, but it can be 
linked with jouissance. We remember that “jouissance” is defined by 
Žižek as the beyond of the pleasure principle, the excess or surplus of 
pleasure which transforms itself in a kind of suffering which is the very 
expression of the death drive. Because we can only encounter “jouis-
sance” in dreams, then this dream is, in its way, a wish-fullfillment.
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Is the way in which Lacan distinguishes two kinds of realities in this 
dream, a true one and a secondary one, not properly inadmissible? Can-
not we think that the accident of the candle falling on the child’s arm 
is traumatizing per se, that it does not necessarily trigger the repetition 
mechanism of a more ancient trauma? This accident would then be as 
real as the words it provokes.
If there is a beyond the pleasure principle, can we still understand it 
as a beyond chance, beyond the accident or beyond contingency? This 
is precisely what is no longer possible. When the victims of traumas are 
“burning,” we certainly don’t have a right to ask: where is the reality in 
these accidents? We certainly don’t have a right to suspect contingency 
for hiding a more profound kind of event, for being the veiled face of the 
compulsion to repeat. To split reality from the Real, contingency from 
necessity, the transcendental from the empirical, good or bad fortune (tu-
ché), from necessity (automaton). Reading this Lacanian interpetation, 
we cannot help but visualize the psychoanalyst as a fireman looking at the 
catastrophe and saying: “there must be something more urgent, I am due 
to take care of a more originary emergency.”
The accident never hides anything, never reveals anything but itself. 
We need to think of a destructive plasticity, that is a capacity to explode, 
that cannot, by any means, be assimilated by the psyche, even in dreams.
The answer we can give to the second objection, concerning castration 
as something which has always already occured, is that the threat of cas-
tration is what helps Lacan to always see, even if he says the contrary, the 
Symbolic at work within the Real.
Castration is for Freud the phenomenal form of the threat of death. Be-
cause it means separation, it gives death a figurative content. About sepa-
ration, Lacan declares: “We must recognize in this sentence [‘Father can’t 
you see I’m burning ?’] what perpetuates for the father those words forev-
er separated from the dead child that are said to him” (58). We find here 
the motive of separation. Here, separation, the child’s death, the separa-
tion from the child is the trauma, the automaton. But since this separation 
can be expressed by another separation, that of words—words separat-
ing from the body—then the trauma encounters the symbolic and never 
escapes it. The real is separated from itself thanks to words, thanks to 
the symbolic.
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What challenges the idea that castration or separation has always al-
ready happened is precisely the fact that this always already is the pres-
ence of the Symbolic in the Real, consequently also a kind of erasure of 
the trauma. There is no “pure” Real.
What brain damage allows us to see is that the violence of the trau-
matizing lesions consists in the way they cut the subject, as we already 
noticed, from its reserves of memory. The traumatized victims’s speech 
doesn’t have any revelatory meaning. Their illness does not constitute a 
kind of truth with regard to their ancient history. There is no possibil-
ity for them of being present to their own fragmentation or to their own 
wound. In contrast to castration, there is no representation, no phe-
nomenon, no example of separation, which would allow the subject to 
anticipate, to wait for, to fantasize what can be a break in cerebral con-
nections. One cannot even dream about it. There is no scene for this 
Thing. No words.
We don’t believe in the possibility of responding to the absence of 
meaning by reintroducing some kind of hidden repetition of the Real. 
We have to admit on the contrary that something like a total absence of 
meaning is the meaning of our time.
There is a global uniformity of neuropsychological reactions to trau-
mas, be it political, natural, or pathological traumas. “Žižeks considers 
this new uniformized face of violence”
First, there is the brutal external physical violence: terror at-
tacks like 9/11, street violence, rapes, etc., second, natural ca-
tastrophes, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.; then, there is the ‘ir-
rational’ (meaningless) destruction of the material base of our 
inner reality (brain tumors, Alzheimer’s disease, organic ce-
rebral lesions, PTSD, etc.), which can utterly change, destroy 
even, the victim’s personality. We would not be able to distin-
guish between natural, political and socio-symbolic violence.
We are dealing today with a heterogeneous mixture of nature 
and politics, in which politics cancels itself as such and takes 
the appearance of nature, and nature disappears in order to as-
sume the mask of politics. (125)
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What Žižek doesn’t seem to admit is that a new form of violence is 
emerging today, one implying a new articulation of the concept of the 
Real, we might also say the concept of what is burning. A concept that 
would give chance its chance, a chance that would never be an “as if,” an 
“as if by chance.”
Let’s turn to the third and last objection. We remember that for Žižek, 
post-traumatic subjectivity is nothing other than the classical Cartesian 
form of subjectivity. The subject is an instance capable of erasing all sub-
stantial content in order always to be new and present to itself and to the 
world. This is as true as the whole history of metaphysics.
This might be true, but it is difficult to believe that traumatic erasure 
can occur without forming each time a new subject, unaware of the previ-
ous one. Repetition is plastic, it gives form to what it destroys. We have to 
think of a form created by destruction, the form of a new person, which is 
not the transcendatal subject, but what undermines it, as the threat of its 
explosion. The plasticity of contingency has the power to bestow its own 
form on the subjects that it shocks. A subject that burns, and that urges us 
to see, at long last, that it is really burning.
～
What is a shock? A trauma? Are they the result of a blow, of something 
that cannot, by any means, be anticipated, something sudden, that comes 
from outside and knocks us down, whoever we are? Or are they on the 
contrary always predestined encounters? Something which would force 
us to erase the “whoever you are” from the previous sentence to the ex-
tent that an encounter presupposes a destination, a predestination, some-
thing which happens to you, to you proper, and to nobody else ? Accord-
ing to this second approach, a shock or a trauma would always result, as 
Freud states, from a meeting between the blow itself and a preexisting 
psychic destiny.
Is this Freudian conception still accurate to characterize current global 
psychic violence, or don’t we have to admit that blows, shocks, strike any 
of us without making any difference, erasing our personal histories, de-
stroying the very notion of psychic destiny, of childhood, of past, even of 
the unconscious itself?
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For Freud and for Lacan, it seems clear that every external trauma is 
“sublated,” internalized. Even the most violent intrusions of the external 
real owe their traumatic effect to the resonance they find in primary psy-
chic conflicts.
When it comes to war neuroses, Freud declares in his Introduction 
to “Psycho-analysis and the War Neuroses,” the external accident that 
causes the trauma is not the genuine cause of it. It acts as a shock or a 
blow which awakens an old “conflict in the ego.” The genuine enemy is 
always an “internal enemy” (17: 210).
According to Freud, there is only one possible kind of “neurosis eti-
ology”: the sexual one. Some passages from “Sexuality” in The Aetiology 
Of The Neuroses and from “My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality” in 
The Aetiology Of The Neuroses are clear in this respect. In the first, Freud 
states: “The true ætiology of the psychoneuroses does not lie in precipi-
tating causes” (7: 250).
In the second text, Freud sums up his whole theory of infantile trauma 
and recapitulates all the changes he has brought to it. He says that he was 
forced to give up the importance of the part played by the “accidental in-
fluences” in the causation of trauma (7: 275). Traumas are not caused 
by effective events or accidents but by phantasms: “Accidental influences 
derived from experience having receded into the background, the fac-
tors of constitution and heredity necessarily gained the upper hand once 
more” (3: 250).
For Freud, brain injuries and brain lesions, since they are regarded as 
merely external, cannot have a real causal power. The brain has no re-
sponsibility in the course of our psychic life and in the constitution of our 
subjectivity. The brain is not responsible, which also means that it cannot 
bring a proper response to the questions of danger, fragility, and exposure 
in general. It is exposed to accidents but not to the symbolic and or psy-
chic meaning of accidents. Sexuality appears to be first of all, for Freud, 
not only the “sexual life” but a new specific kind of cause, which alone is 
able to explain the constitution of our personal identity, our history and 
our destiny. There is a wide gap between external and internal traumatic 
events, even if, as we know, the frontier between inside and outside is 
being constantly redrawn in Freud. Nevertheless, it is clear that none of 
the determinant events of our psychic life has an organic or physiological 
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cause. In a certain sense, such events never come from outside. There are 
no sexual accidents properly speaking.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud goes so far as to state that the 
emergence of a neurosis and the occurrence of a physical lesion are an-
tithetic and incompatible: “In the case of the ordinary traumatic neuro-
ses two characteristics emerge prominently: first, that the chief weight in 
their causation seems to rest upon the factor of surprise, of fright; and 
secondly, that a wound or injury inflicted simultaneously works as a rule 
against the development of a neurosis” (18: 12).
Freud here recognizes the importance of surprise and terror. He seems 
then to admit the power of chance and the absence of anticipation. How-
ever, this power either causes a physical wound or a psychic wound. In 
the first case, there is a narcissistic bodily investment which takes care of 
the wound, as if organic injuries were able to cure themselves without any 
help from a psychic therapy. It is as if physical and psychic wounds have 
nothing in common unless the first can be translated into the language 
of the second, to be considered as “symptoms.” It means that for Freud, 
people suffering from brain diseases do not obey psychoanalytic jurisdic-
tion. That is why, perhaps, we do not encounter any kind of despondancy 
in Freud’s clinical studies.
We then emerge with the idea that the psychic life is indestructible:
The primitive mind is, in the fullest meaning of the word, im-
perishable. What are called mental diseases inevitably pro-
duce an impression in the layman that intellectual and men-
tal life have been destroyed. In reality, the destruction only 
applies to later acquisitions and developments. The essence 
of mental disease lies in a return to earlier states of affective 
life and functioning. An excellent example of the plasticity of 
mental life is afforded by the state of sleep, which is our goal 
every night. Since we have learnt to interpret even absurd and 
confused dreams, we know that whenever we go to sleep we 
throw out our hard-won morality like a garment, and put it on 
again next morning. (Freud 24: 285–6)
Even if Lacan displaces many Freudian statements, he also shares many 
Freudian statements on the indestructibility of psychic life, which is an-
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other name for the always already. Neurobiology puts the so-called psy-
chic immortality into question. Our socio-political reality imposes mul-
tiple versions of external intrusions, traumas, which are just meaningless 
brutal interruptions that destroy the symbolic texture of the subject’s 
identity and render all kinds of internalization/interiorization impos-
sible as well as the accident’s reappropriation or resubjectivation, because 
some regions of the brain have been destroyed. Nothing, in psychic life, 
is indestructible.
At some point in his review, Žižek evokes the possibility that neuro-
biologists would only project their own desire, without mentioning it, 
in their account of neurobiological victims and meaningless trauma: do 
they “not forget to include [themselves], [their] own desire, in the ob-
served phenomenon (of autistic subjects)?” (137).
Here comes desire again! But we might of course reverse the objection: 
does not Žižek omit to include his own desire for the always already? 
Even if he is one of the most accurate and generous readers of current 
neurobiology, as it is manifest in his great book, we might interpret here 
the meaning of such a desire as a fear of the trauma of being definitely 
separated from Lacan.
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Chapter 10
Ecologies of War
Dispatch from the Aerial Empire
Mike Hill
The realities of today’s operational environment…is modified 
by population explosion, urbanization, globalization, 
technology, resource demand, climate change and natural 
disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
– Tactics in Counter Insurgency
SkyOps
The central question of this entry on war—let us recall the genre most 
akin to military affairs and call this writing a “dispatch”—is not why we 
should put “ecology” under the heading of empire but the reverse: why 
use the word ecology as an organizational term by which to connect intra-
governmental violence with so many other forms of “mass destruction”? 
Of course, the term empire is itself contested, and in the ecological sense, 
I would argue, it has also changed. While still a routine marker for uni-
lateral global supremacy and for capital accumulation within an epoch of 
US-inspired neo-liberalism, empire also invites us to rethink geographi-
cal expansion from within dimensions that are rather more disorienting 
than the traditional limits of the nation-state would allow. This is true in 
a spatial sense as well as a temporal one.1 In this expanded notion of em-
pire, history is witnessing an unprecedented convergence of the once dis-
parate systems of technological and environmental modalities of conflict 
listed by US Army Counter Insurgency doctrine (COIN) as comprising 
a twenty-first century co-“operational” reality of war. On this order, there 
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are key words from the epigram above that move the traditionally geo-
graphic orientations of empire into what we might call its aerial domains. 
The term aerial here should signal not only the destructive potential of 
the atmosphere, catastrophic climate change, and by extension, the com-
ing resource wars, but should also pertain to the spatio-informational 
armament, endless ensembles of antennae, satellitic vision, those super-
sites of knowledge transmission, data analysis, and tele-connectivity that 
re-orient conventional military arts. According to the dynamics of aerial 
empire, one might say that the battlefield becomes etherized, and war is 
perpetuated, indeed made immanent to life itself. The key-words from 
the epigram: “population,” “technology,” “mass destruction,” are tried-
and-true war items to be sure, but how to work “climate change” and 
“natural disasters”—as of 2008, legally defined as essential to US security 
policy2—into a military schema that regards “nature” as a functional part 
of the atmospherically embedded war machine? How to account not just 
for sky assassins in the form of unmanned drones but also hurricanes, 
drought, species mutation, extreme weather, rising tides—forces of ma-
chinery and natural elements that work so closely together that they are 
impossible to divide, let alone objectively suss out from the banal vio-
lence of every day life?
There is of course a clear if also dotted line that connects twenty-first 
century US security policy with global ambition as far back as the Mon-
roe Doctrine and up through the Cold War, comprising two centuries 
and more of overt and covert military presence in key regions of the 
world. The list of Cold-war era interventions alone—military-sponsored 
coups, incursions, assassinations, and police acts—are well rehearsed and 
readily rehearsable: Iran (1953); Guatemala (1954); Dominican Repub-
lic (1965); Indonesia (1965); Chile (1973); El Salvador (1980s); Gre-
nada (1983); Panama (1989) (Retort 80–88). Before September 2001, 
there were already 285,000 troops in at least 130 countries (510,927 
troops in 151 foreign countries are reported in 2009), and at the peak of 
the Cold War there were 1,014 foreign US military bases (761 reported 
in 2008).3 As is well known, the US sells more than 50 per cent of all 
weapons on the world market, with the near-failed state of Mexico being 
our most recent reversal of first-world violence come tragically home.4 
All this said, the admittedly hazy term aerial empire is not meant to di-
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minish concern over the standing record of war proper and its traditional 
arsenals, nor should we ignore the hypocritical brutishness of so much 
continued inter-state aggression in the name of democratic freedom. But 
let me qualify if not excuse such haziness: to the extent that this record of 
violence is presumed to exist as an effect of (and presumably, in order to 
fortify) a writerly privilege of objectified safety in the imaginary “green 
zone” of civil society, and to the extent that civil society is arguably trans-
formed by the reality of permanent and proximate war, a different kind of 
analysis—we should say a different analytic—of war is right now start-
ing to emerge. What can writing do and not do in relation to war today? 
To ask the question is to take seriously the US National Security Doc-
trine (NSS), which in the wake of September 11, 2001, renders the “say-
ing” of anything regarding war as being said by the citizen who is always 
also the suspect of our amped-up security state. In this peculiar sense, 
war presents a double bind for the very conceptualization of war from a 
standpoint that presumes to be critical of it. If, as I want to suggest, war 
has seeped into civil society relations and critical thinking as such, then 
it is unsatisfactory or at least highly troublesome to reduce the ecologies 
of war to a seamless next step in the perpetuation of US imperial domi-
nance, itself never on less stable ground. The same 2009 COIN field man-
ual cited in the epigram above sums up this double-bind by referring to 
the predominant conception of foreign military occupation as a matter of 
“armed civil affairs” (Tactics C-7). And next to the National Security Strat-
egy of the United States of America (NSS), one begins to surmise, apropos 
the US Patriot Act and the US Northern Command (20,000 domestical-
ly deployed rapid-reaction forces focused on the coming internal distur-
bances), that this phrase also refers to the arming of civility at home.5 On 
the one hand, contemporary COIN doctrine openly connects with more 
than two centuries of US military confrontation with insurgency, from 
the Whiskey Rebellion (1791–94) in the eastern states, to the eradica-
tion of Native Americans in the Western Plains (1785–1890s), and from 
there, to the Boxer rebellion in China (1898–1901), Poncho Villa in New 
Mexico (1916), Agusto Sandino in Nicaragua (1927–1933), and so on. 
On the other hand, COIN also insists that irregular warfare—the twen-
ty-first century resurrection of the non-state combatant, and in response, 
the self-internalization of war cum security within the US body politic—
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has become a normative social condition that jettisons the link between 
justice and peace. The notion of civil society as a peaceable (and let’s not 
forget, highly privileged) zone of communicative reason has become a 
shibboleth-effect in a context of extra-judicial assassination and uncon-
ventional war. In the past, US covert assassination ops focused on state 
officials and civilians of interest in countries with whom we may (Viet-
nam) or may not (Latin America) have been overtly at war, but were car-
ried out by CIA-trained local paramilitary groups and police forces. In 
2010, there are 13,000 Special Operations commandos deployed world-
wide, an unprecedented number that is apposite to a US strategy of tar-
geted killing well beyond the confines of the traditional battle field. And 
as noted by the New York Times in December of 2009: “For the first time 
in history, a civilian intelligence agency is using robots to carry out a mili-
tary mission, selecting people for killing in a country where the United 
States is not officially at war” (Branfman). The country referenced here is 
Pakistan, but the Global War on Terror authorizes such tactics wherever 
they are deemed necessary: beyond the Middle East, in the former Rus-
sian Republics, Yemen, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and so on. Mecha-
nized assassination further permeates the infusion of violence within the 
world’s peaceable zones of relative safety, a general effect of twenty-first 
century warfare that is evidenced by the secret practices of overhead, and 
underwear, bombers alike.6 In a paradoxical sense, the call for global civil 
society comes at a historical moment when sociability itself has become 
a newly invigorated paramilitary Operational Area (AO). Here intra-state 
violence supercedes, while appearing to compliment, the more primitive 
mode of making war in a geographically coherent national mode.7 Put in 
bumper sticker speak: really, “freedom isn’t free.”
Thus a continued (rather, a continuous) “Revolution in Military Affairs” 
(RMA), to cite Defense Secretary Robert Gates, ushers in a “new real-
ity…for America, and for humanity [insofar as] the lines separating war 
[and] peace…have become more blurred” (5; emphasis mine). At stake 
in this blurring between war and peace, which Gates rightly extends to 
the existence of anything we might go on calling the human, is an innova-
tive set of techno-environmental insecurities that are arguably effacing—
at different levels and with different speeds—the coherency of the state 
and of the state’s anthropomorphic referents in any of humanity’s ethical 
Ecologies of War 243
guises (read here: left-liberal notions of the human being and right-wing 
possessive individualism, alike). Twenty-first century war doctrine re-
gards population control, race and ethnic division, the manipulation of 
computerized knowledge systems, deliberate and non-deliberate mani-
festations of environmental modification (ENMOD), epidemic disease, 
and resource scarcity as commonly intertwined within a complex set of 
super-surfaces that mutate almost too fast to be described (Tactics A-4). 
What is new, a 2009 US Army Strategic Studies Institute paper insists, 
“is that climate change poses security threats unmatched among environ-
mental phenomena” (Parsons 2). And what is radically new is that cli-
mate change represents a relatively untapped means for engaging in war, 
“a unique and promising opportunity for the United States…to advance 
its security interests” (Parsons 7). The explicit reference in this citation is 
to competing US-China interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, the rush to grab 
oil, natural gas, and other commodities; but think, implicitly, of hurricane 
Katrina as the preemptive first strike in a planetary civil war that no one 
has officially declared. In this “new” ecology of war (the scare quotes are 
meant to mark extremities of chronology, breaks, as well as compressions 
and expansions in the experience of time), the epistemo-military arts are 
developing techniques that incorporate a symbiosis of agencies—biolog-
ical, atmospheric, geological, and mechanical—that from any other per-
spective than war would be revealed as the suicidal miscellany of a planet 
abandoned to siege.
This present dispatch thus limits itself to transmitting a set of strate-
gic connections between biotic as well as non-biotic factors of military 
conflict. These connections are becoming central to a new war doctrine, 
while they are only beginning, by fits and starts, to forge analogues of 
philosophical critique that may or may not be able to stand up against it. 
To continue this forging, we will have to range widely from global tele-
surveillance, drone-warfare, and the weaponizing of culture, to other, 
tactically significant life-and-death scenarios, such as climate change, 
viral transmission, the US Amy’s investment in chaos theory, and the 
culling of the human species cloaked as humane adaptation (the count 
of climate refugees is estimated to be 50 million in 2010, 200 million or 
more by 2050) (Glenn and Gordon 2). These items have not until now 
been found under the heading of war. But they may be given a certain un-
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easy futuristic logic given war’s new organizational capacities. And if the 
phrase aerial empire fails to call forth a political formula guaranteed to 
preserve the cause of human equality, or if this dispatch begs the charge 
of being mere catastrophe porn, it is because the reality of conflict with-
in which any humane conviction might be proffered is riddled with the 
same evanescent mini-movements, the same insurgent groupuscles, not 
simply of this or that “population” but also insurgencies of knowledge 
and (or, as) matter, a movement of movements that criss-cross traditional 
phyla, and by doing so, exceed the epoch of what Jürgen Habermas wish-
es to preserve as the “human being per se.”8 Consider, it has been 44 years 
since President Lyndon Johnson’s advisory council linked greenhouse 
gas to “marked climate change.” And as of 2009, about $3 billion per year 
are spent on symposia, conferences, films, TV shows, publications, and 
the like, on environmental issues. In 2010, there are 80 million references 
to climate change on the Internet alone (Editorial 24). What to make of 
such visibility, such ubiquity, and therefore, apparent normalization of 
planetary risk? Should we assume that the almost sadistic publicity of our 
precarious life is sufficient alone to generate change; or does the apparent 
apostasy of scientific truth confirm the existence of a change already in 
our midst? If as I want to suggest this change has at least already mutated 
public sphere activity (perhaps not least, in the form we are practicing it 
now), then we will have to work with a dispatch that retains both a criti-
cally modest and germinal status.
Las Vegas in Afghanistan
Every morning in Las Vegas, Steve Smith kisses his wife 
and young daughters goodbye, gets in his car, drives 
50 minutes down the freeway, past shopping malls 
and casinos, and goes to war in Afghanistan.
– Christopher Goodwin, The Sunday Times
Clearly, the banalization of war as so much work-a-day clock punching 
is evident in this epigram from the Times. All of middle-class life appears 
to be here, wife and family at home, the daily drive, reminders to shop 
(lest the terrorists win), the name Smith, even the division between lei-
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sure work implied by the act of reading The Sunday Times. But this scene 
is met with a violent frisson of nasty equations that determine the guar-
anteed loss—casino-like—of bourgeois existence and of our global war 
gamble alike. Gaining is losing in this epigram: consumption is risk with-
out winning, just as war is nowhere and everywhere at home. What is be-
ing depicted in this casually chilling account of the military work-shift is 
the latest in leading edge war-tech applications, the manning of the MQ-9 
Reaper drone, which pipes real-time video images as well as other data 
at light-speed to the cock-pit key-boards where Officer Smith launches 
Hellfire missiles on unsuspecting targets worlds away. Let us consider 
this Reaper-moment as emblematic of at least one—the mechanical or 
robotic—facet of the aerial empire. This is not only the unmanning of the 
war machine but is also the unmanning of man.
The historical genesis of Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles (UAVs) can 
be located in the Nazi V-1 and V-2 rocket programs. This technology, 
spun out in the 1950s with the CIA’s development of the drone proto-
type, was first deployed in 1959 in order to serve the secretive Rockefell-
er interests (Chase Manhattan and Standard Oil) in Latin America.9 The 
Reaper’s forerunner, the MQ-1 Predator, was used in Yemen in 1992, and 
deployed in Bosnia in 1994, where it has returned since. In the twenty-
first century, aerospace power, such as the Strike Star program, as well as 
the Predator, the tiny hand launched Raven, and the larger Shadow, gives 
the military 24-hour continuous air occupation in Afghan and Pakistani 
skies—and over unknown countries with whom we are not (overtly) at 
war—365 days a year, at the stealthy height of 21,000 feet, with a range 
of 3,700 miles from launch base, and with the immediacy of striking the 
keyboard and dropping the key-strike.10 There are currently more than 
7,000 UAVs deployed by the US military (not to mention those used 
by Iran, and Hezbollah—a political movement, not a state). On average 
2009 saw about one drone strike a week. These techno-terminators are 
capable of generating 16,000 hours of video a month, far more than can 
be digested by the human eye, and are therefore being equipped with new 
batteries of machine intelligence. Drone vision can see through walls, and 
create biometric data-pictures that translate daily patterns of life, such as 
street movement and travel routes, into omni-visible target-rich environ-
ments. Defense Secretary Gates wants more UAVs, and has already said 
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that the next generation of fighter planes will be the last manned fighter 
aircraft (Robertson). An estimated 40 or more countries are currently de-
veloping drones in 2010.
At one level, the military drono-sphere is a stealthier and more lethal 
adaptation of US assassination campaigns that go as far back as the Ken-
nedy administration’s endorsement of the coup that lead to the South 
Vietnamese autocrat Ngo Dinh Diem’s demise in 1963. Only in the cur-
rent instance, with estimates as high as 50 civilians killed for each terror-
ist leader, remote control warfare trades in higher immediate non-com-
batant loses.11 At another level, the dawn of the eternal sortie is not the 
usual art of war. Even with civilian causalities as high as they are—but 
how can one distinguish the civilian from the insurgent?—the 600 plus 
Hellfire missiles dropped by Predators in one year’s time are being touted 
for hitting over 90 per cent of their targets. UAVs are credited with killing 
more than half of al Qaeda’s top 20 leaders. But, paradoxically, by surren-
dering killing to the finer-tuned war machine, by minimizing the human 
input necessary to launch the new weapons of war, the drono-sphere at 
least publicly promises a more humane and also farther-reaching way 
of killing human beings. In line with the RMA’s more general over-haul 
of contemporary war doctrine, new tactical priority and new financing 
is being given to UAV and supporting programs.12 Military experts re-
mark that we are only at the cusp of drone potential, and suggest that the 
UAV is poised to have the biggest impact in 5,000 years on how war is 
waged (Robertson, n. 18). Traditional fighting tools, not least of which 
is the regular, human solider, are being replaced by—or better, are be-
ing reabsorbed into—unconventional military hard- and soft-ware that 
are creating a uniquely twenty-first century war imaginary. This imagi-
nary runs the gamut from Officer Smith’s trigger cum keyboard, to insect-
size swarms of nano-drones, robotic snake surveillance, pain-inducing 
microwave sky-beams, robotic canines, bio-mass consuming automated 
ground-war machines (the Energetically Autonomous Tactical Robot, or 
EATR program), and insect-inspired digital optics.13 But let us stay with-
in the aero-technical realm, to the extent that staying there is possible, 
and hone in on the knowledge systems that accompany drone war and 
are endemic to the RMA, the revolution not only in military—but recall-
ing Secretary Gates—also in human affairs.
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Defense Department documents outline certain key temporal ad-
justments in the future of—or better, the future as—war. New satellite 
technology now focuses on high-density cities and other sites, targeting 
them full-time as potential locations of “urbaniz[ed] insurgence” (Gra-
ham 1). Through the use of UAV video surveillance, either deeply em-
bedded within city architecture or loitering in the atmosphere over po-
tentially insurgent areas, highly sophisticated computer software profiles 
and comparatively reads normal movement patterns against anomalies 
of human flow in the micro-geographies of the planet’s civilian popula-
tions. Pattern recognition capabilities such as this can be used either as a 
platform for the hellfire missile, or to set aloft “fan-propelled swarms [to] 
disperse nano-payloads” of various levels of destruction or interference, 
even before the insurgent act of violence can occur (Graham 3). These 
new capabilities enable warfare to operate in a way that “compress[es] the 
kill chain,” or by a “first look, first feed, first kill” operation, as the Ray-
theon Corporation puts it. Kill chain compression accelerates the time it 
takes to find and kill a target to a point of sight-velocity in which opposi-
tion disappears the very moment it is configured. “Before [you] can drop 
your weapon and run,” the R&D publicity reads, “[you’re] probably al-
ready dead” (4). Preemptive war technology is the tactical application of 
an overall national strategy. It effaces the enemy at the same moment the 
enemy is designated as such. More peculiar still, the enemy exists in an 
autogenic way; that is, as an opponent who is effectively generated within 
the same social space as friendly military occupation. This slippery zone 
of friend/foe distinction works according to relationships of violence 
that—if they can be pictured—are always already armed.14 The target it-
self is not seen and then destroyed: seeing is its destruction according to 
current war R&D. According to the DARPA technologies, the less distin-
guishable it is from civilian life, the less visible and the less objectifiable, 
the more effective war becomes. Real-time satellite, CCTV, and drone 
transmissions compress the duration between violence and representa-
tion. There is ideally no peaceable distinction between the time it takes to 
take a picture and the time it takes to strike.
In this way, machine vision re-works our spatial bearings and enables 
the weaponization of temporality itself. It is not enough to say that war 
is made more proximate by the notion that, in the homeland, everyone 
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is at least potentially both suspect and object of terror; nor is it sufficient 
to argue, as Virilio would have it, that the RMA depends on a “dromo-
logical revolution” (as in the Greek dromos, ‘course of running’) by tech-
nically increasing the dynamics of speed.15 What we might call a drono-
logical revolution works according to the twin mastery of both space and 
time, with intensities of compression and expansion, as well as degrees of 
velocity, that vary depending on the objective of whatever application is 
at hand. To put the RMA completely, twenty-first century war functions 
according to intensities of both proximity and distance, of both speed 
and latency, at specific levels and according to discrete military goals. 
For example, kill-chain compression makes targeting a nearly instanta-
neous act; but it also means that war in terms of beginnings-and-ends 
is displaced by a time signature evidently stopped in its tracks. Wartime 
is both reduced and extended to the hyper-stasis of an eternal present. 
Similarly, regarding space, on the one hand drone war makes violence 
seem virtual and remote. On the other hand, the eternal sortie makes war 
an utterly proximate activity, disintegrating the distinction between vio-
lence and ordinary life, however each side defines the ordinary. To cite a 
particularly apposite example of the new time and space mastery at the 
core of the RMA, consider kill-chain compression along with Cyberki-
netics Inc.’s “brain-gate” program, which for the first time has enabled 
human brain-computer interface (BCI) in its most intimate sense.16 This 
application was seized upon immediately by the Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (DARPA) in 2002, and by 2009 has been fund-
ed by more than $25 million in Department of Defense (DOD) grants. 
Consistent with the DOD’s own war neuromics program, BCI harkens 
toward a moment when weaponry will be literally hard-wired to the hu-
man brain, and when firing will designate both a micro-synaptic, spatio-
cranial event, and a cyber-kinetic macro-explosion on the geography of a 
battlefield both virtual and real. Warfare is here inserted into a network of 
electricity and human biomass such that thinking itself, now a kinetic ac-
tivity, becomes the most deadly weapon of all. A four-millimeter square 
silicon brain implant, studded with 100 hair-thin microelectrodes, is at-
tached matrix-like via a skull-plug that coverts brain waves into a pattern 
of optical or other data via computer translation. This is a version of dro-
no-sphere activity that has absorbed the human being from yet another 
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angle. And again, we see a drono-spheric application that is predicated on 
a dynamic of non-linear time made possible by new ways of gathering, 
computing, reading, and infinitely re-reading, computerized data. Here, 
synapses fire in an only apparently random molecular order, that is, only 
apparently random to the human eye, which needs machine translation 
to form coherent micro-patterns that can be extended to whatever weap-
ons system at light speed: intelligence becomes data; becomes electro-
kinesis; becomes war. In this way, BCI is capable of stretching and shrink-
ing, accelerating and freezing, the twenty-first century battlefield into 
one long moment of the right here and now.
Realized by the symbiotic connection between human and machine, 
BCI uses just a fraction of the brain’s 100 million neurons. Here again we 
can see the connection between kill-chain “compression”—the elimina-
tion of an enemy without the slow subject/object alignment that used to 
guide face to face human combat in a different rhythm of terrestrial vio-
lence—and technologies of knowledge “compression,” per se. There are 
other examples, beyond the brain’s newfound military plasticity, as well. 
As part of the new UAV technologies, the emerging science of digitized 
fractal compression is displacing merely mimetic real-time image tech-
nology with an entirely different space-time calculus. Whereas an older 
format of JPEG technology uses bit-maps to break down an object into 
more or less co-equal translations that parallel each other according to 
individual squares on corresponding grids (the computer screen’s and 
the camera frame’s), fractal media offers a more complex notion of image 
production. Here the word compression means to rethink, and reinter-
pret (albeit mathematically) a given scene, rather than to simply distill, 
unpack, and reproduce it. The fractal mis-en-scene as such reads a picture 
that is both more fabricated and more real, producing different layers of 
spectator-knowledge depending on the sensitivity of the machine and 
what algorithms are at hand: heat oriented, chemically differentiated, 
movement based, and so on.17 In JPEG technology, the more complex 
the snapshot of the image, the higher the compression ratio is needed for 
a reliable replication of the object being viewed. It is a question of knowl-
edge as payload, and only so much data can be “lifted” from a visual field 
at once. But according to fractal image reproduction, the object (read 
here: target) is produced beyond the battlefield without needing the 
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physical referent. This version of data compression needs only a fragment 
of the battle scene and a set of mathematically determined fractal instruc-
tions to create a given pattern and zero in on its anomalies. The same al-
gorithmic technology that underwrites BCI and that sorts through the 
meshwork of fractal data compression are used in 2010 to fine-tune ship-
ping networks, predict life-spans, recall records from emails and social 
networks, map social movements, and predict weather patterns.
As we have already seen, a complex space and time adjustment is at 
work in the drono-sphere in that it mobilizes what we might call an eter-
nal latency.18 BCI and fractal data compression together help bring the 
war machine into an all-seeing and eternal present. At the macroscopic 
level, fractal media looks among the myriad chaos of life-and-death sce-
narios for new patterns yet to go into the tool kit of war. In the same 
way, at the microscopic level, molecular brain firings and computational 
readings recombine in war’s electric flow. At both levels, these patterns 
can be stored within a vast data bank so that the machine learns greater 
and greater subtleties in evaluating the norms and deviations of what-
ever changing groupuscle or latent micro-movement. Essential to the 
efficiency of weaponized war media, large or small, twenty-first century 
compression technology uses computational projection to decrease the 
amount of data needed to be compressed. It uses math to lighten data’s 
so-called weight. Fractal media, as we have seen, only needs to determine 
what is probably there, in the same way the human eye compensates for 
blind spots and peripheral vision. Drone war is thus executed, Vegas-like, 
according to a deadly gaming of the epistemo-military odds. The ap-
parently random events that comprise the patterns of collective human 
existence are finally given objectifiable if also utterly malleable status ac-
cording to the new war machine. Rather than being tethered to the old 
bit-map visual technology, which claims mere representational fidelity, 
mathematically produced targets enable a sort of hyper-vision that invig-
orates aleatory events and former epistemic blindness—as well as those 
sheltered spaces of peace called ordinary life—with unprecedented war 
potential. Drone hyper-vision sorts and manipulates certain life-rhythms 
(brain waves, as well as social movements) at the speed of light, and there-
fore offers a more effective application of war fighting than using plain 
human sight. And by working the image-data from within the fractal war 
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register, not only is image fidelity displaced with image production, but it 
also becomes possible—and militarily useful—to locate otherwise invis-
ible targets from multiple perspectives at once. For example, the Reaper 
is being fitted in 2010 with the $150 million Gorgon Stare system. This 
apparatus configures the drone with multiple super-powered cameras ca-
pable of filming two-and-a-half miles around and from 12 different angles 
(Schachtman). Even if 12 targets are visualized in 12 different directions, 
the Stare could simultaneously orient the elimination of each. The Argus 
program—named after the Greek monster with a hundred eyes—will 
use 92 cameras at once in its round-the-clock orbits. The eternal orbit 
of the Reaper is the mechanical embodiment of war by fractal means, 
which is to say, by mathematical probability, rather than by plain human 
sight, a temporal and ontological “revolution” to be sure: Las Vegas in 
Afghanistan, once more. A next generation of UAVs, the British Taranis, 
will take over completely from the human fighter “pilot,” as autonomous 
craft take off and land, survey an area, and return, without any human 
input. Provided legislation can be amended, civilian cargo flights could 
be automated by 2015, ushering in a juridical mutation in the notion of 
human responsibility, commensurate with a mutation in the human root 
and branch (Goodwin n. 15).
The advance of drone war (and ESCYBERCOM more generally) pres-
ents dynamics that we can apply to the basic war policy questions glossed 
earlier in reference to the US National Security Strategy (NSS). The 
oft-used term “shadow wars” in this document have both real and repre-
sentational applications. With kill-chain (temporal) and fractal (spatial) 
compression/expansion in mind, we should say that the NSS extends 
war’s technical logic into a policy statement that recombines the real 
and representational targets. In the same way, the compression of battle 
within the statellitic mode produces singularities of non-linear time and 
blurs the present and the past into an eternal future of violence. Recalling 
Gates, this unique time-space signature is concurrent with the way war 
is “blur[ing]” into peace in the form of “shadow” wars. There are “shad-
ow” wars fought today (in Sudan, Syria, Pakistan, and Mexico) where 
no offensive power claims a presence, and no one takes credit or blame 
for whatever victory or loss. And we know US policy allows for unan-
nounced attack (if not extra-judicial assassination) in at least 20 different 
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nations (Hallinann). One of the first declarations of President Obama 
was to underscore the uniqueness of twenty-first century war—no lon-
ger the Global War on Terror (GWOT) but simply the “Long War”—as 
“increasingly unconventional and transnational” (qtd. in Hsu). When the 
NSS speaks of a “war without duration,” insisting that “campaigns need 
not be sequential” but instead will adhere to a principle of “direct and 
continuous action,” we are well within the fractal time-space purview of 
the drono-sphere. This does not simply mean continued investment in 
the Bush Doctrine of preemptive and permanent war, although the Wein-
berger and the Powell doctrines, which were designed for large-scale, na-
tionally circumscribed oppositions, and for warfare with clear beginnings 
and ends, are unlikely to return. Rather, the policy of permanent war—or 
its paradoxical lengthening by way of compression—brings us to a fu-
ture, after Bush, of war as unseen and everywhere apparent, up close and 
distant, sped-up and frozen in time.
But technology, such as BCI and fractal data compression, comprises 
only one level of the aerial empire. In 1991, Manuel De Landa asked a 
question about whether expert machines, with their own knowledge 
banks, could produce robot events sufficiently strong to move the execu-
tive capacity of the military technocrat to the computer itself, and thus 
remove humans from the loop. “Could this [emergent satellite and ro-
botic] technology,” De Landa writes, “be the beginning of a new breed 
of machines, predatory machines, capable of hunting and killing humans 
on their own?” (War 161). De Landa goes on to pose the problem, which 
has gone without its due response, of “a technology of multi-spectral 
analysis…[and] the ability to detect the very chemical composition of 
the objects in a picture” (War 181). Here De Landa rightly detects a mix-
ing of life-and-death scenarios at a level beyond mere techno-manipula-
tion, a level where the drone reabsorbs its human operator, and where the 
question of war enters a uniquely contemporary biosynthetic domain. 
But before elaborating on weaponized biosynthesis, that is, before mov-
ing us back to climate change vis-á-vis history of militarized environmen-
tal modification (known since the 1970s UN debates as ENMOD), a re-
sponse to De Landa’s question about the shelf-life of the human being 
needs to be at least partially sketched.
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Excursus on the Human
Mass base members are the true silent supporters of insurgency.
– Tactics in Counterinsurgency
A book released by the Bay Area political collective, Retort, seeks with-
in the “contradictions of military neo-liberalism” a “new political era,” 
one that admits, with unusual frankness, that “the reality of permanent 
war renders inadequate the notion of ‘peace’ as an oppositional strat-
egy” (15). In a statement that paraphrases Secretary Gates’s insistence 
on the blurred divisions of traditional battle, Retort “understand[s] that 
peace…[in a twenty-first century setting] is no more than war by oth-
er means” (94). On the one hand, the group wishes to retain the term 
“Left” as “a placeholder for the last best hope of human kind” (14). On 
the other hand, Retort wishes to eschew any semblance of a “Left” “van-
guard ideal[ism]” that would reduce critique to a “primordial form of hu-
man bonding” (185). What is to be done, “humanely” (emphasis origi-
nal) they ask. Caught between a current war reality without peace and 
the very kind of anthropocentric thinking that a new political era of war 
is in the process of displacing, Retort both admits a “prevailing sense of 
failure [of the 2003 anti-war movement, and the anti-capitalist Left gen-
erally]” (1), and proclaims, with a hint of mourning, to be “partisans of 
wishful thinking” (9). There is a parallel tendency in twenty-first century 
war discourse, both within military circles and in opposition to them, 
that finds in war a positive if also troubled sort of political potential. This 
potential concerns the final voicing of a grand collective silence—the 
“mass base”—which, precisely on the order of kill-chain compression, 
both intensifies the operational significance of humanity as a tool of war 
and simultaneously displaces the category of the human being.19 Can we 
find a positive reactivation of the so-called masses in the vicissitudes of 
twenty-first century war discourse, and must the masses be a term set by 
historical default to connote human forms of biotic combination to the 
exclusion of geological, atmospheric, or climactic processes that exist 
outside human control?
Current conceptualizations of the multitude are inadequate for coming 
to terms with planetary violence on such an expansive order, and are ar-
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guably limited by anthropocentric notions of biopolitics. Antonio Negri 
and Michael Hardt, for example, embrace an epoch of an emergent war-
fare state, and argue, as I am, that war has “become the primary organiz-
ing principle of society” (12). Because the modern “warfare” (as opposed 
to “welfare”) state is “fractured by internal division,” “new mechanisms of 
control…[also promise the] creation of new circuits of cooperation and 
collaborations,” an “unlimited number of encounters within the warfare 
state network” (xiii). As the crypto-ontological analogue to post-Fordist 
shifts in economic production (“crypto-” because non-individuated), 
the multitude here marks a “living alternative that grows within Empire” 
(xiii). Perhaps the word analogue is slightly unfair, in that it is the cen-
tral point of the book to mark a historical moment where economic and 
social relations, like Gates’s “blurring” of war and peace, fold over into 
one another, thus giving affective experience its political due, and replac-
ing the spatially and temporally disciplined notion of the fixed laboring 
subject with a more appositely fluid understanding of commercial infor-
matics and immaterial (both cognitive and caring) modalities of work. 
The social order has thus moved from a period of uniform striation (in-
cluding the striation of the “working class,” and its attendant mythos, the 
dialectic), to a post-unitary formation that “brings death” but also, “para-
doxically, must produce life” (13). Thus life exists in the form of a posi-
tive biopolitics of mass agency and on behalf of human renewal. There 
is a certain kinship, traceable through a Deleuzian and Spinozist philo-
sophical register, that connects the multitude to De Landa’s interest in 
the war machine mentioned above, and at further remove, to the fractal 
vicissitudes of what I have been calling the aerial empire. But it is rather a 
deficient kinship, which betrays a selective reading of Deleuze. The most 
questionable aspect of the multitude writ as fractal macro-subject is the 
equation in Negri and Hardt’s book between the mass’s adaptation of 
asymmetrical combat and the prominence of what they call “sympathetic 
moral feeling.” Here the primary agency of “affect” is presented according 
to the ideals of the Scottish Enlightenment, specifically, the moral phi-
losopher cum Godfather of liberal capitalism, Adam Smith (Hardt and 
Negri 50). That the multitude is finally an anthropological marco-subject 
is clear in Negri and Hardt’s emphasis on the communicative procedures 
attendant to biopolitical production, grounded as they are said to be in 
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a “common”—though occulted—“desire of the multitude” (51). By con-
trast, “Adam Smith’s invisible hand,” De Landa writes correctly, is “at the 
core of modern linear economics” (Thousand Years 42). So, too, is Smith’s 
notion of human reciprocity and historical development, as Marx insists 
upon in his critique of Smith’s teleology of economic progress, a version 
of affective response that is calculated to flatten experience into a highly 
atomized and individualist brand of socio-commercial order.20 The term 
multitude thus presents us with a scenario that jettisons Habermasian ra-
tionalist notions of the human being per se but replaces communicative 
reason with a vitalist—and all too human—affirmation of biopower as 
working within the networks of human affection that future wars might 
invigorate and sustain across nationalist lines. But will war sustain the 
human being as such in a net-centric approach to human relations, and 
why should it?
A different approach, one consistent with De Landa’s pioneering work 
on machine intelligence, would allow us to account for a fuller spectrum 
of the non-biotic factors of war that are now only beginning to gain tac-
tical military priority. “Who does the earth think it is?” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 39) is not a rhetorical question, nor is it posed with the expected 
organic chauvinism (De Landa’s term) that haunts a humanely inspired 
circumscription of the multitude. To put the question that Negri and 
Hardt do not answer in a distilled fashion, is it possible to conceive not of 
a new genealogy of morals but, after De Landa, of their geology instead? 
This question puts paid to the illusion that “structure is the earth’s last 
word” (Deleuze and Guattari 41), even where the structure in question is 
that last set of frontiers separating the human from the non-human, the 
biological from the geological strata, and here we can extrapolate, tech-
nological from ecological realms. One effect that goes missing in current 
theorization of the war machine à la Negri and Hardt is the way in which 
war criss-crosses and remixes organic and geological segmentation, and 
exceeds the bivocal logics that work within—so as to keep separate—
these entirely mutable divisions. This criss-crossing, if we follow a differ-
ent reading of Deleuze, is predicated an alloplastic rather than a homo-
plastic conception of agency and historical change (Deleuze and Guattari 
60). Alloplasty, in the way it is rendered from this position as the total 
otherness of time, makes a completely different sense of the terrestriality 
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of war, or rather, of war’s persistent flows of de-territorialization, in that 
by loosing the moorings of the human being, we can recognize war’s aer-
ial status in the fullest possible sense: the shifting isomorphisms that cut 
back-and-forth between biotic and non-biotic factors of war.
In giving humanity an intermediary—or better, an intra-mediary—
function among the mass of agencies that intersect the planet rather than 
assuming an isolated or purely formal notion of historical change, De 
Landa elaborates on Deleuze’s notion of the abstract machine (Deleuze 
and Guattari 56), and here develops a conception of temporal process as 
dependant on the shifts in the machinic phylum. De Landa insists upon 
the productivity of knowledge on the order of a Spinozist conception of 
“substance,” and embraces both mind and matter commonly (as we have 
seen in brain computer interface) as a heterogeneity of elements whose 
volatile combinatory arrangements are of more interest than their fixed 
or molar forms. Yet De Landa’s take on multiplicity exceeds the multi-
tude writ as a composite of affectively charged human-centered socio-po-
litical events, on the order of a postmodern Adam Smith. The machinic 
phylum refuses to take at face value, and is indeed designed to remix, the 
“phenomena of centering, unification, totalization, [and] integration” 
that are presumed to exist between and within this or that line of biotic or 
non-biotic (let alone species) difference (Deleuze and Guattari 41). The 
machinic phylum refers to those instances of change that depend upon 
“dynamical systems operating far from equilibrium,” for example, “the 
uncontrollable elements of ecosystems, the climate…changing weather 
patterns” (De Landa, Thousand Years 279), as much as the turbulence 
of war. The machinic phylum designates a moment of change that de-
pends on agencies that initiate “auto-catalytic”—or seemingly acciden-
tal—events that in turn have “cross-catalytic” consequences. This chain 
of tipping-points, call them phylogenic trip-wires, spring further accident 
inducing consequences that require machine intelligence for human be-
ings to use or understand. Thus again, the accident is only an apparently 
random event, and can be ordered logically (recall again, BCI and fractal 
data compression) with certain technological prosthesis. Such phylogen-
ic trip wires would depend on such atmospheric or geological changes 
that work as non-human replicators, and reconfigure the status of the hu-
man as such (De Landa, Thousand Years 151). We have seen the machinic 
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phylum’s dynamic in the case of the drono-sphere. Here, time and space 
compressions recombine the visual field of battle according to the fractal 
mathematics of war. And if we allow for the shift in life-form that is the 
coming robot-soldier, it becomes clear that the machinic phylum also en-
ables us to re-evaluate the processes of self-organization in other spheres, 
“living creatures with their inorganic counterparts” (104). In this sense, 
the human being as such becomes a provisional coagulation of biomass 
that forms “one of several interlocking chains…within a meshwork of 
heterogeneous elements” evolving equally by chance as by design. By re-
jecting a neo-institutionalist approach to the question of the human, and 
relatedly, to the social or polity, De Landa offers a sufficiently expansive 
and detailed model by which to rethink the tactical value—beyond the 
anthropocentric tethers of the multitude—of biology and geography, re-
combined within, and across, one another. As we shall see, the US Army 
is working on precisely this kind of bio-geological recombination. By giv-
ing climate change strategic significance as a force multiplier, and by re-
searching—indeed at the atmospheric level—the organizational lessons 
of environmental change, we may now claim both weather and natural 
resources as unpredictably volatile extensions of aerial imperial war.
ENMOD by Default
We regard the weather as a weapon. Anything one can use to get 
his way is a weapon and the weather is as good a one as any
– —Dr. Pierre St. Amand
Well before US Navy researcher Dr. Pierre St. Amand made his statement 
equating weather and weaponry in 1966, the relationship between war-
fare and environmental change has been an essential factor in war. Ar-
chimedes wanted to use the sun’s rays, which could be concentrated off 
highly polished Grecian shields, to set Roman ships afire. The troops of 
imperial Rome in turn sowed salt into the fields of Carthage, sterilizing 
the earth, and producing an early example of eco-nomadism that forced a 
total migration from the city to avoid starvation.21 Queen Elizabeth beat 
Spain on the high seas due in part to a storm. Napoleon Bonaparte lost 
Russia because of bad weather, and was thereby prompted to ask Urbain 
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Leverrier, the astronomer who discovered Neptune, to foretell winter 
storms along shipping and military paths. During the war of 1812, the US 
Army Surgeon General created a directive to keep climatological records 
to assist war efforts, creating the first electronically networked weather 
stations in the US. And during the Buffalo Wars of the 1840s, the US re-
alized that eradicating the buffalo economy would help clear the plains 
of their human foes and end the indigenous American’s way of life (Hal-
acy 31). The US civil war is given credit for expanding the network of 
weather observing stations. And even though President Lincoln resisted 
increased funding for the new science of weather forecasting, there were 
already 500 telegraphic nodes by the outbreak of the war in 1861 (Whit-
nah 10). The civil war thus set the stage for longer-term increases in con-
gressional funding for weather technologies, and for the US Army signal 
service to assume responsibility for meteorological knowledge in 1870. 
By 1881, the National Weather Service (NWS) and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Organization (NOAA) reorganized climate science 
outside the military budget, though both the NWS and NOAA are tra-
ditionally headed by military officers and remain quasi-military organiza-
tions (Fine 211).
World War I, the first total war of the twentieth century, depended 
upon the use of wind patterns and humidity levels to deliver airborne 
mustard gas, phosgene, and chlorine. But because wind knowledge was 
in its infancy, gas warfare had only moderate effectiveness (about four per 
cent of casualties).22 The first such attack was made possible by German 
Nobel Prize scientist Fritz Haber (1868–1934), the inventor of chemi-
cal fertilizer, and only later the father of chemical warfare. By World War 
II, environmental variables and the art of war were fully and officially in-
tertwined. By 1956, the giant brain of the US-Army financed Electronic 
Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC) was announced, creating 
new possibilities not only for calculating bomb trajectories and kill ratios 
but also for providing the computational power necessary to produce the 
kind of mathematically based, multi-layered atmospheric forecasting that 
Professor Bjerknes and the Bergen school of proto-meteorology could 
only speculate about at the turn of the nineteenth century. Spurred on 
by the Russian Sputnik, the US Naval Research Laboratory took the first 
official steps to put a weather satellite into the earth’s atmosphere. With 
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support from the US military’s Research and Development Corporation 
(RAND), and with participation from 8 federal agencies including the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1966 saw the world’s first operational weather 
satellite system. At this moment, climate and war went global in a scien-
tific sense, and the atmosphere could be observed every 12 hours from 
a single orbiting machine.23 Between 1967 and 1972, the tactic of envi-
ronmental modification (ENMOD) was fashioned in a sustained and 
developed way. Attempting to extend the monsoon season in Southeast 
Asia, the US military dispersed several tons of silver iodide from its C-
130s and F-4 Phantoms in order to produce heavy rain over the centuries 
old Ho Chi Minh trail. Operation Popeye, as the program was known, 
ran ENMOD missions over neutral Cambodia and Laos (in violation of 
international law), as well as in North and South Vietnam. Popeye was 
active to the tune of 2,600 flights, 47,000 units of cloud seeding material, 
and a cost of $21.6 million.24 Not to be outdone by the Romans in Car-
thage, the DOD also attempted ENMOD missions against Cuba in 1969 
and 1970. The goal was to cause clouds to drop their rain before reaching 
the island, producing a genocidal crisis of starvation and drought.25
Thus the earliest historical examples of unconventional warfare—
whether accidental or deliberate—were climatological in nature. And as 
this history has not been fully written, we can offer here a set of working 
distinctions, useful for making some final points about the aerial empire, 
between the manner in which weather has been called upon during the 
Cold War to enhance the military arsenal, and beyond that, the man-
ner in which climate change is altering the dynamics of war doctrine in 
a multi-polar post-Cold War epoch. To bring the list of past ENMOD 
activities mentioned above into a contemporary context, we must distin-
guish between the instrumental uses of climate change and a new science 
of environmental security that both seizes upon the event-opportunities 
of the coming eco-catastrophes, and translates the aleatory dynamics that 
produce atmospheric and geographical extremes into an emergent war 
analytic. To understand the current stakes of climate change as a military 
force multiplier, we must make the distinction—crucial for understand-
ing what I called above the shelf life of the human being—between EN-
MOD by design, which is the pre-planned fabrication of climate change à 
la Popeye; and ENMOD by default, which is the turning of environmen-
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tal crises into an autogenic form of weaponry that works its violence not 
only against but also eventually without the need for human beings.
In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union, who had its own long standing 
ENMOD programs, publicized previous US activities in Indochina. Since 
1977, then, the final version of the treaty defines ENMOD to encompass:
any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipu-
lation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or 
structure of the earth, including the biota, lithosphere, hy-
drosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space, so as to cause 
effects such as earthquakes and tsunamis, an upset in the 
ecological balance of a region, or changes in weather patterns 
(clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornado 
storms), in the state of the ozone layer or atmosphere, in cli-
mate patterns or in ocean currents.
However, the conditions under which this treaty was ratified, a ma-
jor point of contention between the opposing Cold War blocks, was the 
US insistence that “each State Party to the Convention undertakes not 
to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modifi-
cation techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the 
means of destruction, damage or injury to another State Party” (empha-
sis mine). By attaching the definition of “severe” to the time-space caveats 
of “widespread and long-lasting,” the DOD aligned US delegates to the 
UN introduced a provision that would allow for a future deployment of 
environmental war. They managed to put key loopholes around the most 
important variables in war: as we have seen above in the context of emer-
gent war technology, the control of space and time. These variables be-
gan to be re-introduced in a serious way as recently as 1996. In a paper, 
collectively authored by 7 Air Force Officers, called “Weather as Force 
Multiplier: Owning the Weather in 2025,” the idea of “full spectrum con-
flict” presents weather manipulation as a “more important weapon than 
the [atomic] bomb” (House 5). “Air Force 2025” measures hurricane 
energy in terms of bomb capacity, noting that a worthwhile “tropical 
storm is equal 10,000 one megaton hydrogen bombs” [House 18]). The 
45,000 lightning strikes that hit the planet daily are said to contain “elec-
tro-potential…with offensive military benefit” that might be induced by 
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“atmospherically buoyant…microscopic” computer drones, designed to 
seed the sky with the chemistry necessary for “aimed and timed lighten-
ing strikes” (House 27). The connection between this version of electro-
potential and brain wave interface is not an immediate one, since the lat-
ter interface, insofar as it absorbs the human in the war machine, is more 
akin to ENMOD by default. With specific focus on the ionosphere (the 
atmospheric layer 1200 miles above earth where radio waves are reflect-
ed as a natural mirror), AF 2025 also evokes the High-frequency Active 
Auroral Research Program (HAARP). Established in 1992 and based in 
Gokona Alaska, HAARP is an array of 180 tower transmitters, 72 feet in 
height mounted on thermopiles spaced 80 feet apart in a 12 by 15 rect-
angular grid.26 Put simply, HAARP is an ionospheric heater designed to 
excite low atmospheric particles, the largest such machine ever built.27
Thus ENMOD by design is by no means off the military table (and 
note: the American Meteorological Society now endorses an ENMOD 
approach to curb global warming), but it is not as fully apparent in (pub-
licly assessable) doctrinal discussion in the way that ENMOD by default 
currently is (“Re-engineering” 7). The time-and-space caveats attached 
to the 1977 UN ENMOD convention have taken on unprecedented 
significance given the current climate change reality, which is no longer 
overtly dodged by the current US ruling apparatus (military, govern-
ment, corporate). Rather, climate change is embraced as a target enhanc-
ing operational environment, the purest form of ENMOD by default. 
This adaptation to, indeed embracing of, planetary risk makes military 
strategy out of a forgone conclusion of anthropogenic climate catastro-
phe. However, anthropogenesis—a crucial qualification—does not at all 
translate to the preservation of the human being. Consistent with both 
military technology and national security policy, ENMOD by default 
disintegrates the efficacy as much of human will as of the human being 
as such. Humanity may appear to determine war in the aerial empire, but 
we are by no means in control of the new dynamics of planetary violence. 
At 350 ppm, we are at—and are surpassing—a level of “dangerous an-
thropogenic interference” (DAI), with CO2 levels to approach 450 parts 
per million by 2012 (Kolber 42).28 (China’s toleration proves higher, at 
550 ppm and even 750 ppm.) Ice caps are melting, sea levels rising, faster 
than the conservative International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
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predicted in 2007. At the current pace of extinction more than half the 
earth’s animal species will be gone by the end of the century, and accord-
ing to a 2009 MIT Integrated Global Systems model, it will be too late 
to stem eco-catastrophe much sooner than predicted. IPCC panel head 
Rejendra Pachauri cites 2012, the expiration date of the US rebuked Kyo-
to Protocol, as the planet’s next tipping-point (qtd. in Vanderheiden xi). 
The same 2009 Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) document that we cited 
by way of introducing drono-spheric SkyOps several moves above also 
displaces the human-centered notion of ENMOD by deliberate design 
à la Operation Popeye with a far more complicated (if not also suicidal) 
strategy of ENMOD by default: adaptation to, as much as mobilization 
of, the destructive power unleashed by coal-produced CO2 gases. Here 
the term climate change moves the problem of ecology from the limited 
context of anthropogenesis toward a more perversely expansive morpho-
genic realm of agitated particles, chance compounds, and aleatory aggre-
gates that are given human purpose only in the wake of this or that event 
of mass crisis. The ecology of war is seen here as a way of fighting so-
called cross-border wars that are not merely trans-national (as across na-
tional lines) but are also infra-national (as within nations) because war is 
phylogenic now. Climate change becomes an accelerant and a multiplier 
of military force (TSC 4) that eventually turns on its masters.
We have seen the mutation of space and acceleration of time as noted 
in the SSI climate change materials already at work in brain-machine in-
terface technologies (BMI), and in the drono-sphere, examined above. 
Here, recall, we found a set of innovative war applications that fused ma-
chinery and meat. Let’s also emphasize that, given the blurriness of con-
temporary security doctrine and the twenty-first century war machine, 
we also detected an elaborate data-driven war analytic that no longer 
cares to divide war from peace, foe from friend, risk from security, al-
terity from homeland, state power from civility, and so on and so forth 
with the traditional divisions of Western modernity. The notion of cli-
mate change as a form of tactical enhancement may also be applied to 
the way in which fractals and chaos are being considered with renewed 
pervasiveness in emergent military systems. A 1996 Navel War College 
paper, “Chaos Theory: the Essentials of Military Applications,” provides 
a theoretical foreshadowing of drone technology, using chaos analysis in 
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a precisely analogous way that De Landa’s uses the term machinic phy-
lum. In the temporal sense, chaos is defined, apropos James Gleick’s well-
known work, as “behavior that is not periodic,  [but is] apparently random , 
where the system response is still recurrent  (the pendulum still swings back 
and forth) but no longer in a predictable way” ( James 14; emphasis origi-
nal).29 By the chance synchronizing of aleatory time signatures that both 
cut across and recombine biotic and non-biotic strata (for example, cli-
mate change and human beings), computer technology produces similar 
mutations of space. Like fractal media, chaos theory allows us to identify 
“ transitions between various dynamics, that are common to many sys-
tems” (14). But again these dynamics cannot be visualized in an intelligi-
bly useful way without the mathematical reading ability brought about by 
electronic machine vision. Algorithms turn chaos into otherwise invisi-
ble new phylogenic lines. Consistent with fractal media, the chance event 
is seized upon to coordinate unforeseen alignments between unlike enti-
ties, as drone vision produces a probable calculus—Las Vegas style—of a 
virtual battlefield that we cannot simply model in advance. “Chaotic flow 
generates time intervals with no periodicity of apparent pattern” (15), 
which is the operational equivalent of security predicated on proximate 
and perpetual war. And most importantly for understanding the relations 
of violence in the aerial imperium, the intra-systemic dynamics of chaos 
gain military application by modeling weapons on climate at several lev-
els. Climate change is conceived of in the literal sense with ENMOD by 
design. In turn, ENMOD by default eventuates in a stage of war that tran-
scends humanity’s capacity to control what we might as well summarize 
as an atmospheric army about to go rogue. Chaos theory seeks military 
benefit by reorganizing war according to the asymmetrical systems of 
“weather dynamics and clouds.” And on the order of the machinic phy-
lum, twenty-first century war is predicated on non-linear similar turbu-
lence events, wind patterns, storm systems, lightening-bombs, ecological 
weapons, that are literally tipped by mechanical “swarms where battle-
fields are filled with new clouds that carry lethal capabilities” ( James 79).
Climate change is a new—and will become the predominant—means 
of waging if not also of modeling war. The atmosphere has now become 
a weapon both by design and by default. And to the same extent, related 
technologies such as BCI and fractal media efface and reabsorb the hu-
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man being. This effacement/reabsorption happens, in the first instance, 
as the war machine has wedged a new machinic phylum across carbon- 
and non-carbon based life forms; secondly, and more dramatically, this 
process of effacement/absorption happens in the sense that humanity 
has stacked the odds against its long-term survival. The victory for this 
or that side of the global human population is no longer a presumptive 
goal in the context of an aerial imperium. As mentioned above once be-
fore, there are 50 million environmental refugees in 2010, and according 
to UN estimates there will be more than 200 million by 2050, marking 
an epoch of population culling if not also a set of re-divisions within the 
human species (Glenn and Gordon 2). In the eco-suicidal register that is 
coterminous with ENMOD by default, humanity itself becomes a side, 
a losing side, within a meshwork of trans-biotic agency that wins by en-
veloping its human other. Rather than being apparent as a category that 
might be divisible into simply national oppositions, so-called transna-
tional war means that the human being is becoming barely traceable as a 
fading bio-political ideal. With the 1925 Geneva protocols against chemi-
cal warfare in mind, the International Committee of the Red Cross “urges 
[us] to…remember our common humanity” (International Committee 
of the Red Cross 3). Within the aerial empire, remembering humanity 
may be all we are going to have.
Notes
1. For the economic side of this debate, see Harvey and Wood.
2. The Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 110-
181, section 951, amends 10 U.S. Code § 118 to require that the next national 
security strategy and national defense strategy include guidance for military 
planners on the risks of climate change, and that the next quadrennial 
defense review examine capabilities the armed forces will need to respond to 
climate change.
3. On the physical reality of US militarism in the form of foreign bases, 
see Johnson.
4. Not surprisingly, in 2010 Mexico adopted an Israeli supplied drone war 
program to battle its own drug cartel insurgence. See “Mexico deploys Israeli 
UAVs in War on Drug Cartels.”
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5. On the Northern Command, see “Pentagon to Detail Plan to 
Bolster Security.”
6. For an excellent example of the colonial revolutionary warrior in US 
history, see Ewald.
7. The important question of the failed state cannot be addressed in this short 
space. But see Hitchcock.
8. For Habermas, the “human being per se” furnished the political self-
understanding of the bourgeois public sphere. See 29 ff.
9. On the Helio Courier, see Colby and Dennett 69, 282.
10. UAV specifications in this section are taken from House, et. al. On drone 
specs, see De Luce.
11. By some estimates US air strikes in the “long war” have killed 85 per cent 
women and children. See Engelhardt.
12. See Drew.
13. On the EATR program, see Byrne.
14. On “autogenic war,” see Hill.
15. See Virilio 73 ff.
16. See Martin.
17. See Davis.
18. On the latency and image, see Parks 137.
19. I have explored the changes around the concept of humanity and 
contemporary war doctrine in a special issue of Differences called “The Future 
of the Human.” See my “‘Terrorists Are Human Beings’: Mapping the US 
Army’s ‘Human Terrain Systems’ Program.”
20. Adam Smith is an apt figure in post-structuralist variations on the Marxist 
tradition. See Louis Althusser’s discussion of Marx’s reading of Smith. See 
also my “The Crowded Text: E.P. Thompson, Adam Smith, and the Object of 
Eighteenth-century Writing.”
21. See Russell.
22. See Haber.
23. See Fishman and Kalish.
24. For a detailed account of American environmental war efforts and their 
effects in Indochina, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
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25. This assault on Cuba occurred according to former DOD consultant 
Lowell Ponte. Pentagon sources deny such operations. See the International 
Herald Tribune.
26. See H.A.A.R.P.
27. See Shachtman and Chossudovsky.
28. See also Hunt.
29. The locus classicus for this text and other chaos-oriented war doctrine is James 
Gleick’s bestseller, Chaos: Making a New Science.
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Chapter 11
Notes Toward a Post-Carbon Philosophy
“It’s the Economy, Stupid”
Martin McQuillan
One more try to save the discourse of a “world” that 
we no longer speak, or that we still speak, sometimes 
all the more garrulously, as in an emigrant colony
– Jacques Derrida, “Economies of the Crisis”
Post-Carbon Philosophy
This is an essay about philosophy, its task and object, after the end of a 
carbon economy. This topic is not wild science fiction; according to most 
estimates we (collectively as a planet) have reached or surpassed the mo-
ment of peak oil (the point at which world reserves begin to dwindle). 
Effectively the post-carbon epoch has already begun, since it is now a task 
of the critical imagination to envisage a world beyond the fractal distilla-
tion of petroleum. The task of thinking a post-carbon world also revolves 
around the difficulty of thinking ‘a world’ at this moment, that is to say, a 
world made global by what we have been taught to term mondelization 
or more strictly mondelatinization (a globalization based on western he-
gemony and privilege).1 The place of philosophy, as a western model of 
thought, is no doubt vexed in this situation, given that all of the terms of 
globalization such as “economy,” “law,” “sovereignty,” “world,” and so on 
are all philosophical terms and are all metaphysical through and through. 
However, given where this task of thinking is beginning from and the re-
sources it has to hand we will have to pick up the philosophical heritage 
that confronts us and come to terms with the obvious and inevitable dif-
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ficulty of becoming part of the history of the object that one wishes to 
describe through this philosophical vocabulary. If it is true that we are 
entering an epoch of new materialities for which we as yet have no de-
scriptive framework then philosophy must respond to this situation. The 
question of matter after all is also a philosophical concept. The empirical 
and all empiricisms are, as Derrida notes as early as “Violence and Meta-
physics,” philosophical gestures that embed themselves within the his-
tory of philosophy. His reading of Levinas in this essay is to suggest the 
ways in which Levinas demonstrates that all empiricism is metaphysical, 
and a constant philosophical thematization “of the infinite exteriority of 
the other.” Levinas in contrast understands the empirical not as a posi-
tivism but as an experience of difference and of the other. “Empiricism,” 
claims Derrida, “always has been determined by philosophy, from Plato 
to Husserl as nonphilosophy: as the philosophical pretention to nonphi-
losophy” (152). That is as philosophy’s way of affecting to speak in a 
non-philosophical way. However, nothing can more profoundly conjure 
the need for philosophy than this denial of philosophy by philosophy. 
Within the metaphysical schema that is nonphilosophy, the irruption 
of the wholly other solicits philosophy (i.e. the logos) as its own origin, 
end, and other. There is no escape from philosophy as far as empiricism 
is concerned; there will only ever be a thinking about the empirical that 
is philosophical. It is this radicalization of empiricism that deconstruc-
tion proposes as a breathless, inspiring journey for philosophy in the later 
years of the twentieth century; as Derrida states in the opening para-
graphs of the essay on Levinas, it is the closure of philosophy by nonphi-
losophy that gives thought a future: “it may even be that these questions 
are not philosophical, are not philosophy’s questions. Nevertheless, these 
should be the only questions today capable of founding the community, 
within the world, of those who are still called philosophers; and called 
such in remembrance, at very least, of the fact that these questions must 
be examined unrelentingly” (79). So, the question of the materiality of 
a post-carbon economy may not be a question that philosophy has the 
resources to answer but which must nevertheless be thought about and 
so determined in a philosophical manner. It may be the case that long 
before peak oil we reached the point of peak philosophy, with Hegel or 
Marx, Nietzsche, or Heidegger and what remains is a post-philosophical 
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speculative economy, which in some necessary way sits on considerable 
philosophical and metaphysical reserves. This thought will be of use to 
us in the coming pages; just as I am at pains in this opening paragraph 
to point out that one cannot seek to swap climate change denial for the 
denial of philosophy.
It will then be difficult to imagine the new materialities of the age of 
climate change without philosophy and in fact the persistent theme of 
matter in the discourse on environmentalism will undoubtedly compel 
us towards philosophy. It may be the case that philosophy will tell us 
that all and every environmentalism is a metaphysics grounded on an 
unquestioned empiricism based upon an unsustainable distinction be-
tween nature and culture. The task of a deconstruction of the question 
of the environmental then might be a rethinking of the experience of the 
environment, and the environment as experience, as an encounter with 
an irreducible presence and perception of a phenomenality that is also 
an experience of the other, the wholly other, and of difference. It is this 
wholly other, the other that separates Derrida from Levinas, that must 
be attended to as the new materiality of an epoch of climate change and 
post-carbon economy. However, in this essay I will not be attending to 
the environmental effects as such of carbon. In a certain sense it is non-
sense to speak of a post-carbon materiality since even if hydrocarbon fu-
els were to be outlawed tomorrow, carbon and its allotropes would re-
main, as they were in Plato’s time, the fourth most abundant element in 
the universe. Therefore, whenever I speak of a ‘post-carbon philosophy’ 
the question in hand does not strictly concern the depletion of a material 
itself. Rather, the task for thinking relates to the sort of world, being in the 
world, and thought concerning the world that an economy and culture 
based on the exploitation of hydrocarbons has given rise to, and what its 
prospects might be as this economy and culture inevitably weans itself off 
of petroleum and onto some other alternative energy source, while liv-
ing with the inheritance of a century of intensive hydrocarbon use. In the 
end, the culture and economy of post-carbon-modernity might not look 
that different from the one that we occupy today. Undoubtedly, carbon-
fuelled capital will not easily give up its privileges in favour of so-called 
sustainable living, and will seek to replace the risks of a carbon-based 
economy with those of a nuclear-based economy. The new materialities 
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and bio-diversity challenges of the post-carbon age may quickly begin to 
look exactly the same as those of the present moment, the here and now 
proposing its own future. The shape of things to come is not the object 
of our speculation here. Rather, in this text I would like to consider the 
question of speculation itself.
Philosophy will not name an alternative energy source, and this is a 
question that philosophy cannot answer and may not be a philosophical 
question. Philosophy, on the other hand, offers a model of crisis. It is at 
its most eloquent when talking about limits, ends and telos, and about 
the inability of theory or the humanities or the human sciences to ground 
themselves in institutions and actions, and concerning the incommen-
surability between what we still call “politics,” “ethics,” “economy,” and 
the global mutations today and the deconstruction of those mutations. 
If we are to understand what is most singular about our present time it 
will emerge from this philosophical reflection. However, the challenge 
for philosophy is not to draw down upon this template but to name and 
situate the most acute moment of the here and now as a crisis that dis-
tinguishes it from all previous crises. It is in understanding how the pres-
ent crisis (of the globalization of neoliberalism, climate change, peak oil, 
and bio-diversity extinction), differs from all other crises (in the history 
of western colonialism, say) that philosophy might begin to think philo-
sophically about this moment. Equally, there may well be no universal ex-
perience of this moment that would enable philosophy to act in a philo-
sophical manner with respect to it. Given the diverse experiences of what 
it might mean for different parts of the world to be in this situation there 
may not be either a common horizon or discourse capable of offering 
an assured competence to frame and explain the crisis. In this sense, the 
philosophical concept of crisis that holds in the tradition after Valéry and 
Husserl would be faced with an inability to phenomenalize and ontolo-
gize a determinable universal experience of the crisis. Philosophy then 
sits on the cusp between being drawn to the crisis as the only means of 
determining it and having its own constitutive divisibility demonstrated 
by its inability to address the crisis through the redundancy of its own 
model of crisis.2
It may be the case that the crisis of peak oil and simultaneous irrevers-
ible climate change is only a concentration and reiteration of previous lim-
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inal cases in the history of the exploitation of planetary resources by the 
west. For example, kerosene derived from coal and petroleum replaced 
whale oil as the source of illumination in America and Europe. The whal-
ing industry had been in decline for a decade due to diminishing sperm 
whale populations and the destruction of the Northern whaling fleet dur-
ing the civil war, when hydrocarbon illuminants were introduced out of 
necessity and innovation leading to gaslight homes and cities and a new 
phase of development in modernity. However, to say that our present cri-
sis today is not unique does not mean that it is not singular. The task for 
thinking about the present crisis might be to understand the idea of the 
crisis today, the understanding that this is a crisis, that it corresponds to 
an idea or model of a crisis, provided for us by, say, philosophy and is the-
atricalized in contemporary discourse as such. The status of the idea that 
the world is in crisis as doxa might be one of the defining features of this 
crisis, the very thing that makes it like no other moment. The singularity 
of our present crisis might be defined by the resources spent in the medi-
atisation of the idea that the world is in crisis, by the competing political 
interests of the day (the advocates, the activists, the sceptics, the deniers, 
and the lobbyists) through all the channels of contemporary communi-
cation. On the one hand, within such rhetorical exchanges, the naming 
or denial of a crisis always serves a political interest. On the other hand, 
to identify an event as a crisis is always to ontologize it and to submit it to 
the model of the crisis that would explain it and domesticate it. Perhaps, 
we might say that today is not a crisis at all but rather the latest instance of 
a long history of planetary exploitation by capital, this instance being no 
more critical than any other in a long history. The naming of a crisis in the 
present works to mask that history and to neutralize it, giving it form and 
therefore a program and calculability.
For either side of the present debate on climate change, say, to name 
only one of the threats to planetary life today, to name this process and 
event as a crisis would be to appropriate it for the present and for a meta-
physics of presence. In giving the event of climate change a form and 
a certain calculability one has begun to neutralize the effects of its un-
knowable future and to erase the experience of alterity at the heart of an 
encounter with the wholly other. To name it as a crisis is to subject it to 
the temporality of “the crisis,” namely that it will one day come to an end 
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and a state of normativity will be restored. One side of the debate would 
say that “normality” (whatever normal might mean on a planet that has 
weathered at least five major ice ages) can be resumed by cutting carbon 
emissions and introducing “sustainable” energy consumption. The other 
side says the present is in fact normal and no change in climate is in pro-
cess. Either way, each side depends upon the idea of a normative climate 
derived from the idea that a change in climatic conditions would consti-
tute a crisis for the human race. A crisis that would no longer allow man-
kind to run a system of resource exploitation that has sustained its devel-
opment for the last two hundred years. In other words, what is at stake in 
the climate change debate is the very future of a world economy and the 
normative, or, ideal conditions for its operation. That is to say, the debate 
is predicated on an essentially conservative notion of how to sustain the 
ideal or normative. In fact, the event and singularity of climate change is 
constituted in the concept that it is already irreversible. The singularity 
of climate change as a crisis might be that it is not subject to the tem-
porality of the crisis and that it might be a crisis without resolution and 
so demonstrate itself not to be a crisis at all but a constant state. In this 
sense crisis becomes a permanent condition or at least the resolution of 
this crisis is the construction of a new idea of the normative. In this way, 
climate change must change the very idea of a crisis by which we seek to 
determine it. At the same time, climate change becomes part of the latest 
chapter in the history of the idea of crisis and continues to be appropri-
ated by it and subsumed to the model it undermines.
On the issue of irreversible climate change and peak oil, I find myself 
to be surprisingly sceptical. Given that hydrocarbon consumption is al-
ready in decline and without fresh initiatives (although there are many 
mountain tops to be dynamited and much oil shale to be extracted yet) 
even the most optimistic forecasts suggest that petroleum consumption 
will have dwindled to almost nothing in my life time, why should we then 
be overly concerned by targets for climate emissions set for fifty years 
into the future? I do not doubt the damage that will be caused to, say, 
the polar ice caps during those fifty years and the resultant biodiversity 
loss. However, such targets seem to me to be aimed at ‘eking out’ the re-
mains of carbon emission rather than addressing the more fundamental 
underlying causes of climate change. This “eking out” is also a transition 
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phase for global capital as it acquires a new carbonless fuel. In fact, while 
it may take a million years for the planet to correct the damage inflicted in 
the next fifty, surely this realignment of the environment will take place 
in the absence of continued fossil fuel consumption. That is to say, that 
irreversible climate change is not necessarily irreversible, just that it is 
irreversible in the lifetime of global capital that as a planetary life form 
is something of a Johnny-come-lately. In this way, the discourse on cli-
mate change on all sides retains the vestiges of an irreducible humanism 
and the parochialism of western metaphysics. It would not be enough, it 
seems to me, for philosophy to accept the discourse and axiomatics of 
climate change advocates, even if it were possible to accept the science 
without reservation. Rather, this discourse in its present state is open to 
question, is fragile and perfectible, or even deconstructable (as Derrida 
reminds us of the abolitionist discourse on the death penalty3 ) because it 
more often than not limits the idea of planetary life to the present condi-
tions of a western-lead globalization and so inadvertently positions cli-
mate change as the latest accident to befall the western subject. In this 
way, climate change is the latest phase of the crisis of European human-
ity. Accordingly, it calls for a response from western humanity, one that 
will require the response of science, philosophy, and the human sciences 
(including economics). However, as an encounter with the wholly other 
of planetary life beyond the limits of western humanism, the event of cli-
mate change will transform, mutate, and challenge the protocols of Euro-
pean humanity’s intellectual apparatus. Climate change accordingly is a 
challenge to reason and so to philosophy as the custodian of western rea-
son. If one were to question or attempt to exceed this as the locus of the 
present discourse of crisis, one might quickly find oneself in a position 
where terms like “crisis” and “irreversible” were no longer appropriate.
As soon as we have determined a moment of crisis, with the temporal-
ity of a crisis and the calculability of a crisis, then we have entered the 
realm of economy. The response to a crisis is always economic in every 
sense of that word. Just as we bring a crisis “in house” by naming it as 
such, one must always ask what is the quickest and most efficient way 
of bringing a crisis to an end. Equally, in the final analysis, we are often 
told a planetary crisis will be a question of economics. However, just as 
one must question reason as the axiom of crisis, then we must question 
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whether economics can continue to stand as a strictly determinable re-
gion of competence in the face of such a crisis. One would have to ask if 
economics can offer a competent realm of judgment, decision, and will 
to respond to the demands of the incalculable. It is not that economics 
does not have a response to the incalculable, but rather that a response 
directed here cannot be purely or strictly economical. This is where phi-
losophy makes a return in the economy of crisis management.
There is a clear and legible connection between what the oil industry 
calls “speculation” and the speculative philosophical enterprise. I would 
like to suggest that speculating for oil has been the basis of industrial mo-
dernity and the western economy for the last two hundred years (wheth-
er that oil was derived from the exploitation of hydrocarbons or whales 
is a moot point, even though the use of oil as a fuel dates, according to 
Herodotus, to Babylon 4,000 years ago). As that which fuels the engine 
of the economy, that which makes the economy as such possible, the 
search for oil is an investment in a venture with the hope of gain but with 
the risk of loss. The speculative structure of oil exploitation follows from 
and is now itself the basis for the structure of all investment in stock, 
property, and the fictional products of capital today. As with speculative 
philosophy, it involves the conjecture or theorization of a future event in 
the absence of the firm evidence of a present. It is this speculative struc-
ture that opens the future as a thinking of risk and as thinking as risk, that 
closely ties philosophy to the carbon economy. The question of the post-
carbon economy is therefore clearly a matter of concern for philosophy. 
I have been careful to speak here from the beginning of a “post-carbon 
economy” (although we might also say “post-carbon-economies” since 
there will undoubtedly be more than one). While oil is a material thing, 
the stuff itself as it were, the price of oil is a question of economy, a mat-
ter of relation, and is irreducibly conceptual. My concern in this text is 
to think through the prospects for an economy and culture (if that is not 
a tautology) based upon the pricing of hydrocarbons as fuel. This ques-
tion may come down to one that concerns the future of speculation it-
self, as much as it does a speculation on the future. I would like to offer 
a hypothesis here, even a speculation, apropos of today, that will need 
to be put at risk and tested, namely that whenever we speak of so-called 
“environmental catastrophe” the business of “financial crisis” is never far 
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behind. In fact, a strong formulation of the hypothesis might be that the 
two are intimately connected, and that their relation always follows from 
a structure of speculation. In this sense, philosophy is what is put at risk 
and must put itself at risk by the conjuncture of the two.
Oil Reserves
The western-lead global economy is predicated on the value of oil. At the 
end of the Second World War, the Bretton Woods monetary conferences 
created the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and estab-
lished a new international monetary system of competitive disinflation 
relative to the US dollar by tying the gold standard to the dollar. This 
system worked well for a while and enabled the post-war reconstruction 
of western Europe and Japan, and put in place the inaugural openings of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which form the basis of the 
global economy today. However, the Bretton Woods Gold Exchange sys-
tem began to break down in the mid-sixties under the pressures of the ex-
cessive costs of the Vietnam War and the resurgence of the European and 
south Asian manufacturing base as exporters of global trade. By Novem-
ber 1967 as the value of the dollar began to look increasingly precarious, 
withdrawals of gold bullion from the US Treasury were becoming exces-
sive (as national governments, notably De Gaulle’s France, redeemed 
their dollar holdings against bullion stocks as agreed at Bretton Woods). 
When sterling was devalued in 1967, Bretton Woods was doomed; the 
dollar came under further pressure to devalue itself against gold in order 
to protect the value of Federal reserves against redemption of dollars by 
foreign governments. The plot of Ian Fleming’s 1959 Goldfinger (adapt-
ed as a film in 1964) can only be understood in relation to the Bretton 
Woods concords. The threat to render the Federal gold reserve inacces-
sible after exploding a radioactive bomb, would have meant national gov-
ernments could only redeem their reserve dollars against Ulrich Goldfin-
ger’s own gold reserve (said to be the second largest in the world) thus 
pushing up the value of his gold and mortgaging the US economy to 
Goldfinger’s personal enterprises. Consequently, James Bond, agent for 
the sick man of Europe, temporarily rescues not only the post-war, cold 
war status quo of the Bretton Woods agreement but secures the future of 
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western leadership in a global economy. Rather than risk the depletion 
of the US gold reserve and the collapse of the US credit rating in 1971 
President Nixon abandoned the dollar-gold link dissolving the terms of 
Bretton Woods in favour of a system of free floating currencies, with the 
international banks and the markets determining the value of the dol-
lar. This combined with the ongoing costs of Vietnam lead to inflation-
ary pressures and wage-price freezes in the American national economy. 
OPEC discussed the value of pricing oil in several currencies to spread 
the risks of the volatile American domestic scene. However, in 1974, Nix-
on moved to do a deal with Saudi Arabia only to price oil in dollars when 
the Saudis, unknown to the rest of OPEC and the US’s western allies, se-
cretly purchased $2.5 billion in US Treasury bills with their surplus oil 
funds (equivalent to 70% of all Saudi assets), once more ensuring the 
position of the dollar as the international reserve currency and initiating 
the phase of American global hegemony based on petrodollar recycling, 
swapping the gold standard for the standard of oil, so-called “black gold.” 
As shocks in the price of oil followed political and supply instabilities, 
so the need for national governments to acquire US dollars ensued. On 
the one hand, dollars flow into oil supplying countries far beyond the 
needs of domestic investment. These surplus dollars are stored in banks 
in New York and London to retain their value as dollars. On the other 
hand, oil-importing countries need to buy dollars to meet the rising price 
of oil. In the 1970s developing nations in Africa borrowed dollars from 
international banks sitting on surplus petrol dollars, creating debts to be 
repaid entirely in dollars and at the then-high levels of interest rates based 
on inflationary pressures in the western national economies. In this way, 
the emergent, post-colonial African continent was impoverished and a 
cycle of crippling debt initiated. The IMF set up by Bretton Woods was 
used to enforce debt repayment to the international banks through the 
implementation of ‘austerity’ programmes that also opened up develop-
ing countries to western private companies. As surplus petrol dollars flow 
in from OPEC countries and are leant out again as Eurodollar bonds or 
loans, the Federal Reserve is in a unique position with respect to creating 
credit and expanding the money supply.4 It is this situation that enables 
the United States to sustain improbable budget deficits and latterly al-
lowed the bail out of Wall Street after the 2007 banking crisis. However, 
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in a post-cold war, multi-polar era, after peak oil, the position of the dol-
lar as world reserve currency is once more in question. Previous attempts 
to rebalance the world economy now have genuine impetus from the 
need to address the imbalance of current accounts between the US and 
China, Chinese currency manipulation, and the emergence of the Euro 
as an alternative or additional reserve currency. Further, the cost in blood 
and treasure of physically securing the oil supply through military means 
may prove unsustainable for the US (the cost of bailing out the banks, 
$660 billion, was the same as the US annual military budget for 2007). In 
a post-carbon economy, it might not be the best position to be sitting on 
a mountain of petrodollars.
There is then a great deal at stake in the question of a post-carbon econ-
omy, beyond the actual “irreversible” damage done to the earth’s climate 
by carbon emissions. Oil is presently the essential fuel of the global econ-
omy and oil trades are the basic enablers of manufacturing infrastructure 
in every industrial nation, of global transportation, and the primary en-
ergy source for 40 percent of the industrial economy. Oil trades in dol-
lars have been the basis for American economic, cultural, and military he-
gemony since the 1970s, and the liquidity that ensures the development 
of the western-lead global economy. A post-carbon economy presents a 
considerable challenge to the present geo-political dispensation and, co-
terminus to this, the current conditions of capital. It is for these reasons 
that we might say that the response to climate change as a staging post 
in the on-going crisis of European humanity, revolves around more than 
a purely scientific solution that will bring the crisis to a dénouement to 
enable a return to western-capital normativity, and everything that de-
pends upon it.
Modern as the phenomenon might be and while philosophy has 
a great deal to say about “energy,” for example, if I might be allowed to 
paraphrase one of Derrida’s more familiar hyperboles: no philosopher as 
a philosopher has ever taken seriously the question of oil. Oil and carbon 
emission has a massive readability today and may define the most acute 
moment of the paroxysm that makes the present crisis like no other. This 
is not to say that there have not previously been bouts of financial uncer-
tainty and environmental disasters precipitated by oil. In fact, the history 
of oil production might be nothing other than a chain of such instances. 
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Rather, the most decisive index of the present moment is the toxic com-
bination of climate change caused by carbon emission, the urgency for 
global capital of the risks of peak oil, and the central role played by oil 
trades in the global economy. We might go so far as to say on this later 
point that the entire practice of the western economy, that is the so-called 
global economy, depends upon oil. That is to say, that while the idea of 
the world market and of the “free exchange” of goods has a philosophical 
heritage running through early modern humanism and enlightenment 
thought, our present understanding of all exchange, debt, and faith runs 
through oil. To speak of a post-carbon economy might in fact be to say 
something quite radical, given that our present situation is so intensively 
related to the price of oil. To think an industrialized economy without 
the price of oil may on the one hand simply be a question of swapping 
one transcendental signifier for another, as gold was replaced by oil, so 
oil might be replaced by a trade in plutonium recycling. On the other 
hand, an opportunity exists here to understand economy as an experi-
ence of difference and as an encounter with the wholly other. This would 
require an other understanding of economy, one that was not dedicated 
to the utilization of wealth (what we now call a “restricted economy”) 
but one in which we began to understand the complexities of a sover-
eign economic term such as gold or oil, not in its loss of meaning but in 
relation to its possible loss of meaning (what Derrida, after Bataille, after 
Hegel calls a “general economy”).5 In this sense, a “post-carbon econo-
my,” presents an opportunity for a consideration of economy not to be 
limited to the circulation of strictly commercial values, the meaning and 
established value of objects such as gold, oil, and plutonium or so-called 
“carbon swaps.” Rather than a phenomenology of values as a restricted 
economy, we might begin to understand what exceeds the production, 
consumption, and destruction of value within the circuit of exchange. 
What Bataille might call “energy” beyond the energy of oil. This would 
not be a reserve of meaning within economy but an aneconomic writing 
of economy that is legible because its concepts move outside of the sym-
metrical exchanges from which they are identified and which according 
to a certain logic of recuperation they continue to occupy. This task of 
paleonymy as deconstruction is not one that philosophy will undertake 
on its own but one that will be played out in the irreversible mutations 
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that take place in the global economy as a consequence of climate change, 
one which philosophy, opened by the materialism of nonphilosophy, will 
merely be at the forefront of reporting. It returns us to a familiar problem 
with which we began: having exhausted the oil reserve and the language 
of philosophy, the unfinished project of Modernity must continue to in-
scribe within its frames and language of intelligibility (i.e. philosophy) 
that which nevertheless exceeds the oppositions of concepts governed by 
its doxical logic. It is not that nineteenth and twentieth-century thought 
is incapable of responding to the new crisis of climate change but that 
climate change is a product of such thought as its latest episode and chal-
lenge. On the other hand, such a reading of economy seeks to understand 
or think what is unthinkable for philosophy, its economic blind spot.
The reserves of deconstruction suggest writing in general as a slick 
economy without oil reserve. Derrida’s text on Bataille and economy was 
first published in L’arc in May 1967, well into de Gaulle’s diplomatic and 
economic attack on Bretton Woods and American expropriation of the 
European economy through dollar investment. His seminar on counter-
feit money was given in the academic year 1977–78, between the two 
shocks in the price of oil in 1974 and 1979, when, as Muriel Spark puts 
it her 1976 novel The Takeover, “a complete mutation of our means of 
nourishment had already come into being where the concept of money 
and property were concerned, a complete mutation not merely to be de-
fined as a collapse of the capitalist system, or a global recession, but a sea-
change in the nature of reality as could not have been envisaged by Karl 
Marx or Sigmund Freud” (127). Spark’s fiction identifies here a “muta-
tion” more significant than the local weather of a global recession or the 
collapse of western capitalism. She recognizes precisely the deportation 
of value itself from the symmetrical alternatives of exchange within a re-
stricted economy of meaning. This is not a deconstruction brought about 
by philosophy but a critical climate change in the entire environment of 
meaning that shifts and re-settles of its own accord. For sure, capitalism 
survived the oil crisis of the early 1970s but as result there was an irre-
versible change and redistribution in the meaning of meaning itself. A 
clear line can be drawn from the substitution of gold for oil in 1971 to the 
credit bubble of 2007 and the transformations in capitalism (around fu-
tures and credit transfer derivatives) and the global economy (around the 
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planetary production and consumption of natural resources). The ques-
tion of the price of oil, and so of the petrodollar and the pricing of the 
global economy, must always be a question of the phenomenon of credit. 
The monetary crisis of 2007, the so-called “credit crunch,” was a matter of 
the credit-worthiness and the credibility of the value of assets. Oil futures 
and the future of oil are a question of credit and so of faith: belief in the 
conventional authority of the market and the credibility of the economy, 
economists, and politicians. The authority of the market is constituted 
by the accreditation, both in the literal sense of capitalization and credit-
worthiness in future exchanges but also in the sense of legitimation as an 
effect of belief or credulity. The authority of a fiction of economy such as 
a global financial and industrial system based on the future pricing of pe-
troleum depends upon a planetary act of faith that far exceeds the cred-
ibility required to believe in climate change. It should not be surprising 
that the current financial crisis is a crisis of credit, a monetary crisis based 
upon the exchange of credit itself independent of physical assets, a dema-
terialization of money and value that requires a leap of faith and which 
in the absence of tangible proof tests that credibility to the limit: a sea 
change in the very idea of reality.
Carbon is the element that oils faith in the global economy. It is inex-
tricably bound to the history of a formation of a world that is essentially 
Abrahamic and European. It is over the question of the propriety of oil 
that the geopolitical now plays out all the contests between Europe and 
its others, and between the religions of the book.6 The price of oil is the 
liquidity that fuels what Derrida called in 1994, “the world war” between 
all the people of the book, whose preeminent figure is “the appropria-
tion of Jerusalem” (Spectres 52). Faith in the book and faith in oil are the 
two pillars of globalization and the temple of capitalism. In the complex 
history of the development of industrial capital and industrial Capitals, 
the city, polis and metropolis, oil powers the transformation of monetary 
forms from the pre-modern faith in metals to the belief in credit exchang-
es and credit-worthiness of the name as signature or future position. In 
this history of Modernity, oil is surely then closely linked to literature, not 
only as the energy source that fuels the illumination of literary produc-
tion, but as the alternative, yet intimately related, site of an idea of credit, 
debt, and belief that runs across the modern period. Oil itself is not the 
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stuff of literature, although certain exceptional cases might be identi-
fied. For example, Melville’s Moby Dick in 1851 is a text on the cusp of a 
transition from whale oil to hydrocarbons; modern literature would be 
unthinkable without the automobile, the aeroplane or gas lighting, from 
The Great Gatsby and Mrs. Dalloway to Sherlock Holmes. Zola’s Germinal 
is one of many texts on the subject of carbon extraction, and Dickens’ 
Hard Times is notable for its description of Coketown: better examples 
could no doubt be multiplied. On the other hand, film is the stuff of oil, 
and cinema is only a special case within the history of modern literature.
Post-Carbon Culturology
As Mac and Oldsen walk across a sunset beach in Bill Forsyth’s Local 
Hero, the American petroleum negotiator asks his Scottish guide, “Can 
you imagine a world without oil?” Between them they make a list of the 
potential losses to modernity: “No automobiles, no paint or polish, no 
ink and nylon, no detergents, no Perspex, no polythene, no dry cleaning 
fluid and no waterproof coats.” Mac stops Oldsen incredulously—“they 
make dry cleaning fluid out of oil?” They should also have added to this 
list “no film and no cinema.” Acetate film or “safety film” replaced the 
combustible Nitrocellulose in the 1950s, and has in turn been supersed-
ed by polyester of PET film. Local Hero (1983) is a slick and economic 
film about the optimism of the North Sea oil rush in the 1970s. Environ-
mental catastrophe is assured as the Knox Oil and Gas Company from 
Texas seek to transform a Scottish beauty spot into an oil refinery for the 
exploitation of North Sea oil reserves. However, the wily locals welcome 
this, understanding that striking oil will transform their lives from subsis-
tence farming to considerable affluence. In the best traditions of Ealing 
comedy, Forsyth’s villagers and their black African missionary minister, 
Murdo MacPherson, seek to extract the maximum value for their land 
from the American corporation that imagines that it is exploiting the lo-
cals. Nothing was known of the effects of climate change when this film 
was made. Instead, we have a comedy of aneconomic, colonial reversal 
and exchange, in which the Texan company (founded by a Scot, with a 
Calvinist work ethic no doubt) returns to appropriate the Scottish main-
land, only to be exploited in return by subjects on the peripherary of an 
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American empire compelled to seek ever further afield for carbon stocks 
to fuel its industrial economy after US domestic peak oil. A series of vi-
sual parallels and exchanges are set up between the streets of Houston, a 
city arising from the desert and designed for the automobile, and Fern-
ess [pronounced ‘Fairness’] Bay, a fishing village with a sandy bay and 
rolling green hills, interrupted only by the leitmotif of a solitary motor 
cycle that appears every time Mac and Oldsen attempt to cross the street. 
NATO jets also disturb the bucolic scene, combining the advances of oil 
consumption with the defence of capitalism against the Soviet threat, re-
minding us of the strategic importance of the Scottish coastline and the 
north Atlantic oil reserves during the Cold War.
The development at Ferness Bay we are told will make the village the 
“petro-chemical capital of the western world” and will last a 1,000 years 
“even through the next Ice Age,” which is a telling sign of the status of 
climate science at this time. Ricky Fulton playing the Knox Oil research 
scientist working on the project tells his colleague that the predicted Ice 
Age can be averted by diverting the Gulf Stream and melting the Arctic 
Circle, “but they won’t listen, they want to freeze.” There are no concerns 
here about global warming; rather the wild west of a black gold rush is re-
turned from Texas to Scotland as the frontier of ‘European’ development 
and expansion, praising the oil industry as “some business…the only 
business.” MacIntosh, the negotiator sent by Knox Oil to seal the deal, is 
of Jewish Hungarian stock but is mistaken by the lucky and cheerful Felix 
Happer (Burt Lancaster), CEO of Knox Oil and Gas, for a Scot. MacIn-
tosh falls in love with the village, becoming more Scot than the Scots, and 
is one of the few sad to see it being bought out by his own company. Hav-
ing agreed to set up a trust fund for the villagers, giving them faith in the 
project by allowing them a share of the profits, he offers to exchange his 
life in Texas with Gordon Urquart (the villagers’ lead negotiator, hotelier, 
accountant, and mini-bus driver played by Dominic Lawson). He offers 
“thirty thousand dollars in mixed securities” and his Porsche (“nothing 
to pay on it, it’s pure ownership”) for the hotel and Urquart’s wife Stella. 
However, the future of Ferness as a trading place is put on hold with the 
arrival of Felix Happer from Texas.
Happer is an obsessive amateur astronomer and is drawn to Scotland 
by MacIntosh’s description of the aurora borealis. Happer has a messianic 
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zeal for comets; “look to the heavens for a sign” he instructs MacIntosh 
before leaving for Scotland. He arrives in the village just as the acquisi-
tion has hit a snag. The beach where oil tankers would dock is owned by 
a beachcomber, Ben Knox, and has been owned by the Knox family for 
years (Happer’s father having bought out the original oil-exploring Mr. 
Knox while retaining the company name). Several attempts are made to 
persuade Ben to sell his beach but he declines, explaining that the beach 
has provided the village economy for years, with between four and five 
hundred people earning a living through the extraction of chemicals 
from seaweed: “then the trade routes opened up to the East and farewell 
Ferness. The business went but the beach is still here. If you got the place, 
it would be goodbye beach forever.” Mac is sidelined as Happer and Ben 
share their interest in astronomy. Happer abandons his plans to site an oil 
refinery on the beach in favor of something all together more refined—
The Happer Institute for marine research and astronomical observation. 
Mac returns to Texas; justice has been done in Ferness, a local economy 
has been created once more around the beach and the proposed Hap-
per Institute but the villagers will no longer be millionaires, as environ-
mental damage has been replaced by marine research. However, it is not 
clear who the eponymous Local Hero is: the popular Mac, who offered 
millions of dollars to the villagers; Gordon Urquart, who negotiated on 
their behalf; the charismatic Soviet fisherman Victor, who visits Ferness 
to review his portfolio of investments with Urquart; Marina, the research 
assistant and mermaid (with webbed-feet) who proposes the research in-
stitute to Oldsen; or Ben Knox, whose refusal to sell the beach scuppers 
the oil refinery.
Few radical claims can be made for Forsyth’s gentle comedy, but it 
might be worth noting some features of the film as a study in an economy 
without oil reserve. Whenever we confront the thematics and axiomat-
ics of oil, there is always a mismatch in exchange values, and always the 
testing of faith. Mac initially hopes to exploit the locals, they in turn ex-
ploit him, Mac and Gordon’s negotiations over the trust fund leads to a 
faith in one another and a proposed if unequal exchange and a wife swap, 
Ben offers to sell the beach to Mac if he can guess how many grains of 
sand he is holding but Mac refuses the deal thinking he is being cheated, 
and ultimately Ben refuses to put a price on the natural resource of the 
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beach. However, this is a film about oil in which no oil appears; all of the 
comedy is fuelled by speculation concerning the value of the oil, as are 
the plastic positions adopted by those in pursuit of the movement from 
oil extraction to plastic and credit cards. When negotiations are ongoing 
with Mac over the trust fund, Gordon Urquart addresses the villagers 
from the Reverend MacPherson’s pulpit asking them to have faith in him. 
Faith requires an economic gesture to invest belief in something without 
tangible evidence and the faith in the value of oil requires a speculative 
investment in economy without guarantee or reserve.
Local Hero represents an optimistic moment in the history of oil and 
its relation to money. Paul Thomas Anderson’s 2007 There Will be Blood 
is another oil film that pushes the question of oil and faith to its limits. 
Once again this text works through a series of theo-thanato-econo-carbo 
exchanges and substitutions that test the faith of those involved in them. 
Daniel Plainview (played mesmerically by Daniel Day Lewis) is a silver 
miner who accidently strikes oil in 1898 during the exploration of Cali-
fornia. By 1911 he has become an oil speculator seeking further open-
ings in the state. He is told of substantial reserves under farmland owned 
by the Sunday family and having bought this information for $100 from 
the runaway son Paul, he visits the Sunday ranch. There he encounters 
Paul’s father Abel and Paul’s twin brother Eli (both brothers are played 
by Paul Dano). Paul’s good news proves correct but Eli strikes a harder 
bargain and asks for $10,000 to fund the Church of the Third Revelation. 
However, Abel has a misplaced faith in the seeming Plainview and sells 
his birth right for a bargain price. Eli was the biblical last judge of Israel 
before the rule of kings, whose lineage was cursed for defilement of the 
temple. The filmic Eli’s judgment comes into conflict with this Daniel-
come-to-judgment on the Sunday oil fields, a veritable den in which it is 
increasingly difficult to tell who is lying and who is the lion, even when 
motives are barely disguised in plain view.
Daniel Plainview refuses to bless the first oil well, which he christens 
“Mary” after the Sunday’s youngest daughter who is beaten by her father. 
He promises her “no more beatings” but the remainder of the film is little 
more than a chain of beatings in a tale of errant filiations and false frater-
nity. Daniel beats and humiliates Eli in public in a fight over a supposed 
loan to the Church; on discovery that the trusted Noah is not his long 
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lost half-brother but a stranger who merely robbed him of his story, Dan-
iel kills Noah and buries his body. However, having been witnessed in the 
act, Daniel must be baptized in the Church of the Third Revelation as the 
price of forgiveness for would-be fratricide and in exchange for a piece 
of land that will enable him to build a pipeline to the Californian coast. 
During his baptism, Eli humiliates and beats Daniel to exorcise his de-
mons. Oil or the price of oil proves thicker than the blood of the lamb or 
the blood of the competing families. Eli leaves the community to go on a 
missionary trip to Las Vegas, while the repentant Daniel is reunited with 
his son HW who he sent away after losing his hearing in an industrial ac-
cident at the Mary well. Years later in 1927 we discover the now alcoholic 
Plainview in his oil man’s mansion confronting his adopted son over his 
true parentage, stating “You have none of me in you… I took you for no 
reason other than I needed a sweet face to buy land.” HW communicates 
through sign language, renouncing any claim on a Plainview inheritance 
in order to marry his childhood sweetheart Mary Sunday, set up his own 
business, and practice the religion of the Third Revelation.
After all these signs and revelations, dissolved and resolved partner-
ships, the film overheats and reaches a tipping point in its final extraordi-
nary scene. In 1927 Plainview lies plain drunk in the bowling alley he has 
had constructed in his mansion. He is visited by Eli who has become an 
evangelical radio host and pastor of a far larger church in Vegas. He offers 
to broker a deal with Daniel for the remaining land owned by the Bandy 
family over which the pipeline runs; the grandson of the Bandy family 
requires capital to leave the farm and move to Hollywood “to be in the 
movies.” Daniel agrees to the deal only if Eli will admit that he is “a false 
prophet and God is a superstition.” It emerges that Eli is bankrupt and in 
desperation agrees to Daniel’s contract, and a third revelation of humili-
ation and beating ensues as the bowling alley substitutes for the previ-
ous scenes of the oil well and the church. Eli repeatedly calls out Daniel’s 
words: “say it like you mean it, say it like it’s your sermon.” However, the 
broken Eli has put his faith in another false promise as Daniel tells him he 
has already drained all the oil from the Bandy land. He counsels the mis-
erable Eli who admits that he is a sinner and his disappointment in the 
Lord who “failed to alert me to the recent panic in our economy…these 
mysteries he presents.” Plainview chases him around the bowling alley 
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striking him repeatedly with a skittle, sparing nothing over Eli’s pleas that 
they are brothers by marriage. He rants “It was Paul who was the chosen 
brother, you are just after birth…I am the third revelation…I told you I 
would eat you up.” The biblical Eli was the last keeper of the Ark of the 
Covenant who is told that his sons will die on the same day. With Eli’s 
broken body and Daniel’s broken promises littering the scene, Plainview 
tells his astonished butler “I am finished” as the credits roll.
Anderson’s film is made in the full knowledge of the risks of oil pro-
duction and consumption, as part of an epistemological climate change 
concerning global warming by 2008. This narrative contract with the 
viewer of who is also aware of the risks of global warming, is the third 
revelation of the film: neither the old testament of a covenant with the oil 
men as part of the manifest destiny of American expansionism, nor the 
good news of salvation from domestic Peak Oil by the arrival of the new 
resources in the lands of the Abrahamic tradition, but the apocalypse, 
namely that oil and the price of oil will bring about the end of everything. 
There are no comic villagers here with a touching faith in the develop-
mental possibilities of oil exploration, only the singular promise of the 
sons of Eli that “there will be blood.” There should be little doubt about 
the status of carbon in the world that Anderson’s film addresses through 
the representation of its oily past. Globalization is a theo-thanato-carbo-
economy in which all the spectres of the religious and the political, old 
and new, circulate in a death drive towards depletion and extinction. 
From the military enforcement of the value of the petrodollar in the Per-
sian Gulf to the devastation of marine life in the Gulf of Mexico, where 
oil is concerned, as Plainview tells Eli at his baptism, “universal salvation 
is a lie.” Instead the speculative structure of a carbon economy is, like phi-
losophy, always a death drive. A drive towards extraction, consumption, 
burning off, calculating and fixing the price that must be paid. Similarly, 
philosophy drives to know and for absolute knowledge to posses the ob-
ject of its inquiry. However, there is always a price to be paid for abso-
lute knowledge and for speculating on oil. In the hydrocarbon cycle we 
are left with carbon deposits, traces in the atmosphere that are the cause 
of global warming and which threaten planetary life for years to come. 
Philosophical and textual production leaves other traces in carbon-based 
graphite and ink, which similarly escape the restrictions of circulation 
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and exchange. Writing philosophy about carbon, like making film about 
oil, is one of those tasks that must inevitably inhabit the positions of the 
theo-thanato-carbo-economy but somehow render those positions plas-
tic by reading the deposits emitted by the economy in order to rearrange 
them according to a new logic and criteriology. One must think about 
carbon and use carbon to do so in order that carbon and thinking about 
carbon might have a future. Dealing in carbon futures will be the com-
ing task of all materialisms, theologies, politics, and ethics on a planet at-
tempting to keep a world economy above water as the polar ice caps melt.
Post-Carbon Coda
This text has begun to open up a number of questions for thinking the 
present and future of a “European” culture and economy based on the 
consumption of oil. It has identified the interrelation of the present eco-
nomic and environmental crises and suggested a role for philosophy in 
framing our understanding of these events. It has also proposed a history 
of oil pricing that demonstrates that its supposedly robust materiality is 
conceptual through and through. Finally, it has considered the relation 
of carbon consumption to the dematerialization of money and to faith, 
credit, debt, and literature (the later pointing towards alternative forms 
of exchange that disrupt established economies). At each of these steps, 
an attempt has been made to submit the experience of oil to a thinking 
of difference and to understanding the risk of climate change as an en-
counter with a wholly other (planetary life itself) that is also unlocking 
the reserves of difference within the human. It has proposed a hypothesis 
for future consideration: the inextricable link between financial crisis and 
environmental damage. The testing and demonstration of this hypothesis 
will require a larger work of comparison and analysis that will involve 
an expanded deconstruction of political economy, political theology, 
and the unavoidable question of what theory today calls bio-power. This 
speculation will require time and will give time, the time of a specula-
tion proposed against redemption at a future date, in a race to keep the 
lights on as one writes in the shadow of oil depletion, a waning telos for a 
resource that will have been and which will never come again. It is a task 
of the carbonic economy that will be complicit with the very thing it pro-
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vokes, ensuring its guilt of the exact thing it believes itself to be innocent 
of. Perhaps, there will be no thought on carbon without carbon. Perhaps 
philosophy since Plato will have only ever been a carbon-based form and 
the end of philosophy will have been the end of carbon. There will always 
be a price to be paid for such speculations with all hands to the pump in 
an epoch of what Tom Cohen calls “irreversible critical climate change.”
Notes
1. See Jacques Derrida’s “Faith and Knowledge: Two Sources of Religion at ‘the 
Limits of Reason Alone’” in Acts of Religion.
2. Many of my comments here reprise Derrida’s reflection on the idea of crisis in 
the text “Economies of the Crisis.”
3. For example, see Derrida and Roudinescou 152.
4. For a fuller, if partisan, discussion of the petrodollar see Clark.
5. See Derrida’s “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism 
without Reserve.”
6. For a curious take on the messianic merits of oil exploration based on biblical 
promise, visit www.zionoil.com, a Wall Street listed company dedicated to 
speculating on oil reserves in the Holy Land.
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Chapter 12
Health
No Prescription, Not Now
Eduardo Cadava and Tom Cohen
Yes, there is hope, infinite hope. But not for us.
– Franz Kafka
There are reasons why one might find in America itself a cipher today for 
extraordinary mutations and blinds. It is not just the accelerated undoing of 
empire, “democracy,” global finance, and planetary resources under the silent 
droning of a captured telecracy. If America in this sense may seem the quiet 
epicenter of an epoch-defining ill or blind, if one’s approach to it can only seem 
pharmacological, this makes its unfinished narrative of “health care” reform 
a sometime allegory of other ills without known prescriptions. Update: As the 
narrative of Obama’s presidency continues to unfold in unpredictable ways, 
it remains embedded in the transformational time of an “America” in which 
certain episodes appear as ciphers. The contemporaneous blog that follows at-
tempts to read one such cipher: the allegory of “health care.” Captured upon 
entry by the credit and financial “crisis,” Obama took office not only with enor-
mous symbolic elation—among other things, breaking the racial code—but 
inheriting the catastrophic damages of the “Bush” parenthesis that have led 
commentators to suggest that Bin Laden succeeded in drawing “America” into 
a self-bankrupting and self-betraying spiral. There are too many names for 
the contemporary scene: the unraveling of an empire, the complete takeover 
by the feudal corporate order, the mediacratic trances that already imply a 
post-democratic era, capitalism in its hyper-autophagic financialization mode, 
and the shadow of all the climate unravellings, the scarcity of oil or water, that 
are repeatedly and functionally denied. Obama increasingly inhabits a curi-
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ous disjuncture between the rhetoric of the possible he marketed and the ir-
reversible facts he faces, with each one signaling its own form of irreversibility. 
This is why, at least for now, we can only read the process of an illness in snip-
pets, reportage, the flux of contemporary symptoms.  From today’s perspective 
(January 2011, exactly one year after the following remarks were written), 
“Obamacare” has passed but remains a miasma: the signature victory has 
been demonized and defaced successfully, the trade-offs and lobbyist adjust-
ments have done nothing to address its core issue (budgetary collapse), and 
the bill risks Republican defunding.  This episode and palimpsest opens onto 
other logics that have yet to be played out. (January, 2011)1
～
As we write [ January 2010], the monstrous compromise that recently 
has emerged as the signature of health care reform in the United States 
is still tortuously winding its way through Congress, even as its fate re-
mains uncertain. Having moved from great expectations to a motley mix 
of payoffs and paybacks, the reform effort was struck another body blow 
in January with the election of Scott Brown to fill Ted Kennedy’s sena-
torial seat in Massachusetts, depriving the democrats of their filibuster-
proof majority. This surprise Republican victory left many predicting 
that the whole reform effort is dead in the water, or that it will be cut 
down even further. Given that the health care and insurance industries 
have had their way, first through their hold on key senators, then through 
this electoral upset, it is well worth adding the event that makes the fu-
ture here perfectly clear: the recent Supreme Court decision to regard 
corporations as persons and to remove all restrictions on monies flow-
ing into campaigns in the name of “freedom of speech.” This decision will 
only facilitate and reinforce the lobbying efforts that have corrupted and 
crippled the entire health care debate. Against this background, however, 
we at least would like to offer a still-to-be-finished symptomatology of 
some of these developments in a dossier for future readers under the title 
“stories from a zombie democracy,” from, that is, a democracy that in-
creasingly has handed over its agency to the telecratic tentacles of capital 
in general. In particular, we wish to delineate the symptoms represented 
and embodied not only in the rhetorical strategies that have formed the 
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basis of the health care debate but also in the political and social configu-
ration of America’s political and national body.
Broken Promises
In order to begin, we would like to evoke a hoped-for future that could 
not, and cannot, be realized, and for what can be said to be structural 
reasons. For indeed there was a possible hope—if not an opening—that, 
with the election of Barack Obama, another face of the “United States” 
might appear. If this hope could be realized, it would mark, in the chant 
that energized and articulated it, a “change” we could “believe in,” a for-
mulation that suggests that what was at stake was a political scenario that 
simultaneously was a metaphysical text.
But we still can imagine the alternative events, even if this imagined 
scenario remains a fantasy, and especially when it attaches itself to the 
figure of Obama alone. We can never remind ourselves enough that 
Obama himself is simply an effect, the symptomatic embodiment of the 
desires of a heterogeneous collective grown weary not only of the ex-
cesses of the Bush Administration but also of a hyper-capitalist system 
whose madness is legible in its desire to define, absorb, and determine 
everything, beginning with the ethical sphere. Nevertheless, the fantasy 
is compelling: entering office with the specter of economic catastrophe 
and a stated mandate for “change,” “Obama” takes advantage of this shift 
in circumstances and, rather than only making a few minor face-lifting 
improvements, rather than pursuing the same politics or economic poli-
cies in a more appealing mode, lets more Wall Street firms collapse and 
therefore breaks the grip of a zombie Ponzi scheme encircling the planet. 
This act would not only interrupt the Ponzi scheme of deferred “credit” 
on which the global economy had relied (including the immense and 
incalculable debt to imaginary future generations), but also the more 
devastating Ponzi scheme of credibility and reference itself. Indeed, the 
latter effectively had dissimulated and nearly erased the specter of global 
climate change and mutating material conditions for “life as we know it” 
and thereby permitted (and still permits) the withdrawal of resources 
such as water, oil, species, land, and so on, from generations still to come.
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But against this backdrop—and the set of catastrophes that he in-
herited—Obama works to interrupt the disastrous inertia of America’s 
suicidal drive. This impulse was unleashed and intensified by the Bush 
Administration, and is just one element of a suicidal impulse that increas-
ingly determines our species and that goes hand-in-hand with the ag-
gression that is widely carried out against the weak within an ensemble 
of political, cultural, religious, and economic considerations. It has led 
(“post-9/11”) to a loss of wealth, the loss of “democracy” under the pre-
text of expanding it, the justification of wars that, ostensibly about the 
spread of democracy and human rights, increasingly sought to concen-
trate natural resources and capitalist riches in the hands of a small and 
privileged part of the human world, and the confirmation of the ongoing, 
but unacknowledged, racism and neglect that was displayed openly after 
Katrina. The consequences of Obama’s activism would have been a man-
ageable depression in which the financial system would have had to re-
organize, oil prices would require an energy consumption pullback, and 
the opening for a mass infrastructure work project and health care assig-
nation would begin processually to undo the corporate stranglehold and 
thereby rewrite the national contract in relation to its founding promises.
Crises
If we have begun with this imagined scenario, it is not only to empha-
size its distance from what has transpired in the months that have passed 
since Obama’s Inauguration on January 20th, 2009, but also to suggest 
that the theater of “health care” in America, taken up by Obama as a 
sure-fire winner, must be read against parallel American crises. Among 
these—taken up by Obama alongside (and at the same time as) the issue 
of health care—is “climate change.” On the surface, it would seem to be 
the opposite: a global long-term argument that only takes away from the 
most urgent and “short-term” present, hurts jobs and companies, and so 
on. This change in climate cannot be represented or fully comprehend-
ed, and can only mean giving things up, including an “Americanness” of 
sorts (an “Americanness” supported by the fact that, although the United 
States includes only 5% of the world’s population, it consumes 25% of its 
energy). The legislative initiatives were begun simultaneously and both 
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appear now largely deferred and dead, even as Obama limps to Copen-
hagen with an unenforceable fig-leaf equal to half of what the scientists 
consider the inarguable limits to stave off future disaster. One can ascribe 
all of this to the “short time” cycles of American mediatric reality, or to 
the determined interests and markets that have decided that all of this is 
irrelevant to the hyper-rich and to the corporate economy, which would 
regardless retain their power and survivability.
In striving to return each fallen Humpty Dumpty back to its perch (the 
economy, Afghanistan and Iraq, Guantanamo, international and dip-
lomatic relations, and so on), Obama misread his moment—and, in so 
doing, also hastened the very “long-term” catastrophics that he has un-
derstood and named clearly. He turned immediately to a managerial res-
toration mode that relied mostly on financial advisers with ties to Wall 
Street and the Clinton Administration and that, in the aftermath of the 
bailout logic of the Bush regime, made the stimulus package the defining 
initiative of his first 100 days. The battle over the stimulus package, how-
ever—which led to a stimulus that was significantly smaller than what 
was required—set at least one of the stages for the ensuing debate over 
health care, since its effect on the national debt now is said to constrain 
what is possible on the health care front.
This is why Obama’s health care initiative must be viewed from within 
this broader relapse. According to some, Obama has wanted to embody a 
presidential style very different than that of Bush: unlike Bush, he would 
not rush to seize power or enforce his will, he would refuse to exploit a 
crisis for political gain, he would be rational and calm, a flawless manager 
rather than a rash and arrogant decider. He would give to his Congress 
the power to formulate a health care plan that would be universal, or at 
least accessible and optimally cost reductive, but, by the time the smoke 
would clear, a bouillabaisse of cut deals and loopholes—arguing that, if 
reform is anti-market, it is anti-individual—would be shaped and shaven 
by the corporate industry through senatorial hacks. The debate quickly 
morphed into a political meme, an emotive or marketing opportunity 
for the Fox News mode of incessant attack, keyword implants, caricature, 
and disinformation, all of which aimed at the delegitimation of Obama. 
In this context, Obama becomes less our hoped-for transformer than a 
tragic figure in the making.
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It is essential to trace the means and effects of this effort to unsettle 
Obama’s credibility. How is it, for example, that those who would be most 
helped by health care reform (the one-time white working class) appear 
to go against their own vital interests to, among other things, uphold a 
meme of Americanism versus the foreign (France, Britain, Canada, “so-
cialism,” and so on) in the interest of corporate acceleration? How is it 
that America leaves a significant portion of its population uncovered by 
health care or lets the insurance industry wield brutal license to use ab-
surd technicalities to cut off people from their plans, even as the spiral of 
profits—autotelic, and mirroring Wall Street—guarantees a crash result-
ing from medical expenditures in the next several years? It is tempting to 
read all the contradictions and aporias at work here, including the subtle 
racial politics they assume. We would need a long review of America’s fall-
ing education, its faith-based politics, its open oligarchism and mediatic 
spells. But as Obama took up this “fight,” he became the Hamlet manager 
of America’s post-imperial stupor, resulting in a Potemkin plan that itself 
is on the verge of being scuttled. What interests us is the allegorical text 
that seems to be unfolding here.
Rhetorical Implosions
As we already have suggested, the health care debate as a cultural mo-
ment appears as a symptomology of a broader set of ills, the ox-wailing of 
a sick obese animal stuck in the oily swamp of its own making. The health 
care initiative is a symptomology for a deeper ill, or mal, the illness that is 
reflected in the zombified system that now defines “America” in ways that 
go beyond the declining empire syndrome. Here we will read just three 
of the ideological and rhetorical weapons mobilized and directed against 
health care reform: the public option, death panels, and abortion:
1) “Public option”—this trope has garnered all the fear and manipula-
tion of the corporate and rightwing rhetorical machine. Initially formu-
lated as the lynchpin of the government’s health care reform program, the 
public option not only would provide insurance to those presently with-
out it, but also would by itself be able to pre-empt the catastrophic medi-
cal costs that are projected to sink the economy even further in the next 
few years. Without this option, millions of consumers will be steered to 
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insurance companies without any checks on premiums or costs. The 
American Medical Association accordingly is dead-set against it, pharma-
ceutical companies reject it out of hand, and the largest insurance com-
panies will not consider it. A clear target, how was it so beautifully and 
effectively assaulted?
The “public option”—the sole effort to counter health industry mo-
nopolies—would be spun so that the word “public” would be heard as 
“socialism” (a nescient code term from twentieth-century imaginaries 
and binaries), and “option” would be translated into the sign of govern-
ment dictatorship, since, as the argument goes, the public option implies 
a government takeover of American health care. First chiasmus. This lat-
ter deflection cannot be dissociated from the rhetorical fringe in which 
Obama is then cast not only as Kenyan, alien, or illegitimate (think 
“Bush”), but further—according to, among others, the increasingly popu-
lar and rightwing extremist, Glenn Beck—as simultaneously a Stalin and 
a Hitler. Second chiasmus. As Slavoj Žižek recently has suggested, what is 
legible in this sequence is “the material force of the ideological notion of 
‘free choice’ within capitalist democracy.” Indeed, the Republican Party 
and the medical lobby (the latter much stronger than even the defense 
lobby) then convince a large percentage of the public that a “public op-
tion”—and even more a system of universal health care—would threaten 
freedom of choice in all matters concerning health and medical treatments 
(since nearly everyone would be required to purchase health insurance). 
If the simple evocation of this potential threat makes all recourse to con-
trary evidence entirely ineffective, it is because we are here at the neural-
gic point, the first ideologeme, of the American emotive reflex: freedom 
of choice. The concept of “freedom of choice” is not only at the heart of a 
certain concept of “American-ness,” which is why Obama also can be ac-
cused of being non-American, but also the hinge of the campaign against 
him, since his election is what represented this ostensible choice most 
clearly. Third chiasmus.
If this ideological battle were to be overcome, the Obama Administra-
tion would have to persuade its citizens that, in order to exercise the free-
dom of choice, a complex network of economic conditions, social and 
legal regulations, and even, we would say, ethical rules, have to be in place 
(as the consummate “American” writer, Ralph Waldo Emerson, would 
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put it: “’Tis fine to speculate and elect our course, if we must accept an 
irresistible dictation”). In today’s America, however, this is an impossible 
lesson to convey, given the absence of any sense of “common good” and 
the destructive battle lines of a post-democratic telecracy. What instead 
is reinforced is the ideologeme of “free choice” and all of its concomitant 
concepts: the self, consciousness, intention, reason, the responsible sub-
ject, and, as we have said, “America” itself. Further reinforcing this meme, 
opponents of health care reform have launched protest movements in 
the name of free choice that warned of death panels, raised the specter 
of Nazi Germany, and portrayed the bill as a major step down the road 
to Communism.
2) “Death Panels”: Enter the an-erotic nymph of the satyr-play of the 
zombie-Imperium, Sarah Palin, who, in a statement on her Facebook page 
in August 2009, first launched the rhetorical grenade of the “death panel” 
threat into the health care debate. Even though the draft health care bill 
explicitly states that the proposal “shall not include any recommendation 
to ration health care, raise revenues or Medicare beneficiary premiums… 
increase Medicare beneficiary cost sharing (including deductibles, coin-
surance, and copayments), or otherwise restrict benefits or modify eligi-
bility criteria,” Palin initiated her Mediscare tactic with the following set of 
remarks: “And who will suffer the most when they ration care? The sick, 
the elderly, and the disabled, of course. The America I know and love is 
not one in which my parents or my baby with Down Syndrome will have 
to stand in front of Obama’s ‘death panel’ so his bureaucrats can decide, 
based on a subjective judgment of their ‘level of productivity in society,’ 
whether they are worthy of health care. Such a system is downright evil.” 
A serial liar, Palin continues to insist on the existence of such panels and 
finds her political prospects shoot up, even after several fact-checking or-
ganizations have declared her claim an outright lie.
These two little words in fact have helped derail the town hall meet-
ings that initially were designed to promote rational discussion of health 
care, a dialogue between lawmakers and their constituents, by stirring up 
such unruly dissent that legislators have been shouted down by their own 
constituents.
Palin’s fevered warning led to cries of “euthanasia” from angry citizens 
at health care town hall meetings all across the country, and even led one 
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person to ask: “Adolf Hitler called his program the ‘Final Solution.’ What 
will we call ours?” Raising the specter of “death panels”—the Obama 
plan was later said to be modeled on the order personally written and 
signed by Hitler in 1939, which set up the Tiergarten 4 board which Hit-
ler mandated to cut health costs by denying health care to those whose 
lives Hitler and the board determined were not worth living—Palin’s 
inflammatory claim was a shout of “fire” in a crowded theater, a meme 
grenade rolled down the aisle. Exhibiting the lurid imagination of some-
one looking for a fight, Palin and others served up a rhetorical orgy of 
fantasized violence and imagined revolution that, proceeding via oppor-
tunistic, conspiracy theories, would stop at nothing to destroy Obama’s 
presidency. What needs to be stressed here is the branding and marketing 
that, together, suggest why the health care debate is less about health care 
than it is about more deep-seated ills.
In the aftermath of Palin’s claim, the bizarre Nazi-Communist-Stalin 
accusations directed against Obama by the so-called “tea partiers” (draw-
ing on the origins of American revolt from the British) were soon joined 
to the “rigged town-meetings,” where mob-mentality was staged to in-
timidate politicians and to dominate the media stage decisively. Indeed, 
while Palin and her collaborators conjured “death panels” that would tri-
age grandma and interrupt the American fantasy of escaping death alto-
gether, of the eternal now of consumption, such panels already could be 
said to exist, to be enacted and enforced, in what the insurance industry 
now practices when it rejects and denies insurance claims on the basis of 
pre-existing conditions (including, among so many others, cancer, diabe-
tes, spousal abuse, pregnancy, and infant obesity).
More interestingly, the insight that the figure of “death panels” con-
ceals hovers within the imaginary fusion of “Hitler” Obama with “Sta-
lin” Obama, the Negro-fascist nightmare of an older white America ema-
nating from the populist-fascist working class that continues to have its 
strings pulled by insurance industry magnates and the likes of Fox News. 
Those most likely to benefit from even the mild reforms appear co-opted 
by the corporate telecratic circuits to exclude racial others once desig-
nated as even more dispossessed than they are (and, in the case of illegal 
immigrants, as un-American). But the insight remains: by invoking the 
imaginary of the wars of the twentieth century, of the “good” America 
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against its evil twins, a slippage occurs that extends beyond the current 
issues into the allegorical zones already mentioned (with the specter of 
“climate change” re-reading all from elsewhere, outside, the future, and 
the present at war with itself). Rather than “winning” these wars and in-
stituting an era of free-market democratic triumph, these efforts only re-
veal the contradictions that structure this particular historical moment, 
and not only this one. As Agamben has noted, a trace of the “Nazi” proj-
ect lingers, virally, in the biopolitical orders of the post-global order—
or in the afterlife of an era of democracy that is still mimicking its own 
greatest propaganda hits of the past. The fusion of the Chinese (“com-
munist”) with the Western (“democratic”) hypermarket models parallels 
the drift toward authoritarian rules that Bush presaged (not least the state 
of hyper-surveillance and de-politicization of the citizen, a permanent or 
normative “state of emergency” without end) and which the coming log-
ics of climate change (resource wars, underclass triage, extinction events) 
irreversibly underwrite today. In doing this, they mirror the impossible 
conditions of the health care debate. This is why, we might say, the true 
death panels are the networks that seek to consolidate capital’s reign 
over America and beyond, and do so once again—as in the case with the 
“public option”—by suggesting a government takeover of “choice,” in this 
instance the choices the elderly and chronically-ill would otherwise have 
in regard to their care and treatment.
3) “Abortion”: Abortion emerged as a major hurdle in the push for 
healthcare reform legislation, with an amendment from pro-life Demo-
crats to bar federal funds from helping to pay for abortions. Although 
they claimed that the new health care plan would require Americans to 
“subsidize abortion with their hard-earned tax dollars,” there are pres-
ently no provisions within any version of the health care plan that would 
permit full abortion coverage. In fact, there is an amendment in a key ver-
sion of the House plan that specifically seeks to ensure that federal funds 
are not used to subsidize abortion coverage.
The efforts of the pro-life contingent can be read in the same light as 
the “death panel” attacks, since, like Palin, it mobilizes the same emerging 
theo-tropic violence that—recoiling as well before climate science as a 
conspiracy of the left and assaulting “evolution” in American schools—
works to confuse and manipulate the debate toward its own political 
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ends. These memes merge, not as equivocations about ending fetal-life 
through state funding (since any possibility that the government could 
help fund abortions already has been removed from the reform bill), but 
because, in the contemporary American context, everything depends on 
a contract. Not with a “Constitution” that theoretically made everyone 
“free” (despite the rhetoric of the tea-baggers), but with a contract that 
assumes that what they are ontologically—“man,” “Christian,” “Ameri-
can,” “free agent”—is guaranteed as property, undefiled by monkey an-
cestors, geological time, or anthropic (and racial) privilege.
Rather than be concerned with the unborn (after all, future genera-
tions are here collectively being sacrificed by ignoring imminent climate 
disasters and by impeding progress on the health care front), the symbolic 
of abortion lies in its positive assertion of a human life, made in God’s im-
age, and of the right of this “life” to come into the world once it is con-
ceived—where it can then be triaged, or denied medical care with a pre-
existing condition (such as “chubby baby syndrome”). Thus the rhetoric 
of “pro-life” harbors a necrophantic kernel, the nihilist core and disap-
pearing point of that last extincting trace of the trailing American cloud: 
the desubjectivized consumer that cannot imagine anything beyond an 
endless reproduction that, in the “future,” would similarly be guaranteed. 
In this scenario, the middle class increasingly becomes the vanishing 
point of America’s emerging transformation into a feudal corporate oli-
garchy that, in Paul Krugman’s term, inevitably will experience its great 
“unraveling.”
With arguments that mirror each other, everything in the abortion de-
bate results from the exigencies of political and rhetorical framing. For 
example, the labels “pro-choice” and “pro-life” both presume the values 
of liberty and freedom, even as they each suggest that the opposition 
must be “anti-choice” or “anti-life” (alternatively “pro-coercion” or “pro-
death”). Such arguments dissimulate the underlying issue of which choice 
or life is being considered and whose choice or what kind of life is deemed 
most important. This is why the constituency that is angered by any hint 
that its privacy and capacity for choice will be diminished (by a govern-
ment takeover of health care, for example) is often the same constituency 
that opposes the pro-choice argument for the privacy of the decision for 
or against abortion.
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The chiasmic reversals that are legible here take on an even more ver-
tiginous and unsteady form when we register that it has become increas-
ingly difficult to fix and define a discourse of life itself, since we generally 
think of those who favor increased reproductive freedoms as “pro-choice” 
and those who oppose them as “pro-life” (why is it, for example, that so 
many pro-life activists support the death penalty and war, and, as we 
are noting, are against a health care initiative that could save innumer-
able lives and indeed make many other lives more livable?). What seems 
lost in this game of spin and emotional blackmail is the simple fact that 
the matter of abortion is itself a health care issue, since the possibility of 
abortion is linked not simply to death but also to life. Indeed, the initia-
tive of health reform has begun in the recognition that our obligation is as 
much to make lives livable as it is to life itself, and to a life that we know is 
from the beginning already touched by death.
Three Symptoms
We cut short this quick symptomatology to return to the real patient, 
America itself, and to the allegorical real that traverses this shadow play 
that pretends to address the patient’s ill by restoring the country’s de-
pendency on the insurance lobby and corporations. As we already have 
noted, the latter represents a different sort of body, a non-subjective “le-
gal” citizen, but one that, as the United States Supreme Court now has 
declared, has the rights of a subject to make unlimited political contribu-
tions, and brings the Wizard from behind the screen. If tempophagy is 
what one might call the active consumption of “time” in an accelerated 
turning back that feeds on itself, we conclude with a series of three symp-
toms that begin to enter legibility in spectral fashion, as the confusing 
life-support of a post-Imperium zombie “democracy” made even more 
legible by the recent health care debate:
1) What is most legible in the current debate—and especially in the 
ongoing diminishment of health reform in general—is that America her-
self is increasingly entering the zone of the uninsured, self-curtailed by 
its “pre-existing condition” in the still-expanding implications of what we 
telegraphically can name the “Bush catastrophe” and of being “America” 
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in a palpably post-democratic era. America finds itself entirely unprovid-
ed for in a world that it has both helped shape and destroy.
2) Without any remedy, the import of the zombie trope returns (zom-
bie banks, zombie politics, and a host of zombie films that make light 
of the question: vampire or zombie?, the two “public options” we have 
left for us today). For what “Obama” (as the name of a network of medi-
ated relations) performs across the boards is a naming of the “dilemma” 
and then a recoil, a refold, a reinscription into the same order we were 
to have left behind—a reflex to restitute the façade of the familiar, to re-
store the discredited institution in order to simulate minimal functional-
ity. Even if this script was handed to Obama by the Bush Administration, 
it doesn’t matter, since he remains unable to break its spell in the medi-
acracy that has supplanted the pretense of “democracy.” As with Bush, 
this tactic appears less a defense against catastrophic logics than a con-
trived deferral and acceleration of them, a Ponzi scheme in re-animation 
mode. Increasingly losing his credibility, Obama mimes the evacuation of 
credit from within an accelerated system anticipating intervention from 
without (whether this intervention is to arrive in the form of technologi-
cal solutions, rapture, or the debt and deprivations of the unborn on a 
dying earth).
Whether what we still call Capital has, as some imagine, an illimitable 
capacity to manufacture such relapses is hard to discern. If the current 
system accelerates in relative inertia, this would mean, according to cal-
culations, not just the usual litany of climate catastrophics and their re-
lated consequences, but a virtual splitting of populations-to-come into 
the gated communities of the hyper-wealthy and everyone else—a vir-
tual species split, which links the “survivor” of tomorrow to the eugen-
ics of the “Nazi” phantom, albeit in accordance with wealth rather than 
with race, at least officially. From this perspective, which always has been 
that of the corporate right in America, there simply is no point in juggling 
health care to include everyone. Such a pretense would have to disappear 
at some point regardless.
3) The health care debate plays to the current symptomatology of an 
“America” paralyzed internally by a sort of numb panic and tempophagy. 
What the gods would destroy, they first drug and stupefy (lead-poisoning 
in Rome would not in any way compare to what is in today’s acquifers, 
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e.g. cocaine, anti-depressants, hypertoxins). It may be that Obama knows 
this and is merely managing things to an honorable appearing sleep, dif-
ferently than “Bush,” who had stuck all the needles and IVs in the patient 
to keep her ignorant and distracted, using “9/11” as a narcotic and plot-
ting resource acquisitions for the elite decades hence (we might recall 
here the innovation of the film 2012, where the moneyed elite keep the 
information of a megadisaster to themselves as they plot their exclusive 
escape). Beneath the reflecting surfaces in this labyrinth are the meta-
physics and econometrics of pharmaceuticals and drugs. So pervasive is 
this in “America” today that it links wars and global politics, failing neigh-
bor states with new shadow narco-states, deals cut with the pharmaceu-
ticals that also accept the toxification of current generations en masse (of 
which traces abound, now, in the river systems) and mediacratic spells 
that reinforce this intoxication in a way that, as we have tried to suggest, 
hopes to make true and lasting health reform in the United States a thing 
of hope rather than of reality. This is why, if “there is hope, infinite hope,” 
it is increasingly “not for us.”
In an environment in which “hope” has wrought so much peril—co-
opted as it has been by the telecracy as a meme of delay and a façade for 
re-inscription—would it not be best to retire “hope” in its current forms? 
Is it possible to inaugurate a politics finally without hope? This is perhaps 
an impossible hope, but the one that seems most commensurate to what 
the recent health care debates have exposed and left for us to read. In the 
end, perhaps we can only hope that our being without prescription or 
remedy may reap us a benefit that we cannot yet see.
Notes
1. This essay forms a sort of “pharmacopolitical blog” on an episode from recent, 
or current, Americanology—and poses the question of illness, of a state of 
being without “prescription” for that ill or its contemporary spells. Such 
“texts” today, whether that of the Gulf oil spill or Bernie Madoff’s adventures, 
arise and disappear from view, as their logics and lines of contamination (or 
force) continue to permeate the still-unfolding. To this extent, the episode of 
“Obamacare” cresting in early 2010 is such a thread. A version of this article 
appeared in Hurly Burly, The International Lacanian Journal of Psychoanalysis, 3 
April 2010. http://www.amp-nls.org/en/template.php?sec=publications&file
=publications/hurly_burly/003.html.
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co-directing a multi-year project entitled “The Itinerant Languages of 
Photography” that includes scholars, artists, and curators from various 
countries, but mostly from Latin America.
Timothy Clark is Professor of English at the University of Durham and 
a specialist in the fields of modern literary theory and continental phi-
losophy (especially the work of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida), 
also in Romanticism (especially P.B. Shelley) and ecocriticism. He has 
published many articles in literary and philosophical journals and pub-
lished seven monographs, including recently Martin Heidegger, Routledge 
Critical Thinkers Series, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2011), The Poetics of Singu-
larity: The Counter-Culturalist Turn in Heidegger, Derrida, Blanchot and 
the later Gadamer (Edinburgh UP, 2005), The Cambridge Introduction 
to Literature and the Environment (2011). He is currently working on a 
monograph provisionally entitled Green Deconstruction, forthcoming 
in this OHP series.
Tom Cohen is Professor of English and co-director of the Institute on 
Critical Climate Change at the University at Albany. He is the author of 
Anti-Mimesis, Ideology and Inscription, and Hitchcock’s Cryptonymies v. 1 & 
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2. His most recent title, co-authored with Claire Colebrook and J. Hillis 
Miller, is Theory and the Disappearing Future: On de Man, On Benjamin 
(Routledge, 2011).
Claire Colebrook is Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English at Penn 
State University. She has written books on Deleuze, literary history, gen-
der, literary criticism, and contemporary European philosophy.
Catherine Malabou is currently Professor of Philosophy at Paris X Nan-
terre and will join the University of Kingston (CRMEP) next fall. Her 
most recent book, Changing Difference, Feminism and Philosophy, will 
come out with Polity Press in June 2011.
Robert Markley is the W. D. and Sara E. Trowbridge Professor of Liter-
ary Studies at the University of Illinois and Editor of the interdisciplinary 
journal, The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation. His books in-
clude The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600–1740 (Cambridge, 
2006) and Dying Planet: Mars in Science and the Imagination (Duke, 
2005). He is completing a book on literature and science during the Lit-
tle Ice Age.
J. Hillis Miller is UCI Distinguished Research Professor at the Univer-
sity of California at Irvine. He has published many books and essays on 
19th and 20th century literature and on literary theory. His most recent 
books are For Derrida (Fordham, 2009) and The Medium is the Maker: 
Browning, Freud, Derrida, and the New Telepathic Ecotechnologies (Sussex 
Academic Press, 2009). His The Conflagration of Community: Fiction Be-
fore and After Auschwitz will appear in 2011 from the University of Chi-
cago Press. A book co-authored with Claire Colebrook and Tom Cohen, 
Theory and the Disappearing Future: On de Man, On Benjamin, appeared 
in 2011 from Routledge. Miller is a Fellow of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences and a member of the American Philosophical Society. 
He received the MLA Lifetime Scholarly Achievement Award in 2005.
Jason Groves is a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University where he is com-
pleting a dissertation, entitled Erratic Blocks: Fictions of Movement from 
Goethe to Benjamin, which deals with attempts in literature, geology, and 
biomechanics to conceptualize erraticity. His engagement with critical 
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climate change in the humanities spans several years and includes contri-
butions to The Global South and Impasses in the Post-Global.
Mike Hill is an Associate Professor and Department Chair of English at 
the University at Albany, SUNY. His books are After Whiteness: Unmak-
ing an American Majority (NYU: 2004); Masses, Classes, and the Pub-
lic Sphere, contrib. ed (Verso: 2000); and Whiteness: A Critical Reader 
(1997). He is currently finishing a book on the moral and philosophical 
writing of Adam Smith, and has an additional project under way on twen-
ty-first century warfare for the University of Minnesota Press.
Martin McQuillan is Professor of Literary Theory and Cultural Analysis 
at Kingston University. London, where he is also Dean of Arts and Social 
Sciences and Director of The London Graduate School. His most recent 
monographs are Deconstruction after 9/11 (2009) and Roland Barthes, or, 
the Profession of Cultural Studies (2011).
Justin Read is Associate Professor in the Department of Romance Lan-
guages and Literatures at the University at Buffalo (SUNY).  His research 
interests include the urbanization and modernization of the Americas 
since 1880.   His first book, Modern Poetics and Hemispheric American 
Cultural Studies, was published by Palgrave in 2009.  Read’s articles have 
appeared in the Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies, Revista de Estu-
dios Hispánicos, Journal of Architecture, and Modernism/Modernity, among 
others.  Read is co-founder of the UB Research Group in Cultural Stud-
ies of Space.
Bernard Stiegler is Director of the Institut de recherché et d’innovation 
(IRI) and founder of Ars Industrialis and the Ecole de Philosophe 
d’Epineuil-le-Fleuriel. Among his recent works in translation are The Dec-
adence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and Discredit, 1 (2011), Taking 
Care of Youth and the Generations (2010), For a New Critique of Political 
Economy (2010), and Acting Out (2009).
Joanna Zylinska is a cultural theorist writing on new technologies and 
new media, ethics and art. She is a Reader in New Media and Com-
munications at Goldsmiths, University of London. The author of three 
books—Bioethics in the Age of New Media (MIT Press, 2009), The Ethics 
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of Cultural Studies (Continuum, 2005) and On Spiders, Cyborgs and Be-
ing Scared: the Feminine and the Sublime (Manchester University Press, 
2001)—she is currently writing a new monograph on the idea of media-
tion, Life after New Media (with Sarah Kember) for the MIT Press, and 
working on a translation of Stanislaw Lem’s major philosophical treatise, 
Summa Technologiae. She is one of the Editors of Culture Machine, an in-
ternational open-access journal of culture and theory. Zylinska combines 
her philosophical writings with photographic art practice.

